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COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI 
COMMUNITY: A CASE STUDY OF LUTON 
ABSTRACT This thesis is the study of the relationship between individuals and communities in the context of racialised minorities in the United Kingdom. The research examines the ways in which individuals belonging to the Kashmiri community articulate and manifest "Kashmyriat" in conditions of diaspora. Specifically, the research is an investigation of the core features of Kashmiri identity. These were selected as being identifications based on culture, religion and the territorial identification with the land of Kashmir, the nature of "culture conflict" between individuals and community and differences between generations of Kashmiris and the role of gender identity in "Kashmyriat ". The central premise is that identity is constantly updated, multiple and redefined in relation to contextual changes through a process of enculturation. Results of the research suggest that culture, religion and territorial identification with the land of Kashmir are central core features of Kashmiri identity in Luton. The younger generation appear to be maintaining a distinct and separate identity based partly on shared culture, religion and territorial identification with the land of Kashmir with the older generation whilst they are redefining their identity in response to the contexts in which they have been born and brought up. Gender identities appear to be less significant as part of overall identity development. Theoretically the thesis is an exploration of identity and its relationship to cultural identity among migrants. In this thesis I rely on qualitative ethnographic work as well as the quantitative research methodology of Identity Structure Analysis (ISA) to tryand draw a textured analysis of Kashmiri identity transformation in the wake of, immigration to Luton. Using the notion of enculturation the thesis sets out to deepen and make this concept more analytically rigorous. Enculturation is deployed as a means to understanding the process of identity transformation. Results of the research suggest that culture, religion and affiliation with the land of Kashmir. Whilst they share the first two with other South Asian ethnicised communities in the United Kingdom it appears that the territorial identification with the land of Kashmir which can be translated as political identity is currently their self­defined identity. This_ is marking the Kashmiri s as a national community whose individuals and collectivities centre their identity on "Kashmyriat". 
I. 
I. 
LIST OF CONTENTS 
Abstract 
List of Contents 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
List of Plates 
List of Maps 
List of Appendices 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM WITH IDENTITY 7 
INTRODUCTION 
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS TO THE RESEARCH 
A. Self ldentification and Ethnicity 
B. Putting Kashmiris in their Place: Context and Community 
1. Assimilation to Multiculturalism 
2. Towards a Genealogy ofEnculturation 
III. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER TWO: ISA THEORETICAL POSTULATES 41 
II. 
INTRODUCTION 
ISA AND IDENTITY 
A. Ethnic Identity and ISA 
B. Theoretical Postulates and Indices Concerning the Identification Process 
1. Role Model Identification with Others 
2. Conflicts in Identification with Others 
3. Ego-involvement with Others 
4. Structural Pressures on Constructs 
Ill CONCLUSION 
I 
53 
CHAPTER THREE: KASHMIRI IDENTITY-THEORETICAL 
POSTULATES I. INTRODUCTION II. CULTURAL NETWORKS III. RELIGION AS A COMPONENT OF P AKIST ANI/KASHMIRI IDENTITY IV. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION V. REDEFINITIONS OF IDENTITY VI. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCHING KASHMIRIS 66 I. INTRODUCTION II. RESEARCH STRATERGY: AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY, MULTI-METHOD APPROACH A. Observations and Interview B. The Measuring Instruments 1. The Biographical Questionnaire 2. The ISA Instrument III. SAMPLE CRITERIA IV. DATA COLLECTION A. Spoken Language B. Class Distinctions C. Problems with Written Language V. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER FIVE: MIGRATION AND IDENTITY 120 I. INTRODUCTION II. THE CULTURAL NETWORKS OF HOME III RELIGIOUS NETWORKS OF HOME IV. POLITICAL IDENTITY AT HOME V. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER SIX: KASHMIRIS ON THE MOVE I. INTRODUCTION II. THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 182 II 
B. A Push-Pull Theories B. Chain Migration Accounts III. BACKGROUND TO KASHMIRI MIGRATION A Who are the Kashmiris? The Effect of Migration on Mirpur and Kotli IV. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER SEVEN: BACKGROUND TO KASHMIRI 
SETTLEMENT 208 I. INTRODUCTION II. KASHMIRI SETTLEMENT IN LUTON A DemographicsB. Patterns of Settlement III. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER EIGHT: KASHMIRIS A WAY 233 I. INTRODUCTION II. CULTURAL NETWORKS IN LUTON III. RELIGION AMONG KASHMIRIS A The Jammia Masjid Dispute B. Islam: The next Generation IV. THE POLITICAL VOICE OF "BURY PARK" V. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER NINE: DEFINING "KASHMIRIYAT" 261 I. INTRODUCTION II. DEFINING THE NATION III. NARRATING "KASHMIRIY AT" A "Kashmiriyat" in Luton 1. Changes in the· Structure of the Community 2. Living in a "Democratic" Society 3. The Crisis of British Identity III 
4. Events in the Subcontinent since the 1970s 
B. The (Re) Producers of"Kashmiriyat" 
1. The State Apparatus 
2. Intellectuals 
3. Organisation
4. Community 
IV. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER TEN: BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES OF THE 
KASHMIRIS IN LUTON 315 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
A Basic Sample characteristics 
B. Migration Characteristics 
C. Education and Employment Patterns 
D. Household Size and Structure 
E. Maintenance of links with Community in Kashmir 
III. INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF DATA 
IV. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: KASHMIRI AND ANGLO-SAXON 
IDENTITY COMPARED 345 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KASHMIRIS AND ANGLO-SAXONS 
A Divided Selves 
B. Ethnic Pride 
C. Betwixt Between Two Cultures 
D. Political Separatism 
E. Political Consciousness 
F. Identification with Islam 
G. Social Networks 
H. Asianess and Englishness 
III. FUND AMENT AL BELIEFS AND VALUES OF KASHMIRI AND 
ANGLO-SAXON IDENTITY 
IV 
A The Place of Language 
B. Marriage
C. Moral Choices 
D. Cultural Belonging 
E. Notions of "Britishness" 
F. An Independent Homeland 
IV. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER TWELVE: KASHMIRIS, KASHMIR AND 
"KASHMIRIY AT" 383 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. POSTULATE ONE: CULTURAL NETWORKS ARE A CENTRAL 
COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN 
A Identification with the Biraderi 
B. Identification with Parents 
C. Influences of Place of Birth 
D. Imagining a Virtual Kashmir 
III. POSTULATE TWO: RELIGION IS A CENTRAL COLLECTIVE 
DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN 
A The Public Face of lslam 
IV. POSTULATE THREE: NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IS A CENTRAL 
COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN 
A Independent Kashmir 
V. POSTULATE FOUR:"CULTURE CONFLICT" BETWEEN KASHMIRI 
MIGRANTS AND THEIR OFF-SPRING IS LEADING TO NEGATIVE 
SELF-EVALUATION 
A Culture Conflict 
VI. POSTULATE FIVE: CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL 
REDEFINITIONS OF IDENTITY AMONGST SECOND-GENERATION 
KASHMIRI BRITISH YOUTH IS TAK.ING PLACE THROUGH A 
PROCESS OF ENCULTURATION AND RESULTS IN HIGH SELF-
EV ALUATION. 
A Enculturation and the Maintenance of Distinctiveness 
VII. POSTULATE -SIX: THE CENTRALITY OF GENDER ROLES IN 
REDEFINITION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY 
A Changes in Gender Roles 
V 
VII. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING KASHMIRI IDEMTITY 
419CONCLUSION: RE-THINKING ETHNIC IDENTITIES APPENDICIES GLOSSARY GLOSSARY OF ISA TERMS BIBLIOGRAPHY VI 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1 Ethnicity, Generation and Gender of the sample 
Table 10.1 Chi-square values for question forty-five 
Table 10.2 Chi-square values for question fifty-five 
VII 
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.i1 Berry's Acculturation Strategies Figure 6.i1 Origin and destination factors and intervening obstacles Figure 7.i1 Types of ethnic area Figure 11. 1  ISA Classification of identity variants VIII 
IX 
LIST OF PLATES 
Plate 1 Eid cards 
Plate 2 Cover of photo album 
Plate 3 Photograph of women at a political rally in Bedford in 1996. 
LIST OF MAPS 
Map 1 The State of Jammu and Kashmir in relation to its neighbours 
Map 2 The State of Jammu and Kashmir showing areas of migration from Azad 
Kashmir 
Map 3 The main towns of migration from Azad Kashmir 
Map 4 Location of Luton with respect to other concentrations ofKashmiri settlement 
Map 5 Location of"Bury Park" area of Luton (wards) X 
LIST OF APPENDICIES 
Appendix 4. 1 
Appendix 4.2 
Appendix 4.3 
Appendix 10 .1 
Appendix 10.2 
Appendix 12. 1 
Biographical questionnaire 
Kashmiri ( older and younger generation) identity instruments 
Anglo-Saxon identity instrument 
Chi-Square calculations: factors important for living in current 
area 
Chi-Square calculations: factors important for living in future 
area 
Scale ranges for ISA indices 
XI 
AFGHANISTA 
eTASHKURGHAN•
YARKAND 
I N DI A 
MAOR,,S 
CH IN A 
LHASAe 
Map I-The State of Jammu and Kashmir in relation to its neighbours 
Source: Lamb, A. 1991 
INTRODUCING COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE 
KASHMIRIS IN LUTON 
This study can be said to belong to the genre of writing that deals with the 
ontology of the social. Specifically, it is an attempt to understand the complex 
ways in which migration and settlement impact on the formation of a community. 
Of the many peoples that have settled in the British Isles following World War II, 
the Kashmiris are in many ways the most intriguing. For much of their history in 
Britain they have been subsumed under the category of (South) Asian and their 
virtual invisibility in Britain, has to some extent mirrored their political absence 
from the world stage, where the lack of a Kashmiri state has further undermined 
the specificity of a Kashmiri presence. To this end, this study has two main 
purposes, firstly it investigates the impact of migration and settlement in Britain on 
Kashmiris as well examining the way in which Kashmiri nationalism has emerged 
into the global arena in recent years. In other words, the story I want to tell is how 
people from Mirpur and Kotli, began to think of themselves as Kashmiris, and 
how this Kashmiri identity developed as a consequence of its migration and 
settlement in Britain. 
The Kashmiris in Britain have migrated to Britain during a particular phase of 
migration in the 60s and 70s. Academic and public policy responses to the 
settlement of ethnicised communities can be encapsulated in a series of tropes that 
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can read such as that of assimilation, acculturation, social integration and more 
recently multiculturalism. Despite the many differences between these concepts, 
they have largely done little to question the unequal terrain upon which these 
concepts were formulated and deployed. Generally, these ideas have not given 
space for the expression of separate identities. Even in the case of multiculturalism 
where ethnic identity has been considered it has been utilised to see ethnic groups 
as categories of identification based on an ascribed identity. That is, an identity 
assigned by largely state and state-led institutions. As ethnic minorities have 
sought to challenge the colonial ascriptions of the British State, social sciences 
have been forced to re-think their analytical and conceptual agenda. The refusal of 
the ethnicised minorities to simply comply with the dominant ascriptions has 
coincided with global transformation of power relations that had undergirded 
European hegemony for the last two hundred years. The story of the Kashmiris, 
while apparently dispersed in the conurbations of post-imperial Britain, such as in 
Luton, while seemingly locked into the local, is marked by these global 
transformations. I hope to show in this thesis how by focusing on the local, we can 
better appreciate the full impact of the global and the emergence of a Kashmiri 
diaspora. 
I. THEORISING ENCULTURATION 
In this study I elaborate on the concept of enculturation as a means of describing 
the situation of Kashmiri settlers in Luton. Enculturation refers to as process of 
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adaptation and transformation in which both the ethnicised minorities and the so 
called host society exchange cultural tokens and in the process transform their 
identities. In some ways the notion of enculturation points towards the way in 
which syncretic and hybridised forms of identification are the norm rather than the 
preserve of an avant-garde. This banalisation (or normalisation) of syncretic and 
hybrid subjectivities is the experience which I label enculturation. In other words it 
is the process by which collective identities (which are internally divided and 
intrinsically fuzzy) maintain their stability while undergoing radical 
transformations. The theoretical discussion of this concept will be found 
throughout this thesis. Its elaboration and development is one of the main tasks of 
this study. I sustain that not only is enculturation relevant to the Kashmiri 
experience but it has wider relevance to the study of ethnicised communities. 
II. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
The first part of this study (chapters one, two, three and four) is mainly concerned 
with theoretical and methodological issues. In chapter one I review some of the 
literature on ethnic identity and put Identity Structure Analysis (hereafter referred 
to as ISA) into context. In chapter two, I present the theoretical postulates and 
indices derived from ISA. Chapter three addresses the way in which constructions 
of cultural, religious and national identities among Kashmiris are affected by 
generational, and gender recontextualisations. In chapter four I describe and 
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discuss the field work stage of the research including the reasoning behind using 
the particular approaches. 
The second part of the thesis consists of chapters five, six, seven, eight and nine. 
This part of the thesis is devoted to an ethnographic account of the Kashmiris in 
Luton. By using narratives from respondents I present in a series of snapshots a 
picture of Kashmiriness, "before migration", "during migration" and "after 
settlement." The purpose of these chapters is to show the transformations in the 
idea of Kashmiriness as Kashmiris left their homes in Kashmir and settled away in 
Luton. Chapter five sets the scene for investigating the way in which practices 
which promoted a sense of Kashmiriness in Kashmir have been adapted to the 
British context. In chapter six I review the prevailing debates on migration and its 
relationship to identity changes. Chapter seven shows the significance of Luton as 
an arena for the development and dissemination of "Kashmiriyat." Chapter eight 
looks at the impact of settlement on Kashmiri identity. In chapter nine, I analyse 
the agents and mechanisms by which Kashmiri identity is articulated and 
maintained. 
The third part of the thesis consists of chapters ten, eleven, and twelve. In this part 
of this study I discuss and present the results derived from application of ISA. In 
chapter ten I present the biographical details for the samples with the intention of 
giving some indication of the sample characteristics to help develop an overall 
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picture of the individuals involved in the research. In chapter eleven I compare my 
Kashmiri sample with an Anglo-Saxon sample, as a way of working to what extent 
changes in Kashmiri sample are specific to them. In chapter twelve I empirically 
review the six main postulates of the research using ISA indices with selected 
indices. 
ill. RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODS 
Specifically the thesis is based on an examination of six dimensions concerning 
Kashmiri identity. The first maintains that cultural networks are a central collective 
dimension of Kashmiri British identity. The second considers the role of religion to 
be a central collective dimension of Kashmiri British identity. The third states that 
national identification is a central component ofKashmiri collective identity. These 
three examine Kashmiri identity in its collective manifestations. 
The following three dimensions are examinations of the way in which Kashmiri 
subjectivity is articulated. That is how individuals are interpolated into Kashmiri 
collective identity formations. The first area for consideration is how identity is 
redefined amongst the cohort of Kashmiris who were either born in or brought up 
in Britain. I suggest that the process of enculturation is far better able to describe 
the experiences of this cohort than ideas of acculturation. The next dimension 
considered is the extent to which the idea of "cultural conflict" amongst Kashmiri 
migrants and their offspring is significant in explaining the current situation of 
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Kashmiri youth. The final dimension examines the relationship between gender and 
redefinitions of identity amongst Kashmiris in Luton. 
These six postulates form both the framework of my Identity Structure Analysis 
(ISA) derived research and the basis of my ethnographic work. ISA provides a 
systematic means of operationalising these postulates whilst the ethnographic 
aspect of my research use these postulates as a guidance in conducting informal 
discussions, and carrying out semi -structured interviews. 
During both my ethnographic and ISA research I followed the British Sociological 
Association's Statement of Ethical Practice. In particular I have maintained and 
respected the anonymity, privacy and confidentiality of research participants. With 
this intention throughout the thesis I have withheld the real names of participants 
and informants. I have also ensured that I have exercised my responsibility with 
those members of the Kashmiri community in Luton and Azad Kashmir who have 
assisted and participated at all stages of the research. 6 
CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM WITH IDENTITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been an explosion of interest in identity. This interest has 
been manifested in a variety of academic disciplines and traditions ranging from post­
Marxism, Social Developmental Psychology and even International Relations. 1 What 
is common to these approaches is an appreciation of the centrality of the question of 
identity for any understanding of political, cultural and socio-economic phenomena. In 
what follows I will concentrate on the way in which the question of identity has been 
used to discuss ethnicity. 
Race, language and culture were used during the nineteenth century to define ethnic 
identity. Using these criteria it was easy to define ethnic groups. This was the basis on 
which much of acculturative and assimilationary rhetoric was founded. Subsequently, 
problems have been found with this static notion of ethnicity. Researchers are more 
reluctant to argue that one can have a list of attributes, which can define ethnicity 
outside any particular context. This idea that ethnicity is a social construct rather than 
a natural category has brought radical changes to the field of ethnic studies. The 
question of defining an ethnic group can no longer be resolved simply by collecting 
data on a select group of features (such as costumes, rituals, language). This means 
that the analysis of ethnicity requires a deeper examination of the process by which 
7 
identity and ethnicity are constructed and maintained. ISA provides a ngorous 
framework in which to explore this nebulous concept. 
My aim is to try to use ISA as a way of linking the theoretical debate on identity, from 
disciplines such as Sociology, Anthropology and Social Psychology, with the 
operational needs of fieldwork research into the identity of Kashmiri settlers. ISA is a 
complex framework, which necessitates considerable explanation. It builds upon 
insights from symbolic interactionism as well as the psychodynamic tradition, thus 
capturing both the sociological and psychological aspects of identity development. 
From anthropology it gains its theoretical and empirical approach to culture. My 
research is an attempt to build on the strengths of ISA as an analytical tool, while at 
the same time focusing substantively on the formations and transformations of 
Kashmiri ethnic identity. 2 
There are three main issues that I deal with in this chapter. Firstly, I introduce the 
main theoretical approaches to identity that have influenced this research, and show 
how two main influences have come from theories about self-identification within 
psychology, and accounts of community structures within sociology and 
anthropology. Secondly, I then go on to discuss the political (and public policy) 
response to the challenge of migration and settlement of ethnicised communities in 
Britain. My particular interest is to show how similar notions of assimilation and 
multiculturalism have governed the main debate about Britain's relations with its 
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ethnic minorities, both at an intellectual and political level. Simultaneously, I illustrate 
how these assimilationist and multiculturalist assumptions have failed to account for 
the way in which Kashmiri identity and community has been constructed. I also go on 
to suggest that the Kashmiri experience may be better described by using the category 
of enculturation. As a prologue to this I present a genealogy of enculturation, and in 
particular a discussion of the way it has been used by Peter Weinreich in ISA. I then 
outline the way in which I will develop the concept. 
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS TO THE RESEARCH 
Ethnicised communities in Britain have been ascribed ethnic identities. These have 
usually been based on ideas that place of birth is the most decisive factor in 
determining ethnicity. 3 The emphasis on place of origin has provided the basis for 
much of the work on ethnicised communities in Britain, leaving a serious gap in 
research on the self-ascribed identities. This gap claims to have been filled by the PSI 
Survey Research, which argues that it has taken into account the "ethnic voice". 4 The 
methodology of PSI surveys, however, is based on a synchronic framework. In other 
words, they use static notions of what constitutes identity, together with their 
respondents' replies to questionnaires and interviews, which are built on ascriptive 
vocabularies. Therefore the respondents have the option of only replying within the 
categories opened up by the questionnaire or the interviewer. The limitations of this 
are obvious when dealing with questions of identities that do not derive from the 
ascriptive vocabularies that circulate in influential discussion. This, as I will 
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demonstrate, is the case for Kashmiris. What differentiates this project from other 
research is that by focusing on ISA and oral history style narrative it attempts to move 
away from simple questions and answers to a dialogic construction of the "Kashmiri 
voice". 
Previous approaches to ethnic identity have tended to minimise the complexities that 
exist within ethnicised communities. Indeed, researchers and policy makers have only 
recently moved away from perceiving the ethnic minority community as being 
homogeneous to recognising internal differences within those communities. There is 
still a tendency to rely too much on overarching categories such as Asian when 
describing settlers of South Asian descent. In this case, even those included within the 
South Asian category are not differentiated in terms of religion, nationality, cultural 
practice and geography ( e.g. people of South Asian descent from East Africa are 
lumped together with other South Asians even though many of them have never been 
to South Asia). 
In recent years, in the press and among the general public, there is some confusion 
over appropriate categorisation of ethnic minorities in Britain. 5 With the breakdown 
of the category "black" to describe all "non-white" people, there is increased use of 
the term Asian even though it could be argued that emergence of Muslim 
consciousness in Britain is subverting the very idea of what Asian (and to a lesser 
extent "black") refers to, and how useful it is.6 For the Kashmiris in Britain the issue is 
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particularly acute. Despite the fact that many are categorised as Asian and within this 
group most of these are labelled Pakistani, they have not been ascribed a distinct 
identity. The effect of this is to tum them into an invisible minority within an minority. 
One reason for this, of course, is culturally insensitive, generalised approaches to 
identity. The starting point for the investigation of ethnic identity in this research is 
therefore self-ascription. Individuals, however, do not exist in isolation, and one's 
position in society has significant effects on the construal of one's' identity. 7 In other 
words, identity has both an individual and social dimension. In order to understand the 
context of the process of identification there is a need to examine the social dimension 
of identity formation and re-formation. In the next section I look at the way in which 
notions of individual identity interact with ethnicity. 
A. Self Identification and Ethnicity 
Milton Gordon has referred to ethnicity as a sense of "peoplehood" created by 
common race, religion, national origin, history or some combination of these. 8 In 
Britain, the idea of ethnicity has often been restricted to members of ethnic minorities 
i.e. the post-war settlers from the New Commonwealth. It is these people who are 
considered to have "ethnic" foods and "ethnic" clothes, whereas the idea of English 
clothes or food is considered not to be part of a specific ethnicity.9 Not only is it that 
ethnic minorities are ethnically marked, but, as I have mentioned before, this marking 
has tended to be ascribed to them. The difficulty with such ascription is clearly 
pointed out by Nimmi Hutnik: 11 
The sense of personal identification with the ethnic group and the 
identification by others as being a member of that ethnic group defines, in 
part, but only in part, the concept of ethnic identity. 10 
In other words, ascribed identities may produce a situation in which there is a gap 
between what an individual considers to be her or his identity and what others 
consider to be that person's identity. So that for example, in the case of Kashmiris 
then one could argue that any reference to them being Pakistanis or British may be 
irrelevant to them if what is psychologically important is to be Kashmiri. In this case 
self-definition will be rendered useless since this is not recognised by others. 
Earlier Lange and Westin had also seen ethnic identity as dividing into the same two 
categories i.e. "defined/perceived" by others and "self defined/perceived". 1 1  The 
"definition/perception by others" is split into a public ethnic identity and public 
personal identity, whilst the "self defined/perceived" splits into "intra-group" and 
"intra-individual". The former is the shared ethnic stereotype whilst the latter is 
individual identity and distinctiveness as "reflected self' which is how the person 
believes others see them. 
Within ideas of self-definition is the idea of the flexibility of identity. That is, ethnic 
identity is not a fixed inflexible commitment, nor is it singular. Multiple (ethnic) 
identities may exist. (One has to be careful about the notion of "multiple identities", 
since too often they tend to give the impression that ethnic minorities are made up of 
schizophrenic individuals. By insisting on the multiple nature of identity there is an 
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implicit suggestion that somehow ethnicised individuals lack coherent personality, as 
they are always being torn between the culture of their communities and the culture of 
Western society). It is more useful (and certainly more precise) to see individuals as 
having multiple subject positions. The idea of multiple subject positions appears at 
first to be similar to the notion of "identity options" as suggested by Sandra 
Wallman.12  In reality, however individuals have very little in the way of "options" that 
they may choose from. Identity "options" may be affected by a change in context but 
in this case the idea of "situated identities" outlined by Weinreich, Kelly and Maja is 
more useful. 13 They suggest that alternative states of identity may be engaged in by 
an individual when cueing into different social contexts. Such alternative identity 
states may be regarded as aspects of one's overall identity, in which how one behaves, 
presents oneself and experiences one's situated self differ according to the social 
context. Identity in this view is constantly changing, as it is associated with new 
encounters and terminations of social interactions. Glynis Breakwell in Coping with 
Threatened Identities also regards identity as a dynamic social product residing in 
psychological processes. It cannot be understood except in relation to its 
psychological context and historical perspective. 14 The context in which identities are 
formed and reformed are also central to ISA as Weinreich writes: "identity systems 
may be updated and redefined for a contemporary sense of identity in response to 
contextual changes." 15 In the next section I present a discussion of the importance of 
context and some social changes that have influenced the emergence of Kashmiri 
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identity in Britain. I begin by putting Kashrniri settlement in Luton into the context of post-war immigration to Britain. 
B. Putting Kashmiris in their Place: Context and Community The settlement of large number of Kashmiris in Luton is a product of post-war migration to Britain. 16 Labour shortages after the Second World War meant that the Ministry of Labour turned to the colonies and ex-colonies to alleviate the problem. Large numbers of migrants started arriving from 1950s. The initial immigration immediately produced two problems for "immigrants" :  employment in low status jobs. and living in inner city slums. Immigrant labour was recruited to do those jobs that white, British workers were not willing to do, and, since most of these jobs were in large metropolitan areas, immigrants settled in the slums of these urban areas. 17 White residents of these areas filtered into better areas, as they became more affiuent.i18 The final waves of migration came about in the 1970s. By the mid- l 970s primary migration had come to an end in response to increasing government legislation to restrict entry into Britain. Immigrants were welcomed as workers, but were socially excluded. Social exclusion was marked by their marginal economic status. This contributed to new racial stereotypes and a new kind of colour racism in Britain. 19 Thus from very early in British immigration history, "black" was used as an overarching categorisation for migrants in Britain. One of the reasons for this was that South Asia provided the 
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source for labour by migration to other parts of the empire, such as South Africa, as well as to Britain. Settlement of Asians in places like South Africa helped produce an anti-colonial front in which the black and white divide became associated with the colonial and anti-colonial positions. For British race relations this was reflected in the political categorisation of South Asians as "black". The end of migration m Britain is generally associated with the increasing "racialisation" of the immigration issue. Increasing public and parliamentary debates centred on the "black problem" in the inner city areas and increasingly Britain's problems were analogous to those of America's black ghettos. The watershed for British immigration policy is usually seen as the Nottingham and Notting Hill riots between white and black youths in 1958.  A series of acts of parliament followed which imposed strict immigration controls.20 Restrictive immigration legislation combined with a declining demand for labour, a growing discontent and some racial violence in inner-city areas, with the increasing visibility of the "black" population, had the effect of focusing attention away from immigration to the difficulties of settlement. 21 By the early 1980s there were increasing demands that a separate "Asian" identity be recognised.22 In response to this "new" development, "Asians" became a homogenous category and race relations language changed from using race as basis of categorisation to using ethnicity as a basis of categorisation. This ethnic 1 5  
categorisation and "accommodation" of ethnic identity did not prevent "Asian" being 
treated as a crude sociological group. Rather, most research on "Asians" failed to 
recognise differences within the groups and adopted an approach where complex 
identities were reduced to anthropological generalisations. So that when there was 
any acknowledgement of difference, the definitions of immigrants have tended to 
revolve around over-simplified explanations of customs and beliefs inherited from 
localised family groups confined to small areas of South Asia. These tended to 
exoticise and ethnicise issues around religious, linguistic differences. Much of the 
research on "Asians" emerged from within this framework. Such a framework 
neglected the Kashmiris because too often it was simply conflated with Pakistani 
identity. The absence of ethnic categorisation for Kashmiris highlighted the way in 
which this large population of settlers was denied a space for self-ascription or self­
identification. 
1. Assimilation to Multiculturalism 
Early British sociological approaches to migration and settlement leant heavily on the 
writings of Eisendtadt, Liberson and Gordon who saw the reduction and eventual 
elimination of cultural difference as necessary to alleviate problems of large-scale 
immigration. 23 In these early years, the response to the challenge of cultural diversity 
was encapsulated in discourses on acculturation and assimilation. 24 
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The terms acculturation and assimilation are often used interchangeably in these 
discussions. Claire, Peterson and Scheff see acculturation occurring when a small 
number of persons from a dominant group seek to impose all or part of its culture on 
a subordinate population.25 They also suggest it may occur where a group of 
immigrants foreign to the host society take on all or part of the host culture. 
Eisenstadt, Liberson and Gordon, however regarded assimilation as the final stage of 
acculturation. Raymond, Teske and Nelson suggest that assimilation and acculturation 
are separate processes. 26 Whilst there are major differences between writers, there is 
the unifying feature that acculturation and assimilation are defined as a process rather 
than a single unitary event. 
Johnstone sees assimilation as two processes. Firstly, it is external, where migrants' 
exterior qualities become less distinguishable from the indigenous population. 
Secondly, it is subjective, where the migrant is willing to identify with the 'host' 
culture and considers it proper to do so.27 Gordon also distinguished certain sub­
processes of assimilation. These are structural, cultural, psychological and biological. 
It is within Gordon's four elements of assimilation that J. Milton Yinger defines and 
discusses acculturation. He sees acculturation as the process of change towards 
greater cultural similarity brought about by contact between two or more groups. An 
ethnic group is acculturated to the degree that the range of values and norms held by 
its members (the blueprints for action and for cognitive, aesthetic, and ethical 
questions) fall into a pattern similar to that of the general population. 
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Definitions have also been suggested which have tried to accommodate difference to a 
greater degree. They include additive acculturation and substitutive acculturation. 28 
Additive acculturation refers to the possibility of the addition of values, norms and 
styles creating a more complex cultural repertoire on which to draw. In this case, 
acculturation does not mean a loss or impoverishment but can be seen as an 
enrichment. Additive acculturation is close in meaning to the concept of biculturalism 
and can be seen as a process of dual socialisation. Under some conditions, often those 
that require adaptation to a dominant culture by members of a disadvantaged ethnic 
minority, many individuals will learn and act according to both the mainline culture 
and the ethnic subculture. 
Although all the above definitions see acculturation as a process, inherent within these 
definitions is the notion that it is a one way process by which the minority becomes 
more like the majority group by foregoing elements of their own identity. Yinger in 
his definition does suggest that majority does not necessarily mean superior but it is 
difficult to disentangle notions of majority ( or dominance) from notions of superiority. 
Certainly, Britain's early official response to the presence of large numbers of 
immigrants, who were distinguished by their skin-:colour, language, religion and 
culture, was to simply declare that they must be assimilated to a unitary British 
culture. This implied the notion of the superiority of white dominant culture. Indeed 
Yinger himself has suggested that "no one can doubt the coercive policies against 
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distinctive cultural groups around the world. At the same time, paradoxically, 
peaceful processes that reduce the differences between members of interacting ethnic 
groups are also readily seen". 29 .Minority culture is regarded as static and individuals 
within minority communities as being in opposition to the dominant culture. Implicit 
within this concept of acculturation is the notion that the dominant culture has a clear 
cut set of values and is homogenous with no major divisions. In reality the dominant 
community is far from being homogenous, and minority identifications with this other 
ethnic group are rarely self-conscious decisions but rather arise from everyday 
unreflective processes. In other words Kashmiri youngsters do not necessarily identify 
consciously with members of the white, ethnically unmarked, majority community. 
Any realisation of majority dominance is recognised over time. Therefore it is not the 
case that there will necessarily be an opposition to the dominant culture, as 
acculturation suggests. In this sense, acculturation does not represent the individual's 
everyday experiences and actions. 
Notions of additive or substitutive acculturation imply an either/or scenario . Yinger 
points out that additive acculturation may be enriching. Implicit within this idea, 
however, is that the white dominant culture will "enrich" the ethnic culture. 
Substitutive acculturation implies that individuals must forego their own ethnic 
identities and substitute it with white dominant culture. Ideas about additive or 
substitutive acculturaiion are attempts at dealing with an inadequate concept by 
generating further forms of the concept. Theories of acculturation obscure the 
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processes of individual identification and give no space to discuss salient ethnic 
identities. This results in static ideas about minority groups, which render these 
concepts inappropriate within today's society. 
From a social psychological perspective, Berry does recognise that acculturation may 
also be an individual as well as group phenomenon. 30 The significance of this for my 
research is that I am exploring the relationship between individual and communal 
identities. In other words, how do Kashmiris take on aspects of living in Britain whilst 
the Kashmiri community in Luton remains distinct? Berry acknowledges Graves3 1 as 
making the important distinction between acculturation as a collective or group-level 
phenomenon ( change in the culture of the group) and psychological acculturation 
( change in the psychology of the individual). Berry also introduces two concepts of 
acculturation attitudes and acculturative stress. 
Acculturation attitudes he argues are where cultural groups and their individual 
members, in both dominant and non-dominant situations, deal with the problem of 
how to acculturate. He notes that the two important issues are cultural maintenance 
(to what extent cultural identity and characteristics are considered to be important, 
and worth maintaining); and contact and participation (to what extent should they 
become involved in other cultural groups, or keep themselves to themselves). 
Considering the above points simultaneously, Berry has presented a framework, 
which posits four acculturation strategies. This is represented in Figure 1.t1 below. 
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Figure 1. 1 Berry's Acculturation Strategies based on two issues: cultural maintenance 
ISSUE 1 
and contact and participation. Is it considered to be of value to 
maintain relationships with 
dominant society? 
NO 
YES ◄ ► NO 
ISSUE 2 
Is it considered to be 
of value to maintain 
relationships with 
dominant society? 
In Figure 1.t1 above the arrows represent attitudinal dimensions positive and negative, 
(Yes or No). Responses to these will intersect to define four acculturation strategies. 
The strategies carry different names depending on which group i.e. the dominant or 
non-dominant groups is being considered. According to Berry: 
From the point of view of the non-dominant groups, when individuals 
do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction 
with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, 
when individuals place value on holding onto their original culture and 
at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the 
Separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both 
maintaining and developing one's original culture, while also having 
daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the option; here, 
there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same 
time seeking to participate as part of the larger social framework. 
Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural 
maintenance ( often for reasons of forced cultural loss), and little 
interest in having relations with others ( often for reasons of exclusion 
or discrimination), and then Marginalisation is defined.32 
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There are three main problems with Berry's model, which can be used to illustrate 
larger problems inherent within all the above models of cultural adaptation. Firstly, 
Berry seems to have a notion of culture, which he sees as static. This is evidenced in 
his definition of acculturation: "acculturation is essentially a form of culture change 
that results from contact between two independent cultures"33 . I would argue that if 
one abandons the view that cultures are hermetically sealed autonomous ( and 
relatively unchanging) entities, then many of the assumptions on which Berry bases his 
models also collapse. 34 This essentialist notion of culture underlies his whole analysis. 
Berry seems to have a very clear idea about cultural boundaries. However, there is no 
reason why we should think that cultural frontiers are so clear-cut. Is it always 
possible to identify particular cultural elements as being part of a specific culture? For 
example in a recent survey the most popular dish in Britain was "chicken tikka 
masala". Does this show acculturation and if so by whom, since the dish does not 
exist outside Britain? A similar point can be made about Balti restaurants in the 
Midlands. What culture do Balti dishes belong to? Are they part of an English culture, 
a Midlands culture, a South Asian culture or some hybrid? 
Secondly, it is interesting that Berry acknowledges that although his analysis is based 
on the assumption that: "non-dominant groups and their individuals members have the 
freedom to choose how they want to acculturate, this is of course, not always the 
case."35 He continues to base his analysis on "choice" when he says that: 
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When the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation, or 
constrains the choices of the non-dominant groups or individuals, then 
some other terms need to be used. Most clearly, people may 
sometimes choose the Separation option; but when it is required of 
them by the dominant society, the situation is one of segregation. 
Similarly when people choose to Assimilate, the notion of the Melting 
Pot may be appropriate; but when forced to do so, it becomes more 
like a pressure cooker. In the case of Marginalisation, people rarely 
choose such an option; rather they usually become marginalised as a 
result of attempts at forced assimilation (pressure cooker) combined 
with forced exclusion (Segregation) . . . .  Integration can only be 'freely' 
chosen and successfully perused by non-dominant groups when the · 
dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards 
cultural diversity. 36 
The key distinction between dominant and non-dominant must be their unequal ability 
to express preferences i.e. make "choices". Thus, we find that "non-dominant" 
individuals and communities are not able to express a "choice" in the way in which 
they acculturate. These decisions are taken at a governmental level and are usually 
very specific to each country's political trajectory. For example, South Asian children 
were discouraged from speaking non-European languages in Britain during the 1970s. 
As a result they were often made to feel that their command of a language other than 
English was a source of embarrassment. The children did not choose to be 
embarrassed by their mother tongues; they did so as a result of a complex set of 
decisions made at a public policy level that filtered down to the classroom. 
Thirdly, it is not entirely clear that Berry acknowledges how racism affects the various 
stages of acculturation. He does not seem to appreciate the way the relations of 
power affect processes of acculturation. For example if as he suggests acculturation is 
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indeed a two way process (acculturation should be seen as a "two-dimensional (rather 
than a one dimensional, either/or process") then how would the dominant community 
acculturate? 37 In fact, acculturation is not a neutral term in principle. That is, change 
may take place in either or both groups as Berry maintains. It is the case that he 
acknowledges that in "practice acculturation tends to induce more change in one of 
these groups" but he fails, however, to recognise that the acculturating group is more 
often than not the subordinate group. 38 Accordingly it will be the "non-dominant" 
(subordinate group) that suffers from Berry's acculturative stress. He points out that: 
This refers to one kind of stress, in which the stressors are identified as 
having their source in the process of acculturation; in addition, there is 
often a particular set of stress behaviours that occur during
acculturation, such as lowered mental health status ( especially 
confusion, anxiety, depression), feelings of marginality and alienation, 
heightened psychosomatic symptoms, and identity confusion. 39 
It is concepts such as these that have helped to popularise notions of 'culture conflict' 
and "stuck between cultures", and it these notions which have often been used to 
describe migrants (usually migrant youth) and pathologise ethnicised communities 
within academic and popular discourse. For example, there does not seem to be much 
attention paid to the possibility that a politically, and economically dominant group 
may actually experience acculturative stress during the acculturation process. For 
example, did the English in India during the Raj suffer such stress? It would appear 
that Berry's notion of acculturative stress, is nothing more than metaphor for racism? 
In other words, when people suffer acculturative stress is this not a description of the 
effects of racism. Ethnicised communities in the United Kingdom asserting their 
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political identity have, in recent years increasingly undermined the notion that 
Britishness meant a privileged identity, as acculturalist accounts tended to assume. In 
response to these developments, multiculturalism has been put forward as an 
alternative to acculturation. 
Multiculturalism was a move towards acknowledging cultural diversity, the end goal 
of which is seen to be pluralism or living with difference.40 In other words, 
multiculturalism seemed to promise an abandonment of the idea that cultures were in 
some hierarchy in which ethically marked cultures were inferior to European culture. 
It emerged first in the United States as an education policy, in response to 
Eurocentrism within the curriculum. That is, multiculturalism was based on the 
rejection of the view that saw European culture as the essence of the modern world 
through which all culture should be defined. 41 Multiculturalism aimed to recognise 
and promote past and present cultural diversity. John Solomos and Les Back have 
pointed out that the debate on multiculturalism has been entangled with anti-racism. 42 
Since the 1980s in Britain anti-racism has been used in a very expansive way to refer 
to public policies aimed at dealing with racial inequality43 . Multiculturalism appeared 
as a way of dealing with racial inequality, by arguing that racial groups in British 
society were not simply the products of racism but had their own rich cultures, and 
public policy should encourage cultural self-expression as a means of reducing the 
effects of racism. 44 Multiculturalism became the official policy by which the British 
State dealt with its ethnic minorities. 
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Although multiculturalism was a move towards recognising cultural diversity it has 
been used to define a group of people as different so that they are then able to 
maintain ethnic boundaries. This difference has been used to define neat communities. 
It has been argued that "by focusing on cultural difference and (more narrowly) 
linguistic competence, [multiculturalism] was effectively a facade behind which social 
inequalities could remain unresearched, unrecognised in official circles, and therefore 
unchallenged."45 This emphasis on cultural difference was, however, not the only 
problematic aspect of multiculturalism. There is also the problem as to how this 
cultural difference was conceptualised. 
In the case of (South) Asians in Britain, cultural differences tended to revolve around 
customs and beliefs inherited from localised family groupings. Discussion has centred 
on kinship and sectarian influences. 46 Thus the unit of analysis in looking at the 
Asians in Britain tended to be a culturalist notion of ethnic community. The study of 
South Asians in Britain tends to be synonymous with the study of an ethnic 
community. This ethnic community provides the arena for Britain's (South) Asian 
minorities to manifest themselves. An ethnic community is assumed to be defined by 
its concentration in particular (urban) districts and by its size and visibility.47 Such 
unproblematic notion of an ethnic community leads to a number of difficulties. Firstly, 
whilst size and visibility are important dimensions of 'community', the factors of 
belonging, and identification with an ethnic group larger than the local community, 
tend to be neglected.48 This is particularly important for Kashmiris who see 
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themselves as belonging to a transnational Kashmiri community. This is the identification with the disputed homeland of Kashmir, which is a political/national identification and transcends state boundaries. In addition, Kashmiris like many other Muslims identify with the Ummah (a world wide Muslim community). 49 It is a transnational community that exists outside of state boundaries and transcends ethnic, racial, linguistic and national identities. Thus too much of an emphasis on the local and particular forms of ethnic communities tends to ignore the significance of transnational aspects of ethnic collective identity. The significance of transnational identities can be seen by for example looking at the way in which "Pakistanis" speak of their collective identity. 50 While it is the case that although identity is always situational depending on particular interactional context, in the political arena three primary communal identities are most frequently recognised. These are: British Muslims, British Pakistanis, and British Asians. Of these three the most significant seems to be that of British Muslims. 5 1  This is the identity most often suggested by "Pakistanis" to be the most positive of their self-attributed identities. It is also an identity whose horizons cannot be easily contained within the ghettos of Bradford or Leicester. In other words, the localism of ethnic communities does not negate the influence of global (i.e. transnational) factors in constructing collective identities. In the same way that racism does not define all the experiences of ethnicised minorities, their "ghettoisation" does not exhaust their identity options. 27 
Furthermore, the idea of ethnic community that is locally circumscribed and 
concentrated, tends to give the impression of an homogenised collective identity. This 
has the effect of denying the possibility of ethnic communities existing within these 
over-arching ethnic identities. The implications of this can be seen even in some of the 
best ethnographic writing on South Asians, which reinforces the dominance of 
Pakistanis in South Asia, by continuing to classify Kashmiris as "Pakistanis". Even 
though the majority of those categorised as Pakistani have been ascribed a 'minority 
within a minority identity' . Kashmiris continue to struggle for acknowledgement that 
the Kashmiri community is different from the Pakistani community. For Kashmiris, the 
significance of their cultural and religious identity has been superseded by the 
importance of their national identity, manifested in their oral identification with the 
land of Kashmir. It is this demand for recognition as a national community, which 
separates Kashmiris and makes them distinct from Pakistanis and Indians. The move 
towards multiculturalism will offer more space for self-ascription than ideas 
associated with acculturation. It is still handicapped by its reliance on particular ideas 
of cultural transformations in the immigration experience. Multiculturalism continues 
to share with acculturation the notion of a well-defined culture, with discrete stages in 
the process of cultural change. It is this notion of culture and cultural change that I 
wish to challenge. 
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2. Towards a Genealogy of Enculturation 
As a way out of the conceptual impasse created by the development of notions of 
acculturation and multiculturalism. I would like to explore the notion of enculturation. 
One of the earliest references to enculturation was by Melville J. Herskovits in his 
1949 paper, "Some Psychological Implications of Afro-American Studies". 52 
Margaret Mead points out that "in all his work Melville Herskovits has stood for the 
significance of historical uniqueness of each culture and each cultural tradition". 53 
Building on this tradition Mead discusses the confusion and resultant 
interchangeability of the concepts of socialisation and enculturation. She suggests that 
socialisation should be understood as the process of learning in its universal form and 
defines enculturation as the process of learning culture in all its uniqueness and 
particularity. 
Within ISA, Weinreich relies on the idea of enculturation especially to explain 
redefinitions of identity amongst youth. He sees enculturation as a process whereby 
individuals experiment with various roles, try them on for fit, reject some components 
and accept others. They formulate their own points of view on a range of topics, such 
as dress, music, boy and girl friends, and begin to scrutinise given moral imperatives. 
Weinreich suggests that through a process of enculturation people may in part identify 
with certain characteristics of another group without foregoing their own ethnic 
group allegiance and thereby redefine or update conceptions of their own ethnicity. 54 
Later, working with Chung Leung Luk and Michael Harris Bond, Weinreich has 
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further defined enculturation as change through incorporation of cultural elements, as opposed to acculturation, which is seen as change towards the dominant culture. In this study they continue to point out that this "is in keeping with the evidence that subordinate and minority ethnic groups generally maintain a remarkable resilient sense of their own ethnic identity". 5 5  In other words, cultural change is not one way ( as acculturation theories tend to imply), nor does it imply the replacement of one cultural identity with another. Weinreich's en passant conceptualisation of enculturation provides a useful entry point for its discussion within this research. There are a number of issues however, that require further clarification and elaboration, all of which flow from the (implicit) notion of culture that sometimes ISA seems to share with some multiculturalist accounts. The first point that needs to be re-examined is the use of ideas of the dominant and subordinate. It is not clear if dominant is used as a purely descriptive term or whether the idea of dominant being superior is implicit within the Weinreich, Luk and Bond's definition of enculturation. There is also the issue that dominant and subordinate are often used more or less interchangeably with host and immigrant cultures respectively in the context of studies of Britain's racialised minorities. Also what is unclear is on what grounds they base their assumption. Could it be argued that they are validating Western notions of superiority by presenting Orientalist categorisations of the other which are not necessarily internalised by the so called subordinate groups?56 For 
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example, many Kashmiris and other Muslim communities' world-wide would not 
subscribe to the view that their culture was in some way inferior. 
A lack of care in using ideas about a dominant or subordinate culture risks eroding the 
difference between enculturation and acculturation. For example, if Muslim women 
decide to wear Western dress is she enculturating or is she acculturating. Of course, if 
it were considered that she is not "foregoing aspects of ones own ethnic identity" it 
would mean that this a process of enculturation. Is it possible that subordinate 
ethnicity could remain constant in the process of identity development? Is it not more 
likely that all identities are being redefined? In other words, a Muslim woman wearing 
a Western dress may transform the dress and what it signifies. 
The second issue revolves around the notion of culture that ISA seems implicitly to 
rely on. In ISA the context is very important to identity development. Indeed much of 
Weinreich' s conceptualisation about redefinitions of identity is grounded in this. 
Despite the attention to context within ISA, it can give the impression that it is 
(implicitly) a situational model which is very successful in bringing into focus ethnic 
minority identity but does not make explicit its notion of culture, giving the 
impression that it relies on bounded ideas of culture in which culture corresponds to 
basically national formations e.g. English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish, Canadian, Chinese, 
Ethiopian etc. In other words there is a clearly bounded English or Ethiopian culture. 
This notion of discrete cultural units is precisely what I wish to put into question. 
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Enculturation is a process by which, coming from a specific culture one becomes part 
of another culture. This idea relies on a notion of cultures as blocks where one can 
hold onto one identity which remains unchanged whilst taking on another. 
This idea of cultures as blocks becomes incredible when one looks at some common 
misgivings about cultural practices. Take for example Asian youth music movements 
such as Ragga. To what extent are they holding on to their own culture or adopting 
elements of a new one? Similarly the recent explosion of mendi painting. It is 
generally regarded to be a South Asian cultural tradition but is currently gaining 
prominence in magazines and large department stores, which are regarded as British 
institutions outside Britain. Further the common preference for parents that their 
children choose marriage partners from a similar background depends on identifying 
which cultural practice belongs to which culture. Is this specific to Asian parents or 
something universal? Unfortunately notions of bounded cultures in this case would 
lead to the common idea that this is an Asian phenomenon which is often translated as 
"generational culture conflict". These examples break down the idea of bounded 
cultures. In these situations one faces a problem. 57 
I would suggest that it is more useful to understand cultures as consisting of 
overlapping networks and practices which do not have strict boundaries but are 
constantly being transformed. 58 If one sees culture as fluid and relational then the idea 
of "foregoing own ethnic identity" does not arise. For example, the idea that certain 
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aspects of Kashmiriness change and others remain constant is problematic, since it seems to suggest that identity may be transformed by external cultural influences but what is internal to Kashmiri culture remains unchanged. It would be more helpful to see that the signifier remains constant but what the signifier actually constitutes is being changed. 59 Thus for the Kashmiris what remains constant is the signifier Kashmiri but its constitution is fluid. Using the metaphor of culture as networks then acculturation is impossible. It remains useful only as a tool for understanding certain policies, which rely on a particular historical/political trajectory. Enculturation as defined by Weinreich is a more useful approach if it is used with a clearer opinion of culture. I would suggest the use of enculturation as a tool to explain identity definition and redefinition with an explicit definition of culture as an unbounded series of overlapping networks. In this research enculturation is seen as a process by which individuals pull together cultural elements which are available to them through a series of networks whose boundaries are intrinsically fuzzy and overlapping. 60 Using the above definition of culture also allows us to move away from the idea of ethnicised communities as being primarily defined by local enclaves and towards the possibility of exploring the relationship of these communities as diasporic. That is, the possibility that communities may share common experiences and culture despite the fact that they may be located many miles from each other. For example, in his book 
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The Black Atlantic Gilroy writes about the cultural networks spanning Africa, the 
Americas, the Caribbean and Britain which has proved a source of strength and 
continuity for people of African descent wherever they are in the world. In this same 
way Kashmiris, despite being scattered all over the world continue to maintain the 
idea of a common people. 
It is clear that there needs to be a reappraisal of the dominant discourses in which 
essentialist accounts of culture have been presented. It is necessary therefore to move 
beyond seeing culture as static and simply primordial but dynamic and redefined in 
relation to continuously changed contexts. This is particularly important as cultures 
become politicised and are mobilised around cultural symbols. For example there is 
the recent drive to identify a British culture and in the case of the Kashmiris to create 
a Kashmiriness. 
These particular articulations of cultural identity have very little to do with culture but 
more to do with the recontextualisation of culture. As Sumerian Sayyid argues: 
Culture (or any form of unity) cannot be a unified object of analysis 
independent of its articulations and readings. In other words, cultures have no 
intrinsic or essential identity or unity -outside history or politics-that can be 
reached by a transparent reading. Rather, cultures are created and interpreted 
by human practice they are like all other practices, products of articulation 
rather than and essence. 61  
In other words there is no such thing as an essential culture. What constitutes cultures 
are different people giving different descriptions that tend to reflect their own interests 
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and locations. Thus, for example, in the case of the JKLF, they argue for a distinct Kashmiri culture based on shared history, which has become central to Kashmiri nationalism and the independence struggle. In this way there can also be no bounded culture. 
ID. CONCLUSION In this chapter I have shown that there is a long and complex history of British contact with people overseas, who have raised issues of identity usually mobilised around race. Whether in policies of assimilation, acculturation or more recently multiculturalism much of these debates have been informed by the dominant paradigm. The discourse has been one of the premises of Western (especially English) superiority. The migration and settlement of different cultural groups have helped to bring about changes within demographic, economic and social structures. They have brought about new cultural diversity, which often brings into question issues of identity. A variety of strategies discussed were developed to deal with ethnic minorities. All gave little space for the assertion of self-ascribed identity in overarching identities, which informed policies and the responsibility of "civilising" the "natives". It can be argued that the race relations industry, rather than allowing self-ascribed identities to flourish, used homogenising identities such as "black" and "Asian" to "melt down" the experiences of various migrant groups. Despite its ongoing anti-racist stance, the 
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official race relations industry has been committed to a policy of assimilation, by 
which British hosts will transform the non-British immigrants into normal citizens of 
the country. Enculturation was presented as an alternative tool to understanding 
identity transformations. I have argued that if one teases out the notion of cultures as 
overlapping networks, than the ISA account of enculturation is significantly enriched. 
The rest of this thesis will make good this claim as I tell the story of Kashmiris in 
Luton. The next episode in this story is to examine the way in which the central 
features of Kashmiri identity are expressed in Luton, but before I do this, I need to 
elaborate the ISA postulates. This is the subject of the next chapter. 36 
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CHAPTER TWO: ISA THEORETICAL POSTULATES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I explained that this study is heavily indebted to ISA This 
debt has two aspects: one is the general influence that ISA has exercised over the 
work, and the other aspect is far more specific. It is to do with the use of ISA 
instruments as a way of addressing some of the main questions concerning Kashmiri 
identity. What I will do in this chapter is elaborate on some of the central tenets of 
ISA as a prelude to applying them to the investigation of my research propositions on 
Kashmiri identity. 
II. ISA AND IDENTITY 
A. Ethnic Identity and ISA 
Weinreich sees ISA as a metatheoretical framework in the sense that it is a 
"scaffolding" type theoretical orientation, which uses explicitly defined concepts. It 
allows for the inclusion and elaboration of four perspectives on self and identity: the 
psychodynamic, symbolic interactionist, personal construct and cognitive affective 
consistency theory. It attempts to use them in order to generate further empirically 
grounded theoretical propositions, which take into account contemporary value and 
belief systems as they are held by the individuals and groups concerned, in addition 
to existing hypotheses. 1 In this sense it is a theoretical orientation to identify 
phenomena rather than an "identity theory". Weinreich argues that an understanding 
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of the processes of identity within societies has hitherto been hampered by a lack of 
theoretical concepts concerning identity development and change, which could be 
readily used for empirical research in the field. He makes the point that sophisticated 
theorising about ethnic identity is generally not matched by a use of concepts by 
which it ( ethnic identity) may be compared from group to group and from one social 
context to another. The mismatches between theory and practice are largely problems 
of conceptualising the process of identity development and defining the complex of 
concepts associated with it. It is as a way of covering this gap between identity 
theory and its operationalisation that Weinreich sees as the principal task ofISA. ISA 
is then an open-ended metatheoretical framework of concepts and postulates about 
current structure and process pertaining to identity.2 For the purposes of this thesis 
my interest relates to ethnic identity. Weinreich's definitions of identity are as 
follows: 
One's  identity is defined as the totality of one' s self-construal, in 
which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the 
continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past 
and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future. 
One's ethnic identity is defined as that part of the totality of one's 
self-construal made up of those dimensions that express the continuity 
between one's construal of past ancestry and one' s future aspirations 
in relation to ethnicity. 3 
Central to Weinreich's definition of ethnic identity is self-construal. As a way of 
operationalising this, the theoretical concepts of ISA make a number of assumptions 
and present quantitative indices of identity structure, which can empirically assess 
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individuals. These can be operationalised through idiographic analysis and 
nomothetic comparisons within and across cultures and subcultures. 
B. Theoretical Postulates and Indices Concerning the Identification Process. 
As mentioned above ISA allows for the investigation of identity at the structural and 
individual levels. By looking more closely at some of the assumptions behind ISA 
we can begin to draw some theoretical assumptions and indices of identity together, 
which allow for the empirical analysis of identity. 
1. Role Model Identification with Others 
One of ISA' s assumptions is that: onet's positive and negative reference models 
represent onet's positive and negative value systems. Weinreich makes a distinction 
between two modes of identification: empathetic identification and idealistic 
identification.4 
Empathetic identification refers to one's de facto states of being in relation to others. 
In other words it is a sense of recognising a de facto commonality with that person. 
Individuals will have affinity with others but this does not necessarily mean that 
empathetic identification is always a positive identification. Individuals may 
recognise commonality with the other in terms of shared vulnerabilities or a 
compassionate understanding of shared failures.5 So in this way empathetic 
identification is the degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the 
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other. Weinreich also makes the distinction between current and past empathetic 
identification where past empathetic identification with another is seen as the degree 
of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other in one' s past self-image. 
In summary the ISA assumption is that : "One identifies empathetically with others, 
generally some of whom do not constitute totally positive reference models" 
Idealistic identification is one's orientation towards others in terms of aspirations and 
dissociations. In other words idealistic identification is the extent to which one 
aspires to or wishes to emulate the other in terms of the extent of "desirable" 
qualities possessed by the other. These aspirations can be deduced from one's 
aspirations as defined in terms of one's ideal self-image, in other words how one 
would like to be. Within ISA, these aspirations are directly operationalised by 
reference to construals of "me as I would like to be". From this it is possible to 
obtain idiosyncratic aspirations for oneself in terms of attributes, beliefs, skills, 
behaviours, characteristics of lifestyle that may denote what and how one wishes to 
be. Weinreich suggests that it is important to highlight two points with regard to a 
person's  ideal self-image.6 Firstly, the quality of aspiration or the "wish to emulate", 
is directly assessed by reference to the person's ideal self-image (or occasionally, 
proxies such as an admired person, or by contrast a disliked person). In this, 
semantically, the words "me as I would like to be" denote the positive orientations of 
aspirations. In this way it is fundamental to the ISA conceptualisation. 
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Second, the meaning of "idealistic identification with the other" is to be understood 
as referring to some variable degree of wishing to emulate the other which may range 
from minimal to considerable. Only when idealistic identification is considerable can 
one assume that the other is a positive reference model. The respective formal 
definition of idealistic identification with another is defined as the "degree of 
similarity between the qualities one attributes to the others and those one would like 
to possess as· part of one's ideal self-image". 7 
The term contra-identification with the other refers to the extent to which one wishes 
to dissociate from the characteristics of the other, shown as polar contrasts. As with 
idealistic identification with the other, one's contra-identification with another is a 
parametric variable for which only high values would indicate that the other in 
question might be regarded as a clear-cut negative role model. It is perhaps worth 
noting that it is possible for one to perceive "positive" role models as having 
qualities from which one would wish to dissociate. The same may be true of one's 
contra-identification where for example a Kashmiri individual may contra-identify 
with the overall ideology promoted by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF) but nevertheless idealistically identify with some of the policies being 
suggested. Contra-identification and idealistic identifications will vary over time and 
from context to context as particular issues become salient and as individual 
biographies change over time, but are likely to be relatively more stable in the 
shorter term than empathetic identification which may vary from situation to 
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situation. 8 The formal definition of one' s contra-identification with another is "the 
degree of similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those from 
which one would wish to disassociate".9 
2. Conflicts in Identifications with Others 
ISA makes the assumption that one generally has conflicts in identification with 
certain significant others and groups. Since ISA is a developmental, as well as 
socio-psychological conceptualisation it places the individual' s  biographical 
development in a socio-historical context. "What this means in practice is that, in 
accordance with the ISA definition of identity being the totality of one's self­
construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity 
between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one aspires to be 
in the future, one' s psychological state in the current moment is poised between 
one's past biographical state in the current moment, and one's wishes for the future 
projected from now." 10 Thus the social context is of fundamental importance to ISA 
conceptualisation. It follows then that the one's  empathetic identification with the 
other is located within the social context. If the individuals simultaneously wished to 
dissociate (contra-identify), conflicts in identification with the other will take place. 
"One 's  conflict in identification with another is both a function of the extent of one's 
current identification with the other and one's simultaneous wish to dissociate from 
certain characteristics of the other".1 1  Weinreich also points out that when a person's 
current empathetic and contra-identifications with the other increase so that person's 
conflicts in identification will also become greater.12 
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The ISA conceptualisation sees both the formation of new identifications and the 
resolution of conflicts in identifications as fundamental to the process of identity 
development and reformation of identity. Individuals attempt to resolve conflicts in 
identification with others striving for an "optimising" solution. They are seen to 
achieve a balance over time between resolving such conflicts and maintaining 
realistic appraisals of self and others. Attempted resolutions of specific conflicts may 
be achieved as individuals dissociate from others through decreasing empathetic 
identification with them and/or forming more positive appraisals of others and 
decreasing contra-identification with them. 
Weinreich points out that whereas Erikson drew attention in general terms to the 
synthesis and re-synthesis of earlier identifications in identity development, ISA is 
specifically concerned with the process by means of which people attempt to re­
synthesise their existing identifications and synthesise further ones with those 
already existing. These themes have been central within this research and are 
presented in the following ISA postulates: 
Postulate one: Resolution of conflicted identifications. When one's 
identifications with others are conflicted, one attempts to resolve the 
conflicts, thereby including re-evaluations of self in relation to the 
others within the limitations of one's currently existing value system. 
Postulate Two : Formation of new identifications. When one forms 
further identifications with newly encountered individuals, one 
broadens one's value system and establishes a new context for one's 
self-definition, thereby initiating a reappraisal of self and others which 
is dependent on fundamental changes in one's value system. 13 
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In his study of a group of adolescent boys and girls from two ethnic minorities, 
Weinreich found that in nearly all the cases of "West Indian" and "Asian" 
adolescents, conflicts in identifications with general representations of their own 
ethnicity were salient, despite other differences amongst the groups. 14 He attributed 
this as the outcome of dual socialisation arguing that first children form 
identifications with their parent cultural group during early primary socialisation, 
which then becomes altered through secondary socialisation through the indigenous 
culture, schooling and so on. This leads to varying degrees of conflict with some of 
the early identifications which has led to popular ideas about "identity conflicts" 
being the result of young people from ethnically marked communities being "stuck 
between two cultures." 1 5  
ISA conceptualises identity diffusion as the degree of difficulty in re-synthesising 
childhood and later identifications. That is a difficulty in incorporating new 
identifications and resolving conflicts in existing identifications, which are dispersed 
over a number of significant others. Individuals may however have difficulty in re­
synthesising identifications, incorporating new identifications and resolving conflicts 
in existing identifications. 16 The concept of identity diffusion is used to identify the 
dispersal of conflicts in identification with others. The conflicts in identification 
associated with identity diffusion are viewed as providing the impetus towards 
reappraisals of both oneself and others in question. In general, individuals will aim to 
maintain an optimal dispersion of conflicts in identifications. 17 
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Weinreich's  Bristol study has also shown that a range of self-evaluations, which can 
range from negative to positive, may accompany identity diffusion. The ISA 
definition of self-esteem takes into consideration the idea of self-construal in the 
present and the past and the continuity between both in line with the ISA definition 
of identity discussed in preceding paragraphs. As Weinreich comments : "One's self­
esteem is defined as one's overall self-assessment in terms of the continuing 
relationship between one's past and current self-images, in accordance with one' s 
value system" . 18  In some circumstances high identity diffusion may be accompanied 
by very low self-evaluation and the individuals involved may be in a state of identity 
crisis. However in other circumstances individuals may exhibit identity diffusion as a 
result of having identification conflicts and yet have moderately favourable self­
evaluation. 
3. Ego-involvement with Others 
Weinreich sees ego-involvement as the degree of overall responsiveness to the 
other. 19  He points out that empirical investigation using the concept as defined by 
ISA indicate that: firstly, one is more ego-involved with people with whom one is 
familiar (parents and siblings) than more remote individuals (for example 
acquaintances). Secondly, one may have high ego-involvement with others who, 
although remote from oneself, have a strong impact on one's sensibilities (in the case 
of the Kashmiris Maqbool Butt, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) or 
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negatively with the Indian and Pakistani leaders Narasimha Rao and Benazir Bhutto, 
respectively). 
The ISA definition of ego-involvement has brought attention to the importance of 
identity processes in people's responsiveness to entities, and both their negative and 
positive evaluations. Previously it was only possible to see one's ego-involvement in 
terms of positive connotations. The current definition leads to clarification and more 
relevant empirical meaning. Therefore formally: One's ego-involvement with 
another is defined as one' s overall responsiveness to the other in terms of the 
extensiveness both in quantity and strength of the attributes one construes the other 
as possessing. 
4. Structural Pressures on Constructs 
Constructs are developed from personal biographies, religious and cultural beliefs 
and values. Structural pressures on these constructs measure the consistency or 
stability of core evaluative dimensions of identity, which may represent cultural 
interpretations of behaviours. In other words the ISA indices of Structural Pressure 
are able to assess the centrality of people' s  values and aspirations as represented by 
their constructs, or alternatively the uncertainty and evaluative inconsistency with 
which they hold and use them. Formally, then, Weinreich defines structural pressures 
on one' s construct as "the overall strength of the excess of compatibilities over 
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incompatibilities between the evaluative connotations of attributes one makes to each 
entity by way of the one construct and one's overall evaluation of each entity". 20 
ID. CONCLUSION 
In the sections above, I have presented some main points of ISA which pertain to my 
research. ISA's open-ended framework allows for the operationalisation of concepts 
central to the research through specially designed computer programs which also 
allow for theory building. 21 In this chapter, I have presented the skeleton of my thesis 
by focusing on the ISA framework. In subsequent chapters, I will flesh out this study 
by examining the question of Kashmiri identity. I argue that ISA is a useful way of 
investigating Kashmiri identity, and later on in this study I will show what insights 
can be gained from the application of ISA. What I want to do next, however, is to 
develop the theoretical postulates concerning Kashmiri identity, which I presented in 
the introduction. 
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CHAPTER THREE: KASHMIRI IDENTITY-THEORETICAL 
POSTULATES 
I. INTRODUCTION In chapter one I examined the way in which identity has been theorised in the context of ISA. In particular, I focused on the concept of enculturation. In the previous chapter I examined the way in which ISA theorises ethnic identity, especially looking at the theoretical postulates and conceptualisation concerning the identification process as a way of understanding the complex nature by which identities are transformed. In this chapter I want to use some of these theoretical insights to introduce the main contours of Kashmiri identity. This chapter presents a review and discussion of the main influences on Kashmiri constructions of identity as a prologue to the six research postulates that will be developed in the succeeding chapters. Kashmiri identity is here conceptualised as being constructed along three main dimensions: cultural networks, religious identification and a sense of nationhood. Within these there are specific issues of redefinition of identity with regard to changing contexts, such as how individuals continue to narrate themselves into the future despite changes in their current situation(s) of community. This research focuses on the way in which constructions of cultural, religious and national identities are affected by generational and gender recontextualisations. The following sections attempt to develop these further and present the research postulates. 
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II. CULTURAL NETWORKS 
Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller suggest that ethnic cultures play a central role in 
community formation: "when ethnic groups cluster in specific areas, they establish 
their own spaces, marked by a distinctive use of housing and public areas." 1 As I 
have discussed previously there are considerable problems in defining the term 
"culture". I suggested that it is useful to think of culture not as some totality with 
fixed and sharply defined boundaries but rather as series of overlapping networks, 
which may be densely clustered around one particular element but more sparsely 
clustered around another set of elements. These elements would correspond to what 
Richard Dawkins calls memes, that is the cultural equivalents of genes, bits of 
information including beliefs and ideas. 2 For the purposes of this research I want to 
focus on memes about kinship and biraderi. It is these types of cultural relationship 
which tend to mark out the Kashmiri settlers from the Anglo-Saxon hosts. In the new 
settler environment these types of cultural relationships help individuals to organise 
community, resist exclusion and discrimination and maintain a sense of self-esteem 
and personal identity in a situation where their experiences and capabilities are 
undermined.3 Much of South Asian society in the sub-continent is organised around 
two important and linked features of social networks - Kinship and Biraderi.4 Both 
are very influential over major aspects of behaviour within the home and in the wider 
society and therefore have a very important place within the considerations of this 
research. Linked to this are extra-familial kin networks. These relationships are 
referred to as "birder". The word stems from the word birada,r, meaning brother, and 
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it is this which shapes kinship networks beyond the joint extended family. What is 
interesting is that self-definitions within the Kashmiri community in Luton continue 
to be based around pre-migration memes. I am not suggesting that there is an 
essential Kashmiri culture, which the Kashmiris carried with from Mirpur to Luton. 
Rather, I want to examine how the pre-migration memes were adapted and 
(re-)defined for the post-migration world of Luton and its environs. In other words, I 
want to investigate the claim that cultural networks (by this, I mean relations of 
kinship and the biraderi) are crucial aspects of Kashmiri collective identity. This will 
be Postulate One: Cultural networks are a central collective dimension of Kashmiri 
British identity. 
ID. RELIGION AS A COMPONENT OF PAKISTANI/KASHMIRI 
IDENTITY 
Religiosity is an important aspect of Kashmiri life and has significantly contributed 
to the reproduction of a distinct social world. The "private Islam" is difficult to 
observe whilst the "public Islam" is more visible to the observer and is institutionally 
represented by mosques. A feature of Kashmiri settlement in Luton has been the 
rapid conversion of buildings into Mosques followed by the building of purpose-built 
Mosques with associated madrasas for Quranic learning. The large-scale investment 
into Mosques is an indication of the dedication and commitment to the maintenance 
of a religious identity within a non-Islamic context. Further it reflects the importance 
placed on the continuation of a religious identity for the younger generation. 
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Religious values and practices are preserved through the construction of places of 
worship and associated religious centres of learning such as madrasas and "religious 
circles" Religion is an important marker of difference. In this way then a group 
which is defined as being different and inferior, by more powerful group, which does 
not recognize as being its equal, and denied the opportunity to assume its identity 
will rely on self conception and self-esteem focused on religious belief and practice. 
For many academics religion is not seen as separate to ethnicity but rather an integral 
feature of ethnicity. Rohit Barot points out that, where the majority community 
stigmatises ethnic minorities and their cultures as inferior to what is conventionally 
regarded as European culture, this leads to marginalisation and exclusion from the 
normal civil society. This often leads to ethnic mobilisation in which the notion of 
group solidarity based on common religion may have an important role to 
play.5According to Barot reconstructions of religious identity may take place in three 
main ways: firstly through preservation of religious values, secondly through the use 
of space, and thirdly as a result of feeling threatened. In an alien environment these 
religious identities may be reinterpreted and constructed.6 There has been 
considerable discussion in the literature on the reconstruction of religious identities. 
The recent research such as the Runnymede Trust 's Islamophobia Report talks of 
threatened identities for Muslims as a result of religious discrimination. It suggests 
that Muslims are suffering disproportionately from marginalisation and exclusion 
based on religious discrimination.7 Therefore their experience of resentment, 
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hostility, racism and prejudice makes the religious difference larger and religious identities more threatened by this added dimension of religious discrimination. According to the assimilationist assumptions, living in European secular societies would mean that for immigrants religions would be relegated to the private sphere. The assumption is that this would certainly be the case if not for the first generation of migrants then certainly for the offspring born and brought up in this country. This is what Sahgal and Yuval-Davis are suggesting when they point out that: It is likely that the mode of expression of identity through religion must be modified, and may eventually become little more than a residue, at least as a basis for activism or political mobilisation. They argue that social mobility puts a greater focus upon relations with more powerful exterior forces-relations, which see legitimacysymbolised in other, more secular ways. The new Muslim middle class in Britain will continue to undermine Islamism ( as opposed to the simple expression of religious faith as an aspect of ethnic identity). 8 Similarly Fuller and Lesser argue that Islamic/Muslim communities abroad will find that eventually this identity will be dissolved into secular Western identities. They comment that: On the one hand Islamic communities in the West will try to retain their conservative social philosophy and to preserve their values in the Western community. On the other hand with each generation it will prove increasingly difficult to maintain these practices. Muslim immigrant parents will have problems holding their teenagers to traditional social patterns as the children push for greater assimilation with Western lifestyles and attitudes - it will be nearly impossible for Islam to play the formal institutional role in daily live. 9 They suggest that as Islam becomes more secularised two forms of Islam will emerge. Firstly, full Muslim integration into European society (to the extent that 
57 
Europeans permit it) while preserving Islam as a matter of personal faith and cultural 
preference Secondly, ghetto Islam, a recreation of Islamic society within European 
society on the basis of separatism. It is clear that Fuller and Lesser do not regard 
many of the Muslims born and brought up in Europe as European. They assume that 
Europe is a clearly demarcated geographical space and its inhabitants (together with 
their large global diaspora) share a wide range of social, cultural and biological 
characteristics which mark them off as being different from non-European. European 
identity, is however, like other forms of social identity relational and negative. 
Europe defines itself in relation to what it is not. 10 Historically, Islam, has constituted 
one of the main others ofEurope.1 1  
Contrary to Saghal and Yuval-Davis and Fuller and Lesser' s observations the case of 
Muslims in Britain suggests that in fact the opposite is happening. Religion in the 
form of Islam appears to be increasingly becoming a source of public as well as 
private identity. Barot, however, suggests that this return to an Islamic fold is similar 
to the desire of Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets to emphasise the value of Islam 
more than the principle of universal political participation. 12 His assumption is that 
Islam is not political and is therefore making the distinction that Sayyid has 
discussed in his "immigrant studies model" between the host society having politics 
and the immigrants having sectarianism. 13 
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Islam appears to be growing in Britain in line with the demographic growth of the 
Pakistani/Kashmiri and Bangladeshi communities. With the passing of time since 
initial migration, the evidence appears to suggest that Islam has remained central 
within the life of the British Pakistani/Kashmiri communities. This is evidenced by 
changes in British legislation on burial rites, halal meat, dress codes in schools and 
the establishment of Islamic schools and purpose built mosques. 14 It is estimated that 
there are currently approximately one thousand Mosques in Britain and many more 
are being planned or are under construction. 
This research shows how religion continues to be central to Kashmiri ethnic identity 
in Luton. Importantly this is not the case simply for migrants but also for their 
offspring who have been born and brought up in Britain. As with other aspects of 
ethnic identity religion is redefined and modifications occur in relation to contextual 
change. As Vertovec writes: 
Ethnic ideologies comprised of selective reflections on the past, 
present and future plights of a community within a given context arise 
or are modified at certain historical junctures often marked by rapid 
social change. Religious concepts, values and practices may play
fundamental roles in the formation of such ideologies, since they 
provide points of reference or legitimisation, which hold considerable 
affective power among community members. 15  
In other words the vocabulary of religious values may help furnish the descriptions 
of identity that individuals may use in secular contexts. Thus Postulate Two states 
that: Religion is a central collective dimension of Kashmiri British identity. 
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IV. NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION 
The territory of Kashmir is divided between India and Pakistan. India has the larger 
part of Kashmir including the capital Srinagar and the valley of Kashmir. Pakistan 
controls the area known as Azad Kashmir. (See Map 1) The Kashmiri migration to 
Britain has basically been from Azad Kashmir. This division of Kashmir is disputed 
by the majority of Kashmiris. Unlike the Pakistanis in Britain with whom they 
closely share religious affiliations, the Kashmiris in Britain come from and identify 
with a homeland whose borders and control are subject to international dispute. For 
the Kashmiris the disputed nature of their "homeland" is currently a priority in terms 
of maintaining ethnic distinctiveness. As previously discussed, most research has 
started either with the notion of being Pakistani or from a particular district such as 
Mirpur and consequently has not given space for "Kashmiriyat" to be expressed. It is 
obvious, however that Kashmiri identity is not completely separate from that of 
Pakistani identity. Kashmiri identity will share the features described by Werbner i.e. 
of being British Muslims or British Asians in terms of common beliefs, culture and 
experiences. But it is the contention of the research that it is the national 
identification with the land of Kashmir and the aspirations for that territory that are 
currently an important part of Kashmiri identity and therefore separates the group 
from the Pakistanis by adding another dimension to their identity. Therefore 
Postulate Three: National identification is a central collective dimension of Kashmiri 
identity in Britain 
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V. REDEFINITION OF IDENTITY 
The above three postulates form core collective dimensions of Kashmiri identity. 
However, they do not exhaust all significant identity factors. In the following 
section, I will present postulates that focus on the individual experience of the above 
core dimensions. I am interested in how Kashmiris cope with the above collective 
identities. In other words, how do notions of "Kashmiriness" manifest themselves in 
the everyday life of individuals who call themselves Kashmiris and who are called 
Kashmiris by others? Richard Rorty suggests that we should: 
(T)hink of human minds as webs of belief and desires, of sentential 
attitudes - webs that continually reweave themselves so as to 
accommodate new sentential attitudes . . . . . . .  just assume that new ones 
keep popping up and that some of them put strains on old beliefs and 
desires. Or we may create a whole host of new beliefs and desires in 
order to encapsulate the disturbing intruder, reducing the strain which 
old beliefs and desires put on it and which it puts on them. Or we just 
unstitch, and thus erase a whole range of beliefs and desires.o16 
Rorty believes that no self can be distinct from the self-reweaving web he describes. 
In similar vein, Weinreich suggests that individuals formulate their own points of 
view on a range of topics, such as dress, music, boy and girl friends, and begin to 
scrutinise given moral imperatives. Thus in circumstances where alternative ethnic 
identities are salient young people may empathetically identify with elements of the 
alternative lifestyles and world views represented by these other salient ethnic 
groups. Therefore some partial cross ethnic identifications may occur without them 
actually acculturating and forgoing any of their ethnic allegiances. What appears to 
be happening is a process of enculturation where identifications are made with 
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respect to the majority culture within the context of their own ethnicity. This thinking 
ihas led to: postulate four: Contemporary contextual redefnition of identity is taldng 
place amongst second generation Kashmiri British youth through a process of 
enculturation rather than acculturation, in which results in high levels of self 
evaluation are maintained. 17 
Redefinitions of identity have often been misunderstood as the popular notion of 
"culture conflict" between older and younger generations. It has usually been 
negatively portrayed in the media. Take for example the often quoted issue of 
arranged marriages within South Asian communities. These individuals are depicted 
as facing the dilemma of bipolar values, to the overall detriment of identity 
development. They are seen as being "stuck between two cultures" or more recently 
rather than being stuck just being "between cultures", having to choose either the 
perceived constraining norms of the parental culture or the perceived freedom 
offered by Western values.t18 Conflicts are seen as leading to negative self-concept. 
These scenarios do not give space for the expression of separate identities or the 
persistence of ethnic identities. Rather than being seen as negative, this research sees 
conflicts in identification with significant others as being an important psychological 
impetus for personal change. It uses the ISA notion of identification conflict or the 
absence of identification conflicts to investigate. Identification conflicts may 
accompany high or low self-evaluations. So in the case of moderate self-evaluation, 
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identification conflicts may give nse to re-appraisals of self and others and 
redefinitions of identity. Postulate Five: "Culture conflictt" amongst Kashmiri 
migrants and their offspring is leading to negative self-concept. 19 
As discussed previously, identities are not singular entities. Individuals may have 
differing subject positions. In this way gender identity is seen as a composite part of 
ethnic identity. Here gender identity is being used as socially constructed and related 
to male-female dynamics that occur in everyday life, which are influenced by 
changes in the contexts in which they are negotiated. In Kashmiri society gender 
roles are clearly marked by cultural and religious traditions. The combination of 
these has fuelled images of women in Kashmiri society (as in the case of South 
Asian and particularly Muslim South Asian settler communities) as backward and 
oppressed. Generally the marker for this has been misunderstandings of male-female 
dynamics within Muslim communities Significantly women have been seen as 
lacking any agency. The differences in terms of gender dynamics have also been 
marked in terms of those women born in the subcontinent and women born and 
brought up in Britain. Weinreich argues that moral issues such as those concerning 
sex, love, marriage and family are central to the processes which underlie gender 
roles and the formation of "new" conceptions of ethnic identities. He believes that 
there is often strong conflict between primary ethnic gender roles on the one hand 
and powerful secondary identifications with other salient indigenous gender roles on 
the other. Also significant are the ways in which these gender dynamics are redefined 
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in the new context. Thus Postulate Six suggests that: Redefinitions of gender identity 
are a composite and integral part of redefinitions of ethnic identity. 
VI. CONCLUSION In this chapter, I have presented three collective postulates and three individual postulates. These six postulates will frame this research. The three collective postulates refer to communal notions ofiKashmiri identity, while the three secondary postulates are pitched at the level of the individual. In the subsequent chapter, I will present the fieldwork, which was used to investigate these postulates. Before I do this it is important to discuss the specificities of researching Kashmiris in Luton. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCHING KASHMIRIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some of the epistemological difficulties of researching ethnic minorities have already 
been referred to in previous chapters. In what follows, I address how these general 
epistemological concerns have impacted on methodological problems of studying 
Kashmiris. In this chapter, I will outline the research strategy, sample criteria, and 
issues of data collection. The aim is to clear the ground for subsequent chapters where 
I will use some of the findings to address the propositions outlined in the previous 
chapter. I will show that there is a need for an inter-disciplinary approach to the 
investigation of ethnic identities. That is, research by "mixing and matching" 
qualitative and quantitative research methods is better placed to offer an account of 
Kashmiri identities than uni-disciplinary methodologies. 
II. RESEARCH STRATEGY: AN INTER-DISCIPLINARY, MULTI­
METHOD APPROACH 
An inter-disciplinary approach was taken to the study of Kashmiri British individual 
and community identity. The research incorporated research strategies whose 
foundations lie within anthropology, sociology and social psychology. Further, it 
adopted qualitative and quantitative approaches in the multi-method style. The 
historical antagonisms between different disciplines and between proponents of 
quantitative and qualitative research are well documented in the literature. However 
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there appears to be little attempt to fuse the inter-disciplinary approach and the multi­
method approach. The research design reflects the complexity of the study of identity 
and contributes towards bridging this methodological gap. Discussion of the research 
methodology also highlights some of the particularities of researching with the Luton 
Kashmiri community and in doing so questions the use of traditional methods when 
undertaking community research of this type. Although each piece of research is 
unique there are nevertheless commonalities. We can learn from each other's 
experiences in an attempt to resolve our research questions. 
Whilst it is customary in presenting research methodology to describe the different 
phases of research undertaken it must be noted that whilst such presentations provide 
neat and tidy accounts of the conduct of research they are nothing short of 
misleading, for in this context, research is presented as a linear model with a 
beginning, a middle and an end. Yet the reality is very different and infinitely more 
complex. "The project and the methodology is continually defined and redefined by 
the researcher and in some cases by those researched". 1 For presentation and 
discussion purposes the methodological approaches have been separated but the 
intention is not to present a simplistic linear model of the methodological approaches 
adopted. In reality many of the procedures overlapped and the interviews and 
observation continued throughout the research. 
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Three inter-linked and complementary research approaches were used to investigate the identity structures and identity development of Kashmiris and a small sample of Anglo-Saxon individuals. These were observations and interviews in the ethnographic style, a biographical questionnaire in a sociological style and an ISA instrument in the social psychological style. Data collection utilised qualitative and quantitative methods. 
A. Observations and Interviews If one desires to understand what is important in terms of identity to the Luton Kashmiri community then the logical step is to consult the Kashmiris themselves. With this founding principle the research design was integrative. The intention from the beginning was to ascertain what is important in terms of identity to the Luton Kashmiris who are resident in the "Bury Park" area of the town. Early on in the research I recognised the need for understanding the wider context which impacts on Kashmiri identity. For this reason my ethnographic data was collected from a variety of sources in Luton and Azad Kashmir from 199 1  to 1 996. During this period I carried out 75 in depth interviews ( open and well as semi-structured) interviews.2 The data collected from Azad Kashmir was a product of two field trips undertaken in 199 1  and 1996. During the first fieldtrip I gathered background information and undertook participant observation and informal interviews amongst Kashmiris in Kotli, and Mirpur districts. 
68 
The second field trip involved participant observation and a number of open interviews and informal discussions with government officials, leading members of political parties as well as ordinary Kashmiris in Mirpur and Kotli districts. Observations and interviews were undertaken in order to provide Kashmiri narrative on important issues impacting on Kashmiri identity 3 and more specifically to design measuring instruments that were a reflection of the community under study. Since the Anglo-Saxon sample was seen as a " comparison sample" and was not the focus of the study, participant-observation was not carried out within the white majority community. However, interviews were carried out. The term participant-observation refers to a multitude of activities and roles: the term is only a loose and general label that covers the many varieties of participation and observation, and distinguishes them from formal interviewing or library research. Thus Everett Hughes writes, "the unending dialectic between the role of member (participant) and stranger (observer and reporter) is essential to the very concept of field work, and this all participant observers have in common: they must develop a dialectic relationship between being researchers and being participants".4 Gans identifies three types of participant-observer: 1 )  Total participant - the field worker who is totally involved emotionally in a social situation and who only after it is over becomes a researcher· again and writes down what has happened. 2) A researcher participant, who participates in a social situation but is personally only partially 
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involved, so that he can function as a researcher. 3) Total researcher, who observes 
without any personal involvement in the situation under study. 5 At various stages of 
the research I became all three types of participant-observer. I was a total participant 
whilst out shopping in "Bury Park", at weddings, funerals, children's parties and 
religious gatherings. In these situations I did not take notes until I returned home. I 
became a researcher participant whilst visiting functions at community centres, open 
community meetings or religious meetings. Only at political meetings did I become a 
total researcher. 
Frankenberg points out that to undertake participant observation the researcher must 
deliberately submit and become resocialised into another society, which is substituted 
for the researcher's own.6 Being a total participant and researcher participant at one 
level came easily to me since there was no process of submission or resocialisation. 
Although I am not a Kashmiri, but of Pakistani origin, I share some commonalities of 
culture, dress, language and religion with the Kashmiris I was observing. It is the case 
however that the researcher must make some adjustments in attitude. Although I 
made my research intention clear from the outset, the research would have been 
difficult to conduct without these commonalities, since it was because of these shared 
characteristics that I was seen as an "insider". My participation and observation was 
"approved" because I was seen as "one of them". I was not seen as a foreign intruder 
and consequently, "the fear and suspicion which always lurks in the minds of subjects 
and informants during social research in general were almost absent" 7 
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On occasions, however I was perceived as an "outsider" . This occurred most 
prominently at political meetings and in these situations I became a total researcher 
since I had no personal involvement. There were two reasons for my "outsider" 
status. Firstly, gender was an issue. Kashmiri women are not directly involved in 
political meetings and my presence went against the norms of the society. Secondly, 
my Pakistani origin was considered irregular since these meetings centred on the issue 
of independence from Pakistan and India. So in effect I was an insider and outsider 
within the same study. 
Throughout the participant-observation stage of the fieldwork I kept detailed notes. 
At the time these notes seemed irrelevant to the research aims. However in retrospect 
they were vital for establishing a holistic view of community concerns and they were 
important at the interpretation stage of the research. There are problems with 
participant-observation. Most prominently data may not be available to be observed. 
Examples include past events, privacy situations where the observer would not be 
tolerated and situations where the presence of a researcher would alter behaviour to 
give misleading impressions. 8 These sentiments were expressed by members of the 
community and exemplified by the following comments. Ms F commented, "it's so 
good to see one of us doing work on our own communities. At least you won't sell 
your own people short and make them look like uneducated fanatics". Mr N said, "I'm 
only telling you this because you understand what I'm talking about and it means as 
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much to you as it does to me. I wouldn't tell anyone else". Mrs K said, "You're OK, 
you're one of us". 
The risk with developing such close links is that personal, emotional and 
psychological detachment from the issues becomes difficult to maintain. This is one of 
the major criticisms directed at "insider" participation-observation.9 The researcher by 
being insider and participant is prone to becoming too closely identified with the 
subjects of her study and thus eroding the difference between object and subject. This 
type of criticism is however based on a positivist epistemology, which itself becomes 
subject to major critique from various positions. The abandonment of positivism must 
lead to the conclusion that total objectivity in research is impossible. There is no 
intrinsic reason why an insider-participant is more vulnerable to bias, poor judgement, 
or over-simplification than an "objective outsider-analyst" . 10 While I do not share 
completely the positivist belief of an objective knowledge, it is useful to have more 
than one account. In other words information based on positivist assumptions may 
help to provide a different texture. In an effort to avoid total reliance on insider­
participant observation, further data was collected simultaneously through interviews 
with members of the community. Interviews are an essential prerequisite for the 
methodology involved in constructing ISA instruments. The example presented in the 
Manual for Identity was used as a guide to structure the interviews. 1 1 
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As mentioned previously initial interviews were carried out with Kashmiris in Azad 
Kashmir and in Luton and with members of the majority Anglo-Saxon community in 
Luton. Interviews with the Kashmiris were of several types : informal discussion, semi­
structures interviews, consultation with respected community members, multi-person 
interviews in homes, male head of household in home, women only in a community 
centre, and younger generation of both genders in the university. Interviews with 
members of the white majority community were carried out in the university only on a 
one-to one basis. Interviews were semi-structured and they were conducted with 
some notes to direct discussion. It was important to discuss the overall aims of the 
project and also those questions which might prove sensitive. The aim had been to 
carry out individual interviews with selected members of the Kashrniri community. In 
the event the interviews soon became group discussions as other members of the 
family, friends, next door neighbours, visiting relatives and friends joined in. The same 
situation occurred during interviews with respected members of the community 
outside the home setting. This lengthened the interview process, with interviews 
lasting from one to three hours. This did however mean that the data collected was 
rich with information, which proved vital for the impressionistic accounts provided in 
the forthcoming chapters as well as corroboration of the ISA results. Further, contact 
with a number of community members for interviews meant that my work was gaining 
a credible reputation which proved vital for snowballing and accessing Kashrniri 
families during the final data collection stage. Three individual interviews and four 
group discussions were carried out with members of the Kashmiri community. Three 
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interviews were carried out with members of the white majority community on a one­
to-one basis at the University. All interviews were tape-recorded and were carried out 
in the interviewee's  desired language. 12 During the interviews some important 
features in the person's development were noted: 
Background and family life: which included issues of generational interaction with 
parents, members of own ethnic group and other ethnic groups. Present self and 
future self: emphasis here was on how respondents saw themselves at the time of the 
interviews and how they felt about themselves for the future; their aspirations, role 
models and reference groups. Influences on socialisation: which included significant 
people, culture and religion. The importance of these on value systems in a person's 
development. Views on marriage and gender interaction were also addressed. 
Views on society: for the Kashmiri sample views on their own society were discussed 
in the context of the majority white society and in the case of the Anglo-Saxon views 
on the Kashmiri community as well as opinions of their own community were 
ascertained. Opinions about living in the United Kingdom and Luton, issues of 
nationality and the political situation in Kashmir were also addressed. 
Constructive research must take into account the value systems, belief systems, 
customs and religious systems of the individuals/community that the researcher is 
working with. These systems are usually repeatedly expressed in common phrases and 
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words, as well as embedded in institutions and organisations. 13 Amongst the Kashmiri 
group certain words such as izzat, biraderi, JKLF and Islam commonly recurred. 
Amongst the Anglo-Saxon sample John Major, the Conservative Party, the Church 
recurred. The intention from the start was to identify what in terms of identity was 
important to the two samples. 14 The data collected was used to formulate three 
measuring instruments :  1) a biographical questionnaire for the Kashmiri sample. Since 
the Anglo-Saxon sample was seen only as a comparison group and a profile of the 
Anglo-Saxon sample is easily obtainable from documented sources, it was felt that a 
biographical questionnaire for the Anglo-Saxon group would not add to information 
already available. 2) An ISA instrument for the Kashmiri sample. 3)  And an ISA 
instrument for the Anglo Saxon sample. 
Instruments were created for the older and younger generation respondents in both 
samples in order to make them more meaningful to individuals. At the interview stage 
there appeared to be differences in terms of important issues for the younger and 
older generation. A closer investigation, however, revealed that these were not 
sufficiently significant to warrant two separate identity instruments, especially since 
ISA allows differing opinions on the same issue to be represented by means of the 
same instrument. Thus in retrospect it was felt that the creation of older and younger 
generation variations in the instruments was unnecessary and time consuming. 
Further, at the data collection stage, the use of two different instruments created some 
suspicion, particularly for the older generation who felt that younger members of the 
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family were being asked to comment about the elders. In one instance the male 
member of the household requested to see the younger generation instrument before 
granting permission for his son to complete it. Participant observation and 
interviewing led to overall familiarity with the "Bury Park" area and informal 
interaction with the Kashmiri community. Also, importantly, it established 
relationships with members of the Kashmiri community which were vital for accessing 
Kashmiri families in order to complete the biographical questionnaire and the ISA 
instruments. 
B. The Measuring Instruments 
1. The Biographical Questionnaire 
A biographical questionnaire for individuals within Kashmiri households was 
developed to collect personal data, migration data, residential details and data on the 
maintenance and nature of links with Azad Kashmir. The questionnaire (see Appendix 
4.t1) was designed after considerable reference to questionnaire and survey design 
methods. Household surveys, the Census and the questionnaire developed for the 
Health and Lifestyles Project under the auspices of the Health Education Authority 
were all used as examples, with particular reference to demographic questions. 15 The 
final questionnaire was a combination of analytical and relational techniques set up 
specifically to show: 1) The biographical details of the Kashmiri community. These 
helped to identify individuals who complied with the sample criteria, and to build a 
profile of the community. Further results helped locate the Kashmiris within migration 
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and settlement literature discussed in chapters three and four. A detailed description 
of the biographical data is provided in this chapter. 2) Associations between selected 
variables. The associations provide the basis for exploring explanations. They 
contribute towards substantiating the research propositions and provide vital 
information for interpreting the ISA results. Some of the questions were also intended 
for descriptive analysis. The advantage of these open-ended questions is that they 
allow a range of individual expression and thus provide a rich data source. This can 
provide important additional data to that obtained by the fixed range questions. 
Therefore not all the questions are intended to show causal relationships between one 
variable and the other . Opinions, preferences and perceptions show associations and 
correlations, which together with historical details help to build a profile of the 
Kashmiri community in Luton. All this data was vital for interpretation of ISA results. 
The questionnaires were tested in several stages. Kashmiri students at the University, 
family and friends were approached to answer the initial questionnaire. Although not 
all these respondents were Kashmiri, testing the questionnaires revealed that several 
questions were poorly worded and that it was necessary to make changes to the order 
of questions to improve the overall structure of the questionnaire. 
A pilot study was then carried out in conjunction with the ISA pilot. 16 Eleven 
Kashmiri households were approached and seventeen questionnaires completed ( eight 
men, nine females, seven older generation and ten younger generation). Respondents 
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were asked to comment on their overall feelings about the questionnaire. All 
respondents mentioned that the questionnaire was too long and cumbersome. This 
fact was aggravated as respondents were also expected to complete the ISA 
instrument after completing the biographical questions. They also felt that some of the 
questions were ambiguous. Selected questions were removed and others were 
reworded. The result was a more concise questionnaire, which took less time to 
complete. This increased participation of responses by reducing respondent fatigue17  . 
The final questionnaire asked a total of seventy.five questions and took between an 
hour and an hour and a half to complete. 1 8  
The original intention had been to ask respondents to complete the biographical 
questionnaire with the interviewer. (ISA instrument on their own with the interviewer 
present for guidance purposes only). However in the event a strict interviewing 
procedure could not be adhered to. Individuals within the households had different 
requirements. Some respondents chose to complete the questionnaire on their own, 
some with the interviewer present for guidance purposes only, whilst others relied on 
the interviewer to take down responses as they read a duplicate questionnaire. 
Furthermore in some cases the interviewer had to verbally translate the questions for 
the non•English speaking respondents. There were therefore inconsistencies in the 
way that questionnaires were answered. 19 
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Early recognition of these problems meant a constant interview technique was quickly 
established. Hence any inconsistencies resulting from the misinterpretation of 
questions are likely to be perpetuated throughout the study and therefore the data can 
be regarded as reasonably comparable. The above problems were not encountered at 
the pilot stage of the inquiry. This may have been a reflection of the small size of the 
pilot sample. A larger pilot sample may have brought to light some of the above 
problems in advance. 
When all the replies had been collected the responses were analysed using the SPSS 
computer programme. A prerequisite of data entry using SPSS is that the questions 
should be coded and labelled. The questions had been coded from the outset to ease 
data entry. The coded questions were labelled and entered into the SPSS computer 
programme for statistical analysis. The SPSS computer programme enables data from 
surveys to be analysed fully and flexibly. It includes a wide range of procedures for 
statistical analysis and provides facilities for tables and graphs.2° For the purpose of 
this research SPSS was used to: 
• Examine the basic biographical features of the respondents and summarise 
the spread of the data by using simple frequencies. Frequencies were carried out for 
personal details, motives for migration and migration data, and residential details. 
This was done to establish a biographical profile of the community but also to 
identify patterns of chain migration and settlement. The frequency data was not 
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symmetrical and any further statistical analysis required a non-parametric statistical 
test.21 
• Identify associations between selected variables. Cross tabulation was used 
to identify frequencies of association for gender and generation with respect 
to selected coded variables. 
• Assess the degree of association (significance) between the cross-
tabulated variables selected. Since the data was nominal and non-parametric the Chi­
square test was used. There are a number of restrictions to the test. Data must be in 
frequencies (i.e. the number of discrete objects occurring in different categories), 
categories must be mutually exclusive to avoid double counting ( cannot have 
answered more than one). If the number of categories is greater than two, no more 
than one in five of the expected frequencies should be less than five and none should 
be less than one, and if the number of categories is two both the expected frequencies 
should be five or larger. 
2. The ISA Instrument 
"Custom designed" personal psychological ISA instruments were created after the 
semi-structured probing interviews mentioned above (see Appendix 4.2 for the 
Kashmiri instruments and Appendix 4.3 for the Anglo-Saxon instrument). These semi­
structured probing interviews were undertaken to assess the individual' s  appraisal of 
self, of others and of significant aspects of his or her social world, such as institutions, 
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religion, customs and value systems which have been important influences within the 
person's life. Since one's identity is made up of partial identifications with significant 
others, it is essential that the entities should contain a judicious mix of such significant 
others and component aspects of self-image, certain of which are mandatory for 
ISA.22 Since primary identifications were with family, relatives, children, elders, 
religious leaders, mosques and political figures, and centred on interaction with the 
opposite gender, these were included. At the open interview Kashmiri individuals 
were asked to identify important white majority social groups and institutions which 
have had and indeed are having an impact on their lives. These represent the 
individual's social worlds and provide broader biographical context. Accordingly, 
white majority institutions, political parties and people were included. Common 
features of the interviews were used to develop a number of "entities" Common 
modes of verbal expression were noted and used to develop "constructs" which 
measure the individual's construal of self, others and significant influences on their 
life. 
Although most of the constructs were elucidated from the interviews some were 
supplied. Such constructs are in a sense bipolar, since one pole can only be used to 
differentiate people when it is contrasted with another characteristic e.g. pole one 
might be weak minded and the contrast pole two might read strong willed.23 
Weinreich points out ·that since ISA ascertains the individual's value system, full use 
of this facility should be made by including, alongside quite usual constructs, such as 
8 1  
"masculine-feminine", the more subtle ones for which some individuals would choose 
the other pole. It is often more revealing to avoid "obvious" bipolar constructs and to 
replace them with ones that allow for both "polar" characteristics to be designated 
e.g. masculine-not at all masculine: feminine-not at all feminine. 
An essential first step towards the creation of the final ISA instrument was piloting 
the instruments with a small cross section of the respondents. This was carried out 
simultaneously with the piloting of the biographical questionnaire. The intention was 
to ensure that the instruments contained significant entities, appropriate constructs, 
overall understandability of the instruments and time required to complete the 
instruments. With this intention a semi-standard instrument containing entities and 
constructs was developed for older and younger generations within the Kashmiri and 
Anglo-Saxon samples. The Kashmiri instrument was offered in English and Urdu in 
order to optimise understanding and meaningfulness of the responses. 
Eleven Kashmiri households were visited and seventeen instruments completed ( eight 
men, nine women, seven older generation and ten younger generation). Five members 
of the white majority community completed instruments (three men, two women, 
three younger members and two older members). All interviews with respondents 
from the white majority community took place at the university. The respondents 
were asked to rate the entities on all the constructs using a seven-point centre zero 
rating scale and were asked to comment on the significance of the entities, 
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appropriateness of the constructs, overall understandability of the instrument, and length of the instruments. After some interviews it became apparent that some of the entities were ambiguous. They were not relevant to the respondents. A common complaint was that the instruments were too lengthy and time consuming. This limited the accuracy of the responses, as respondents became tired towards the end of the instrument. Some individuals failed to complete the instrument. As mentioned above the Kashmiri instrument had been translated into Urdu to make it more meaningful to those respondents who were unable to read English. However, many of the Kashmiri respondents of the older generation complained that the written Urdu was a classical written Urdu and not an everyday spoken Urdu. These comments are best expressed by one respondent, Mr L, who said: Yes of course I can read Urdu, but not this Urdu. My Father taught me to read Urdu and he wasn't even an educated man. To understand this Urdu you have here (the instrument) I would need a university degree in Urdu. None of the people you will be interviewing will understand this because they are from rural villages not universities. Reassessment based on the pilot study and respondents' comments led to the instruments being re-evaluated. Ambiguous entities were removed and replaced by more Luton Kashmiri specific ones. For example the entity Mosques was regarded as too general and was replaced by the specific named Mosques in Luton. The length of the instruments were reduced and the Kashmiri instruments retranslated to reflect 
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more precisely the Urdu spoken by the Luton Kashmiris. Retranslation proved time 
consuming and expensive and with hindsight a cost that might have been prevented 
through better consultation on instrument design with members of the community. 
Entities were developed to reflect Kashmiri primary identification and social and 
interactional influences. The final instruments comprised twenty-eight entities, which 
are here recategorised for clarity. Entities are only listed for the Kashmiri sample. The 
same overall principles were used to develop equivalent entities for the Anglo-Saxon 
sample. Entities relating to Kashmiris were included within the Anglo-Saxon 
instrument to identify Anglo-Saxon perceptions of Luton Kashmiris. Appendix 4.3 
shows the Anglo-Saxon instruments. The following entities were chosen for aspects 
of self-image. These are mandatory for assessing identity parameters with ISA. 
Me as I am now ( current self image) 
Me as I would like to be (ideal self image or ego ideal) 
Me as I was when I left Azad Kashmir (past self image - older generation) 
Me as I was when I left school (past self image - younger generation) 
The person's ideal self-image provides the basis for designating one's value system. 
This is a prerequisite for calculating one' s evaluations of all the other entities that one 
construes; the extent to which other people form one's positive or negative reference 
groups; and the extent that one has identification conflicts. His current and past self 
images are required to estimate his level of self esteem, as well as to delineate one' s 
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patterns of empathetic identifications with others in terms of both his past and current 
self construals.24 The following entities were chosen as mandatory entities for 
reference purposes, such as assessing the validity of results. 
Person in the community I admire 
Person in the community I dislike 
Here the community refers to the respondents' own community. These mandatory 
entities are additional anchoring features of identity that provide checks on the validity 
ofthe identity indices calculated for each respondent. 25 
Other entities chosen for "significant others" were: 
My children born in the UK ( older generation) 
My parents 
My children born in Azad Kashmir ( older Kashmiris) 
My children to be born in the future (younger Kashmiris) 
Significant others chosen for ethnic identification were: 
Young English women in Luton 
Young English men in Luton 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
Young Asian men in Luton 
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Young Asian women in Luton 
Kashmiri music ( older generation) 
Bangra music (younger generation) 
Luton University 
British Media 
Apache Indian (younger generation) 
Actual evaluative connotations and use of the cognitions and beliefs in construing 
significant others and symbols are ascertained within ISA for each respondent thereby 
determining explicitly the differences between individual respondents and their value 
systems. 
Entities chosen for cultural representations were: 
Kashmiri Biraderi 
Pakistan/Kashmir welfare association 
Entities chosen for religious representations: 
Mosque Noor 
Luton Islamic Society 
Madina Masjid 
Jammia Masjid 
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Entities chosen for political representations were: 
JKLF 
Muslim Conference 
John Major 
Narasimha Rao 
Benazir Bhutto 
In retrospect some of the entities were ambiguous even after the pilot. Many Anglo­
Saxon respondents mentioned that some entities were irrelevant to them. Increasing 
the number of semi-structured interviews at the instrument creation stage might have 
reduced this problem, but time constraints involved in a study of this scale prevented 
this. Excluding some of the entities would have reduced the size of the instruments. 
As mentioned above, the constructs were developed after verbal expressions at the 
interview stage but some were stated and intended to touch upon the issues delineated 
in the propositions. The constructs for the Kashmiri instrument are listed below. The 
equivalent constructs for the Anglo- Saxon instrument can be found in Appendix 4.3. 
1 I have warm feelings towards I don't like at all 
2 is/was strongly English in is/are very Asian in my/their ways 
my/their ways and keeps away from English customs 
3 is/was/are strongly Pakistani in is/was/are strongly Kashmiri in 
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their attitudes and customs and 
see Kashmiri as the same as Pakistani 
4 speak/s English only because it is 
necessary for employment in the UK 
5 speak/s traditional language because 
it is an important part of heritage 
6 believes that traditional systems of 
arranged marriages are fundamental 
to being Asian 
7 believe/s that parents and elders 
should be treated with special 
deference 
8 feel/s that Kashmir should be 
reunited and independent of both 
Pakistan and India 
9 believes and respects izzat 
10 feel/s deeply committed to 
the system of biraderi 
11 outside the home prefers 
to wear traditional dress 
12 prefer/s the company of men 
in leisure time 
13 enjoy/s spending leisure time 
with women 
their everyday life and regard 
Kashmiri attitudes and customs to 
be different from Pakistani customs 
speak/s English to become fully 
integrated into English society 
speak/s traditional language only 
because of pressure from family and 
biraderi 
believe/s that in today's society it of 
is better to have the freedom to 
choose one's own marriage partner 
feel/s that parents/elders should be 
treated as equals and have to earn 
special respect 
think/s that all of Kashmir should 
be part of Pakistan 
think/s that doing the right thing 
according to one's sense of morality 
is more important than izzat 
believe/s in the freedom for 
individuals to follow their own 
independent life 
outside the home prefers wearing 
western style dress 
would spend time with men only 
at work or school/college/university 
prefer/s to mix with women 
only at work or at 
school/ college/university 
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14 feel/s Muslims should feel/s Muslims should be 
only many Muslims able to many non-Muslims 
1 4  prefers to socialise with Muslims would socialise with all Asians 
1 6  is/are strongly Kashmiri and is/are Kashmiri bur feel/s more 
would be happier in Kashmir at home in Luton 
1 7  feel/s happy with British would feel happier with Kashmiri 
nationality nationality 
1 8  feel/s that a Kashmiri should believe/s that Kashmiris should be 
only marry a Kashmiri able to marry non-Kashmiris 
19  feel/s more at home in Kashmir feel/s more at home in Britain 
20 want/s the younger generation believe/s that the younger 
to think of Kashmir as their generation should think of 
homeland Britain as their homeland 
The constructs posed some problems. Most individuals mentioned problems whilst 
they were answering the instrument. Others noted their comments on the rating sheet 
or at the end of the instrument in the comments section provided. Respondents 
emphasised the restrictive nature of the constructs. Some felt that by rating some 
entities towards one pole they were committing themselves to that pole whereas the 
issue was wider and warranted discussion. 
Construct six was recurringly referenced as being too constraining. An often noted 
postscript was that there should be parents' choice but with own demands 
considered.26 One respondent wrote: 
Marriages these days aren't as cut and dry as this question is 
suggesting and arranged as everyone imagines where two people are 
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thrown together on the wedding day without consultation beforehand. 
Although parents make the final choice we have a lot of freedom in the 
selection of the marriage partner, after all parents are aware that it is 
our life. 
Although problematic for the constructs these postscripts were essential at the 
interpretation stage of the research. Construct eleven was also seen as being too 
restrictive and it was often explained that: 
Western dress is OK as long as it is Islamic dress which refers to 
modesty for example long loose skirts for women which cover the 
whole body and not revealing mini skirts or tight jeans. 
Constructs twelve and thirteen were also problematic for most respondents as they 
mentioned that socialising with the opposite gender was prohibited only if that person 
was not part of the extended family. For example one respondent wrote : "My brother 
and father are men and yes I spend leisure time with them outside of school so in that 
sense I do socialise with men so this question is irrelevant". A further problem of the 
constructs was that often the respondents were being asked to make crude 
generalisations about deep-seated emotional issues which it was clear in the 
interviews were causing considerable "soul searching" . 
Despite these problems with the constructs it is important to note that whilst 
identifying some of the problems of ISA instrument design they also provided 
important insights into the wider nature of some of the issues being investigated, in 
turn providing significant input for interpretation of the results. 
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The respondents were asked to rate (construe) each entity with each construct by 
marking their response on a seven-point centre zero scale. The intention was to best 
reflect their views of each entity, including facets of self-image in relation to the 
construct. One design limitation of the instrument is that not all entities are relevant 
to the construct. In such cases and where the constructs were irrelevant to the 
respondents, they were requested to mark the centre zero point on the scale. This 
method is obligatory for the ensuing computational analysis. 27 The ISA instruments 
described were analysed using the Identity Exploration computer software. The 
principal generic names of the software in the IDEX system are IDEX-IDIO 
(Idiographic) and IDEX-NOMO (Nomothetic).28 These are described below. 
The IDEXPC forms part of the IDEX-IDIO (Idiographic) software. This software 
allows the user to: 
• create and edit identity instruments 
• display and check such instruments on screen 
• print the instruments 
• enter data on screen 
• analyse the data from an identity instrument, that is to compute the identity 
indices for individuals 
• display on screen the full format of identity indices 
• accumulate multiple data files and transfer the protocol data files to the IDEX 
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IDIO (Idiographic) mainframe software 
• store the instruments for future use and reference. 
The responses from the printed instruments were entered into the PC computer using 
a template instrument. Each instrument was designated a stem code based on 
sequence of the instrument, ethnicity, generation and gender of respondents. Multiple 
data files (protocols) were created from the many respondents who were transferred 
to the mainframe IDEX programmes. The IDEX-IDIO programme calculates 
empirically assessed indices for the individual case based on the value and belief 
system of the respondent. The resultant idiographic analysis can be: 
• examined and interpreted in terms of theoretical postulates concerning 
process, structure and context in orcjer to derive empirically grounded theoretical 
propositions for the individual. 
• utilised to make comparisons between individuals and groups using the IDEX 
NOMO (Nomothetic) computer software. As with the Idiographic case, examination 
of theoretical postulates with reference to the distinctive group commonalities of 
identity characteristics may lead to the development of empirically grounded 
propositions for the groups in question. 
IDEX-NOMO (Nomothetic) permits collation of information derived from the IDEX­
IDIO software for the comparative analysis of categories of respondents classified 
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according to the needs of the research, for example according to ethnicity, generation 
or gender. IDEX-IDIO normalises or standardises identity indices to scales so that 
they may be directly compared from individual to individual and group to group. 
Since the indices are standardised, any idiosyncrasies in respondents' different style in 
use of the rating scales or in different values systems of the respondents are 
eliminated. The following tasks can be performed on a set of data generated by the 
IDEX-IDIO programme: 
• The tabulation of the mean values of these indices for each specified group 
according to the chosen criteria 
• The graphical display of the mean values of such indices for selected groups. 
• Analysis of variance 
• The abstraction of specified indices for selected groups, to a separate data file, 
for further analysis by other statistical packages. 
IDEX-NOMO was used to tabulate mean values of the indices for specified groups. 
Two way analysis of variance was computed and graphical displays of mean values 
were obtained for presentation using selected groups' criteria. 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) examines the effects of independent variables on the 
dependent variable. As mentioned above, ANOV A is available within the IDEX­
NOMO computer software. Three-way ANOV A was used to make comparisons 
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between Kashmiri older and younger individuals and Anglo-Saxon older and younger individuals for a general comparison between the two groups. Two way ANOV A was used to examine the interaction between the independent factors of generation and gender for the Kashmiri individuals on the different identifications (entities) using selected indices (dependent variable). The target entities selected were current diffusion, past diffusion, current evaluation and past evaluation. A further eight indices were chosen in relation to selected entities. The indices chosen were ego-involvement, ideal identification, contra ­identification, current empathetic identification, past empathetic identification, identity conflicts based on the current self, identity conflicts based on the past self, evaluation of self and others. The index of structural pressure was used to investigate the respondents' consistency in using the constructs and identifying the centrality of people's values and aspirations as they are represented by their constructs, or alternatively the uncertainty and evaluative inconsistency with which they hold and use them.29 The results of analysis of variance and discussion are presented in chapters eleven and twelve. 
ill. SAMPLE CRITERIA The sampling criteria for the Biographical questionnaire and the ISA instrument was that wherever possible each Kashmiri household should contain individuals who were born in Azad Kashmir (older generation) and their offspring who were born in Britain 
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or came to live in Britain as babies or young children (younger generation). They were Muslim Kashmiris of both genders. The Anglo-Saxon sample was selected according to age. Individuals above thirty were considered to be older generation and those below thirty as the younger generation. Given that the Kashmiri community's statistical profile is submerged within that of the Pakistanis it is impossible to look at probability based sampling techniques since it is not possible to extract data specific to Kashmiris. There are no accurate parameters for the population. Census data have traditionally formed one of the most important sources of information in this type of study. One problem encountered when using the census data is the problem of classification. There is a danger of generalising about groups which share a common classification. In the census, for example, people born in the New Commonwealth are classed as a single population but in reality this forms a broad group of people from well over twenty countries including India and Pakistan. Similarly census data only provides us with estimates of the size and the location of the Pakistani community in Luton. 30 The Kashmiris are not referenced as a separate group and come within numbers enumerated as being Pakistani. Thus the census data can provide nothing more than an indication of the location of the Pakistani community in Luton of which a high proportion are Kashmiri. In view of this, extreme caution has to be used when using the census data for comparative purposes. Further, the Kashmiri community is not homogeneous but is composed of many clan groups 95 
and Islamic denominations. This makes it impossible to obtain a structured sample and 
thus mitigates the use of probability sampling. There is also a widely held belief that 
some degree of under-enumeration of immigrant groups in the United Kingdom has 
occurred. Also the UK census only provides a decennial record, which significantly 
increases the unreliability of data. 
A major technique used that can be used is of snowballing based on community 
networks where a few appropriate individuals have been located and then asked for 
the names of addresses of others who might also fit the sampling requirements. Ecob 
and William and Chaturvedi and McKeigue have highlighted the use of the electoral 
register in identifying Asian names. If this approach is repeated a number of times it 
can yield substantial numbers. 3 1  
Snowballing techniques have been widely criticised as not fully representing the 
population of concern. This type of community research is heavily dependent on the 
researcher's judgement because of the constraints over access as discussed previously. 
It is anticipated that by monitoring the responses it will be possible to obtain a fair 
sample of older and younger generation Muslim Kashmiris of both genders. Therefore 
the final sample will be representative within its own parameters in terms of 
information which should give an indication of both the diversity and commonality of 
views. 
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In an attempt to maintain this balance I tried to obtain as wide a spread of individuals 
as possible by using a second technique to complement snowballing. A variety of 
registers were used to map the location of Kashmiri families to give a spread beyond 
those produced through snowballing. 
The electoral register of 1991 was used to determine the scatter of Muslim 
households in Luton. An analysis of names has often been used in community studies 
to provide community based sampling frames. 32 Many Muslim names are distinctive 
and easily distinguishable because of their Quranic origin. Households can be 
identified through their Muslim names. However there are significant methodological 
problems with using the electoral register: 
• data becoming unreliable very quickly due to the movement of households 
• under registration 
• it has been difficult in distinguishing between Bangladeshi, Pakistani and 
Kashmiri names. 
Another valuable information resource is the funeral register. There are several funeral 
committees in Luton serving each community. These committees take responsibility 
for sending back bodies to Azad Kashmir for burial. The committee has a concise list 
of names and addresses of Kashmiri households in Luton. 
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A third invaluable but little known data source is the Mosque Register. The Mosque 
register is used to record families that make regular monthly contributions (chunda) 
to the upkeep of the Mosque. To corroborate the information in the electoral register 
and to identify households that complied with the sample criterion, key members of 
the Luton Mosque committee who record this data were approached. Through their 
record keeping they have an intimate knowledge of each Muslim family in the area 
and were able to help in identifying Kashmiri households that reflected the 
requirements of the sample criteria. Such a compilation of data provides a unique 
body of information on residential distributions of Kashmiri households. They have 
not hitherto been adequately utilised in research of this type. Thus with the additional 
information from the internal community registers the data extracted from the 
electoral register can be reliably used to depict the spread of the Kashmiri community 
in Luton. 33 
There were however issues in using Mosque registers which a researcher needs to be 
aware of In Luton for instance there are three main Mosques broadly reflecting 
particular ethnic nationalities and Islamic denominations. The information obtained 
from the initial open interviews was invaluable in identifying which Mosque reflected 
the overall Kashmiri religious commitment. With a few exceptions the majority of the 
Kashmiris identify with the Jammia Masjid which is the large purpose built central 
Mosque in ''Bury Park". 
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Having ascertained the spread of Kashmiri households in Luton the strategy was to 
collect data centrifugally. That means working from within the community building on 
links already established and networking the community. This involved some "cold 
calling" to complement the snowballing technique. The intention was to visit 
approximately thirty households in order to complete a biographical and identity 
instrument for two or three members within the household. The sample comprised 
110 individuals. The table below shows the breakdown of data for the sample by 
ethnicity, generation and gender. A more detailed profile of the sample is provided in 
Chapter Ten. 
Table 4.t1: Ethnicity, Generation and Gender of the Sample. The sample of 
respondents who completed the biographical questionnaire and the ISA instruments. 
Ethnicity 
Gender 
Kashmiris 
70 
Anglo-Saxon 
40 
Male 28 15 
Female 42 25 
Ethnicity x Generation 
Older Male 18 8 
Older Female 19 15 
Younger Male 
Younger Female 
1 0  
23 
7 
1 0  
As mentioned previously in addition to the above respondents I also collected data 
from 7 5 other respondents using an ethnographic methodology. This ethnographic 
date was collected in Luton during 1 992-1 996 and from Azad Kashmir during field 
trips in 1991 and 1 996. 
IV. DATA COLLECTION 
Data collection used quantitative and qualitative methods. There are distinct 
advantages to be gained from the juxtaposition and integration of these two styles of 
research.34 Quantitative and qualitative methods were also combined with a case study 
approach. "Using a variety of data collection techniques and methods allows more 
rounded, holistic study than with any other design". 35 Also "different kinds of 
information about man and society are gathered most fully and economically in 
different ways, and the problem under investigation dictates the methods of 
investigation" 36 
The first phase of the research involved "getting into" the Kashmiri community in 
Luton. Fundamentally, access involves getting permission to conduct research in a 
particular setting. This process involved negotiation and renegotiation with the 
"gatekeepers" of the community. The procedure of negotiation and renegotiation 
continued throughout the research. Commenting on Geer' s work Van Maanen points 
out that access to the ·research site is not a one off event; it is instead a social process 
that occurs throughout the research project. Indeed the access that a researcher 
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obtains influences not only the physical accessibility but also the development of design, collection, analysis and dissemination phases of the investigation. 37 Gatekeepers are particularly important in relation to getting access to the community. In most cases they are able to determine the success or failure of a research project. This may hinder and control the direction of the research. In the course of the research gaining access of two types and was undertaken at different stages of the study: • Gaining credibility from the community gatekeepers to gain access to Kashmiri households and to promote the legitimacy of the research. These gatekeepers were community leaders, leading members of Mosques, welfare organisations and political parties in Luton. All were men. These gatekeepers were the main source of initial contact into the community and offered the names and addresses of families who would be willing to co-operate with the interviews. • Gaining credibility with household/family gatekeepers. Once the names and addresses of families had been obtained using the methods described above and from the community gatekeepers, initial contact was made by telephone and an appointment was arranged with families. It proved essential during the introductory conversation to mention where I had got the telephone number. Once families knew that community leaders, relatives or friends had recommended them, conversations 
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flowed more freely. Where telephone numbers were not supplied or were unavailable, 
visits were made unannounced. At times the women of the household were reluctant 
to be interviewed until the male head of the house had given his permission for the 
discussion to take place. Often I had to get the permission of the male head of the 
house before I could proceed with the interviewing. The household/family 
gatekeepers were usually the grandfather, father, eldest son or on occasion an uncle. 
In some cases negotiation was delayed by the household/family gatekeeper being 
unavailable. In such cases further appointments were made for a mutually convenient 
time. In only one case was permission for interview refused. The cause was stated as 
the male head of household not approving of the sensitive nature of the questions. 
Interviews with the Anglo-Saxon sample and the initial open interviews with women 
and offspring of both gender in settings other than the household did not necessitate 
negotiations with household gatekeepers and consequently were less time consuming. 
The impact of the ethnicity, class, language and gender of the researcher are well 
documented as being potential barriers to research in particular environments. 
"Access is shaped by the cultural and ascriptive differences between the field 
researcher and the researched. Where these differences are minimal, access and even 
acceptance are likely to be enhanced, but where the differences are large, participation 
opportunities may be constrained severely and even eliminated" 38 "Literature on 
fieldwork processes does not adequately address all the specificities ( entering the 
field, and developing relationships of exchange and trust) of conducting research with 
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ethnic minorities. Further there is very little information on the unique conditions 
faced by minority scholars conducting research in minority communities" . 39 Rhodes 
suggests that there has been little discussion in the British literature on issues of race 
and its role in the interviewing process.40 American research has been more 
forthcoming on this debate and has highlighted the hostility and distrust among 
minority people towards researchers who are "outsiders". For example Blauner and 
Wellman point to the growing hostility in many black ghettos.41 Moore's account of 
the history of a study on Mexican Americans reveals community suspicion against 
Anglo researchers. 42 A common complaint was, "Why is it always Anglos who study 
us, why can't it be one of us?" Some of these suspicions can be overcome by being an 
"insider".43 Distrust can arise where individuals have "two mutually incompatible 
world views" Anderson references the work of John Gwaltney a black anthropologist 
who has written about the mistrust of white social scientists expressed by black men 
and women.44 They reported, "I wouldn't want to talk to any anthropologist or 
sociologist or any of those others if they were white because whatever I said they 
would write down what they felt like, so I might as well save my breath". Another 
said, "We know white folks but they do not know us, and that's just how the Lord 
planned the thing. Now you know they are great ones for begging you to tell them 
what you think. But you know, only a fool would really do that". Black people may 
be inhibited in their communications to a white interviewer not simply because they 
feel that communications will be passed through a white cultural filter, but that there 
are dimensions of the black experience that are invisible to the white interviewer who 
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possess neither the language nor the cultural equipment either to elicit or understand 
the experience. 45 As Ladner points out "Blacks have always been measured against an 
alien set of norms. As a result they have been considered to be a deviation from the 
ambiguous white middle class model, which itself has not always been clearly 
defined". 46 
To avoid research which has come across as racist and patronising proponents of anti­
racist research in America and Britain have emphasised the importance of matching 
interviewers and respondents by a series of social characteristics such as race and 
more recently ethnicity. The idea has been for more inclusive research incorporating 
the experiences and perspectives of minority groups through the conducting of 
research by minority scholars themselves. Accordingly Blauner and Wellman point out 
that "there are aspects of the racial phenomena, however, that are particularly 
difficult, if not impossible, for a member of the oppressing group to grasp empirically 
and formulate conceptually".47 These barriers are existential and methodological as 
well as political and ethical. We refer here to nuances of culture and group ethos; to 
the meaning of oppression and especially psychic relations; to what is called the 
Black, the Mexican American, the Asian and the Indian experience. 
Similarly Zinn argues that field research conducted by minority scholars with 
minorities has some empirical and methodological advantages which are summarised 
as follows. Firstly, the "lenses" through which they see social reality may allow 
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minority scholars to ask questions and gather information others could not.48 
"Undoubtedly, white social scientists are as capable of engaging in race research as 
their non-white colleagues even though their everyday experiences differ. However 
because they come to the task with different backgrounds they are likely to see 
different problems and pose different questions. The intellectual and practical 
concerns may overlap, yet their analysis and recommendations will almost necessarily 
differ insofar as these are tempered by differences in the individual sense of urgency 
and conception of the possible. The results of these differing perspectives for what 
appears as interpretations of the urban world are profound".49 Secondly, insider 
research is less apt to encourage distrust and hostility and the experience of being 
excluded from the communities or of being allowed to "see" what they want them to 
see. Thirdly, white researchers often lack insight into the nuances of behaviour. This is 
not to say that researchers who come from the community being researched do not 
experience problems. It is just that the problems are different. 
As discussed above a sense of commonality in terms of racial identity and ethnicity 
with the respondents was very important. This was exemplified by one of the first 
questions the respondents, particularly the older generation, asked me: "Are you a 
Kashmiri?" which was closely followed by "Are you from Luton?" and "Are you a 
Muslim?" It was clear that the researcher's ethnicity was important to the respondents. 
Being from a similar culture (Pakistani origin) and common religion mattered to the 
respondents. Often initial conversations with community leaders, household/family 
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gatekeepers and the respondents involved a review of my own personal details. 
Discussion of family background, parental roots, parental residence, talk of religion, 
marital status were common. It was clear that I was being researched. No doubt my 
evaluation by the Kashmiri respondents affected the quality of the information they 
provided throughout the various stages of the research. Only when there was total 
satisfaction with my profile did discussions about the research interviews follow. I did 
not find this intrusive since it follows that if I was asking personal questions of them, 
they would do the same with me. 
During interviews it was also clear that respondents felt at ease and placed 
considerable emphasis on common colour, culture, and religion, signifying existence 
within the same system. Implicit within this is similarity in rationalisation and 
understanding of their concerns and opinions. This formed an instant bond between 
the researcher and the respondents. If the researcher had not been from a similar 
culture and more importantly the same religion, access to the families and the 
respondents within the family would have been different, as would the direction of 
conversations and content of responses. 
These sentiments were referenced in comments such as, "look I really don't mind 
telling you this because you're a black sister like me". Mr F highlights the importance 
placed on race when he points out that, "I'm going to tell you this because you're not 
white. Whenever I talk to white people about these things they look at me as if I'm 
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some freak, they just don't understand where I'm corning from right" . Another 
respondent commented, "Why are you asking me this? You should know what I'm 
going to say you're a Muslim aren't you?" With reference to construct six one young 
girl commented, "This is a really personal question. I like arranged marriages. Do you 
understand what I mean? They're not as bad as everyone thinks. Our parents only do 
the best for us. We're not forced like all white people think. You know what I'm 
talking about. I don't need to tell you because I know you understand". It was 
obvious that this young woman valued an interviewer from a racially and ethnically 
similar background when discussing such a personal issue. It is clear that ethnicity of 
the researcher and compatibilities of worldviews was important to the respondents. 
The effects of different race and ethnicity of the researcher did not appear to cause 
hostilities from the Anglo-Saxon respondents. Discussions centred around my 
occupation as a researcher and a member of the University. Thus some transparency 
was maintained through similarities in status. Since emphasis was on occupation it 
could be argued that the emphasis here was on class rather than race or ethnicity. 
There is a notion that "women are more 'natural' field workers since their traditional 
role in many societies is one of interaction and relationships" .50 This idea however has 
been based on the experiences of largely white European women researchers who 
have been outsiders. Although the marginality of black women scholars and their 
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status as "outsiders within" gives them distinctive advantage of race, class and gender, 
the experience of women's insider status may also affect data collection.51 
The Kashmiris in Luton belong to a patriarchal Muslim society. In such society there 
are clearly delineated social spaces for men and women. Family roles are traditional 
and women • are seen first and foremost as sisters, wives and mothers. Social 
interaction between the genders is not encouraged. Since as mentioned above the 
gatekeepers were men, there were some initial problems carrying out discussions 
about the research. My identity was perceived as a woman first and only secondly as a 
researcher and professional. Many respondents, usually the older men, questioned my 
role as a researcher as this broke from the traditional norms. This was most often 
referenced in comments of concern for my safety and the need for a male protector. 
For example, Mr W said, "A young women like you shouldn't be doing this type of 
job, it's not safe for girls to be on their own these days and it's not really very 
Islamic". 
Mr N said, "I'm not sure that education in our culture means that a young girl should 
be out and about on her own. It's important that we educate our daughters so that 
they can educate their sons but not so that they should go from home to home" Mr K 
commented that, "You really ought to have a husband or at least a brother with you, 
it just isn't right for you to be here on your own" One often quoted comment which 
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in essence sums up the above mentioned perceptions of women's role was succinctly 
put by Mr A who asked, "When are you going to settle down"? 
Further problems were encountered when interviewing male members within 
households, particularly the younger male respondents. In some cases it was 
impossible to get a private interview. Often a female member of the family would be 
present during the interview. In some cases this discouraged discussion and honest 
responses to some of the more personal questions. One of the advantages of being a 
Muslim female researcher was that once the above concerns were eliminated I was 
readily accepted into the family and allowed to interact with all family members. 
Being accepted into the family home meant that I was also able to extensively observe 
family environment and family interactions. A male researcher would have been seen 
as more of a "threat" and not been given ready access to family homes, and certainly 
no access to the female family members of the household. A white female researcher 
might have been given limited access. 
Due to these problems of accessibility, research on South Asian communities has 
often focused on the public arena rather than the private. This has led to 
misconceptions of the role of women in Muslim communities. Much research has 
given the impression of Muslim women's lack of agency and community participation, 
which has often led to a false impression of the dynamics of power within Muslim 
families. Certainly as with any community, oppression of women does take place, 
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indeed there is enough literature pointing to this. 52 Being a Muslim woman, speaking 
the language and understanding the dynamics of gender relations allowed me access 
into the private arena of the Kashmiri/Muslim community in Luton. This allowed me 
to understand the role of women and to contribute to acknowledging their extensive 
roles in British Kashmiri identity development. Linguistic differences were 
problematic. There were three dimensions to this: Problems with spoken language, the 
class dimension in the relationship between the researcher and the older respondents, 
and problems with written language. 
A. Spoken Language 
My ability to speak Punjabi and Urdu was of great help since most Kashmiris in Luton 
speak a dialect of Punjabi. The socio-linguistic history of the area of Azad Kashmir is 
that most families speak varieties of Punjabi which are mutually intelligible.53 It is true 
that in the initial stages of the research it was difficult to understand the dialect, which 
led to some difficulties in explanation and understanding responses. However these 
were overcome early on in the research as contact with respondents increased and I 
became increasingly familiar and comfortable with the Kashmiri dialect (Pahari). 
B. Class Distinctions 
There was a class dimension to the relationship between me as the researcher and the 
older respondents. After initial conversations it became clear to respondents that I 
was a British born Pakistani of urban background whereas the older respondents were 
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of rural backgrounds. The rural, urban divide in Pakistan is one of the social 
indicators within Pakistani society. In many cases conversations were a mixture of 
Punjabi dialect, Urdu and English. Some individuals began to make conversation in a 
fragmented English although I made my introductions in Punjabi. On occasions this 
English would be interspersed with sentences in Urdu and then respondents would 
revert to English before returning to their obviously more comfortable Punjabi dialect. 
This together with reference to my privileged background, urbanised Punjabi and 
fluent English created perceptions of social distance between myself and the older 
Kashmiris. My experience made clear to me that research occurs within the context of 
power relationships. After all research does not occur independently of society's 
values and structures. To reduce these differences, wherever possible I emphasised 
similarities between myself and the respondents. 
C. Problems with Written Language. 
As mentioned above the Kashmiris in Luton speak a dialect of Punjabi. It is not true 
to say that Punjabi does not have a written form. As with Urdu it can be written in the 
Perso-Arabic script. However, for most practical purposes, including surveys, it might 
as well not have written form since the Punjabi script is not used in Pakistan or 
Britain. 54 Although the local dialects of Punjabi are spoken in the home it was decided 
to offer the ISA instruments in Urdu rather than Punjabi. Urdu is the language of 
literacy. It is the national language of Pakistan and is used in Government offices and 
educational establishments. It is a language based on the speech of the (urban) 
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educated Muslims of northern India. 55 The research instruments were therefore 
bilingual, written in English and Urdu in order to optimise the meaningfulness of 
responses. However there were disparities in Kashmiri Urdu literacy, which raises 
major research issues. 
The older generation men were able to read the written Urdu and the English. The 
younger generation of both gender were able to read the English but not the Urdu. 
However the older generation women were unable to read the Urdu or English. The 
women were illiterate in Urdu and English. Those who had been educated explained 
that their education in their villages of origin was an oral education rather than a 
written one. In these cases the questionnaire was answered verbally in the Punjabi 
dialect. 
Other factors which affected the overall length of the interviewing process: the older 
generation respondents of both gender had difficulties in consigning their responses to 
paper. There appears to have been a psychological barrier. They were unwilling to 
make a written commitment to paper. There are three possible explanations for this: 
the sensitive nature of some of the questions; suspicions as to the end use of the 
research; but an often quoted reason was that this was 'something that they are not 
used to' since as mentioned above their education had been oral rather than written. In 
such cases I would verbally ask the question and then mark the instruments where the 
respondents indicated usually by pointing to the seven point centre zero scale. This 
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raises issues of the extent to which this type of research can be carried out by 
researchers from different backgrounds to the researched. 
Often terms used whether in English, Urdu or the spoken Punjabi were not 
understood. In such cases I had to explain these terms often using examples. 
Hospitality meant that I was often offered tea and other refreshments. This was 
appreciated but prolonged the interviewing process. These combined factors meant 
that interviews took approximately an hour with native English readers and anything 
up to three hours with non English and Urdu readers. Throughout the data collection 
I emphasised commonalities between myself and the respondents and drew attention 
away from my British education and upbringing. I upheld and respected the nuances 
of etiquette. I wore Pakistani shalwar kameez throughout the research and where the 
situation required I wore the dupata to cover my head. I made my introductions in the 
Islamic way and addressed the respondents with the respect that one must accord to 
those elder and younger and male and female within .Pakistani/Muslim society. Older 
male respondents were addressed as sahib (Mr), elder women as khala, younger men 
referred to aspaji (brother) and women as baji (sister). Men and women closer to my 
own age or younger were referred to by name. In return I was referred to as beti 
(daughter) or baji (sister). 
Coming from a similar cultural background, sharing the same faith, communicating in 
the same language, respecting the nuances of etiquette, spending time with 
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community leaders and socialising with the community in informal settings led to 
overall inclusion within the community. The following comments are typical. 'This 
young woman is one of our community daughters and we must help her with her 
work. She is one of our sisters'. Therefore early on in the research a strong 
relationship developed based on cultural, religious and linguistic similarities, leading 
to mutual respect and trust. The building of credibility to allow me to be accepted into 
the community networks has been vital. The relationship between the research worker 
and the person in the field is the key to effective interviewing. This often determines 
whether the door to research will be open or shut.56 I relied heavily on community 
people's support. During the research I developed strong relationships with some of 
the families and in most cases became part of their lives. I attended weddings, Eid 
celebrations, many evening meals particularly for breaking of fast in the month of 
Ramadan and in two cases the celebration of the birth of children. All of these are 
occasions not to be taken lightly, and are events for family and close friends. I was 
always conscious of the exploitative nature of research and most often felt like the 
"special" and "privileged" insider. ' 57 I assisted some families with completing social 
security forms, applying to the university for a degree course, helping younger 
members of the family with homework, organising assertiveness classes for local 
community women, and in one case paying gas bills. Although this was not intended 
as part of the research it was a small attempt to reciprocate their help. In the event it 
actually helped to gather further information and through informal conversations to 
understand their overall concerns. 
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Whilst being an "insider" has been important in my research it has raised some issues. 
Researcher objectivity is often quoted as a problem of "insider" research. The 
implication is that the researcher should not make assumptions based on these 
commonalities. An important step has been to separate self from the research and to 
make no assumptions based on common background. This, however, is no different 
from any researcher working within their community. The other more significant issue 
has been one of responsibility and accountability to the Kashmiri people I have 
studied.58 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to highlight two major factors: firstly the need 
for an inter-disciplinary and multi-method approach to the study of identity and 
secondly the particularities of researching in the Kashmiri community, which 
questions the use of traditional research methods. Community research cannot rely on 
traditional methods of research such as probability sampling. This chapter has 
highlighted some original data sources, internal to the communities, which have 
hitherto not been adequately utilised in community research. This type of community 
based research is likely to be problematic for researchers who do not share cultural, 
religious or linguistic commonalities with the researched. To optimise interaction and 
produce valuable research the researcher needs to be sensitive to the researched 
communities' belief systems. The researcher should exemplify as far as possible the 
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key values of the researched. In doing so the researcher is according them izzat and 
being sensitive to the belief systems that will optimise interaction. Being from the 
same community as the researched does raise issues of objectivity for the Asian 
researcher but this should not be overemphasised and it is no more a caution than that 
which is applicable to any researcher working within their own communities. It is not 
being suggested that all researchers should share ethnicity, class, language and gender 
with the researched. As a political strategy this would marginalise Asian issues and 
Asian researchers. What is being suggested, however, is that often in this type of 
community this type of research may be more appropriate. Having discussed the 
methodology that informed my research I now turn to the question of Kashmiri 
identity, specifically. In the next chapter I begin to draw out the main points of 
Kashmiri identity development. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MIGRATION AND IDENTITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand how Kashmiri identity has been transformed through 
settlement in Britain, it is necessary to understand what "Kashmiri" identity was 
prior to migration to Britain. In this chapter, I will present a "before" picture of 
"Kashmiriness", so that the nature of changes that have taken place amongst the 
Kashmiri community and individuals is clearly seen. In other words, the main 
elements of the collective individual propositions of this study will be examined 
diachronically. 1 The aim is to present the main lines by which Kashmiri identity 
has been transformed in the movement from home (i.e. Azad Kashmir) and away 
(i.e. Luton). 
II. THE CULTURAL NETWORKS OF HOME 
In Kashmiri society the home and the family unit form the focus of life. The 
family is a complex unit and many writings about ethnic minorities have adopted 
an essentialist and simplistic approach to the study of South Asian families. 
Often complex family situations have been diminished to the point where any 
explanations fail to offer any understanding or confer any positive regard for 
culture. It is not therefore my intention here to homogenise the Kashmiri family 
and reinforce essentialist constructions of the other. What is intended here is to 
offer some elucidation of the influences on Kashmiri family life. It is offered as 
an attempt to move towards acknowledging difference, accepting difference and 
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embracing difference through the adaptation of anti-racist perspectives on 
difference. This is perhaps not in itself enough for understanding identity but will 
create some awareness of the range of factors that affect its maintenance and 
reformation. 
The form and functioning of the Kashmiri family are bound together by religion. 
The majority of Kashmiris from Azad Kashmir are Muslim. Like most religions 
Islam is a way of life and governs and affects moral and social order as well as 
family life. The Quran and the Hadith (teachings of the prophet Mohammad 
PBUH) lay out the particulars of Islamic family behaviour. Subsequent chapters 
make further reference to the religious component in Kashmiri life. The 
foundations of the family are seen in the extended family system, the importance 
of and respect for relationships within the family, izzat (honour), the continuation 
of religious heritage, and the adherence to eating and dress codes that have a 
religious as well as a social base. 
Extended families are based on a set of kinship ties that exist between persons as 
a result of their genealogical connections, and also encompass affinal relations 
created by marriage and descent. The extended family may include several 
generations of family members. These may be immediate family, parents, 
siblings and their p�rtners with their children and also grandparents, aunts, uncles 
and cousins. 121 
The exact roles and responsibilities of members within the family are clearly 
delineated. This reinforces the nature of the relationships and special regard for 
family members. Elders within the family are treated with special respect and the 
younger siblings and women of the family protected. This ensures a sense of 
belonging and mutual need, and encourages family bonding. As Verity Saifullah 
Khan indicates, "relationships between the family are close, emotional, 
dependent, they are relationships of loyalty and obligation". 2 It is frequently a 
three-generational unit that comprises the extended family unit, including 
grandparent(s), married son(s), their wives and children, unmarried sons and 
daughters and sometimes divorcees or widowed uncles or aunts. 
The joint family members usually pool their resources and have 
common property. There could be some absent members of the 
family who work in a city or live in another country, such as 
Britain, but have the same status. No doubt, family composition 
changes over time. It changes according to the natural cycle of the 
family, some members die, others are born, daughters marry out 
and daughters in law come in, as it is a patriarchal family
structure.3 
Migration separates families but does not necessarily disrupt the workings of the 
extended family. The relationships that go beyond the extended family are 
regulated by the biraderi system. The word biraderi literally means brotherhood 
and is analogous to the clan system. It is this which shapes kinship networks 
beyond the joint-extended family. The Biraderi includes all persons who are able 
to trace their relationship to a common ancestor, however remote. It refers to all 
those belonging to a patrilineage and any non-related members who have become 
acquainted.4 Anwar has suggested that often kinship-friendship networks are 
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undervalued [by external researchers] but are extremely important m the 
5understanding of values and norms. 
Alavi explains biraderi as: 
. . . . .  a descent group, including in principle all those between 
whom actual links of common descent can be traced in the 
paternal line, regardless of the number of generations that have 
elapsed. In this sense then the biraderi is indefinite in size. 6 
Alavi goes onto make an important point when he comments that a practical 
problem arises with biraderis, which is that written genealogies are not generally 
kept and without such records the boundary of the biraderi is determined by the 
limits of recognition. 7 As memory fails in tracing relationships beyond a few 
generations and with each successive generation, branches of distant kin tend to 
drift beyond the horizon of mutual recognition into separate biraderis. The 
genealogical depth of biraderis tends to be relatively shallow. 
The concept of biraderi can be used in a number of contexts. For example, Blunt 
uses it to denote a group, which does not mean a sp�cifically located ecological 
or geographical group.8 Korson states that it includes not only the blood relatives 
but other people as well.9 Anwar suggests that, in actual fact, where it ends 
depends on the person defining those he thinks belong to the biraderi. In practice 
it depends on the contact maintained with each other, the degree to which 
endogamy is practised, the frequency with which members meet and take 
decisions which affect the biraderi as a whole. 10 As Mr Y, a councillor in Roli 
village, indicated: 
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My biraderi can be [anyone] whose help I need or whoever needs 
my help. That person is not always known to me and my family, 
but someone somewhere will know of them. Well it's not a big
place is it? 
Anwar's point about biraderi being a function of the frequency with which 
members meet was further mentioned by Mr K who commented: 
People make a big deal about the biraderi, between you and me, 
I'm always told. All the time that this man is a member of the 
biraderi and then I shake his hand and never see him again. I 
haven't got a clue who is in the biraderi and who isn't. It just
seems to be anyone and well I suppose the more often you meet 
someone the more he's a part of the biraderi. 
The biraderi functions as an institution of mutual aid. Interviews with members 
of the Kashmiri community who were visiting Azad Kashmir during the May­
June 1996 field trip commented on its importance during the migration process. 
Recollecting his experiences of preparing for migration to Luton Mr L 
commented: 
What would I have done without my brothers in my village? They 
told me about what it would be like in Britain and even helped me 
out with the cash. I hadn't seen that much money before. I was 
only a boy. 
Mr T said: 
I had no money and well there wasn't much hope here and they 
gave me money to travel and even bought me the clothes to wear. 
The biraderi also functions as an emotional support as Mr H commented: 
I was the eldest son, my father was dead and, well, I had to leave 
all my sisters behind and, well, it was the biraderi members who 
looked after them. I knew that they were safe and that helped me 
very much in the early years over there. 
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Mr H's eldest sister added the importance of the emotional and security factor 
when she pointed out: 
To leave us young women behind was a big thing. I wanted him to 
go because we needed the money but it was bad because we were 
on our own here. Family helped but lots of men had gone as well 
from their families and, well, we had to rely on the good nature of 
our other brothers (biraderi members). 
Biraderis do not always function as positive institutions. Interviews suggested 
that the biraderi bound individuals to the prevailing social mores and in some 
cases left them vulnerable. Those most affected were often women. The effect of 
these institutions and the migration process on women is under-documented in 
literature. Migration not only deprived villages of some of their potential labour 
but had huge implications for village women. The men who migrated were often 
the breadwinners of the family. Migration therefore deprived women of their 
economic source. There were further implications connected to the nature of 
society. Kashmiri society is patriarchal, where a woman's legitimacy within that 
order is governed by her role as a daughter who is protected by her father and 
brothers, as a wife protected by her husband and as a mother protected by her 
sons. Women are seen as the bearers of izzat and men are defenders of izzat. 
Migration from Azad Kashmir led to the breakdown of these systems. Women's 
economic positions were altered and they became more vulnerable. Often 
changed circumstances led to the questioning of a woman's role within the 
extended family, and the questioning of her honour by biraderi members. This 
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had not yet started sending money home. This point was summarised by Mrs T 
when she said: 
Your izzat is with a man at your side, no one takes you seriously 
otherwise and they all look at you with a bad nazar (look). It 
doesn't matter who they are, they all think like each other. 
Many women talked of the adverse effects of migration. Everyone had 
experiences or knew of someone in the village who had problems during this 
time. As Mrs D discussed: 
When my husband died and I had lots of little children and they 
(members of the biraderi) sorted out my life and said that I should 
marry the cousin and I said that I didn't want to, they said that it 
was everyone's decision. I didn't want it but I couldn't say 
anything to them. I was told that they were doing the best for me. 
Mrs G talked extensively of her experiences after her husband migrated to Britain 
in 1969: 
He promised, of course that he would send for me once he was 
settled over there you know when he had some money. The 
money came but it went straight to his brothers. They didn't give 
me anything of it. My children had to work to get food and always 
letters came to tell me that he will call for me. I knew he was 
sending money but nothing was happening and then one day I told 
one of the men in the village to help me, he was an older man. 
They (husband' s  brothers) just went mad saying that who was I to 
complain and that he was doing the best for his family and 
supporting his family. 
Financial limitations and time constraints in the early years of migration meant 
that many men could not return to their homes. Long separations from wives 
meant that in many instances men took second wives in Britain, which caused 
tensions when news reached home. Mrs B told me: 
She was such a pretty little girl when he went away. She was from 
another village and they (her in.laws) didn't treat her very well 
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and then when he went away they wouldn't even give her milk. He 
came only once and she got to have a baby and then they found 
out that he was married again and they said it was her fault. 
In other cases men would return home for several weeks and during these stays 
women would become pregnant. Despite having members of the extended family 
and biraderi there for support it was clear from conversations that nothing could 
compensate for having the husband and father present. When husbands returned 
to Britain to work the women were left to bring up their children. Mrs Y 
commented on these problems: 
I feel so bad saying this but look you know how things are with 
our people. It wasn't that bad at first but then I would spend all 
day doing the family member thing. It was in my mind but I felt 
part of the family again. Then I was going to have a baby and I 
was part of the family again but then he went back and I was on 
my own again. It was hard those years. 
Overall then the biraderi functions as an institution of mutual aid in times of 
need. This may include financial aid, particularly significant during the early 
migration years; emotional support at difficult times such as those associated 
with the migration process mentioned above; reprimanding members of the 
family; at the deaths of loved ones and at weddings and births. In its 
unadulterated form it can be seen as legitimising solidarity for families and 
normative obligation to members within those families. 
One way of cementing relationships with biraderi members is through the 
exchange of gifts. Unless financial, gift exchange is usually administered by the 
older women of the biraderi. Gifts are offered and exchanged at births, deaths, 
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marriages, visiting family and biraderi members, and at religious occasions such 
as Eid-ul-Fitar and Eid-ul-Hqj. Both Alavi and Anwar refer to this as vatan 
bhanji but in everyday Kashmiri vernacular it is simply refereed to as lena-dena 
which literally means to get and to give.1 1 
It is important to point out however that an essential obligation of vatan bhanji is 
the obligation to reciprocate. It is not usual for this exchange to take place at the 
same occasion. Gifts may be reciprocated at another occasion. It may be for the 
same amount or significantly more than what was received. Mrs G pointed out 
that : 
"Lena-dena can be anything really. I can give some milk or some 
money to a family but they don't have to give me milk or money 
back. They can just do something for me like get me wood or help 
me do something in my house that I cannot do myself" 
At weddings and when children are born we give clothes or these 
days just some money because people don't always like the gifts. 
Money is better. At weddings there is always someone to write 
down the money we give so that that family will know in the 
future which family has given what so that when someone from 
that family gets married they will be given something back. 
Interviews suggested that lena-dena from biraderi members was particularly 
important during the migration years, since biraderi members often gave 
financial support to each other which was not necessarily reciprocated in 
monetary terms. For families that remained behind it was a further source of 
support. For all tho�e involved it also functioned as an institution of belonging. 
As Alavi points out, it functions as the biraderi of participation. 12 
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Villages in Mirpur and Kotli districts are small and residents are members of one 
or two extended families. They also considered themselves to be part of the 
biraderi that extends outside of the family and goes beyond the village area. 
Biraderi also functioned further afield, encompassing individuals, families and 
whole villages in neighbouring areas. Large-scale migration from these regions 
has meant the formation of transnational biraderis where although members live 
thousands of miles away they remain in close contact attending important 
functions back in their villages. 
Alavi points out that numbers as well as physical distance impose limits on 
biraderi organisations and the social interaction which keeps mutual recognition 
alive. 13 However, in the case of the Azad Kashmiris who have migrated to Luton, 
the continuation of biraderi systems, despite the problems of distance, appears to 
have secured their primordial loyalties back to the biraderi-based social 
organisation within their villages and towns of origin. It has ensured that 
assimilation does not take place in the new British context in which they are now 
settled. 
Biraderis can be identified through names. All biraderi members belong to a Zat, 
which is generally accepted as an endogamous group: a "kindred of 
recognition". 14 All biraderis have zat names and such names are used as 
surnames to identify biraderis. It is, however, important to point out that 
surnames and zat cognomens are not always mutually exclusive and intimate 
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details of biraderi organisation within specific locations are often necessary 
before making associations. However, through links with the Kashmiri 
community in Azad Kashmir and Luton it is possible to identify the main 
biraderis from which migration to Luton has taken place 1 5 . 
Many of the migrants from Azad Kashmir are Rajput. The Rajputs claim to be 
from the princely lineages in Kashmir, namely Hari Singh, and converted to 
Islam when Mohammad Bin Kasim brought Islam to the region. They were the 
large land ruling classes in Kashmir and amongst Kashmiris their names are 
usually prefixed with Raja, which literally means prince, for identification. The 
Maliks in the region were the Jagirdars (landlords) for the Rqjas, working 
primarily as ministers and accountants managing the lands. The Raja and Malik 
zats and biraderis are heavily represented in Luton. The Jats are also represented 
and Gujar zats are less represented but nevertheless significant. The Jats are 
primarily large landowners and farmers and the Gu_jars are small landowners, 
primarily shepherds and nomads. In Luton many of the Chowdry biraderi are 
from the Jat and Goojar zats. The other main biraderi represented are the Butts 
who are also from the Jat zat. They generally worked for the Maliks on the land 
but were also clerks and small business owners. The zat system is often likened 
to the Hindu caste system. Khan for instance points out that: 
"Although �he caste system is rejected in Islam there are clear 
vestiges of the pre-partition social structure. Notions of purity and 
pollution, restricted commonality and certain other features of the 
caste system are less evident in Mirpur but there is a general
hierarchy of castes". 1 6  
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Alavi disagrees with the notions of caste as he points out that: Not simply because the religion of Islam does not sanction it, that is an ideological view [shared by many Pakistanis] because it is based not upon the observation of society but upon the interpretations of ideas and ideals without reference to social realities. The central criteria of caste-orientated behaviour, namely that of ritual pollution and associated purificatory rites, do not exist. No dietary restrictions differentiate people with different zat names nor are there any restrictions on commensality. There is no hierarchy of castes. High status is accorded to the Sayyids who claim descent from the sons of Fatima the Daughter of the Prophet Mohammed. But such status is accorded to them in Arab societyalso: but that society is not organised on the basis of caste. 17 Indeed interviews also reaffirmed Alavi' s  observations. Mr I commented that "there is no caste in Islam, it is prohibited and one's zat group does not mean one's biraderi". Mr H presented an Islamic reasoning for marrying into one's own zat when he said: Look the Quran doesn't say anything about zats but the Hadith says that we should marry within our kind to avoid discrimination and things like that. Marrying into your own zat is suggested as being good for daughters because then they will be with their own kind and know all the systems and things like that. Zat does however become important for marriage arrangements as it defines the boundaries of looking for marriage partners. As Mrs D highlighted: When my daughter gets married she will get married within our family to a cousin or if she doesn't want that then within our zat. I don't care where he's from. He could be a Malik from Britain for all I care but it's  better that he's from our zat because then we know the customs and things like that and she will know how to behave and then have respect because she is the same. Marriages within Kashmiri Muslim society tend to be consanguineous and take place within the extended family or Biraderi. The first "port of call" for choosing 131 
a marriage partner is to tum to the prospective partners' brothers or sisters to 
make a match. Often "brothers and sisters expect to be given the right of first 
refusal in offers of marriage for each other's children, so much so that rejection 
causes great offence. It is often regarded as a repudiation of the obligation of 
siblingship itself'. 1 8  Only if suitable partners are not available will parents look 
elsewhere. Mrs T explained the reasoning behind exogamous marriages: 
It is best to marry into your own family. Look put it this way if my 
daughter marries my brothers' son then everything will be in the 
family. She will know her parents-in-law as she has been brought 
up with them and they will know her. She will know their ways 
because they are the same as our ways. It will be so easy for her to 
be accepted and be happy. 
Ballard points out that "one common suggestion is that it is a tactical response to 
Islamic law of inheritance, which makes daughters heirs as well as sons so by 
marrying patrilateral cousins, men can ensure that property does not slip beyond 
the control of the descent group." 19 
Interviews did not suggest this to be the case directly but certainly the cost of the 
marriage was often mentioned as less when family members were involved 
because there was less of a need to impress. Although this was not seen as an 
incentive it was considered an advantage. This was not always- the case however 
as Mrs D commented: 
Look you have to look after your own better than others otherwise 
it causes big problems later. Brothers and sisters can be the worst. 
Mostly it is good because your sisters and brothers will treat your 
children well; after all they are their nephews and nieces as well. 
When something goes wrong in the marriage they will help 
because it is their izzat as well as ours: we are the same family. 
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Also there is more love because when children are born they
belong to all ofus and they increase the bonds between the family. 
Where family members are not available suitable matches will be sought within 
the biraderi. Suitable matches may be made between two families who have high 
respect for each other. Marriages are overwhelmingly arranged within the same 
zat in Azad Kashmir. Overall, marriages are seen as consolidating relationships 
within the family or between two families. Whatever the marriage mores, 
families, biraderis and zats remain important in Azad Kashmiri society. Socio­
cultural, economic and political affiliations and solidarity are functions of the 
organisation of the biraderi. 
As with the extended family, roles and relationships within the biraderi are 
clearly delineated. Bazoorg (elders) within the biraderi are treated with respect. 
Matters affecting the family and biraderi are discussed with the bazoorg whose 
advice is highly valued. "Respect for old age and traditional authority are 
enjoined by religious beliefs and are part of the local traditions" 20 The bazoorg 
within family and biraderi can be both men and women. Although much of the 
literature on the South Asian family identifies the patrilineal social organisation, 
very often the role of women is ignored or undermined. General perceptions of 
the role of women in Muslim society centre around issues of submission to 
patriarchy, limited freedom of speech and subordination. The status of women 
within Islam is discussed below in more detail but here it is important to identify 
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Within Muslim society there are clearly delineated social spaces for men and 
women and indeed the "ethics" of interaction between the genders are also 
clearly defined. Since many of the Kashmiri women who have migrated to 
Britain are from this society they carry with them these mores. The importance of 
the male and female domains and the relationship between the two as a mutually 
stabilising organisation are underestimated within the literature. 
Misunderstandings arise from lack of access to the female domain. Limited 
access by male researchers, non-Muslims, as well as white female researchers, 
has led to these misunderstandings. 2 1  
Dahya is one writer who has underestimated if not ignored the female role in 
social organisation when he writes that: 
The head of the family exercises control of the family members 
and manages the property and the distribution of resources for the 
domestic needs of its members. He is responsible for the handling 
of the family's funds, for arranging marriages for his sons and 
daughters and for his grandchildren, if any, and for undertaking
economic ventures in the interest of the family. He represents the 
family in its dealings with all outside authorities and makes 
decisions in all matters affecting the social-economic life of the 
family members. He is the decision-maker for the family. It is 
believed that he knows what is best in the interest of the family. 22 
Access into the female domain revealed that in Kashmiri society as in much of 
Muslim soci�ty the woman's role is indispensible within the home. She is first 
and foremost responsible for the smooth and efficient running of the home. This 
includes attending to her husband's needs, her children ' s  needs and those 
requirements of the extended family. Her role further extends into the female 
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domain of the biraderi where she maintains family contact with other women and 
through her social skills ensures the continued and enhanced respectability of her 
family within the biraderi. This is vital for one of her most important roles: that 
of arranging marriages. Interactions are social and can range from the very 
informal practice of sitting and talking with other women after the evening meal 
or dropping in on each other during the day, to the more formal practices of 
attending religious gatherings, engagements, weddings, births, funerals. All 
however are equally important to the reputation of the family. Indeed it is the 
women that carry out much of the lena-dena mentioned above. As Mrs G pointed 
out : 
If you don't go to pay your respects when someone in the biraderi 
has died, then well you're just not seen to be very good and you 
get shunned and so does the family and then you won't be 
respected. 
Mrs Y commented: 
We must attend things like funerals because we represent our 
families at weddings and things like that and if we don't then we 
will be seen as a poor family and no one will want to marry their 
son or daughter into our family. We will not be seen as khandani 
people. 
As Mr F pointed out: 
I go and work and only see the men and we talk of money and 
business and politics. If it wasn't for my wife, how would I know 
what was going on in the community? You know - who was 
marrying who and that sort of thing, and that's more important
than anything else sometimes. 
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Much of the interaction depends on interpersonal skills. These are usually taught 
to succeeding generations of women and are vital for good marriage prospects, as 
Mrs B pointed out: 
Everyone wants a daughter-in-law who knows how to talk 
properly and who knows the etiquette about betna-utna and 
things. So I have to teach my daughters this otherwise no one will 
want them. If a daughter is able to do all of this it increases the 
izzat of the family at the end of the day. 
As with the male members of the family and biraderi, as the women get older so 
does the respect accorded to them by younger members. Generally speaking, the 
older the woman the more power and control she has within the female domain 
and the biraderi as a whole. Older women are able to transcend the boundaries of 
the male and female domains and often act as mediators between the two. Social 
limitations on women are reduced as they get older, since they are seen as less 
sexual. Mr H commented that: 
I don't run this house really. I'm here to make the final decisions 
and all of that really. My mother and wife have already made all 
of the decisions before they even get to me. 
Mr Y said: 
What would we do without our Grandmother? Whenever there 
needs to be a marriage arranged she does it. Whenever there is a 
problem she sorts it out. She is in charge really. 
Although the level of control that Mr H and Mr Y talked about is not necessarily 
the norm in most families, it was clear through interactions with families in 
Kashmir that wome� were far from being the subordinate partners in Kashmiri 
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Look they are the kings of their kingdoms. We cannot say
anything to them concerning their business. We can say but they 
know best about those things because they have been taught about 
them and we about ours so it's best that people stay with what they 
know. 
It is clear from Mrs C's comments that it is essential that etiquette and decorum is 
maintained for a harmonious system. To the untrained observer the spatial 
manifestation of the separate male-female domains has been seen as seclusion. In 
many homes in Azad Kashmir there are separate quarters for social interaction 
with non-family members, usually called the baithak (front sitting room) .  The 
baithak is usually at the front or side of the house with a separate entrance to 
maintain the privacy of other family members. Here non-family male members of 
the community can be entertained without unnecessary interaction with female 
members of the family. 
In Azad Kashmiri society then it has tended to be the men who were the 
economic earners and women who played central roles in the running of homes 
and looking after children and livestock. The woman's  role was central and 
essential for the functioning of the Kashmiri biraderi. Interaction between men 
and women does take place, but according to the cultural and religious etiquette. 
For Azad Kashmiris much of their identity is located with the significant others, 
namely immediate f�mily, extended family, and kinsmen making up the biraderi. 
As noted by Dahya, "in the villages I visited a person's identity stemmed 
primarily from his family, his group of kinsmen and his allies, both in his own 
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village and in neighbouring ones." 23 As well as the political situation in Kashmir 
and biraderi systems religion is also a pivotal identifier for community 
organisation in Azad Kashmir. 
ill. RELIGIOUS NETWORKS OF HOME 
Religious ideology has played a major role in the creation of the South Asian 
subcontinent as it is observed today. At a more localised level religion has been a 
focus for the specificities of the form and functioning of community. That is, the 
Kashmiri family and biraderi are bound together by religion. 
Formation of religious leadership and associated cultural formations, which have 
their origins in Azad Kashmir, have directly contributed to settlement and the 
associated community formation in Britain. The religious beliefs carried and 
transferred through the migration process have had a direct impact on the 
specificities ofKashmiri British identity formation. 
It is not my intention to present the basic tenets of the Islamic faith since this 
space has been more than adequately filled by other writers.24 What is intended is 
presentation and analysis of the origins of the character of Islam and the 
significant spiritual and psychological aspects of the form of Islam specific to the 
Azad Kashmiris now settled in Britain and Luton. Implicit within this therefore is 
the idea that there are significant differences in the forms of Islam practised by 
Muslims. Before embarking on the differences it is necessary to present those 
aspects of Islam that are universal. The overwhelming majority of Kashmiris are 
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Muslims. Islam is a monotheistic faith and lies within the Abrahamic tradition. 
Fundamental to all Muslims is the concept of Allah. 
The God of Islam is transcendent, the all-powerful and all 
knowing Creator and Lawgiver, though at the same time infinitely 
merciful, generous and forgiving. Man, His creature His servant 
into whom He has breathed something of His spirit, stands before 
him without intermediary or intercessor, meeting Him through 
prayer during this brief life on earth and meeting Him face-to-face 
when his life is over. In Islam God does not embody himself in a 
human being to make Himself accessible through idols and 
images. He is what he is, absolute and eternal. 25 
The words of Allah are written in the Quran, as revealed to the Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH). The Quran, the Hadith (teachings of the prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH) and the Sunna (actions of the Prophet, PBUH) lay out the 
particulars of lslamic life. The Quran refers to Islam as din (a way of life). Islam 
affects moral as well as family life and social order. The foundations of the 
family and social organisation with the importance of the extended family unit; 
the importance of and respect for relationships within the family with its explicit 
reference to the nurture of others within that family unit; izzat; the continuation 
of religious heritage; adhering to gender, eating and dress codes - all have a 
religious as well as a socio-cultural base. 
Islam is united in the belief and practice of its five pillars. The Prophet's last 
address at Arafat on his final pilgrimage before his death in 632, sums up the 
essence of lslam wh_ere he identifies the five pillars oflslam: 26 
0 people, indeed your lives, your properties and your honour are 
sacred and inviolable to you till you appear before your lord. 0 
people! Be conscious of God. And even if a mangled Abyssinian 139 
slave becomes your leader harken to him and obey him as long as 
he establishes and institutes that Book of God. Worship your Lord 
and Sustainer. Perform your five daily salat (prayer) . Fast your
month [of Ramadan]. Make pilgrimage to your House [the
Kabbah at Makkah] . Pay the Zakat on your property willingly and 
obey whatever I command you. Then will you enter the Paradise 
of your Lord and Sustainer. 
Despite common belief in Allah and the Islamic ideals, "in practice, political and 
historical factors have helped to create differences within the community which 
are essentially of a social and cultural nature." 27 There are two broad sects 
within Islam, namely the Sunnis and the Shias, and various schools of thought 
have emerged from these particular Islamic leanings. 
Both Shias and Sunnis believe in the five pillars of Islam but there are many 
conceptual and ritual differences, which have emerged over the centuries. Akbar 
Ahmed succinctly summarises the conceptual differences and these are identified 
below. 
The essence of the difference lies with the Shia concept of the 
Imamate as distinct from the Sunni concept of the Caliphite. The 
Caliph is the elected successor to the Prophet with regard to 
political and military leadership but not to the religious authority 
of the Prophet, whereas the Imam is both political leader and 
religious guide and is the interpreter of God's will as formulated in 
Islamic Law. It is this Shia concept of religious authority that is 
unacceptable to the Sunnis who believe such authority lies with 
the consensus (ijma), that is the consensus of the ulema, the 
traditional religious scholars. Further differences arise because 
Sunnis believe that the God's laws in the Quran and Sunnah ended 
with him whilst the Shias believe that God would not leave them 
without guidance. Thus Imams are seen as the guides who are 
sinless because God is guiding them. Shias believe that Ali was 
the favoured successor and that he was rightfully the first Calipha. 
The martyrdom of Ali and his son Hussain are seen by Shias as 
personifying their history, which is seen as a history of the 
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struggle of an oppressed and disinherited community trying to restore God's way against evil. Sunnis on the other hand take the opposing view and see early Islamic power as signs of God's guidance and rewards to the faithful community as well as the validation of Muslim beliefs and claims28 There are many other differences between the Sunnis and the Shias, which centre on ritual differences. These are complex and beyond the scope of this study. Shia Islam has its largest following in Iran. Although it has a significant presence on the South Asian Sub-Continent its followers are outnumbered by the Sunni majority. Within Sunni and Shia branches of Islam there are several schools of religious thought and distinct traditions. In Azad Kashmir the majority of Sunnis belong to the Barelwi tradition. This particular strand of Islam and its dominance within the subcontinent is widely attributed to the influence of Sufism and Ahmad Raza Khan ( 1856-1921) with his ardent defence of Sufistic practices against the increasing attacks by the reform groups at the time. Indeed it was Ahmad Raza Khan who cultivated the Barelwi tradition and established a common identity. The Sufis have played a significant role in the Islam practised in Azad Kashmir. Popular images of the spread of Islam centre on military conquest. However some commentators question the validity of this consensus. For instance Khan points out that the Sufis often served in the armies and helped them in their campaigns and had the task of bringing Islam to the hearts and souls of the 141 
people. 29 They were particularly significant in bringing Islam to remote rural 
areas where many of the Muslim armies did advance. 
Gellner has identified differences in the types of Islam practised in rural and 
urban areas. Geaves discusses Gellner's analysis and sets out his two sets of 
characteristics, which he claims distinguishes urban and rural forms of Islam. 30 
This analysis is particularly significant in the case of the Azad Kashmiris who as 
we have seen above migrated to Britain from the rural areas, and it helps in 
understanding their particular form of Islam. 
Urban Islam in Gellner' s analysis is characterised by: strict monotheism; 
puritanism; stress on scriptural revelation and therefore on literacy; 
egalitarianism amongst the believers and consequently an absence of human 
mediation and its accompanying hierarchy; a minimisation of ritual or mysticism 
and focus on sobriety and moderation; and finally the stress on rules rather than 
emotional states. Rural Islam is characterised by: a tendency towards this-world 
and other-world hierarchies; a reliance on human intermediaries in this world and 
a hierarchy of spirits in the other; the development of perceptual symbols and 
images rather than the abstract word, which leads to a multiplicity of ritual and 
mystical practices; and finally towards personalities rather than a set of rules. 
This analysis is ba_sed on the argument that rural Muslims require spiritual 
mediators because illiteracy renders the abstract reasoning of trained ulema 
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beyond them. Further they require the mediators to define the norms of tribal 
life. 3 1 
In Azad Kashmiri society these mediators are known as Pirs. These are usually 
men who have received the veneration of villagers. They are individuals who are 
deemed to have a special connection with God. They are blessed individuals who 
have karamat (supernatural powers) to help alleviate their followers' problems 
through barakat (the power to bless). Pirs usually travel from village to village 
often stopping in a particular village for a while. Villagers then come to a Pir's 
khanaqah or dargah (shrine) to ask advice and seek solace. Often this is 
presented in the form of ta'widhs (amulets) which contain some specific Quranic 
verse thought to be appropriate for the particular ailment. 
"Spiritual powers are not lost after the death of the Pir but claimed by his 
successor known as the pirzade. This is usually by stressing blood ties to the 
saint himself or to his immediate successor. The main duties of the successor are 
to cherish the memory of the dead saint"32 . Over the centuries there have been 
many prominent Pirs in the Azad Kashmir area, who have gathered large 
followings. The Nakhsbandi, Chisti and Quadiri tariquas are three that have the 
largest silsilah of followers from the areas from which migration to Britain has 
taken place. 
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Geaves points out that the Barelwi tradition is the only major nineteenth century 
Islamic movement in the subcontinent whose teachings were not derived from 
the ideas of Shah Wali-allah.33 
Rather than emerging out of a desire to change standards of 
religious practice, they adhered to the custom-laden style of 
Sufism and closely allied themselves to the teachings of the 
medieval Pirs. The Barewalis can be seen as a conscious reaction 
to the Deobandi reformers. 34 
The Barelwi tradition is strongly represented, although not exclusively, in the 
migrant communities of Azad Kashmir and consequently in Britain and Luton. 
Pirs sometimes travel to British cities with their disciples to speak to their 
followers. Notification of visits usually passes from one family to another and 
meetings are usually held in local community halls or in people's homes. To 
welcome a Pir to one's  home is highly revered in Kashmiri society. From 
interviews with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and migrants now settled in Luton it 
was apparent that this particular form of Islam was used to reinforce a religious 
identity. This was perceived as different from other Muslims in Britain, 
particularly the Punjabis, and as such it reinforced identification with migrants' 
villages in Azad Kashmir. Mr K commented: 
We can't be confused with all the rest of them. I mean we are 
Muslims we know that but we are different and well it's got a lot 
to do with where we come from. If my family didn't have a Pir 
then we would be different we would think different. 
Mrs J said: 
In Britain other Muslims look down on us because we follow our 
Pirs. We follow the Naksbundis. They think that we are 
worshipping idols and look down on us and I've even heard them 
call us Kafirs (non believers). They shouldn't do that because we 
are all Muslims. 
Mrs D commented on the 'changes' in her daughter: 
My daughter thinks that all this visiting Pirs and things is a waste 
of time and that they are just out to get money from us. Our 
youngsters think that they don't need help from these people
because they can get it from God. All this going to these Muslim 
women's things is making then look down on us. They say we are 
unpar andjahil. It's tough coming from your kids. 
Mr K and Mrs J's comments indicate some of the potential sectarian problems 
that are impacting on the British scene and which have been particularly 
significant in the formation of community. Mrs D's comments are particularly 
significant to the understanding of changes in religious identification amongst 
migrants and the Kashmiri British youth. 
As well as understanding the rural and urban particularities of Islam it is also 
important to make distinctions between the private and the public Islam. 
Identification with Pirs forms a part of the public Islam easily identifiable to 
outside observers. As well as following particular Pirs and organising around this 
particular identity, another focal point of public religious activity in Azad 
Kashmir is the local village Mosque. Here the Imams lead the congregation to 
prayer five times a day and particularly on Fridays at the Jumma prayer. As well 
as leading prayers, the Imam is responsible for sermons on special days, the day 
to day functioning of the Mosque and the religious instruction of the village 
children. In many cases he also acts as the mediator between different village 
groups. The role of the Mosque is primarily religious, but another important role 
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is as an arena where discussion of various important issues, such as for example 
debates and discussion of politics, can take place between and within biraderis. 
Many of the Mosques built in villages in the Kotli and Mirpur district were 
initiated by local Pirs and funded by the local communities or devotees of the 
particular Pir. Often one or two biraderi groups would share the same Mosque in 
the village. 
Islamic expression was widely visible throughout Azad Kashmir with large 
numbers of Mosques and shrines dotted all over the landscape. Various villagers 
pointed out that Kotli district is often described as the city of Mosques. Each has 
a separate character reflecting the Imam's or founder's particular style. Public 
manifestation of religious identity helps maintain a common religious identity 
and at the private level Islam gives a sense of belonging, values and morality to 
the individuals. 
Although as mentioned above women tend to have a separate, usually private 
domain, in rural Azad Kashmir women also partake in public religious activity. 
Although it is not the custom for women to attend Mosques at prayer time, they 
usually pray at home on their own or in groups. Women also attend Pirst' shrines 
and thus play an important role in consolidating identity. One interesting point 
was highlighted by Mr D ofRoli village: 
When I was young we used to have just a very small shelter-like 
Mosque here where we would pray. It was very small and it was 
for all ofus and then people from here started to go away and send 146 
money back to their Pir you know it's sawab to do that. We 
Muslims have to do that you know like paying zakat. The people 
here are very religious so they all do that. Some women even sell 
their jewellery and give it to the Pirs for their Mosques and 
shrines. Then it started getting bigger and better - the Mosque. We 
are very proud when your grandson sends money for the Mosque. 
Mr D's experiences of witnessing the changes in his Mosque suggest another 
direct impact of remittances from Britain and Luton. Mrs H indicated that : 
These Pirs or their disciples come to the UK to collect money to 
build their Mosques and shrines back home. Didn't you know this? 
You must know this? They are everywhere. Sometimes you don't 
know who is real and who just wants money to make his own 
name big back home. I don't know what to do sometimes but my 
mother-in-law always says that we have to help God's men. 
The motives of Pirs was often commented upon by Kashmiri youth in Luton as 
one of the reasons for moving away from what one young respondent Shahid 
called "ego Islam". His sentiments and those of other young British Kashmiris 
are discussed in more detail in relation to Islam in Luton. 
For now at least we can note the importance of remittances, visits and associated 
collections. They have the effect of maintaining religious identity and more 
particularly ensure that the specific Barelwi traditions are maintained. What is 
apparent is that "it is a strand of Islam that is inextricably interwoven with the 
customs pertaining to ethnic origin". 35 The following chapter presents an analysis 
of how this particular form of Islam is expressing itself within the Luton context. 
It considers its sali�nce within the Kashmiri community; and its future role in 
identity maintenance in the face of the demise of cultural forms of Islam. These 
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have declined in favour of identifications with a more orthodox global Islam. Before moving onto this, however I want to turn to the political identity at home. 
IV. POLITICAL IDENTITY AT HOME Preceding sections have outlined some of the significant details pertaining to economic conditions, socio-cultural factors and religious belief which appear to been significant during the migration process and that have contributed to the transfer, construction and redefinition of identity within the new British context. Whilst acknowledging differences between the South Asian communities settled in Britain it would be correct to say that Kashmiris share the above experiences with other South Asian communities settled in Britain. Research suggests that it appears to be the unique political identity of Kashmiris that differentiates them from other South Asian groups settled in Britain and particularly from the Pakistani group with whom as discussed above they have been categorised for academic as well as policy reasons. The political dimensions to migration and identity have often been under-emphasised within literature. In much of the literature on Pakistani migration to Britain the economic factors have taken precedence. Invariably they have been the focus of research, and political factors in migration have been under emphasised. This is not surprising since as mentioned �hove there have been long traditions of economic migration from these regions. However for Kashmiris there has been a significant political dimension that has affected and is affecting identity formation and reformation. 
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In the 1950s and early 1960s an important political dimension .to migration from 
Azad Kashmir was the construction of the Mangla Damn. Some Kashmiris 
displaced by the construction of the Dam see themselves as political refugees 
rather than economic migrants. 
Construction of the Mangla Dam had the effect of displacing large numbers of 
Azad Kashmiris. Discussion and research with former members of the Anti 
Mangla Dam League, based in Mirpur, suggests that the history of the 
construction of the Dam goes back to pre-partition days. At that time the scheme 
was being proposed by the Punjab Government. Hari Singh opposed the proposal 
because the wall of the proposed dam fell within the Jammu and Kashmir State 
and at that time the Kashmir Government was not willing to give up part of 
Kashmir to the Punjab Government. After partition Pakistan faced serious 
irrigation problems as the headwaters of the region's largest rivers lay on the 
other side of the control line. In 1950 India refused access to its water supply. 
The need for a dam became an issue of urgency. 
The project was started in the 1950s by a consortium of countries which included 
the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Germany. The 
intention was to confine the water of the Jhelum and Poonch, increase the volume 
of irrigation water for the Punjab and to generate electricity for this area. 
Construction of the Dam took place in several stages and initial stages involved 
the relocation of approximately 200 villages and the old town of Mirpur, which 
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comprised approximately 13,000 inhabitants. In the 1960s the population close to 
the dam was evacuated and from 1 963 the whole population of the area was 
relocated so that when construction was in its final stages approximately I 00, 000 
inhabitants had been moved. 
The Mangla Dam achieved many of its original aims. It is a major source of 
hydro-electric power and serves as the principal water storage reservoir for the 
entire canal system of West Punjab. Mangla is thus critical to the success of the 
Pakistani economy as a whole providing cheap electricity, year round irrigation, 
and security from flooding. 36 
However, large-scale dam construction has serious environmental consequences 
and the construction of the Mangla Dam was no exception. Construction meant 
some of the most fertile land in Mirpur district, and the district's two major 
market towns, Mirpur and Chaomukh, were flooded. Transport routes were also 
disrupted and efforts to build alternatives were undermined by lack of finance. 
As Ballard puts it, the government of Pakistan and the World Bank - who 
provided most of the finance for the Mangla Scheme - chose to skimp and save.37 
This was only too obvious to the Mirpuris. The Dam constructors built a first 
class road around the southern (and originally virtually unpopulated) shore of the 
newly formed lake._ However, the long and winding road around the densely 
populated northern shore, which now provided the remainder of the district with 
its only access to the plains, was built to a much lower standard. This was not 
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completed until some years after the water had risen. It was more than a decade 
before a bridge was finally constructed across the river Poonch to Dudyal, which 
the rising waters of the dam had turned into an isolated peninsula inaccessible to 
vehicular traffic. Ballard' s observations were reiterated by Abdul Khaliq Ansari, 
a Mirpuri advocate: 
They promised us lots of things. They made promises that we 
would get free water, free electricity. They promised because they 
wanted to construct it and were getting opposition. We now pay 
more than the Punjab are paying for electricity and well, the roads 
you can see for yourself 
Mr Q of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell added: 
Before the Mangla Dam, from Mirpur to Dudyal was half an hour 
but afterwards it is about a two hour drive. They promised us the 
fish will be free to eat now they are in the possession of W APDA. 
Now they only give fishing contracts to their own people and we 
are deprived offish. We do not have the right to tender for fishing. 
They have in effect occupied this area. Why haven't they 
developed this area? It's clear it's a colony of that country 
(Pakistan) and who takes care of the colony and it's colonial 
people? No one. We have no rights, we can't demand anything 
from them and it's our land. 
From conversations with individuals at all levels, a political dimension to 
migration was emerging which is vital when understanding the interrelationship 
between migration and identity. It is important to recognise that Kashmiris in this 
area had already been uprooted as a result of the above mentioned political 
upheaval leading up to 1947. Construction further displaced families. Estimates 
as to the number vary from approximately 100,000 to 200,000 people. At every 
stage there was opposition to the construction of the Dam. Mass opposition 
centred on one fundamental issue: ownership of the land on which the dam was 
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to be constructed. These feelings were emphasised by many of the individuals 
interviewed in Mirpur who had memories of the "Mangla Dam Years" . Abdul 
Shakoor Khokhar head of the then active Anti Mangla Front pointed out that : 
We knew nothing about the Mangla Dam about a year or so before 
they planned on starting the building. Of course no one was going 
to consult the people who would be affected, the Kashmiri people. 
Look, the thing is that the land belonged to the Kashmiri people 
not the government of Pakistan. Put it this way - Kashmir is a 
disputed territory. That is, it is c;lisputed by Pakistan and Kashmir. 
We the people of the state do not dispute it, we know that it is 
ours. Pakistan knew if they admitted this then there would be no 
Dam and Pakistan would become a desert. We just didn't get a 
say. 
Abdul Khaliq Ansari added: 
Politically Pakistan did not have the right to build in another 
country that was Jammu and Kashmir. The whole thing took place 
by force, it was forced all the way. There were demonstrations 
from everywhere. People living here came out of their houses, 
even the women and children were demonstrating. We didn't want 
to leave our land but had no choice because unless we agreed to 
move we were arrested. Lots of people were arrested because they 
were demonstrating against the Pakistani Government. We were 
asking why no one asked us what we wanted. When we refused to 
go they brought in the Army and the police. They had no right to 
construct the Dam in our country. We didn't understand how they 
could call it a development scheme when the only people it 
benefited were the Pakistanis. 
MroH added: 
It wasn't a peaceful construction. Those who opposed it were 
thrown into cells. There were hundreds of people in cells. It was 
the force of the Army and police that got that Dam built . If no one 
was going to listen to the people then no one was listening to the 
Azad Kashmiri government either. 
Abdul Shakoor Khokhar continued to point out that: 
It was because there was so much opposition to the Dam that we 
formed the Anti Mangla Dam Front, so that someone at the top 
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would hear what the people wanted. We wanted a say about what 
was happening to our land. It was the right of the Kashmiri people 
and only the Kashmiri people. They even bought off our people.
The president of the Anti Mangla Dam Front was given an offer to 
become a commissioner of the state. The Secretary General was 
given the post of an Advocate General of the Pakistan Water and 
Power Foundation and the chairman was given a post of a minister 
in the cabinet. 
The above sentiments were reiterated by many individuals in Mirpur. 
Discussions with members of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell in Mirpur 
highlighted the psychological impact of the upheavals caused by the 'capturing of 
our land'. Mr F recalled that: I don't remember much but I know it was very 
painful for my parents. Everything had to go. When people like my parents 
refused to go then they started to submerge the land. Some houses and other 
buildings in Old Mirpur were half submerged and even then people would not 
leave. They were taken away. Some left then with their things on tangas, with all 
their possessions. 
The psychological attachment to home was recalled by Mr Q: 
In my father's desperation to hold onto a piece of his home he 
removed the front door of our house. He keeps it on the roof of 
our current home believing that one day he will construct a house 
like that one, or maybe to remind him. 
About 246 villages were submerged in total, of which an estimated 189 were in 
Mirpur District and approximately 57 in Pakistan (Kashmir Record and Research 
Cell). Mr N pointed out that: 
We were 189 villages affected here and more than 80.000 people 
had to leave and migrate and more than 65,000 acres of land was 
submerged in the water. 
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Anwar comments that "at the end of the 1950s and 1960s, the villagers of the 
proposed dam area were give compensation. Some bought land and settled in 
other parts of Pakistan". 38 Some who had relatives in Britain used the money to 
come to Britain and to find work. The issue of compensation resulted in some 
passionate and angry responses. Mr T said: 
They promised compensation but it was just for their fun. They 
never honoured what they said. Yes people were given 
compensation. We got money for houses and if we had some little 
bit of land then they bought that also. The big zimidars could get 
land the same size somewhere else. There was no choice though. 
We just had to go where the government decided. The land was in 
the far off districts of Punjab, in Gugrewala, Surgoda, Faislabad, 
Multan, Deragasikhan and some families were settled in Sind 
province. 
Mr S commented: 
If you didn't have land - and many people didn't you know, we 
are poor people, we worked for big landowners, - in the town 
they would say that, for example, you bought this land for 
lO0rs. Now it's old so we can give you less. To them it was just 
money. They could have given us land in our own country. 
There's no compensation in seeing my land going to someone 
else. 
Mrs H, who is now resident in Luton but originally from Old Mirpur, commented 
on the subject of compensation: 
With the money they gave us for our land and house we couldn't 
get anything there so I stayed and your Uncle (referring to her 
husband) had to come here. 
Mrs H's husband added that: 
With that m<;mey I couldn't build another house like the one I had 
there, well not until I came here. Really they made us leave that 
country. I would never have left my family if I could have 
managed. It's not compensation separating parents from their 
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children, brothers from sisters and fathers and mothers from their 
children. 
Mr T, also resident in Luton, told me: 
They sent us where we didn't know anyone. OK you can try to get 
on but those people were different. I wanted to go back home but I 
came here because there was nothing there and I had my izzat. 
Now I have a small bit of land in Mirpur. That is where I belong 
but I can only afford it because I give my brother money. At least 
I have somewhere I belong, but what if I hadn't been here? 
Many of those affected used their compensation money to travel to Britain. Many 
of those forced to move had previous experience of migration. Mr H of the 
Kashmir Record and Research Cell suggested that they were forced to move 
when he explained: 
More than 80.000 people went abroad. They had to leave because 
of the Mangla Dam but although they didn't want to move they
were used to it. So many had given up their land and bought bad 
land, it wasn't irrigated. They had little choice, lots settled there 
because they didn't have land here then. 
The political consequences are a relatively recent example of the political 
dimension to migration and identity. Experiences of political upheavals, however 
have a long and complicated history. In this research political experience and 
sentiments have been best expressed in the form of a national identification with 
the homeland of a united Kashmir. 
It is not intended within the limits of a study of this length to present a detailed 
historical account of the political situation in Kashmir over the last fifty years; 
that is beyond the scope of this study. What is intended however is a review and 
presentation of the core events within Kashmiri political history which appear to 
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be firmly lodged within Kashmiri sentiment and have been expressed as 
contributory factors to the development and the maintenance of a Kashmiri 
identity in its current form. A review of the political history of the Kashmir 
situation is therefore presented as a vital prerequisite for contextual 
understanding of the debates currently prevalent within the Kashmiri British 
community, and as a way of understanding the current importance . of territorial 
identification within their identity structures. 
For centuries Kashmir' s  beauty has been documented in photographs and 
literature. It often being referred to as "Paradise on Earth" or "Heaven on Earth" 
and idealised in folk crafts and songs. In contrast its political history has been 
troubled. Its status has been disputed within international politics since Partition 
in 1947. It is without question the events of 1947 which have been the focus of 
much of the debate on Kashmir and its current position. The majority of 
Kashmiris question the Instrument of Accession of 1947 whereby Kashmir was 
handed over to India. Their suspicions have recently been supported by Lamb, 
who suggests that the Maharaja could not have signed the Treaty since he was 
travelling from Srinigar to Jammu at the time that the treaty is alleged to have 
been signed. Accordingly, then, he argues that when the Indian troops arrived at 
the airfield, that state was still independent, rendering the Treaty fraudulent.39 
However, to unders�and the complexities of the "Kashmir Issue" it is necessary 
to delve deeper into Kashmir political history and review the political events 
leading to Partition in 1947. 
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Through its history Kashmir has been ruled as a princely state by twenty-two 
dynasties. As part of their colonial expansion the British had come into 
possession of the territory of Kashmir due to the gradual demise of the Sikh 
Empire ofRanjit Singh which was suffering gradual collapse with the pressure of 
British imperialist power. The foundations for the present day nationalism 
amongst Kashmiris across the world were laid in 1846. Bose begins his account 
of the turbulent history of Kashmir, and sees the roots of the present day conflict 
as also being laid in 1846. At this date "a commercial transaction was concluded 
between the British, then preoccupied with bringing the entire subcontinent under 
their direct or indirect rule, and Guiab Singh, the Dogra King of Jammu"40 He ' 
continues to point out that the reason Guiab Singh was chosen as the beneficiary 
was that despite formerly being a leading member of the Lahore court, he had 
been conniving with the British against Ranjit Singh's successors. 
With the signing of the treaty of Amritsar of 1 6  March 1846 the Vale of Kashmir 
was sold to Guiab Singh by the British. As quoted in Choudhry (1996) referring 
to this human sale, the poet Iqbal wrote: 
0 Thou morning breeze: if ever thou shouldst happen to pass 
Geneva, convey from me to the League of Nations: these poor, 
innocent peasants, their fields and their crops, their beautiful 
streams and gardens, all sold for sordid cash - in fact a whole 
nation was wantonly sold into slavery and sold very cheap.41 
The British imperialists acknowledged Kashmir's semi-independent status m 
return for military support from Guiab Singh and acknowledgement of British 
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supremacy in the region. Thus the State of Jammu and Kashmir was taking 
shape. Before 1846 Guiab Singh had already taken Ladakh and Baltistan. After 
the acquisition he set about expanding his territory to include Gligit, Hunza, 
Nagar and other areas bordering Afghanistan and China collectively known as 
Dardistan. These areas are now referred to as the Northern Areas. With his 
obtaining of the Vale of Kashmir in 1846 his expansion was complete and "he 
became the master of practically all distinct regions that came to comprise the 
historical territory of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir". 42 
Lamb points out that "the State of Jammu and Kashmir thus assembled was, 
therefore, of considerable complexity". 43 It was moreover, in the context of the 
broad history of India a totally new polity quite without precedent. The original 
heartland Jammu was predominantly Hindu and Sikh in population and 
dominated by the Dogras who claimed Rajput ancestry, though in the outlying 
districts it had by 1947 a small Muslim majority, the latter concentrated in 
Mirpur (now part of Azad Kashmir). The vale of Kashmir was largely Sunni 
Muslim with a small but influential Hindu minority who were largely Braahmin 
Pandits, from which group came the family of Nehru. The sparse population of 
Ladakh was mainly Tibetan Buddhist. Baltistan was Shia Muslim whose 
population was ethnically related to Tibet and the people of Dardistan were Shia 
or Ismalli Muslims. 
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"Controlling" the Muslim majority in the Vale of Kashmir proved a difficult task. 
"It took Guiab Singh, and then only with British military assistance, some two 
years to establish himself in his new possession where his possession was not 
welcomed by the local population - some of his opponents were flayed alive, one 
of his favourite punishments".44 Guiab Singh was an extremely unpopular 
autocratic ruler. 
Bose highlights how Kaul "paints a Dickensian picture of Srinagar in the early 
1920s - prostitution, thievery, beggary, disease, illiteracy and unemployment 
were apparently rife, while 90% of Muslim houses [were] mortgaged to Hindu 
money lenders". 45 Bose continues to point out that the Pandit writer Bazaz wrote 
in 1941 that: 
The poverty of the Muslim masses is appalling. Dressed in rags 
and barefoot, a Muslim peasant presents the appearance of a 
starving beggar. Most are landless labourers, working as serfs for 
absentee landlords - almost the whole brunt of official corruption 
has been borne by the Muslim masses . . .  rural indebtedness is 
staggering. 46 
There was increasing discontent amongst the population of Jammu and Kashmir 
against the types of social and economic deprivations described by Bazaz. 
Discontent became a struggle and culminated in the formation of political 
movements in the 1930s. These political movements and their ideologies have 
been transferred with the Kashmiris through the migration process and 
consequently have a presence within the Kashmiri diaspora. 
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In protest against the Maharaja's autocratic rule and the poor social and 
economic conditions, there were a series of minor revolts within the area. 
However it was in 1932 that the first significant organised political party was 
formed in reaction to the prevailing conditions, in the form of the All Jammu and 
Kashmir Muslim Conference, by two of the most prominent leaders of modern 
Kashmiri political history, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas. The 
aim of this organisation was to co-ordinate the popular movement for democratic 
government and social justice. 
In 1938 the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference split on ideological 
grounds. Abdullah was more secular in his approach and closely subscribed to 
the ideology of the Indian National Congress. He persuaded members to shed the 
communal label and adopt the new title of the All Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conference, which would include Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Abbas on 
the other hand was more communal with an ostensibly religious approach. Out of 
some seventy or eighty delegates only about four were opposed to the change of 
the name. Despite this majority, a minority led by Abbas continued as the 
Muslim Conference. "Inevitably the latter grew closer to the [Jinnah's] Muslim 
League and later threw in its lot with Pakistan, becoming the nucleus of the Azad 
Kashmir Government, whilst Abdullah's National Conference lined itself with 
the Indian National Congress".47 Bose points out that "the National Conference 
had a strong following in the Valley because of Abdullah's charismatic 
leadership, but also more importantly because of the party's 1944 social 
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manifesto, Naya [New] Kashmir, which promised radical land reform once the 
monarchy had been abolished". 48 The Muslim Conference continued to be strong 
in the J ammu region with deep roots amongst the biraderis, especially in the 
western Jammu districts that later became part of"Azad Kashmir". 
The majority of Kashmiris question the accession of Kashmir. The events leading 
up to the accession have been presented from a variety of perspectives and are 
the subject of academic as well as political dispute. The intention here is not to 
recount treaties in chronological order but place emphasis on the significance of 
these to the identity of the Kashmiri people. It is well to remember that the years 
leading to the withdrawal of imperial power were ones of considerable turmoil 
throughout the South Asian subcontinent and this was replicated, with 
considerable severity, nowhere more than in Kashmir. The Maharaja was 
challenged by the popular movements within Kashmir and in the face of 
increasing instability was trying to hold on to his power in the region. Bose 
points out that in the face of the chaos he "briefly toyed with the idea of working 
out an association with Pakistan once imperial paramountcy over Jammu and 
Kashmir lapsed on 15 August 194 7, if Pakistan would agree to leave his throne 
intact. By August a limited standstill agreement had been signed". 49 
However the Mahal:"aja faced increasing problems with revolts against his rule. 
Between August and October a major Muslim revolt began from the Poonch and 
Jammu areas. Further revolts occurred in the Valley. The Muslims and some ex-
161 
Indian army men became the Azad (free) Kashmir force. This initial resistance 
led to the creation of Azad Kashmir under Pakistan's  control. Interviews with 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and those now settled in Luton who experienced the 
atrocities highlighted the psychological impact of these years. 
Many recounted the atrocities by the Maharaj a' s armies against the Muslims as a 
way of quelling the uprisings. Dawson points out that "the worst example 
occurred in early November when two crowded convoys of Muslim evacuees 
who had been promised safe conduct to Pakistan were set on by their guards and 
others outside Jammu and men and women and children were slaughtered."50 As 
a result of this about 400,000 Muslims fled into Azad Kashmir and at least 
another 100,000 into Pakistan. Kashmiris enlisted the help of Pakistani men, 
many of whom were from the North West Frontier and volunteered as part of the 
Islamic Jihad. "However the tribal invasion soon degenerated into an 
indiscriminate looting and murder of Hindu and Muslims like."5 1  As Bose 
correctly observes "memories of this carnage were to imbue an entire generation 
of Kashmiri Muslims with deep scepticism towards subsequent rhetoric 
demanding Kashmiri 'self-determination', a generation who were forced to leave 
their homeland, suffer the humiliation of refugee status and poor economic status 
when settling in other areas of Kashmir". 52 
"Under the Act of Independence the rulers of all 560 princely states had been 
empowered to accede to either India or Pakistan if they wished with the proviso 
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that they took into account the geographic contiguity, religious composition and 
wishes of their people. At the time, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was thus 
independent as no accession document had been signed linking in to India or 
Pakistan".53 However as 1 5  August 1 947 approached, the Maharaja, faced with 
the prospect of being overthrown by the rebels, sought the ,help of India. He was 
faced with two choices: stand against the rebels or lose power and accede to India 
with the prospect of remaining Head of State. 54 
On 26 October with the support of Abdullah who was in favour of an 
independent Kashmir loosely linked to India rather than Pakistan the Maharaja 
signed the Instrument of Accession. Importantly, Lord Mountbatten, the then 
Governor General of India, included a covering letter saying "In consistence with 
their policy that in the case of any State, where the issue of accession has been 
the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance 
with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my government' s  wish that as 
soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the 
invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to 
the people"55 . In this sense then the treaty was provisional and conditional upon 
the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The UN Security Council set up a 
commission, which passed a number of resolutions calling upon both countries to 
cease military hostilities and institute a UN-supervised plebiscite to ascertain the 
wishes of the Kashmiris. The UN plebiscite has not yet been instigated. 1 63 
Further uprisings in the wake of accession led the UN to enforce a cease-fire line. 
Ali, Ellis and Khan indicate that "the territory of Jammu and Kashmir is now 
split into several parts either resulting directly from actions in 194 7 or by 
subsequent events both military and political. In 1947 the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir was divided into two with Pakistan controlling what is currently known 
as Azad (free) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the Northern Areas." 
. 
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provisional government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was established and this 
was the government of Abbas' Muslim Conference. India came to control the 
remaining part including Ladakh. The area came under the governance of 
Abdullah and his National Conference. "The Northern Areas comprising 
Baltistan, Gilgit and Hunza are officially part of AJK but under the Karachi 
agreement of 1949 is administered by Pakistan on behalf of the AJK government 
until the AJK government is capable of doing so. This arrangement was recently 
reconfirmed by the Supreme Court. In 1962 in an agreement with China Pakistan 
handed over some territory in Hunza on a temporary basis on the explicit 
understanding that this would be reviewed when the overall Kashmir situation 
was resolved". 57 
A further uprising took place in Indian occupied Kashmir with the arrest of 
Abdullah in 1953 and his replacement by the new Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam 
Mohammad. Abdullah's continued stance became increasingly unpopular with 
Nehru.58 He spent the next fourteen years in prisons across India until his death 
in 1982. The politics Indian Occupied Kashmir changed beyond all recognition 
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and gradually a state which was more or less self governing, with its own Prime 
Minister, own President and national flag, by 1 964 became like any other Indian 
state subject to the rules and regulations of the Indian Constitution. As Bose 
points out: 
In 1 954, a Constitutional Order (Application to Jammu and 
Kashmir) was promulgated by the President of India, which 
empowered the Indian government to legislate on matters on the 
union list, not just defence, foreign affairs and 
communications . . .  this was the beginning of the end of article 
370.59 
In Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir the status of the Kashmir Issue was also 
changing. The death of Jinnah in 1948, one year after independence, the 
assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1 958, the dismissal of his elected 
successor Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin in April 1 953 and his eventual 
replacement by Ayub Khan meant that "Pakistan slipped into the hands of the 
Babu bureaucrats and political agents of the outgoing imperial regime. Publicly 
scorned by Nehru as unrepresentative clerks and beneath him to talk to, the Babu 
Kashmir policy was quite simple: to latch the country onto the device of Western 
alliance and hope and pray that these "leaders of the free world" would, in return, 
force India to let the UN hold a free and fair plebiscite and let the Kashmiris 
decide whether they wanted to join India or Pakistan".60 
This state of affairs continued until 1 962. After 1 962 a series of events relegated 
the Kashmir Issue to bilateral status. After the breakdown of talks between the 
respective Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers, Sardar Swaran Singh and 
165 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the outcome was India's relegation of the cease fire line to a 
permanent border. In the shadow of failed negotiations Pakistan made an attempt 
in 1965 to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control. Pakistani 
commandos were meant to lead a Kashmiri uprising under the so-called 
Operation Gibraltar, destroying strategic communication lines, and under the 
sister Operation Malta to cross the cease fire line and free the Kashmiris. Both 
operations failed as Pakistan felt the fuIJ force of the Indian army which also 
crossed the cease fire line into Azad Kashmir. 
For the Kashmiri people the failure of Operation Gibraltar and Operation Malta 
left two very significant lasting impressions. The first was the memories of the 
casualties of war which are deeply ingrained, and secondly the loss of faith in the 
Pakistan Army as their potential 'liberators'. A further blow came in 1971 with its 
failure in East Pakistan. 
These events were particularly significant for the Kashmiris who took matters 
into their own hands. As Mr D from Mirpur commented: 
Look, just about everyone has failed us and then the situation was 
so bad that they [ the imperialists] no longer cared. They just spoilt 
the place and then left. Whilst our brothers were being killed they 
were counting their losses and washing their hands of the whole 
thing. Pakistan was helping because they wanted Kashmir for 
Pakistanis not a Kashmir for the Kashmiris and everything they
were doing was failing anyway. They sold Kashmir and they were 
humiliated out of Bangladesh. We had to do things for ourselves, 
we aren't any less than the Bangladeshis. 
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Nationalistic and liberation politics were further enhanced with the 'loss of faith' with Pakistan over the Simla Treaty in 1972. At this date, under the Bhutto regime Pakistan agreed not to take up the issue of Kashmir at any international forum but only consider bilateral talks between itself and India. The Kashmiri people are not included in the equation, thus they are seen as the problem only and not part of any solution to the issue. Most Kashmiris, even those that subscribe to accession to Pakistan, believe that with the signing of the Simla Treaty Bhutto sold Kashmiri freedom to the Indians. His intentions of making Kashmir the fifth province of Pakistan were fervently rejected by the majority of Kashmiris. Pakistan's failure to support the Kashmiris, deep-seated mistrust of the Bhutto regime and increasing anti-democratisation of Kashmir by India resulted in the formation of stronger liberation organisations working for independence within Indian-occupied Kashmir and Azad Kashmir. Referring to Indian Occupied Kashmir Bose points out that: "the inevitable result was that when mass Kashmiri alienation from Indian 'democracy' eventually surfaced in an explosive form . . .  it was simultaneously a total and violent rejection of the Indian nation". 61  The Kashmiri struggle for independence continued in the form of protests but it was not until 1987 that the Azadi (freedom) organisations in Indian Occupied Kashmir organised _themselves under the Muslim United Front (MUF). Their main objective was to participate in elections as a way of forcing the political settlement of the Kashmir issue. "But on this occasion too the Indian imperialism 167 
repeated the process of fraud and rigging. The frustrated youth seemg no 
alternative took to guns".62 They saw Farooq Abdullah of the National 
Conference as selling out to the Indians. Failure in the elections and discontent 
with the ruling National Congress led to the more organised expression of 
liberation movements, indeed mid-1989 is generally seen as the beginning of 
organised liberation movements in Kashmir. The most prominent of the 
liberation movements in the Valley are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF), the Hizbul Mujahideen (who are closely linked with the Jamat-I-Islami) 
and the Therek Ulema. 
The status of Azad Kashmir is not significantly better than that of Indian 
Occupied Kashmir. It is certainly not as Azad (free) as the designated name 
suggests. Since 1947 and more ardently after 1972 the Bhutto regime began to 
show their support of Sardar Qayum rather than the Muslim Conference of 
Sardar Ibrahim. No genuine election has ever been held. The judicial system is 
rudimentary and its constitution stipulates that no one person or political party in 
Azad J ammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part in 
activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State's accession to 
Pakistan.63 Mr T further pointed out that : 
We are supposed to be free and we can do nothing. We are really 
just Pakistan's puppets and we have to go along with what they 
say. 
Along similar lines Mr H pointed out: 
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Look, we have a government OK and it's meant to represent the 
Kashmiri people but in fact they just represent Pakistan. They
don't even know what the Kashmiris want just what the Pakistani 
Government wants. They have a seat in the Pakistani National 
Assembly and then Pakistan tell them you have to keep your 
mouth shut or well you can speak but then don't expect us to do 
anything about it. Let's face it it's all just to keep us quiet'. 
Although there have not been any popular uprisings in Pakistani-controlled 
Kashmir there are high levels of support for Kashmiri brethren across the cease 
fire line. As Khan points out there exists "great support and fervour for the 
uprisings, while there is strong feeling of solidarity towards their kith and kin 
across the border who have been subjected to immense suffering under Indian 
Occupation"64. These observations were supported by Mr H from Muzzafarabad 
when he said: 
In many ways I was lucky and in others I wasn't - you know why? 
Well I had to leave my family. Some of them are still there. There 
aren't very many now but the thing is what can I do sitting here, 
sometime I would like to visit and well that's the thing that makes 
me keep on with fighting for them over there. One day I will see 
my family over there again. 
Mrs K, the head of the Women's Textile College in Muzzaffarabad, commented: 
That [Indian Occupied Kashmir] is my real home. I am a refugee
here and there we had everything and here well we live like 
people who had nothing. We have an identity that is different from 
Pakistanis and we have been forced to be like them. So we are the 
blessed ones that we are here free from harm but my heart is there 
with my brother and his family and one day our Kashmir will be 
ours again. 
As well as personal loss these comments and others like them highlight the sheer 
frustration and resentment with Britain and the international community in 
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general for ignoring the Kashmir issue and "turning its back" on the human rights 
violations in the area. Mrs K continued to comment that: 
Sometimes I think that the world has forgotten us people. It was 
OK when the tourists had to come and then we were the 
Kashmiris but now that things are so bad even the British who 
made the problem in the first place don't care. What I would like 
to do is send people postcards of the refugee camps instead of the 
beautiful landscapes, and hope for a better reaction than what our 
people are getting. 
Support for the Kashmiris in Indian Occupied Kashmir and for a free Kashmir 
are expressed in the ideologies of some of the liberation organisations in Azad 
Kashmir, some of which have their foundations in the Valley. In 1960 K. H. 
Kurshid founded the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League otherwise 
known as the Liberation League. Khurshid's background was also through the 
Muslim Conference. He did not have a natural constituency in Azad Kashmir 
since he had originated from the Valley in a society whose traditional networks 
were heavily biraderi based. In 1962 he became head of the Azad Kashmir 
Government. Thus for the first time there was political opposition to the Muslim 
Conference's pro-Pakistan ideology. 
The other formidable pro-independence parties organising around this time were 
the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples National Party (JKPNP), The Plebiscite Front, 
Tehreke Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF), 
Pakistan People's P�rty Azad Kashmir (PPPAK), Azad Jammu Kashmir People's 
Party (AJKPP), Azad Kashmir Muslim League (AKML) and the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). 
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Bose points out that "in fact it was in prison during 1987 that the five young men 
who formed the (JKLF) nucleus in the Valley in 1989-90 met and on their 
release, took a collective decision to go to Pakistan-controlled Kashmir in search 
of military training and weapons."65 These men were Asfaq Majid Ali Wani, Ejaz 
Ahmed Dar, Abdul Hamid Sheikh, Yasin Malik, and Javid Ahmed Mir. 
In recent years there has been increased mobilisation along liberation lines within 
Azad Kashmir. Bose talking to Qasim Khokhar, a member of the JKLF in Mirpur 
suggests that: 
There has been a resurgence in the pro-independence sentiment in 
Azad Kashmir in the last few years. He comments that the 'the 
1980s were an especially difficult and frustrating decade for the 
independence activists, what with the crushing burdens of martial 
law and Islamisation. However by the end of the decade, the 
insurrection across the border had begun to have a tremendous 
demonstration effect on Azad Kashmir, and attendance at JKLF 
meetings, for example rose dramatically, despite the threat of 
harassment and victimisation. 66 
Mr Ashraf of the Pakistani Muslim League explained the increased support for 
and membership of liberation organisations as the direct result of more organised 
strategies for recruitment: 
The men at the head of the liberation organisations are calling on 
young men in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan to join their men on the 
front line. They target young men of course because they are 
easily persuaded. They are more organised now and they go to 
schools and colleges and talk about human rights and Muslims 
being killed in the Valley. They have training camps up in the 
mountains ":'.here they take these men and teach them how to use 
guns and explosives and then when they are ready send them to 
the front line. Before they were only recruiting Kashmiris in Azad 
Kashmir; now they are targeting Pakistani young men as well to 
join the cause. 
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Increased support of liberation movements within Azad Kashmir can be 
attributed to increased organised awareness of the political causes of the Kashmir 
issue and atrocities occurring across the cease fire line. The flow of information 
has been transmitted across the border via letters from relatives and the media. 
There have been further advances as Ms Sultana of the women's section of the 
JKLF pointed out, commenting on her observations: 
A few years ago much of what we heard was just word of mouth. 
There were reports and things but it was difficult to tell what was 
what. Now things are more together. We have information 
through our own organisations like the Kashmir publicity core of 
the JKLF and the information is given to us regularly by our men 
over there. All this means that we can tell our people here with 
facts what is going on and people especially the young women 
and men like that sort of information, the real facts. 
During the April 1991 and May-June 1996 field trips to Azad Kashmir, meetings 
were held with the publicity section of the JKLF and the Kashmir International 
Friendship Club whose headquarters are in Mirpur. Observation and interviews 
highlighted the improved organisation of publicity around the Kashmir issue. Mr 
Y of the publicity core of the JKLF based in Mirpur, commenting on his 
organisation, pointed out: 
We have always had a mixed membership with older and younger 
men but now lots of the people are very young and that's very
good because they are enthusiastic. They come from universities 
so they are enthusiastic and more and more educated which makes 
a big difference. 
Dissemination of information was widespread through the distribution of books 
and pamphlets distributed at rallies and also through networks across Azad 
Kashmir and the international Kashmiri diaspora. Three particularly interesting 
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mediums of disseminating information were through the use of political 
postcards, tapes which contain songs of freedom in a lamentation style, and of 
extensive graffiti across Azad Kashmir. Political graffiti were very much a part 
of the Azad Kashmiri townscape. This represented most of the liberation 
organisations, and political slogans included calls for liberation from India and an 
end to human rights violations. Most organisations and their sub-organisations 
were advertising their cause. Graffiti were not restricted to the cities and towns 
and could be found on walls and painted on mountain-sides in the remotest and 
most inaccessible areas. Particularly visible was the work of the student wing of 
the JKSLF. Often under their initials were the words "our objective is national 
independence". As well as political slogans there was a heavy pictorial presence 
of martyred leaders particularly Maq bool Butt the founder of the JKLF who was 
killed in 1983 . The Kashmiri flag was also commonplace and displayed outside 
homes in cars and in taxis. Slogans that were common place included "Free 
Kashmir", " I  love Kashmir" and "See you in Srinagar" to name a few. 
The centrality of the Kashmir issue in the emotional life of the Kashmiris in Azad 
Kashmir was highlighted by other visible reminders of the struggle. For example 
the issue was also represented by the central chouk, (roundabout) in Kotli town. 
The terrain of Kashmir is represented by a mountain which is etched and painted 
with a man holding_ a gun. The words etched above are "Indians out Kashmiris 
In". The centrality of the issue can be seen in the important place accorded to 
freedom fighters and refugees by welfare associations in Kashmir. The Kashmir 
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Welfare Society based in Kotli is one of these. Many receive donations from the 
UK-based Kashmiri community, thus maintaining links. Representations were 
not simply confined to the townscape. Pictures ofMaqbool Butt, martyred family 
members, stylised pictures of Azad Kashmir, calendars published by liberation 
organisations, pamphlets and newspapers were visible in almost every house 
visited in Azad Kashmir, bringing the Kashmir issue into the home m an 
organised manner. As I will go on to show, these form part of the discourse of 
"Kashmiriyat" and impact on the formation ofKashmiri identity in Luton. 
Visual material promoting notions of "Kashmyriat" were commonplace all over 
Azad Kashmir. In addition there is a vast intellectual literature now accumulated 
on the Kashmir Issue. Mr A of the Kashmir Record and Research Cell pointed 
out that: 
We have to know what is being written about Kashmir. Kashmir is 
not just about that fight for freedom • it's about the place and the 
people out there. Our history is a struggle for freedom but we have 
to know about that place as well. 
His feelings were supported by Mr G who said that: 
The next generation has to be made up of intellectuals as well as 
fighters. We need all types of people. Everyone has a role to play 
and that's what will get us our freedom in the long run. 
Muslim women have been accused of lack of agency. The existence of the 
women's  wing of the JKLF is a testimony to their importance in the struggle for 
independence. Women are playing an important role in the liberation politics of 
Kashmir. 
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Women in Indian Occupied Kashmir have been actively demanding freedom 
from India since 1947. Action has largely taken the form of support for male 
members of the family joining freedom organisations and protesting against the 
Indian Occupation. Ms Y who came to Azad Kashmir to flee the violence in 
Indian Occupied Kashmir pointed out that: 
Women are at the heart of the issue. Remember we cannot detach 
ourselves because the martyred men you talk of are our fathers,
brothers, husbands or sons. How can it be that we are not 
involved? We suffer the most because we put up with the pain of 
loss. My female relatives over there have been part of the struggle 
all along and I know they would not hesitate to kill after what they 
have seen. There is no such thing as a peaceful Kashmiri.. You 
cannot be calm after what they have seen and what we have heard. 
Ms Y's desire to fight for freedom is also captured in "Women's testimonies from 
Kashmir", collated by The Women's Initiative who organised and visited the 
Kashmir Valley between 2nd and 4th May 1994 with the intention of being "a set 
of eyes and ears which would listen and bear witness to the testimonies of 
ordinary people, particularly women". This collection highlights the women's 
commitment to take up arms. Asiya is recorded as saying: "We thank the forces 
for their excesses. The more atrocities they commit, the more people will be 
prepared to take up arms for the struggle". U.B.G. is noted as saying: "After what 
I have been through, I have the right to revenge to pick up the gun. But what will 
happen to my family, my sisters? I may pick up the gun, but I don't like 
bloodshed and violence". 67 
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The women in Azad Kashmir are not as directly involved in the struggle as their 
Indian Occupied Kashmir counterparts. However, Sabrina Sultana of the 
Women's wing of the JKLF based in Mirpur pointed out that: "Women here have 
always been active in Kashmiri politics since they are affected by it every day of 
their lives, but until recently the Azad Kashmir women have not been organised 
to be so pro active but now we have started a women's section". 
Sabrina continued to point out some of the reasons of women's lack of 
participation :  
You know young girls are not thought strong enough to get
involved in this sort of thing. It's OK if your father' s  involved or a 
brother but on your own it's difficult. We try and get things 
organised, get the men's permission and then on the day not many 
women turn up. It's always the same few who do. I think our 
culture is a problem. 
Support for the liberation movement was unanimous amongst all the women 
despite the fact that the majority of them were not directly involved in organised 
activity. They all described their anger at the continued killings in Indian 
Occupied Kashmir which were having an impact on their lives. Mr K in 
Muzzafarabad pointed out that: "The border's only over there. Some nights I lie 
awake and I can hear the guns and then have to relive every moment of my 
brother's death. This fight is destroying our families." 
Many of the women interviewed have lost a member of the family or knew of 
someone who had lost a member of the family. Sadaf talked at length of her 
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young brother who was one of the martyrs killed in the 1 991 attempted border 
crossing: "I can't get his face out of my head. He was my brother and they killed 
him for nothing. I am proud of him. Proud that he did what he did. At his funeral 
I couldn't cry. I didn't cry." 
What is clear is that the emotional impact of Sadaf s brother's killing has not 
deterred her from the Kashmir issue, rather made her stronger and adamant to 
fight. Below she talks of how if she were able she would take up arms and fight 
alongside her brothers to live in a free Kashmir: "I see his face and then it's clear 
to me that they deserve to die. I would have no hesitation in taking up arms. 
Sometimes I have so much anger in me that I think just give me a gun and I'll 
give you Kashmir but then we can't fight. Sometimes now I wish I was a man." 
Unable to participate on the front line, Azad Kashmiri women help with 
collections for supplies for the wounded men, provide food and sometimes 
shelter for refugees whose numbers are continuously increasing according to 
Rani Mussaffar. These women feel an emotional and moral responsibility to 
support their cause. 
Research suggests that Kashmiri political identity forms part of the geographical, 
political, economic, social and emotional fabric of their lives. For men, women, 
young and old the resolution of the Kashmir issue focuses primarily on two 
aspects: the reunification of the divided territory and the self-determination of a 
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United Kashmir, the installation of which can on]y come about through a 
plebiscite. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have presented the "before" picture of "Kashmiriyat" In the 
process I have had to tell much of the history of Kashmir during the period 
1eading up to the formation of Pakistan and India. I have relied extensively on the 
testimony of many respondents as a means of understanding what they consider 
the main elements of Kashmiri identity. It can be seen that the partition of 
Kashmir and the emergence of distinct "Kashmiriyat" are closely linked. The role 
of memory as a means of carrying memes associated with "Kashmiriness" is 
crucial. It is because of the way in which memes signifying "Kashmiriness" have 
been intrinsic to Kashmiris that the shock of partition, occupation, displacement, 
migration and settlement seems to have been absorbed, to the extent that a notion 
of "Kashmiriness" continues to operate. This of course, does not mean that 
Kashmiri identity has not changed as a result of these processes (and in particular 
the process of migration and settlement to Britain), but it does mean that we have 
to be specific about the ways in which Kashmiri identity has changed and ways 
in which it has remained the "same". I have shown how the process of migration 
has been linked to particular features of Kashmiri life, for accounts of push-pull 
and chain migration_ have depended on social structure and economic practices of 
Kashmiri life. I have also argued implicitly for the primacy of the political. In 
other words, the various economic, socio-cultural, religious factors of Kashmiri 
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identity are seen as secondary to the politics of the Kashmiri context. This is not 
only because of the specific nature of Kashmiri identity, but more importantly, 
because the construction of a collective identity seems to be an inherently 
political task. 
I want to go on to look at the identity transformations of Kashmiris who have 
settled in Britain. In other words, having presented the "before" picture, logic 
demands that I present the "after" picture. So having looked at the core factors 
that influence Kashmiri identity at "home" I want to turn to Kashmiris "away" 
There is, however, an intermediate stage between "before" and "after", between 
"home" and "away" - the "during", or more prosaically the process of migration 
itself This then is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: KASHMIRIS ON THE MOVE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the relationship between migration and identity. 
Migration leads to the construction, consolidation, transfer and redefinition of 
identities resulting in distinct configurations of identity through time. We cannot 
understand these configurations without discussion and an understanding of the 
historical, political, economic and socio-cultural forces in the emigrants' country 
of origin, as well as the forces prevalent in the countries of settlement which have 
influenced migration and settlement and the maintenance of identity. It is the 
former that are the concern ofthis chapter. 
The aim of this chapter is to use current literature on migration, interview data 
gathered during two field trips to Azad Kashmir and interview data collected 
amongst the Luton Kashmiris, to identify the collective features of the Kashmiri 
migration which have influenced Kashmiri identity in Britain. Migrants' stories 
were used to ascertain their experiences. These have been central to 
understanding the role of the migratory process in the construction of identity. 
After all it is difficult to imagine how one can analyse what humans are doing 
without some notion of why they think they are doing it. Humans act for 
purposes and according to the meaning these actions have for them. Hence, any 
social analysis must attempt to understand the ensemble of meaning in which the 
action of human agents takes place. 
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II. THE ROLE OF MIGRATION IN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 
The earliest systematic approaches to the study of migration derive from the 
nineteenth century geographer Ravenstein, who advocated the formulation of 
statistical "laws of migration" in his paper to the Royal Statistical Society on 17 
March 1 885 and subsequently in 1 889. Ravenstein's basic framework is still used 
by many ecoqomists, geographers and demographers. 1 
A. Push-Pull Theories 
Ravenstein' s hypothesis suggests that migration can be attributed to socio­
economic imbalances between regions. There are certain factors "pushing" people 
away from the area of origin and others "pulling" them to the area of destination. 
"Push factors" include demographic growth, low living standards, lack of 
economic opportunities and political repression, while "pull factors" are demand 
for labour, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political 
freedom. 
Often South Asian migrations are explained in terms of this push-pull thesis and 
the present research draws heavily on these ideas. It is important to note the 
problems with these accounts; The tend to be individualistic and a-historical . 
Rarely is a decision to move based on an individual decision or a decision that is 
based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining in the 
area of origin or moving to various alternative destinations. As Brown and Foot, 
commenting on Bank's work, point out: researchers tend to deal with movements 
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or events which have happened, and therefore can err with hindsight in assuming 
that such trends or happenings were inevitable. Further they tend to think of 
migrants as crude sociological groups and therefore miss the intricate patterns of 
decision making which precede migration. It is not individuals, but families, the 
key unit of decision-making and selection of a migration strategy. 2 
Further, these models ignore restrictions or constraints such as government 
restrictions on immigration or emigration. These are ignored or regarded as 
distortions which should be removed from the rational choice market. Certainly 
immigration controls have influenced Kashmiri patterns of migration. These are 
discussed below. Everett Lee does consider restrictions or constraints on 
emigration or immigration and refers to them as "intervening obstacles". He 
summarises the factors which lead to the decision to migrate in four categories as 
follows: 
1. Factors associated with the area of origin 
2 .  Factors associated with the area of destination 
3. Intervening obstacles 
4. Personal factors 
The first three of these can be represented below in Figure 6.t1. In every area there 
are a number of factors which come together to hold or indeed attract people to 
that area. These are shown as plus and minus signs. The set of pluses and minuses 
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at both the origin and the destination is differentially defined for each migrant or future migrants depending on personal factors. However it is important to note that there are fundamental differences between factors associated with the area of origin and the area of destination. Knowledge of the latter area is often not exact and in many cases advantages and disadvantages can only be weighed up by living there. Intervening obstacles may affect the prospective migrants' motivations and even prevent migration. These intervening obstacles include problems of migration restrictions, mentioned above, and may include problems of financing migration. 3 Such obstacles are often faced by Azad Kashmiri migrants and are referr�d to later. Figure 6. 1: Origin and Destination Factors and Intervening Obstacles in Migration. ---.... ►► push pull Intervening variables ►----.. ► factors -----►► factors Source Jackson, 1986. These models have much in common with neo-classical theories of the labour market, indeed this approach is mainly found in the work of neo-classical economists.4 Borjas puts forward the model of an immigration market. According to him, neo-classical theory assumes that individuals maximise utility: individuals search for the country of residence that maximises their well being. The search is constrained by the individuals' financial resources, by the immigration regulations 185 
source country. In the immigration market the various pieces of information are exchanged and the various options are compared. In a sense, competing host countries make "migration offers" from which individuals compare and choose. The information gathered in this market place leads many individuals to conclude that it is "profitable" to remain in their birthplace. Conversely, other individuals conclude that they are better off in some other country. The immigration market randomly sorts these individuals across host countries5 . Borjas claims that "this approach leads to very clear - and empirically testable - categorisation of the types of immigrant flows that arise in the world where individuals search for the "best" type of country". 6 If this were the case, then it would follow that all disadvantaged people would be moving from poorer areas to more wealthy ones and the disparities between different areas would be sufficient to generate migration flows. In the long run these migration flows would equalise wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium. Actual migratory movements however appear more complex than over simplistic theories. It is rarely the poorest people from the least-developed countries that move to the richest countries. More often the migrants are of intermediate social status and from areas that are undergoing economic and social changes. Similarly the push­pull model would predict movements from densely populated to under populated areas, yet in fact countries of immigration are amongst the world's most densely populated. A further problem arises with the push-pull model since it treats 186 
intervention of the state as being merely disruptive of the "normal" functioning of 
the market. The state invariably plays a major role in shaping and controlling the 
movements. Therefore the notion that migrants make free choices in order to 
"maximise their well-being" but also to lead to "an equilibrium in the market 
place" is far from historically correct. Perhaps more importantly the push-pull 
model does not explain the localised nature of migration. Why do a certain group 
of migrants from a particular town in one country move to a particular town in the 
new country of origin?7 
B. Chain Migration Accounts 
One important factor is previous history of migration among vanous locals. 
Traditions of international migratory movements usually arise from the existence 
of prior links between the sending and receiving countries. These links may be 
based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties. Thus 
migration from Azad Kashmir or Pakistan has been linked to the British colonial 
experience in the South Asian sub-continent. It is suggested that migrations can be 
best understood by using the conceptual framework of "migration systems. "8 A 
migration system refers to a set of places linked together by flows and counter 
flows of people, information, goods and services and ideas. These links can be 
categorised as state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connection 
and family and social networks. Migration systems consist of macro and micro 
structures. Macro structures refer to large scale institutional factors such as the 
political economy of the world market, inter-state relationships, and the laws, 
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structures and practices established by the states of the sending and receiving 
countries. The micro structures refer to the beliefs and informal networks and 
practices developed by the migrants themselves to cope with migration and 
settlement. These informal networks include psychological adaptations, personal 
relationships, family and household patterns, friendship and community ties and 
mutual help in economic and social matters. These micro structures have 
previously been referred to in literature using the concept of"chain migration." 
"Chain migration" can be defined as the movement in which prospective migrants 
learn of opportunities, have transportation provided for them and have initial 
accommodation and employment arranged through primary social relationships 
with previous immigrants. For example different forms of sponsorship and 
patronage have the effect of clustering Kashmiris. In addition, kinship-friendship 
networks are involved whereby the role of chain migration becomes important. 
John and Leatrice MacDonald have used "chain migration" to describe the 
fundamental processes influencing ethnic neighbourhood formation. 9 They have 
used the concept of chain migration to account for the presence of Italian 
neighbourhoods in American cities, coming from highly localised places of origin. 
The process of chain migration may begin with the arrival of a single immigrant 
who subsequently becomes successful. News of this reaches home and encourages 
friends and relatives to join him. This is the first stage of chain migration. The 
second stage starts when early migrants became well established, sufficiently so 
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that they are able to call their wives, children and in many cases brides-to-be to 
join them. This process leads to the reuniting and establishment of families, which 
eventually leads to the recreation of home culture. Traditional ceremonies and 
social occasions become more numerous and the customs and values of their place 
of origin become more strongly rooted with greater emphasis being placed on 
education and religion. Community life becomes well established and once news 
of this reaches the area of origin it has the effect of enticing the older, younger 
and the less enterprising. This completes the chain and the results are a full 
community life. 
Research in Luton suggests that another stage of migration is now taking place. 
Once new communities are established they preserve identity through links with 
relatives in Azad Kashmir. This form of identity preservation is made easier in 
today's global era where geographical distance is not a limitation on interaction 
with family and events in Azad Kashmir and where, consequently, perceived 
distance is no barrier to memory renewal. This transnational transfer of 
information has the effect of renewing and reconstructing memory and 
maintaining identity-creating transnational communities. 10 
The following sections look at the historical, economic, socio-cultural, religious 
and political contexts to migration, which have influenced memory and through 
migration have contributed to the formation of British Kashmiri identity. The 
contexts in which memory has been formed and subsequently transferred to the 
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new environment are essential to the understanding of the current identity 
manifestations of the Kashmiri British community in Luton. 
III. BACKGROUND TO KASHMIRI MIGRATION 
A. Who are the Kashmiris? 
There is a tendency among researchers to refer to their samples as coming from 
Pakistan although on the basis of the migration patterns, their sample will have 
been from Azad Kashmir (see Map 1 ,  2 and 3). Alternatively a regional designation 
may be given. I I  For example Anwar refers to his sample as Mirpuri without 
acknowledgement that this is a district of Azad Kashmir. 12 Contrast this with 
Dahya, who states that his sample is from Azad Kashmir but does not elaborate 
any further, and thus implicitly continues to treat the sample as Pakistani. 13 Other 
writers who know that their samples are from Azad Kashmir assert that this is not 
relevant and that the sample can be treated as Pakistani, giving little tangible 
evidence that this represents the views of their samples. 14 Khan and Ballard are 
among the many writers who have designated migrants from Azad Kashmir as 
explicitly Punjabis or Pakistanis. For example, Khan writes: 
Mirpuris from Mirpuri district of Azad Kashmir are Punjabi in 
culture and can be conceptualised as subcategories deriving from a 
degree of marginality. Mirpuris are proportionally over represented 
in the Pakistani population and in addition to all other Punjabis 
form the great majority of the population. 15 
Ballard argues that Mirpuris are Punjabis: 
Not only are at least two-thirds and possibly as many as all British 
South Asians of Punjabi origin, but the great majority of British 
Punjabis can trace their roots (in approximately equal numbers) 
either to Jullundur Doab in India or to Mirpur district in Azad 
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Kashmir: Indeed as many as three quarters of British Punjabis may 
well be either Jullunduries or Mirpuris. 16 
Samad, however, does acknowledge the complexities of identity when he points 
out that : 
Working class Mirpuris from Bradford can see themselves as 
British, Pakistani, Muslim and Punjabi depending on the political
and social circumstances which depress or elevate various strands 
of identity. 17 
Generally these accounts seem to exclude the idea of a distinct Kashmiri identity 
option., something that, as my research in Luton demonstrates, is a subject 
position clearly articulated by those whom people like Ballard will call "Mirpuries 
or Punjabis." 18 
Ascription of a Pakistani, Mirpuri or Punjabi identity can be understood since 
many of those individuals who see themselves as Kashmiri actually hold Pakistani 
passports, so for official purposes are seen as Pakistani. Further the geographical 
proximity of the Mirpur district to the Punjab and similarities with the Punjabi 
language made it difficult for early researchers to differentiate. However the 
blanket approach does not reflect the specificities of migration from Azad 
Kashmir to the United Kingdom and underplays the unique role that the migration 
process plays in transfer of the cultural, religious and national identities. 19 
Migration from Azad Kashmir has been a long and complicated process and has 
occurred in several historical stages. As suggested previously, some factors can be 
explained in terms of the above-mentioned "push-pull" thesis as well as chain 191 
migration. This point is supported by Anwar who sees migration as broadly 
resulting from colonial links, political freedom of movement and an economic 
"push" and "pull" which slowly developed into a chain migration.2° As mentioned 
above migration has occurred from selected areas of Azad Kashmir. The 
overwhelming majority of emigrants have come from Mirpur or the southern 
district of Kotli. 
Kashmir had for a long time been a depressed region within the subcontinent. 
Among the majority of Kashmiris education was unavailable as the governmental 
policy was to keep it for those groups that were linked to the political elite. Many 
revolts left large numbers of people being displaced and forced to migrate to the 
Punjab during the British Raj in the 19th Century and to Southern areas, namely 
Mirpur and Jammu. Many migrated to East Africa, the Indian Ocean Islands and 
the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. Further, a largely agrarian economy and 
small land led to a surplus male labour force in the area. 21 During the First and 
Second World Wars many people from Azad Kashmir joined Allied armies and 
navies. Mirpur district is well known for the high percentages of men in the British 
army. Army service provided the opportunity for men to go overseas and 
provided knowledge of the advantages in foreign lands. 
There are three main phases in the mass-migration of Kashmiris. Firstly, the 
partition of India in 1947 when Pakistan was created. Partition had the effect of 
displacing large numbers of people on a scale never seen before in the South 
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Asian sub-continent. The large-scale movements of population which took place 
following the creation of Pakistan in 1947 created Muslim refugees (Muhajirs). 
This migration at the time of the Indo-Pakistan partition fits quite neatly into 
Peterson's category of "impelled flight" discussed earlier. The related problem of 
the Kashmir issue may also fall within this category. The constant threat of war 
between India and Pakistan in this region has resulted in further displacement of 
large numbers of Mirpuris since 1947, some of whom have now established 
residence in this country. 
Secondly, migration at the closing decades of the last century, particularly from 
Mirpur, was caused by the need to look for work The "push" factors were mainly 
the poor quality of land and high unemployment because of a predominantly 
agrarian economy and little industrialisation. Consequently high numbers of 
Mirpuris joined British steamships operating from Bombay as stokers. Once the 
original connections were made, the rest was easy. The railway station at Gujjar 
Khan was little more than a day's walk away from most parts of Mirpur district, 
and having reached Bombay, finding work presented few difficulties. By the end 
of the last century a high proportion of engine-room and stoke-hold sirhangs 
were themselves from Mirpur. 22 
Thirdly, as the British coal-powered merchant fleet expanded so more and more 
men were recruited. After the Second World War Mirpuri men who had been in 
the army began to settle in Britain. They had access to knowledge of job 
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opportunities on shore. As a result of the industrial labour shortages during the 
Second World War many of the men were recruited to fill the gaps. After 1 941 
former seamen began to leave ports and settle inland. These were the "pioneer 
migrants" and they became a source of voluntary chain migration.23 . Similarly 
Ballard suggests that these wartime pioneers formed the bridgehead to further 
settlement. He goes on to point out that when opportunities began to widen still 
further in Britain's subsequent post-war boom, Mirpuri seamen began to leave 
their ships in ever-increasing numbers and having established themselves ashore 
began to call their kinsmen over to join then, unleashing the process of chain 
migration.24 Aurora suggests that once a tradition of migration is established it 
acts as a "social force" and many people who may not have an economic reason to 
migrate are drawn into it. 25 There have, therefore, been close historical links 
between these areas and Britain, which influenced migration patterns in the 1950's 
and 1960's. 
The main migration of Azad Kashmiris from Mirpur Town and Mirpur District 
began in the late 1950's and early 1960's as migrants followed the routes of 
pioneer migrants. Impetus for the large-scale movement of people was provided 
by the construction of the Mangla Dam, which had huge implications for the 
people of Mirpur district, and Mirpur Town itself. Some individuals no doubt saw 
the economic possibilities in Britain. As mentioned above the tradition of surplus 
male labour in the region meant that a tradition of economic migration was long 
established. Lee indicates that "a person who has once migrated and who has 
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broken the bonds which tie him to the place in which he has spent his childhood is 
more likely to migrate again than is the person who has never previously 
migrated."26 Similarly Banton suggests that if there is already a tradition of 
migration, that makes the process much easier since it provides not only the 
psychological element in the motivation but often the material possibility as well.27 
The immigrants left Pakistan with the intention of returning home with money 
which would benefit their immediate kin at home, by being used for extending 
land holdings, building better houses, giving larger dowries and starting up in 
business; in short, factors which would increase their social standing within the 
local community. The scale of migration from these areas has been truly massive. 
In many of the villages over half of the population now lives overseas.28 
The flow of knowledge back from the migrants has been important for Azad 
Kashmiris in Luton. Sponsorship and patronage by the pioneer migrants has 
helped to overcome the obstacles mentioned above. Push-pull factors with chain 
migration on the kinship-friendship basis, has continued even after the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. 
These events were taking place at around the same time as the immigration laws 
were being put in place to limit future immigration. News of this in Azad Kashmir 
resulted in an increased effort and a larger influx of migrants than might have been 
otherwise experienced. However whilst it might be said that the 1 962 
Commonwealth Act might have created a sudden imbalance to the pattern as more 
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rushed to beat that deadline set by the act, the pattern would have continued albeit 
at a slower rate. The most important influence as Anwar suggests is the presence 
of the pioneers who acted as a catalyst for further migration. 29 
During the early migration years Azad Kashmiris had to travel over seven hundred 
miles to Karachi to obtain passports. By the end of the 1960s, however, passports 
could be obtained from Rawalpindi, only a few hours journey from Azad Kashmir 
and Mirpur itself The high level of immigration from these regions can also be 
attributed to the number of travel agents who began to make money out of the 
process. Pakistani agents established their agencies within the towns of Azad 
Kashmir and their contacts deep within the countryside. Many of my respondents 
claimed that these agents helped intending migrants to evade the restrictions that 
the government of Pakistan had imposed on the migrants to Britain. 
Due to increasingly restrictive immigration laws since 1 962 it has become more 
difficult for adult males from the sub-continent to enter Britain. But in the Mirpuri 
case the pressure to migrate has remained intense. Above all, because there are so 
few local opportunities to make money largely because of unmechanised 
agricultural methods, a farmer' s  life is still one of back-breaking toil so even those 
with substantial land holdings see work abroad as offering better prospects than 
staying back home. 30 
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Immigrants had no intention of becoming assimilated into British society and classed themselves as transients, not settlers. Their main motive for coming to Britain was economic. As Shaw points out this is not surprising since wages for labouring jobs in Britain in the early 1960's were over thirty times those offered for similar jobs back in Pakistan. In Mirpur, for example, the average weekly wage was equivalent to about 37 pence whilst in Birmingham, a Pakistani's average weekly wage was £13.3 1  Peach has also suggested that employment was a major factor in attracting people to Britain. He has shown that there is a strong correlation between the level of Commonwealth immigration and job vacancies in this country, i.e. when job vacancies went up immigration rose and when job vacancies went down, immigration fell. 32 One further characteristic of Azad Kashmiri migration is that migrants were given financial assistance to pay for fares through sponsorship and free accommodation and hospitality once here. Pioneer migrants also provided help to seek suitable employment. The type of migrations mentioned above have been reduced to a trickle. Expectations that migrants will return back home have subsided as family unification and subsequent settlement and community infrastructure has ensued. It is clear that they now regard themselves as settlers and not transients. Azad Kashmiris settled in Luton make frequent visits back to their homeland and as a result it is well known that unemployment in Britain is widespread and jobs are difficult to obtain. Migration that does occur has now taken on new characteristics. 197 
Migration of partners for marriage to Azad Kashmiris settled in Britain does 
continue but migration for economic purposes has been geographically redirected 
and increasingly takes place to the Middle East. The restrictions on migration 
imposed in 1962 and 1968 limited entry almost entirely to family reunion: wives 
and children joined the male head of the family already resident in Britain.33 
B. The Effect of Migration on Mirpur and Kotli 
Despite long-term settlement the Luton Kashmiris have maintained strong links 
with their homeland. Ballard suggests that this may be the result of two factors. 
Firstly: they have tended to delay uniting their families overseas, and secondly: 
their kin who have remained at home have become increasingly dependent on 
remittances to maintain their standard of living. 34 Certainly the dependency factor 
was recurrently emphasised by residents of New Mirpur as they described the 
changes to their town- and village scapes. Mrs B pointed out that "It is the men 
who have gone to Britain who have built New Mirpur. It wouldn't look like this if 
it wasn't for them." Similarly Mr F commented: 
I just could not live like this if it wasn' t  for my brother who just 
happened to be the one that moved to the UK ... you see he wasn't 
married and the rest of us were then and well it was just natural 
that he should be the one. He worked really hard and that's why we 
have all of this. 
The Mirpur and Kotli areas have rapidly developed as a consequence. As Ballard 
points out, thanks to the remittances they have sent back, there has been an 
immense inflow of wealth into these otherwise remote and isolated settlements. 35 
Before mass migration to Britain and the flow of remittances back to Mirpur and 
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Kotli districts, houses in the area were characteristic of those across much of the 
rural area of Pakistan. They were kacha buildings with flat roofs, three or four 
rooms which doubled as living quarters during the day and sleeping areas during 
the night. Houses were surrounded by temporary walls, which would be extended 
as the family grew. Washing facilities and animal enclosures were located within 
the courtyards. Streets outside the houses tended to be dirt tracks or at best 
locally built cobbled alleys. The transformation from kacha to pukka housing is 
best illustrated in the words of those who experienced the transformation: 
You cannot have recognised this place twenty years or so ago.
Then there were no big houses like this. Not much was brick like it 
is now. There appears to be so much money here in these buildings 
and well now it is a place to be proud of - better than your place. 
Mr G showing us around his fifty-bedroom home located in the Kotli district said, 
"when I was building this house it was not usual but now everywhere you go 
things are like this - things are improving."  He continued to point out that: 
The first type of housing like this really happened in Mirpur but 
now those people who have gone to UK from Kotli and villages 
are sending back money. We caught up with Mirpur. 
Mr T commented: 
It is a reflection of the foreign exchange, those who have gone 
abroad because of the Mangla Dam. They have constructed Mirpur 
- we have done everything ourselves. Look they (Pakistan 
Government) bought our land for 1 50rs for a kanal and sold it 
back to us for 27.00rs for a kanal. We could not afford to buy
anything back because at that time we didn't have the money. They
flooded our land and took our livelihoods. We had to rely on our 
brothers abroad. 
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Mr Q said: 
We thank our people that are living there and earning. Do you
think there are factories and industries where children can get jobs? 
There is no source of income here. 
New houses are usually built from a combination of brick, metal and cement and 
tend to follow a Western style with climatic modifications such as flat roofs and 
balconies. Characteristically all new homes have Western style facilities, 
particularly bathrooms with a move away from communal spaces to more and 
more private spaces such as bedrooms. All homes are now well equipped with 
labour-saving devices such as washing machines. Interestingly, many of the 
household appliances, televisions and videos and increasingly satellite dishes, are 
visible, consumer durables often brought over from Britain on various trips back 
home by family members settled in Luton. Living standards in these areas have 
certainly risen. As Mrs B, now settled in Luton, recalls: 
Beti (daughter), it 's not the Kotli I grew up in. Then it was a big
thing when we had to leap the walls of our house with cattle dung, 
now they use paint and a brush. Then we used to go down to the 
local well to collect water. Now it's piped to the house. I had to 
wash all the family clothes by hand. I had three little children then 
and there was all the rest of the family and only one of me and now 
they have machines ... it was just very different. 
Associated developments in the bazaars have also taken place particularly in Kotli 
and Mirpur towns. Mirpur in particular has experienced rapid expansion with busy 
bazaars. One feature absent until Kashmiris abroad started investing in the town 
were the modern style shopping plazas like the Valayat Centre (English Centre) 
which was developed by a Bradfordian Kashmiri and run by his family who are 
resident in Mirpur Town. 
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Ballard has noted the existence of a thriving remittance economy m Azad 
Kashmir. He points out that the inflow of resources has not stimulated real 
economic growth, since Mirpuris have not found secure and profitable ways to 
deploy them, other than by leaving them on deposit in the bank. This has proved 
exceedingly problematical, given Mirpur's location in the wider political economy 
of Pakistan.36 He also points out that farming is no longer considered a priority by 
migrants or their families. 37 
Interviews carried out during the May-June field trip to Azad Kashmir indicated 
that there appear to be changes since Ballard's observations. 38 Although 
investment in housing based on remittances from Luton Kashmiris is continuing 
there was also increasing investment into the local economy. Investment initiated 
by Luton-based Kashmiris included monetary input for local irrigation schemes, 
roads, small businesses such as the running of local bus services, car workshops, 
and furniture import and export businesses, to name a few. At interviews carried 
out during the May-June field trip, when asked about the economic input of the 
British Kashmiris into the local Mirpur economy, Amanullah Khan, Chairman of 
the JKLF, pointed out: "They are investing in industrialisation now. The schools 
are run by British Kashmiris on a commercial basis and they are helping their 
families back here very much." 
Abdul Rashid Turabi, the President of the Jamaat-1-lslami m Azad Kashmir 
pointed out that: 
201 
Economically our brothers abroad are very important because they are sending us pounds and keeping this economy floating. They have established industries in Mirpur and therefore providedemployment and other services to our community over here. Others need to be persuaded to come and invest over here. The then Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Qayum, indicated that : "The British Kashmiris are extremely important. They are meeting the requirements of unemployment here - they are very helpful economically to us." Investment in agriculture however tends to remain a lower priority for investment as Ballard suggests.39 On this point Mr Q commented: We need men to work on the land and many of them have gone to the UK. Us older men can't do all this type of work. Also farming these days needs machinery like tractors and well we can't afford so much and the government doesn't help and well this land is a colony of Pakistan and I don't know that it is a good idea to putmoney in land that another country occupies. We'll probably lose it like Mangla. In response to questions about government policy on the diaspora, Amanullah Khan and Abdul Rashid Turabi indicated that they had no specific agenda to encourage or utilise any form of investment from Kashmiri communities overseas. Any policies that did exist were ad hoe and in place generally to encourage investment through tax exemption. 40 Mr K's comments about the uncertainty and political marginality of Azad Kashmir being a hindrance to investment were also reiterated by political leaders, who felt that the government could do much more to encourage investment from overseas. Interviews and conversations suggested a lack of government investment into Azad Kashmiri economic infrastructure. A poor quality road network, limited subsidies for industry, especially in terms or 
202 
energy consumption and loans to industry from state banks, were often quoted as 
examples. 
There was also some indication in conversations with Azad Kashmiris that 
remittances have slowed down over the last ten years. As Mr H indicated: "We 
can't expect those people over there to work and work for us and have nothing 
for themselves. We need to do something for ourselves now. I didn't expect 
money for ever from them." Giving the example of her brother's family based in 
Luton Mrs B attributed changes in remittance patterns to the fact that: "Jobs are 
hard to get now over there so how can he send us so much money like he used to 
and he has his own daughters to marry." 
The effect of families joining early migrants, the associated increasing family 
demands, the need to build community life in Luton and rising unemployment 
have resulted in changing patterns of remittances and investment back into Azad 
Kashmir. Less aflluent families here have reduced the level of remittances to 
relatives but it is important to point out that research does not suggest that they 
have stopped. Results suggest that it appears remittances will continue as the 
Kashmiri youth become more economically active. 
The tensions caused by strains on households due to reduced incomes here are 
less documented. Often families remitting money to relatives in Azad Kashmir felt 
they were "losing out on the luxuries of life." Mr K highlighted this point when he 
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said that: "I don't mind sending money home but the thing is I really wish they 
would do something with it rather than just buy a tractor which sits there." Mr S 
commented: "I have been sending money back for years and it's a lot of money but 
every time there is a wedding they want more. I don't mind but I'm not a cash till . "  
Talking of her cousins Ms N said: 
I remember when my cousins used to work all night to get money 
together to send to relatives back home. Whenever I go there they 
always expect more. I really wish they could just see how hard it is 
here to get money together and besides why is it that we are 
always the ones that have to go without things? I haven't seen my 
mother ever wearing expensive clothes but all my aunties over 
there do and she's the one who's always on the machine like I just 
don't get it, oh and it's always my dad's family that get the cash of 
course. 
There is no doubt that the impact of remittances has had a huge impact on the 
town- and village-scapes ofKotli, Mirpur and the surrounding districts. However, 
the disparity between aflluent and poor is clear. It is not difficult to distinguish 
between families who have members overseas and those who do not. Despite 
changing patterns of remittances, research suggests that they provide an economic 
and emotional link with kin in Azad Kashmir which is vital to individuals for 
identity maintenance. 
It is perhaps worth noting that the majority of migrants had prior experience of 
migration albeit within the South Asian sub-continent. This point is noted by Lee 
who says that " A person who once migrated and who has broken the bonds 
which tie him to the place where he has spent his childhood is more likely to 
migrate than a person who has never previously migrated." 41 Peterson has noted 
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the importance of individual migrants' motives and decisions and suggests that the 
feedback of information and other help given by pioneer migrants was an 
important factor in stimulating others to join the movement. 42 
Migration was initially male. This can be explained by the surplus of male labour 
due to the economic condition and history of early migration, but another 
important factor was the religious-cultural background of the migrants. The 
Islamic way of life encouraged seclusion of women and culturally the joint family 
system enabled wives to be protected by the extended family while their husbands 
left for Britain. The sponsorship by pioneers also meant that only men could be 
sponsored. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I looked at the relationship between the process of migration and 
identity transformation, in particular how the migratory process has impacted on 
Kashmiri identity development. Using data collected from fieldwork, I argued that 
despite popular notions of economically induced migration, Kashmiris also see 
their migration in political terms, and this has a profound impact on the 
development of nationalistic sentiments. This finding supports the point I made in 
the last chapter, regarding the primacy of the political in articulation of Kashmiri 
identity. In the next chapter, this finding will be further elaborated, as I will look 
at what happens to "Kashmiriyat" when Kashmiris are "away" from Kashmir. 
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ENDNOTES 1 Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 19. 2 Brown and Foot, 1994, p. 2. 3 Modified versions ofRavenstein's model showing Everett Lees intervening obstacles can be found in Jackson, 1986, p. 15 and Anwar, 1979, p. 18. 
4 As suggested by Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 20. 5 Borjas, 1989, p. 461 .  6 Ibid. 
7 For a criticism of these theories see Castles and Miller, 1993, pp. 20-21 .  8 Fawcett and Arnold, 1987, pp.456-7. 9 John and Leatrice MacDonald, 1962, in Anwar, 1979, p. 19. 
1 ° Common historical-economic, socio-political and religious memories of home have the effect of maintaining a separateness from the majority white community and sharing identity with other South Asian groups. However for Kashmiris political memory has the effect of maintaining a separate identity from both. Theories of migration acknowledge the possible political causes of migration. However they appear to underplay its importance in favour of socio-economic causes. Many writers commenting on migration refer to the political context of migration but only as part of the larger economic implications. Whilst it is true that political problems in Kashmir are inextricably linked to economic reasons for migration, what is being suggested is that in the case of Kashmiri migration to Britain political reasons must be allocated their due academic space, since they have been particularly important in current identity structures. Ansari, 1994 and Clark, 1994 acknowledge the importance of political factors in migration. With reference to Partition they talk of political factors being the cause of migration from India to Pakistan in 1947. From conversations with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and Luton it appears that the political upheavals in Kashmir as the colonial powers left the sub-continent were an important factor in their migrations to Azad Kashmir. There was no alternative but to face the hostility of the Indian Army. Migration from 1960s onwards can be seen as a response to discrimination by the Pakistani governments in the wake of their own policies and the marginality of Azad Kashmir. Experiences of upheavals are recollected through shared memory and reinforced through links with relatives and events in Kashmir. The role of memory in the migration process is vital for identity within the new context. In the case of the Kashmiris, as well as memory of family, village life, culture and religion there is the additional migratory memory that is related to a contested history, recollection of oppression, persecution and lack of representation. As, 1994 suggests memory of oppression and totalitarianism is one of the driving forces behind some of these migrations and the transmission of memories between family generations, which are then reconstructed in the new abode. In the new location this common experience and shared memory can mobilise as resistance and in the case of the Kashmiris the right to self-determination. Benmayor and Skotnes, 1994, p.9point out that social movements of disenfranchised people are placing a wide range of identity issues on the public agenda and that through such struggles, people constitute themselves as social subjects and actors, reasserting and redefining who they are and what they want to become. This memory transferred through the migration process in the case of the Kashmiris is reconstituted to become a political tool. Thus, in response to specific situations and moments, people strategically bring to the fore different dimensions of their individual and collective memories to construct who and what they are fighting for. It is important to note that generation and gender play significant roles in the differential construction of memory and definitions of "what they are fighting for" and the migration process changes gender identities within the new context. 1 1  See for example Robinson, 1979; Anwar, 1979; Peach 1990, pp. 414-20 and Rafiq 1991, pp. 213-21 .  
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1 2  See Anwar, 1979. 13 Dahya, 1974. 
14 See Dahya, 1972, pp.75-86; Shaw, 1988. 
1 5  Khan, 1976, p.225. 
16 Ballard, 1990, p.220. 17 Samad, 1992, p.508. 
18 Joly, 1986. In her research she identifies her sample as Kashmiri families from Mirpur 
district, speaking a dialect of Punjabi and manifesting their particularities through community 
activities. Ellis, 1991, p. 378 in her Coventry study talks of people identifying themselves as 
Kashmiris. She also demonstrates awareness of the existence of Kashmiris elsewhere when she 
points out that in some towns across Britain tensions based on a Punjabi-Kashmiri split have 
caused tensions within Muslim community organisations. 
All of the respondents interviewed who had migrated came from Azad Kashmir and importantly 
identified themselves as Kashmiri rather than Pakistani or Punjabi. Most were from Kotli 
district and do not call themselves Mirpuris now even though they migrated in the l 960s prior to 
the administrative split. Some respondents were from Mirpur district and variously called 
themselves Kashmiri and Mirpuri. 20 Anwar (1979) 
21 In this case eventually land holdings would be so small that they would not be able to sustain 
families. 
22 See Ballard, 1990. 23 See Anwar, 1979. 24 Ballard, 1990. 25 Aurora, 1967. 26 Lee 1969 
27 Bar:ton, 1983 28 Ballard, 1990. 29 Anwar, 1 979. 
30 Ballard, 1983 . 31 Shaw, 1988 32 Peach, 1968. 33 Nielsen, 1984. 34 Ballard, 1983 . 35 Ballard, 1 990. 36 lbid., 
37 Ballard, 1988. 38 Ballard, 1990. 39 Ballard, 1 988. 
40 This information was gathered during a fieldwork in Kashmir during 1996. Subsequently the 
data from this fieldwork has appeared in a paper by Ellis and Khan. 
41 Lee, 1969. 42 Peterson, 1 958. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: BACKGROUND TO KASHMIRI SETTLEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION In the previous chapter I have illustrated how migration is rarely a single historical event, rather it is a continuous process, the final stage of which is permanent settlement. Once initial migration is complete, settlement of pioneer migrants, their households and the establishment of a community infrastructure within a new environment ensues. We have seen that through the process of migration individuals transfer their identity maintenance systems to the new country of residence. Settlement of community changes the context in which identities are formed and reformed and it is argued that these contextual changes, whether local, national, or global, transform identity kits. Thus, once community establishment is complete and the concerns of the early migration and settlement years have been overcome, these identity systems may be updated and redefined to give a contemporary sense to identity, particularly amongst the British offspring. This redefinition takes place through a process of enculturation. In what follows I look at the way in which contextual changes (i.e. settling down in Britain) impact on the identity ofiKashmiri community and individuals. 
IT. KASHMIRI SETTLEMENT IN LUTON Before I tum to the issue of enculturation of Kashmiris it is necessary to place Kashmiri settlement in the broader context of post war migration and settlement to Britain and specifically the ethnic and the South Asian component. 
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A. Demographics1 
The 1991 Census did include the ethnic question, by which it is now possible to 
make a more accurate estimate of Britain's Pakistani population. However there 
continues to be a dearth of accurate information with regard to the proportion of 
those referred to as Pakistanis who are Azad Kashmiri. From the Census data it 
appears that many of the Kashmiris opted for the Pakistani category where there 
was no satisfactory category recognising their ethnicity. Based on the 1991 
Census the Pakistanis are now the third largest ethnic minority group in the 
United Kingdom. 
Overall the Kashmiri community is the largest of the Muslim communities. 
Estimation of the actual numbers of Kashmiris in Britain is obscured, as already 
mentioned, by Kashmiris holding Pakistani passports. Although the majority of 
Kashmiris are now British nationals, many have dual nationality and retain 
Pakistani citizenship, a process which was eased by the Pakistani Government. 
This further obscures estimations of the actual size of the Kashmiri community in 
Britain so at best only estimates can be made. Ballard has estimated that 
somewhere in the region of two-thirds of those who are categorised as 'Pakistani' 
are in actual fact from Azad Kashmir. 2 
In many cities in the United Kingdom but particularly Bradford, Birmingham and 
Luton, the Kashmiris form the largest group amongst those categorised as 
Pakistani, followed by Punjabis and Pathans. Pakistani/Kashmiri settlement in 
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theUnited Kingdom reflects the economically driven aspects of migration and 
consequently the largest settlements are found in the West Midlands, West 
Yorkshire, Lancashire, Central Clydeside, and selected areas of Scotland. The old 
industrial cities such as Bolton, Bradford, Birmingham, Manchester and Luton 
have been the main recipients and hence it is in these areas that "Kashmiriyat" is 
best expressed. Map 4 shows the geographical distribution of the 
Pakistani/Kashmiri community in the United Kingdom. The dynamics of 
migration, settlement and identity are however best understood at a local level. 
The following sections look at these in relation to the Kashmiri experience in 
Luton. 
B. Patterns of Settlement 
Migration has not only been selective in terms of region of emigration. It has also 
been very localised in nature so that there exists a town by town pattern of Azad 
Kashmiri settlement in Britain. Significant Kashmiri settlement has taken place in 
Luton, the largest in the South East of England. Luton has a population of 
approximately 171,000 people. Black and Asians make up 20% of the population 
and the Pakistani/Kashmiris comprise 6.2% of that total. This percentage places 
Luton in the top ten boroughs/districts in England and Wales, in terms of its 
ethnic population. 3 Community estimates of the size of the Kashmiri community 
vary from 10,000 to 12,000 people, the majority of whom are from Mirpur and 
Kotli. Census data, however, put the Pakistani population numbers in Luton at 
2 10  
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10,657. There is reason to believe that official statistics may have significantly underestimated the Kashmiri population in Luton. 4 The majority of the Kashmiris have settled in the three adjacent wards of Dall ow, Biscot and Luton South in the area that is referred to as "Bury Park", which is located to the north-west of the centre. Map 5 shows the municipal wards in Luton. There is an abundance of Kashmiri households across these three wards. Although there are significant Black and Asian settlements in the Marsh Farm area in north Luton, unlike many of the larger industrial cities such as Bradford and Birmingham there is no clear segregation of different ethnic groups. Kashmiris, Punjabis, Pathans, Bengalis, Sikhs, Hindus and members of the African Caribbean community are all represented within this area. This is in contradistinction to cities like Bradford and Birmingham where intra-ethnic segregation is more visible. One reason for this may be that these towns and cities are larger than Luton. Birmingham is a good example of this. The majority of Kashmiris have settled in the Small Heath area, Alum Rock and Aston, whereas Punjabis have favoured Sparkbrook, Small Heath, Edgbaston and Handsworth and the Pathans appear to favour Sparkbrook and Alum Rock. "Bury Park" is well known in Luton for being the ethnic segregated area. It is important to point out that segregation in this context refers to situations where members of the Azad Kashmiri community in Luton are not distributed uniformly in relation to the rest of the population. It has the effect of reducing interaction 21 1 
one of the earliest Kashmiri migrants, a retired army officer based in 
Muzzafarabad, described the popular story of the first Kashmiri pioneer migrant 
to Britain: 
Look it was with one poor man that it all started. He was really
very poor and from here he went to Mirpur and from there to the 
Punjab to look for work. I am talking about the pre-partition days 
and still he found no work so he went to the seaport of Karachi. 
He got a job there on a ship. There were no cranes then and he had 
to load all the coal on the ship. He worked for two months. When 
he had enough of loading twenty kilos of coal he hid in the coal 
store and left the country hiding. Someone is said to have seen him 
and reported him to the captain who made him work in the 
kitchens and when they came to London he let him go. The story is 
that he stayed there and called all family and friends over from 
Mirpur where his family had gone to be with him. 
Mr Y explained the migration of one of the pioneer migrants to Luton: 
I suppose he was like one of our forefathers, I suppose if it wasn't 
for him really many of us just wouldn't be here at all. This was 
1954 and I think he settled in Beech Road and then there were 
other houses where men started to come . .  . I  know that Westbourne 
Road was another place where a lot of us young men settled when 
we first came here. 
Mr Y' s comments highlight the importance of chain migration: "I came here 
because a friend of my father's was here in Luton so where else was I to go. I had 
to come here because he was here and he knew about jobs and things. Contacts 
are very important in a new country." Community contacts highlighted streets of 
pioneer settlement as Ferndale Road, Dallow Road and Sailsbury Road. 
Subsequent settlement of Kashmiris followed pioneer migrants. This approach to 
some extent assum�s that immigrants have a choice in the areas they wish to 
reside and in doing so avoids discussion of the constraints affecting newly arrived 
immigrants. Problems of migration are extenuated by the economic necessity to be 
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close to places of work and cheap housing. There are many factors such as debts 
to repay and the travel costs of bringing their family to the new country, as well as 
the desire to save as much as possible for remission to kin or to accumulate 
wealth and return home relatively well off. Discussion of constraints centred on 
finance for housing. As Mr G comments: 
Oh there were always big houses then as well but two things you 
must remember: first we didn't need then because there was only us 
men and then we couldn't afford them and then well they were so 
far from work and the community. It would have cost so much to 
get to the places and we had to send back money to family. When 
we first came here we could just about afford to live together. We 
shared beds not just houses. I remember one year there was nearly
twenty of us in the house. We were never there all together but 
there were lots ofus and we didn't even think of the big houses and 
the posh areas. For us it was work and sleep to get by. 
From the above comments it is clear that finance was a constraint on housing 
choice. 
Economic difficulties have played an important role in the segregation of Kashmiri 
households in Luton. We have seen that one of the "push" factors for Kashmiri 
migration to Britain was shortage of work in Azad Kashmir. The "pull" factors 
attracting Kashmiris to Luton as with the majority of migration from the South 
Asia was the availability of work. As in other major industrial towns and cities in 
Britain the Kashmiris came to Luton as "replacement labour"' and overall 
settlement in the inner city area is reflective of the services that the Kashmiris 
came to provide. 
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Kashmiris were initially attracted to the industries in Luton8 . Luton was founded 
on the hat industry in the nineteenth century. Early employment taken up by 
Kashmiri migrants was unskilled labour in the factories in the inner wards of 
Luton. Principal manufacturing industries at this time were motor cars. The 
largest employers in car manufacture were Vauxhall Motors9 followed by IBC 
Motors. Other manufacturing industry centred on the manufacture of domestic 
and bulk meters (Asea Brown Boveri), ball and spherical roller bearings (SKF), 
domestic electrical appliances (Electrolux), industrial pumps (Hayward Tyler), 
chemicals (Laporte Industries) and clothing. In the post war period there were 
considerable number of vacancies in these industries. For this reason Luton was 
also attractive for those migrants that had gone to other industrial towns of 
Britain. Intra-urban migration was particularly attractive during the 1970s as 
industries in the north began to decline. 
As I have already mentioned, the migrants were from predominantly rural 
backgrounds and lacked qualifications.10 They had very little knowledge of the 
English language and spoke only their local dialects. Kashmiri migrants on arrival 
entered into the lower echelons of this hierarchy due to lack of skills, education 
and wealth. The morphology of the city and financial constraints means that they 
were restricted to particular types of houses. For example in Glasgow Asians were 
confined to the pre 1880 tenements, in Birmingham to low quality inner city 
housing and in Bradford to the cheap back to back terraces. 1 1  The need for cheap 
accommodation due to the narrow occupational structure is accentuated by many 
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factors. These include debts to reimburse travel costs, remittance payments, etc. 
In all cases these migrants were a residual population filling the gaps where the 
whites no longer wanted to live through the "filtering process". 12 
The settlement patterns of Kashmiris in Luton meant that they involuntarily 
entered the inner city areas which are synonymous with deprivation and cheap 
housing. 13 New housing is built for affluent residents but the filtering mechanism 
does not provide better housing for all, hence almost every town has its area of 
deprived housing. Bury Park is such an area. In Luton the filtering mechanism is 
further hindered by the continuing influx of Azad Kashmiri migrants. With time 
and as a result of improvements in their socio-economic situation, migrants are 
expected to move out of the segregated area. As a generalisation then, there is an 
upward shift of the whole socio-economic system. This upward shift does not 
appear to be taking place in Luton. This may be one reason why Kashmiris 
continue to reside in Bury Park. Some of the most often quoted reasons for 
patterns of settlement were to do with work. As Mr D's comments exemplify: "I 
lived here because I was working near. In those days I didn't know about buses or 
couldn't afford a car or a house for that matter so it was best to live close to 
where I worked. All us young boys lived close in those days." 
The psychological impact of migration and changes in employment is often 
ignored in the literature. The ease with which these migrants adapted to their new 
factory work was remarkable considering their occupations in Azad Kashmir. 216 
However this was not without its problems. Kashmiri narratives highlight the 
changes in working conditions that came about as a result of migration to Luton. 
Mr K talks of the changes from rural life to factory life in Luton: 
I couldn't stand to be in indoors all the time. I just felt as if I never 
saw the daylight. It was awful and I thought that I would never get 
used to this life. It was really strange to have been working out on 
our farmland one minute and come to be indoors aII the time. At 
first I couldn't understand why they (family) all thought that this 
would be the best option for me. 
Since the decline of industry in the inner wards of Luton, the Kashmiri population 
has once again had to adapt itself to change. There have been considerable 
casualties of industrial decline but many have moved into small scale consumer 
retail businesses. These individuals however have come from small business 
backgrounds in their villages back in Azad Kashmir. In Luton these businesses are 
particularly visible along Bury Park Road. In recent years there has been the 
emergence of ethnic businesses such as solicitors' firms, accountants' firms and 
international pay -phone exchanges within this area. These firms tend to be headed 
by professionals who have migrated from Azad Kashmir, migrants who have 
continued education on arriving and particularly the younger generation of 
Kashmiris born and brought up in Britain. 
Migrants often accepted conditions which they would not have tolerated in Azad 
Kashmir because of the other benefits besides employment, such as free health and 
education which are highly regarded amongst Kashmiri migrants. Conversations 
suggest that these factors may be some compensation for lack of employment. 
Mrs F commented: 
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My husband has been out of work for nearly five years. He had to 
leave because he got heart problems. I just thank Allah that we are 
in this country because we have got good medical help and well 
you don't have to pay. In Kashmir I would have had to sell things 
or borrow money to get the care that he has got at the L and D 
(Luton and Dunstable Hospital). 
The majority of migrants are small landholders with five to six bighas ( 4 
bighas = 1 acre) in Mirpur district. They are therefore small landholders 
who had very low incomes and landless labourers who also earned very 
small wages. However after migration to Britain, migrants, both labourers 
and 'gentry', work alongside each other in factories and mills because "in a 
strange country the status of a labourer is not the same as that associated 
with the labourer back home." 14 
Many immigrants do succeed in climbing this hierarchical ladder and thus improve 
their economic and social status, but this "upward" mobility is easier to achieve 
during periods of economic boom. However the British economy has been 
relatively stagnant over the last decade leading to high scale unemployment within 
the Kashmiri immigrant social group. 
The arrival of Kashmiri migrants and entrance into the lower echelons of the 
socio-economic hierarchy mean they involuntarily enter into the inner city area 
(Dallow Ward/Bury Park area in this study) which are synonymous with 
deprivation and cheap, often poor quality housing. Low socio-economic status of 
ethnic groups can only partially explain their high levels of segregation. 1 5  
Discrimination is another important factor in segregation. 
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Discriminatory factors come into play where ethnic groups are perceived as 
undesirable by the host population. The "blocking" strategy is usually 
administered by the existing occupants of city neighbourhoods, in an attempt to 
resist the "invasion" of ethnic groups. This occurs in a variety of ways ranging 
from social hostility to petty violence and deliberate vandalism. Where this 
strategy of "voicing" opposition is unsuccessful or where the area in question is 
occupied by socially and geographically more mobile households, the host 
population's strategy becomes that of "exit". 16 This process eventually leaves the 
ethnic group spatially isolated. 
The spatial concentration of ethnic minorities further comes about through 
discrimination in the housing market. This has been termed the "discrimination 
thesis" . 17 The most powerful discrimination devices in the private sector are the 
inability to obtain and maintain a mortgage. As already mentioned, Kashmiris are 
economic migrants and a "replacement labour force" and therefore were 
irregularly employed in low-paid unskilled jobs which were rejected by the host 
population. 18 Under these circumstances mortgages were difficult to obtain. 
Further discrimination occurs through estate agents. The presence of Asians in a 
neighbourhood is thought to lower property values and neighbourhood status. 
Thus estate agents not willing to antagonise future white clients did not direct 
Asians to all-white residential areas. 
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Parallel discrimination is thought to exist in terms of entry into the public housing sector. A system exists "in which some ethnic groups deemed to be inferior become a de facto ghetto".i19 There has been considerable support for the discrimination thesis in the literature. For example, Carter and Jones state that there is "an accumulated wealth of evidence that Asians in common with other British Blacks, have been subject to continuing housing discrimination, overt and covert, individual and organised, deliberate and unintended". 20 Baboolal points to the undervaluing of the importance of skin colour in place of easily measurable characteristics such as religion and social class. Skin colour is an explicit factor in segregation within the city.21 Even if the actual threat of discrimination disappears the psychological threat remains an important factor in segregation. The localised nature of cheaper accommodation mentioned above has an impact on the residential segregation of Azad Kashmiris in Luton. It has the effect of further channelling ethnic minority groups into particular niches. As Ms P comments: "You're talking about the experience of us lot when we first came here. I can't get a Council house now." There have been many studies which have shown that disadvantaged groups have long suffered discrimination in allocation of local authority housing.22 Carter highlights the discrimination by building societies, estate agents and builders.23 Recent research on housing patterns of South Asians emphasises the decisive role played by racism in curtailing the accommodation options available to South Asian settlers.24 This approach contrasts sharply with work done by academics 
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like Dahya and Werbner whose research suggests that South Asian housing 
patterns were a matter of choice based on cultural preferences.25 According to 
these writers Pakistanis prefer owner occupation. The question which Dahya and 
W erbner fail to address is exactly what is involved in the idea of cultural 
preference. Is it not possible that "cultural preference" for owner occupation may 
be a cultural adaptation to an environment in which South Asians faced serious 
discrimination in accessing other forms of accommodation? What is it about 
"Pakistani culture" that would favour owner occupation? How specific is it to 
"Pakistanis"? Too often culturalist explanations betray a determinism "which 
portray Britain's black population as pawns, unable to resist the forces which 
control their lives, and which fail to consider culture, in the sense of world view, 
rather than attributed exoticism."26 Mr K commented on the discrimination he 
experienced whilst trying to buy a house: 
Racism has always been around. I remember when things got bad 
on the job front people blamed us. You know the stuff - get out 
you Pakis and all that rubbish, but I didn't really come across it in a 
really big way until I wanted a house. I went to the council and 
they said that they couldn't give me a house in 'Bury Park' and 
there were some available in Marsh Farm area. Well my wife and 
children would know no one there but they wouldn't listen. Then 
someone told me that I could get a mortgage. I didn't have a clue 
in those days but I know now that they didn't even want me to 
have that. In the end I had to borrow most of it from people I 
knew from here and there. Most men I knew did that. 
Similarly Mr H pointed out: 
When I came to this country I had money and well even though I 
wanted to btiy a house off New Bedford Road I had problems. I 
remember going and talking to these people ( white estate agents)
and them just not wanting to show me the place and it was only
when I insisted that they showed it to me. In the end I gave up and 
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went to one of our own men. I didn't want to do that because you 
can't trust them either. 
There is however, another set of arguments which explain the spatial 
concentration of ethnic minorities, not in terms of discrimination, but as result of 
voluntary non-participation by immigrants. The "Return Migration Orientation 
Thesis" developed by Dahya, maintains that ghettoization of ethnic minorities is a 
product of their desire not to fully participate within the host society.27 As Patiya 
describes: "this theory is based on the concept that the immigrants come with the 
firm intention of returning home where they hope to enjoy the fruits of their 
labour in retirement. That is, the immigrants consider themselves to be transients 
and not settlers. "28 According to this approach Pakistani migrants are in Britain to 
accumulate money which they use to pay off their debts incurred in the process of 
migration, to invest in larger land holdings in their villages of origin and to 
construct pukka permanent houses in Pakistan. The main aim of the vilayati ( a 
Pakistani who has migrated to Britain) is to save as much as possible to enable 
him to return home quickly. In order to be readily accepted back into the village at 
home the vilayati must maintain his culture, which means non-participation in the 
'morally lax, status conscious British society' . 29 Similarly Banton suggests that the 
"reference groups" by which the migrant measures himself are located in the 
sending society, as are indeed many of the informal social controls upon his 
behaviour when in the presence of fellow migrants.30 To resist conforming to 
values and social behaviour of the receiving country over generations requires a 
tremendous commitment to the group and powerfully distinctive institutions. 
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This non-participation manifests itself in variety of ways including: "their living 
and eating requirements were broadly the same as before migration and secondly, 
savings are maximised to allow them not merely to express but also to defend and 
perpetuate their traditional social forms, values, beliefs and ethnic identity."3 1 In 
British society this is expressed in housing purchased by Azad Kashmiris in Luton. 
Aspirations of Pakistani immigrants are determined by the kacha (non-permanent) 
houses found in the villages of origin, so the industrial terrace became the norm. 
Ownership allows Azad Kashmiris to save greater percentages of their income 
whilst at the same time allowing easy access to places of employment and 
providing money for remittances to Azad Kashmir. Dahya also notes that the 
immigrants do not think of localities in which they live as decaying areas or slums 
since no matter how old and dilapidated the immigrant houses in Britain may be, 
they are regarded as infinitely superior to those left behind in the villages.32 
There is some suggestion that non-participation in majority societal norms 
continues to be an important factor for Kashmiris in Luton. For example one 
respondent claimed: "I think it is better to live amongst people of your own kind 
because that way you will be influenced by their ways and you won't get children 
going to clubs or going out like English people do." It is not clear whether non­
participation (i.e. refusing to accept without distinction) the cultural norms of a 
host society is the same as not participating in other ways within the host society. 
Not accepting prevailing norms turns a de facto settler into a transient. Dahya 
seems to have an essentialist notion of migrant social forms, values, and beliefs. 
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There is clearly an assumption that because something is traditional it is somehow 
static and immutable. The whole point about enculturation is to examine the ways 
in which traditional beliefs and values are adapted to new environments. A closer 
analysis of traditions of ethnic identity demonstrates clearly that what is 
considered to be traditional is also open to re-definition and re-contextualization.33 
Other explanations for the apparent segregation of Azad Kashmiris in Luton can 
also be summarised by the ideas put forward by Boal. 34 He suggests such clusters 
are basically defensive in function and in response to external pressures. Different 
immigrant groups have different levels of assimilation. Segregation is more Jikely 
to occur if the immigrant group is easily identifiable by colour and clan. The 
differences in the way in which segregation manifests itself in distinct spatial 
outcomes. It is important to note here that ful] assimilation adopts the notion that 
total dispersal of an immigrant population amongst the host population should 
take place. This wilJ only take place if migrants mix with the host population 
quickly before any differences between the immigrant population and the host 
population become extenuated. Where this occurs ethnic or residential clusters are 
only temporary in the assimilation of the migrant group into the host population. 
Boal terms such clusters as "colonies". 35 
These "colonies" serve as a port of entry for members of the ethnic group 
concerned. They provide a foothold in new societies for groups who are likely to 
have little difficulty in achieving either behavioural or structural assimilation and 
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most importantly are motivated towards those ends. Ethnic clusters which exist over a longer time are usually the result of the interaction between discrimination and internal cohesion. Where internal cohesion is a prominent feature residential clusters are termed "enclaves". This ethnic area is likely to persist over time because it is primarily based on choice and in particular the preservation function. The term "enclave" adequately describes the situation occurring amongst Azad Kashmiri migrants in Luton. Where external factors such as the constraints and the discriminatory action of the host population exist, the residential clusters are termed "ghettos". These are ethnic areas which persist and here no assimilation takes place. Figure 7.i1 shows a number of ways in which the three spatial forms of the colony, enclave and ghetto may emerge and are based on Boal's ( 1978) examples. Thus it can be argued that the concentration of Azad Kashmiris within the poorer inner city areas emphasises the social and economic disadvantage experienced by these groups when they arrived in Britain. This concentration also has the effect of increasing the visibility of an already distinctive minority, (making them easier targets for hostility and aggression). It is argued that with time the coloured immigrants will disperse from their ethnic clusters into the white majority community and the socio-economic structure of 225 
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the host society. 36' It is likely that at a later stage, the immigrants may begin to re­
evaluate their position vis-a-vis Britain and Pakistan. Accordingly, they may adopt 
new values and aspirations and seek recognition in British society. Alternatively 
they may modify their present perspective and yet, given the external constraints 
suggested by Rex and Moore, find their residential mobility blocked. Reticence of 
aspirations has certainly taken place amongst the Kashmiris. The most significant 
factor was that many felt it was unrealistic to hope that they would return to Azad 
Kashmir to settle. 
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permanently. As Mr. J said: "I thought once that I might go home, I think most 
people my age thought that we would but it' s  not possible now because all my 
children are here. I can't see them going back unless it' s  for holidays. This is their 
Kashmir." 
My research also suggests that Kashmiris will remain segregated within "Bury 
Park". Kashmiri residential segregation in Luton remains high despite the fact that 
migrants have been settled for nearly thirty years and have structurally 
assimilated. 37 
Reasons for remaining within the segregated community were given as: 
There is no need to move out of this area. My family are here, my 
friends are here and we have all our day to day necessities here. I 
know people who live in other areas of Luton, Farley Hill or 
Lewesly Farm, and I can tell you they're not happy at all. You 
know it' s  one thing being with your own family and own kind and 
another being with strangers. 
I can't live with those people. They are not like me, you know, they 
don't speak the language and they don't do anything like we do. 
Here at least I know that if I need it I will get all the help that I 
need. I can ask a fellow Muslim for anything and I know that he 
will do his best to get it for me and even I feel that my family is 
more protected here because everyone knows whose izzat that is. 
Interestingly, whilst recognising the negative aspects of living within segregated 
community many younger members of the Kashmiri community expressed the 
desire to continue living within the "Bury Park" area, which is perhaps an 
indication of the depth of their identification with that particular locality. 
I can't go out of this area. Here I know everyone and I feel 
protected. All my mates are here, I went to school here and well 
everything is here ... when I get married my family will be near for 
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things that I will need. It's no good going away when I will need their help and all that sort of thing. Relatives are important but you know something else when I came all the jobs were here and that was just great. I could walk to work. I lived here to be close to my sister but also to be close to my work, now there's no work anymore and I feel at least there is some family here and there is a Mosque and other things just for us and our needs. Kashmiri segregation has thus been influenced by 'institutional completeness' and Azad Kashmiri use of exclusive institutions which increases their identification with traditional culture, language, national origin and religion. These factors increase Kashmiri ·encapsulation' and reduce the opportunity for assimilation leading to segregation. Kashmiri settlement within "Bury Park" is geographically distinct. Settlement has also reached the stage where the community is now structurally, socially and culturally distinctive. The segregated area may therefore be seen as a separate territory, which serves to heighten and proclaim a distinctive identity of the minority and provide support and protection for the migrants as Boal suggests. Perhaps most importantly the segregated space acts as an important self-ascriptive force, which is central to identity formation. From the above sections it is clear that Kashmiri patterns of settlement are distinct and that for many of the Kashmiris in Luton the segregated area is very important. Research suggests that by living in close proximity, as well as being psychologically comforting Kashmiris in Luton are able to reproduce the social systems of home which are held together by ethnic institutions. The following sections highlight the important cultural, religious and political institutions that are influencing the identity ofiKashmiris in Luton. 
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ID CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have drawn a demographic outline and settlement profile of the 
Kashmiri community in Britain and more specifically in Luton. I spent some time 
discussing the way in which the Kashmiri population is concentrated in the "Bury 
Park" area of Luton. This concentration can be understood in the terms of the 
four main models: choice/constraint model, the discrimination thesis, voluntary 
non-participation thesis, and the idea of defensive settlement. Regardless of which 
model one accepts, what is clear is that settlement models are linked to ideas on 
the identity of ethnic minorities. This is fairly clear in the latter three models, 
which all explain the behaviour of ethnic migrants as being affected by who they 
are, whether this be in the form of discrimination and exclusion or self-induced 
non-participation. Even the choice/constraint model has an implicit notion of 
identity. In other words, who the migrants are conditions the way they have 
settled in Luton. The urban landscape of Luton is marked by the identity of the 
Kashmiri community, not only in the provision of particular types of buildings and 
amenities ( mosques, halal butchers etc.) but also in the spatial form the settlement 
takes. Thus, identity is central not only in terms of providing the norms and values 
of Kashmiri settlers, but also in terms of the manifold ways in which Kashmiri 
settlement is given shape. Therefore, an investigation into the identity of 
Kashmiris, is an investigation that deals with the everyday life of Kashmiris. The 
question of who the Kashmiris are is not simply an ethnographic one, because 
who the Kashmiris are determines their economic and social, as well as their 
cultural well being. In this chapter I took issue with the way Dahya' s model 
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assumes a static notion of tradition and identity. In the subsequent chapters, I will 
show how the process of enculturation produces syncretic forms of identity, that 
is identity states that are re-defined and re-contextualised in response to new 
situations and environments. In the next chapter, I will investigate the collective 
and individual dimensions of Kashmiri identity, examining the way in which they 
have been translated in response to migration to Britain. This chapter, then, by 
providing a profile of the Kashmiri community in Luton, has set the stage for the 
investigation into what aspects of Kashmiriness have changed, and what facets 
have remained the same, in the context ofKashmiri settlement in Luton. 231 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: KASHMIRIS A WAY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I pointed out how the spatial concentration of Kashmiris 
within Luton is only explicable in terms of who the Kashmiris are. In other words, 
their concentration in particular areas was part and parcel of the way in which 
they manifested their identity, how this identity interacted with the identity of the 
host community, and what accommodation options were available to them, given 
that the way their identity states interacted with the new environment. As I have 
already discussed, identity is not a constant, nor is it something that is constantly 
changing. If the latter were the case, there would be no continuity, as an identity 
would transform to such an extent that it would be unrecognisable from its 
previous states. If, however, identity were constant, it would be impossible to 
account for any changes: Kashmiris would always be Kashmiris. This would deny 
the historically contingent nature of identity. What needs to be examined are the 
complex ways in which some elements of identity are maintained whilst others are 
changed. In this chapter, I begin the task of showing how the process of 
enculturation has produced syncretic forms of Kashmiri identity which reflect not 
only the way Kashmir and its history has marked the Kashmiris but also how their 
settlement in Luton has affected "Kashmiriness" . In other words, how 
Kashmiriness continues to be produced in very different contexts and situations. 
The next few chapters will be primarily dealing with this issue. In this chapter I 
investigate the collective and individual dimensions of Kashmiri identity. 233 
Specifically it looks at the way in which these dimensions have been transferred and translated within the new context of Britain and especially Luton. 
II. CULTURAL NETWORKS IN LUTON In the early years of settlement cultural networks manifest themselves most obviously in their role of sponsorship and patronage. A number of previous studies have shown the importance of sponsorship and patronage by pioneer migrants. 1 We have already seen that the cultural networks such as the biraderi system function as an aid to the chain migration process, an important function being the alleviating of Lee's intervening obstacles to migration. Cultural networks have also played an important role in the settlement and subsequent segregation of Azad Kashmiris in "Bury Park". Once pioneer migrants have settled they have developed the infrastructure by which later growth and settlement was possible.2 Research in Luton supports these earlier studies and suggests that the pioneer migrants aided the settlement of new households by obtaining employment through mutual support. Eventually the process brings households together, thereby encapsulating them. Once new immigrants become established, they in turn take up the role as inn-keepers, sponsors and informants for newly arriving immigrants. These new arrivals have increased dependence on kin and friends' and systems such as the biraderi function to protect and educate them and to find them jobs. The biraderi has been especially important in the process of Kashmiri 
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migration and has resulted in a chain migration on a kinship-friendship basis, 
which is linked to very specific spatial patterns within Luton. Interviews revealed 
the direct impact of the biraderi. The following are typical of conversations with 
members of the Luton Kashmiri community. 
Mr H was one of the biraderi brothers so we had to help him. You 
know Islam says that we must help our brothers. 
Mr T pointed out that: 
I am here because my cousin was here before me and not long after 
he was here my father back in Kashmir said that I should try and 
go and so he wrote to my cousin and asked him to help me settle 
down here. I was very excited. I knew that he would look after 
me . . .  you see I was very young then. He came to the airport to pick 
me up, he showed me the ropes and after about a month I got a 
job. It was really all his doing. 
Similarly Mr G said: 
Mr A was sponsored by one of his relatives who had come to 
Luton several years earlier and had managed to establish himself. I 
knew Mr A back home, we live in Kotli town and our fathers were 
friends. Anyway he came back to see his ill father soon after he 
went to Luton and told me that I should come back with him. He 
gave me the air money and I came over here with him. 
Thus, in the early days the pioneer migrants and their biraderi functioned to 
influence relatives and friends back home through letters, visits and remittances, 
thus displaying to them the economic opportunities available in Britain. Migration 
continued steadily through the 1 960s and early 70s. Jorgen Nielsen points out that 
this was particularly significant for the future, as it was in this period that the 
infrastructure for prospective settlement was made possible. He suggests that as 
the first immigrants arrived, they established themselves and were then ready to 
facilitate the settling of family and friends.3 This availability of a ready 
235 
infrastructure also meant that many migrants chose to settle within the community 
area. In the early days of settlement segregation also helped people with similar 
values maintain their group norms and preserve a sense of cultural and religious 
identity. The foundations for the development of institutions to enhance the 
maintenance of identity were therefore developed prior to family reunification and 
during the phase of mass migration. The process of chain migration led to biraderi 
based migration and bound subsequent settlement. The continued segregation of 
Azad Kashmiris in the "Bury Park" area of Luton demonstrates the importance of 
kinship-friendship networks and the biraderi even after the initial stages of 
migrations were complete. 
Today the impact of the biraderi within the Kashmiri community m Luton 
continues to be of vital importance to the social organisation of the community. It 
is important however not to overemphasise the importance of these cultural 
networks and therefore present deterministic accounts of community organisation 
Settlement of Kashmiris in Luton reflects their biraderis and zats. So the same 
five biraderis found in Azad Kashmir are represented in Luton. Each biraderi may 
have a slightly different approach to the same issue. Further, if we are to 
essentialise these cultural systems, then there is no space for redefinition of 
identities in the new context or different expression of identities by different 
generations of Kashmiris. It is not necessarily the case that individual actions are 
bound by the biraderi and that individuals are not allowed to belong to various 
cultural organisations or to develop other alliances. Essentialist accounts of these 236 
systems have too often been used as catch-all explanations of settler community 
infrastructure. There is no essential biraderi system as so much of the literature 
suggests.4 At a policy level this has been commonly used as an excuse for poor 
allocation of resources. 
The infrastructure that Nielsen refers to is a complex one compnsmg 
organisations dealing with social organisation, community welfare, religion and 
local politics. Once permanent settlement has taken place communities quickly 
established infrastructures whose organisational structures are complex. It is very 
difficult to distinguish between the social, cultural, religious and political 
organisations of the Muslim community since there is a high degree of 
polyvalence. In addition, the demarcation between different domains is not 
necessarily the same as those demarcations that circulate in Eurocentric 
discourses.5 For example, in Luton the Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association may 
be primarily involved in welfare but has also represented Kashmiris in Luton at 
significant religious and political events in the town. Thus this one organisation 
has played various roles depending on the circumstances. What is clear from 
interviews with Kashmiris in Luton is that these cultural networks provide the 
basis of community fabric and are important for rallying initial support for various 
schemes regardless of whether they are welfare, religious or political issues. The 
following narratives point out the importance of the biraderi for social 
organisation: 
In many ways the biraderi is our life. It's like a group of relatives 
and friends that you invite to weddings and funerals and go out 
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with in happy times. They are your friends and help you out . . .  they 
are people that you can rely on for all sorts of support. 
Most people here have loads of family but I don't have many here 
in Luton so when there is a small problem I know that I can call 
upon someone who knows who I am. They know that because I 
am from the same village back home. It helps a lot. 
It is so important to have community like this because you need it 
for your children. How will they know who they are if they don' t  
have people the same as them to sit with, to  eat with and to 
socialise with? 
You know the thing is that it ' s  fun getting things on Eid from 
people you know and then giving things out and things like that. 
My Mom does all of that but it makes us who we are . . .  weddings is 
another time my parents always help out as much as they can. 
This narrative is referring to the function of lena-dena (literally "taking and 
giving") which has been discussed by Alison Shaw amongst others. She points out 
that these transactions are in general the offering of gifts at special occasions to 
celebrate family rituals of all kinds, including birth, circumcision, children' s  
birthdays, a child's  first completed reading of the Quran and of course marriage. 6 
The new contexts mean that these transactions may go beyond the biraderi and 
include non-relatives and go beyond Kashmiris settled in Britain. 
Other reasons for the importance of cultural networks were highlighted as 
financial support and often mentioned was the usefulness of these systems on 
social occasions especially marriages. Overall they provide the mechanism by 
which Kashrniris in Luton can recreate the social systems of home. Commenting 
on the "public face" ofKashmiri social organisation Mr Y commented that: 
You know, these people you know are vital when you are trying to 
get support for something you want to set up. 
238 
Mr M pointed out that: 
All these organisations are is a formalisation of these systems in 
many ways. Someone identifies a need, gets support from 
community members and tries to get Council support. 
In terms of community welfare active members of the Kashmiri community have 
established various welfare organisations for Kashmiris in Luton. Welfare 
organisations in Luton include the Pakistani/Kashmiri Youth Forum.7 This 
organisation deals with youth programmes catering for the needs of Pakistani and 
Kashmiri youth from the ages of seven to twenty five. It is also active in 
identifying new areas of need and dealing with issues concerning all youth in 
Luton regardless of ethnicity, such as crime and drugs. The other significant 
organisation is the Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Organisation.8 This organisation 
deals with enquires about income support, housing welfare rights, interpretation, 
and health issues. Mr M pointed out that many of these organisations are at risk of 
dwindling because they lack volunteers. He also highlighted that they need to be 
tackling more issues: 
A lot of it has to do with lack of organisation and volunteers. I 
think that they should be at the forefront. When you talk about the 
Pakistan/Kashmir Youth Forum, it's a youth organisation and they 
should be setting up training programmes for young people. 
Unemployment within the Kashmiris is the highest in these two 
wards, Dallow and Biscot, so they should be doing things to 
improve their opportunity towards jobs. 
MstE said, 
They should take charge yeah and they don't. There seems to be a 
bit of ownership flying around and that's not good. 
The role of Luton Borough Council is significant to these welfare organisations. 
In most instances they work in partnership with these organisations. Limited 
239 
resources also mean that they look for joint funding with other organisations. In 
line with increasing need, Luton Borough Council has recently established an Anti 
Poverty Scheme to identify pockets of poverty and the means of alleviating 
poverty. The Kashmiri community has been included in this. There are also 
various other welfare organisations in Luton such as the Federation of Pakistani 
Youth and the Luton Muslim Youth Organisation. With reference to the 
effectiveness of these Mr M commented that: "They are nothing but paper 
organisations. In reality they do very little and are not effective at all." 
The importance of cultural networks is perhaps overemphasised in discussions 
about religion and politics (which often seems .to insist that religion and political 
activity is heavily conditioned by cultural networks such as the biraderi). It is 
worth noting that this research sees the relationship between these as 
complementary in the sense that an overwhelming majority of Kashmiris settled in 
Britain are Muslim and religion affects every aspect of living. The relationship 
between cultural networks such as the biraderi in politics is more complex than 
generally assumed and is most often referenced as important for rallying support 
for local Councillors. Local political activity among Kashmiris in Luton cannot be 
reduced to being an epiphenomenon of biraderi and factionalism. 
At best cultural networks such as kinship-friendship networks and the biraderi 
should be seen as an aid to cultural reconstruction in the new environment, 
providing a framework for everyday interactions amongst Kashmiris and a sense 
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of solidarity over issues affecting them. Ballard sees them as " 'networks of 
reciprocity' which lie at the heart of any sense of community". 9 
Even our councillors use it and at the end of the day they represent 
the community. They really keep their support within their own 
direct community like Raja, Jat, Malik plus when they get in the 
only people that benefit are from their own biraderi. 
The biggest problem in Luton is that the organisations are wary of 
each other, and that they don't like to work in partnership ... there's 
that brilliant British thing about divide and rule. That' s it in Britain 
because no one's working together except in pockets and they are 
doing the same thing if they all came together and then we 
wouldn't be this far behind. Compare Luton to Birmingham or 
Bradford. We're ten to fifteen years behind them. 
ID. RELIGION AMONG KASHMIRIS 
The cultural networks of kinship-friendship and biraderi as well as all other 
aspects of Kashrniri social organisation are bound together by religion. Religiosity 
is a central feature of Kashmiris living in Luton and its influence is felt in all 
aspects of Kashmiri life. This dynamic has directly contributed to settlement in 
Britain and has had a direct impact on Kashmiri British identity formation. As Rex 
points out, "the presence of major Islamic communities in the British Isles in the 
1980s is to a large extent the result of a late imperial process, common to all of 
Western Europe - the migration of people into Britain seeking work from former 
British colonies".t10 Proposition two argues that religion is an essential component 
of ethnic identity. As migrants have settled in an environment in which their 
·ethnicity is seen as inferior, mobilisation around religious values and religious 
symbols ensues. Where there is a continued threat from majority identity these 
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symbols will become even more powerful. This inferiority was manifested most 
fervently in assimilation policy, which understood that migrants would eventually 
give up religious identities or reconstruct them in line with the majority religion, 
which is secular (i.e. that religion should be part of the private conscience rather 
than the public discourse). 
These accounts derived from paradigms, which had for more than a century 
accepted that assimilation of religious identities into the national society was a 
necessary precondition for socio-economic and political development. In fact, 
diverse and competing ethnic and religious communal identities were seen as a 
primary factor in dividing post-colonial societies and hindering development. In 
this context religious identities were seen as inimical to rational social planning 
and economic development, and thus highlighted the classical European model 
where, it was assumed, modernity had eroded communal identities in favour of 
loyalty to the state1 1  . 
Contrary to assimilationist policies, rather than fade away Muslims in Britain have 
organised around religion. Despite the fact that Islam in Britain has a long history 
many commentators have suggested that religion was not significant to early 
migrants to Britain12 . It is important to note that discussion with Kashmiris 
suggest that the contrary was true. As narratives highlight, mobilisation around 
Islam became increasingly important with family reunification and settlement. As 
MrtD noted; 
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I think that looking back people think that it wasn't very important 
to us. I don't blame them really because we were working all the 
time and anyway there were no big posh Mosques so nobody saw 
us praying. How did they know which room in a friend' s house 
was for prayer, they probably though we were having parties. 
Mr F' s comments below highlight however the increasing importance of religious 
organisation in family reunification: 
When we were on our own here we really had nothing to worry
about. On Jumma we just got together in someone's  front room 
and prayed. When my wife came over I started to pray more and 
then when we had children we both prayed more because we 
wanted them to be Muslims also. 
In a country which is not Muslim I can't expect my children to be 
Muslims if I don't pray and I don't do anything about their 
religious teaching. 
For most Kashmiris interviewed in Luton the development of religious spaces 
within areas of Muslim settlement was seen as a necessary step to living in Britain. 
Thus it can be argued that the "reunion of the family was the route as well as the 
cause and the locus for the immigration of Islam to Britain" .13 Neilsen notes that 
the increasing number of Mosques may indicate rising commitment to Islam in 
Britain. "From I 966 the number started increasing at a steady rate to 8 1  in 197 4 
and then at an even faster rate to 314 in 1985 and 452 in I 990. Informed 
observers suggest that the actual figure is probably more than double". 14 
Despite the diversity of Muslims in Britain the selectivity of migration means that 
the form of Islam that developed most strongly in Britain was South Asian Islam 
with its particular form and experience of European colonialism. This has been 
transported via the migration process to Britain, and influenced the development 
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of Islam in this country. As Rex points out "religions survive their original 
historical context as ethnic and religious groups migrate to wholly different 
contexts". 1 5  
Within the South Asian group there are differences based on region of migration 
in South Asia, income, occupation, education, and sectarian allegiances. As 
discussed, the Barelwi tradition is strongly represented, although not exclusively, 
in the migrant communities from Azad Kashmir since historically these regions 
have been closely linked with the Sufi tradition. It follows then that it is this 
particular form of Islam, practised in towns such as Kotli and Mirpur, that initially 
established itself and continues to be strongly represented amongst the Luton 
Azad Kashmiris. This form of Islam "involves a wide range of local customs 
established by oral tradition or kept to a particular locale through being focused 
around a Sufi shrine". 16 
The Barelwi tradition has significantly impacted on the political organisation of 
Islam in Luton. Geaves argues that "within the major Sufi tariqas the prime 
loyalty is not to the tariqa itself but to the individual pir and that although those 
amongst the Barelwis who follow a pir acknowledge his tariqa, they do not 
organise themselves around their identity as Naqshbandis, Chishtis, or 
Qadaris"1 7• In Luton religious organisation does appear to be influenced to some 
extent by the tariqas. Mr G observes that: 
When I first came to Luton many years ago you know no one 
really cared about who was this and what that person was. If you 
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were Muslims you were Muslim. It could have been because we 
were all from similar places in Kashmir. Then everyone started to 
come here and now when you go anywhere people don't just want 
to know if you are Muslim they want to know what type of 
Muslim and what person you follow. 
The change in context has had several effects on Barelwi identity. Firstly, since 
much of Barelwi religious worship exists around pirs and their shrines, in 
migration to Britain this locus of religious identity was displaced. In many cases 
this has been has been overcome by pirs visiting from "back home" and in some 
cases residing in Britain for months at a time. 
There are pirs here as well. Well they call themselves pirs and 
people here know about them and go to visit them a lot. They 
might be in other towns so they go there or they might come and 
visit here and they go to the people. Usually it' s  to do with 
illnesses or if they have some muradas. 
Secondly, changes in context have meant that Barelwis have came into contact 
with other Islamic traditions, particularly the reform groups such as the 
Deobandis, Jamat-I Islami and Tabligh-I Jamat. This is not to say that these 
individuals were unaware of such groups before migration but that changes in 
context have resulted in increased contact with individuals from these groups. 
Geaves quoting from a discussion with Maulana Shaid Raza points out that he 
insists that the Barelwis are particularly afraid because the reform groups, 
especially the Jamat-1-Islami and the Tabligh-1-Jamat are exceedingly well­
organised, having good leadership, and working in a dynamic way in this 
country.18  
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These reformist movements have had a significant impact on Azad Kashmiris. Changes brought about by increased contact are highlighted in narratives: I suppose in a way we were all Barelwis at one time. I didn't understand Islam. I do now and I feel more in tune with who I am. Islam is about politics as well as peace and that is why I feel more in tune with the Jammat' (referring to the Jammat-1 Islami) . You know once I came here to this country I realised that I had to learn more about Islam and then that 's when I thought that this was going to be an important time in my life. Being here made me realise that I had to join the Tabligh-1 Jammat. For these Kashmiris in Luton (in line with all Muslims in Britain) then, Islam was not only becoming a key signifier in marking religious identity with respect to the majority community but also internally among Muslim settlers. Differences in internal religious expression are illustrated by the establishment of denominationally orientated Mosques. As with other major cities of Muslim settlement, organisation of Islam in Luton initially centred on Mosques. Mosque development in Luton has closely followed ethno-religious lines and has been used to enforce and reinforce group identity in the town. During early settlement religious activity generally took place in front rooms donated by various members of the Azad Kashmiri community19 . As Mr K points out: Our identity is the Mosque. When we came here we knew that this is what we needed because they had churches and we needed Mosques to be ourselves but no one had any money or knew how 
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to do anything so we really just gathered m friends' houses 
whenever we could. 
We had to have a place to pray because otherwise we would forget 
that we are Muslims. I suppose you could call this front room a 
Mosque if there were a few people. That' s  the way it was then. 
As permanent settlement continued as a result of family reunification, community 
members pooled resources and purchased properties specifically for worship and 
religious education. A more recent phenomenon has been purpose-built Mosques. 
Many of these Mosques are denominationally oriented. Mr G said: 
We had to get bigger places because there are so many of us now. 
On Eid and other religious days there was no way you could get 
everyone into those small houses. 
With reference to an article on Bradford Pakistanis published in the 1970s, Lewis 
reports that there were two stages to community development: 
Whereby an initial tendency towards fusion - in which pioneer
settlers associated together regardless of their regional, caste or 
sectarian origins, gradually gave way as numbers grew, to fission 
and segmentation; in this second stage of fragmentation ties of 
village-kinship and sectarian affiliation grew steadily more 
significant as the basis of communal aggregation.20 
Kashmiri narratives suggest that this was also the case in Luton. Mr Y comments: 
Most of the time we used to go to the same Mosques and now 
things are different. We can go into any Mosque here but you
know you stick to the one where the things you agree with are 
said. I can't  go to the big Mosque (referring to the Jammia 
Masjid). 
There are three Mosques in Luton all located within the Bury Park area reflecting 
different Islamic denominations21 . The largest Mosque is situated on Westboume 
Road. This is purpose-built. Construction was started in 1974 and it serves the 
majority of Barelwi Azad Kashmiris in Luton. 22. The Madina Mosque is located 
on Oak Road and serves the Tablig-I-Jamat. The Masjid Noor largely serves the 
Bangladeshi community and is located on Bury Park Road. 
Much of the recent literature on Muslims in Britain has focused extensively on 
Mosques as the centre of community organisation and religious identity. 23 Over 
attention to Mosques may be due to the fact that they are perhaps one of the most 
"visible" manifestations of Islam in Britain and because they are of relatively easy 
access. Mosques also architecturally mark out a space that is very "other". Thus 
like the hijab they become highly visible representations of Muslim identity. 
Discussion has also centred on the nature of sectarian influences and hostilities 
amongst various Islamic schools of thought, which manifest themselves as internal 
Mosque disputes. In most cases this has the effect of sensationalising community 
differences, destabilising the Muslim community and implying that it is 
dysfunctional. Despite a variety of factors behind the disputes they are often 
described as biraderi or sectarian disputes. This is partly due to the fact that 
conflicts within ethnic minorities are denied a political dimension. In reality they 
involve a mixture of motives and interests (personal, ethical, manipulative, 
ideological and political etc.). 
A. The Jammia-Masjid Dispute 
The Jammia Masjid dispute has been the source of internal and external attention 
during the research period. Most descriptions of the Mosque dispute in Luton 
(Jammia Masjid) emphasise the a-political nature of the conflict by pointing to 
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factors such as faction in-fighting, biraderi based dispute, sectarian clashes or 
ego-driven conflicts. 
What is relevant to the research is not the actual events of the Mosque dispute but 
the question of how the participants and observers actually represent the dispute 
and to what extent these are rhetorical devices in the dispute itself In this sense 
then the narratives outlined above are also rhetorical. In describing disputes within 
communities such as the one above academics such as Lewis tend to make a 
distinction between politics and internal disputes within settler communities. By 
doing this they reduce such issues to ones of factionalism. As Carl Schmitt argues, 
the political is inscribed in the friend-foe distinction. 24 So wherever this distinction 
exists a political conflict arises. Thus there is no reason why a Mosque dispute 
such as the one in Luton cannot be seen as political ( rather than sectarian or 
religious) and there is no reason to see it as exceptional since like any political 
conflict it will be waged by whatever means are acceptable to those involved in 
the dispute. 
B. Islam: The Next Generation 
As the Kashmiri community has settled and early intentions of returning home 
have subsided, the second and third generations are incorporated into wider 
society, however precarious this relationship may be. One of the most pressing 
issues facing Muslims in Luton and generally in Britain has been the issue of 
transfer of religious identity to offspring born and brought up in Britain. As the 
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preceding paragraphs have suggested this was an important part of the creation of 
religious spaces within areas of large Muslim settlement like Luton. 
Conversations with older Kashmiris suggest that what they did not foresee was a 
move away from traditional Islam towards a more universal Islam grounded in 
notions of the Ummah, for the younger generation. In considering this increasing 
Islamic identity in Britain many external commentators have placed little emphasis 
on the discourses internal to the communities within which the individual is 
physically and emotionally located, apart from highlighting what they see as the 
"caught between two cultures" syndrome. It is vital that identity is seen as an on­
going psychological process where individuals make conscious choices as to the 
elements of religious identity they choose to maintain for a contemporary 
contextual sense of their identity.25 Mrs H comments that: 
I thought that my kids would become less Muslim not more 
Muslim. Now they tell me that I should do this and not be doing 
that. It's strange but I'm proud of them . . .  You know what's so 
new to me is that they are telling me that my religion isn't Islam 
and that it's really just our culture. 
Geaves argues that for the younger generations, gathering around Islamic symbols 
has been utilised as an attack on the ethnic customs of their parents and un­
Islamic. He suggests that they often seek a different form of Islam, one which is 
free from South Asian cultural accretion.26 "Regardless of British citizenship there 
is no doubt that membership of a universal community - the Muslim Ummah - is 
an important aspect of self awareness and understanding. To belong to the 
Ummah young people are going through a process of identity development".27. 
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This process of "Islamisation" has been described by Sayyid and Clark amongst others For Sayyid Islamism is about placing Muslim identity at the centre of political practice. In this sense he sees Islamism as a political discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order and can range from the assertion of a Muslim subjectivity to a full-blooded attempt to reconstruct society on Islamic principles. 28 The encounter for the first time with different cultural and religious forms, even with different Muslim traditions, as well as British society and the emergence of the second generation of British born and British educated Muslims, has made the creation of an Islamic community that is not seen to be too closely linked to anyparticular cultural tradition a top priority. 29 Younger Kashmiris' drive towards increased Islamic identity can be summarised as being in response to -racism and anti Islamic feeling within Britain and against Muslims internationally, and a general disillusionment with the cultural Islam of their parents' generations. In this sense changing contexts may have the effect of redefining forms of Islam or creating new forms of religious expression. As we have seen above, for the older generation who were born in Azad Kashmir there appears to have been little reason to question their religious ideals and understandings because their context did not require this as an aspect of living. What was prominent in their minds was the creation of religious space within areas of settlement and the recreation as far as possible of the religious systems of home in their new environment. This is not to suggest that there was no debate but rather that this debate was located within traditional Islamic jurisprudence, for example the debates around Sunni versus Shia. 25i1 
The younger generation however are living in a context where they are ethnically 
and religiously marked as different and therefore the nature of the debate is 
shaped by this context. In this case then these religious identities are constructed 
and reconstructed in response to the prevalent political discourses. As Yasmin Ali 
suggests, the idea of engaging with the interpretation of Islam as an intellectual 
exercise was unfamiliar to most of the older generation, who mainly came from 
poorly educated rural backgrounds. 30 As well as this it is worth noting that they 
were from a Muslim background so that Islam was part of their common sense. 
However the younger generation are able to engage in this as an intellectual 
debate because they have been educated in the traditions of Western critical 
discourse which has led to the questioning of revealed truths. Kashmiri narratives 
suggest reactions to racism and disillusionment with the cultural Islam of their 
parents' generations. As Ms F points out: 
I can't  stand the fact that every time I leave my house someone 
calls me a Paki. Now that I wear the hijab they call me a smelly 
Muslim or stuff like that. It's better to be that than a Paki. If 
there's a few of us together they're scared. I think a lot of people 
are reverting back. You know there' s that phase about ten years 
ago when people were going away from religion and going to 
clubs and pubs and things. We have to thank the press for bringing 
them back because all of a sudden the people who didn't see 
themselves as Muslim now call themselves Muslims. The Rushdie 
thing and the press have done it really by slating Muslims and 
saying they are fundamentalists. 
There's more of an Islamic identity in Luton that's being created 
significantly from external pressure that we get from national and 
local press. This tends to fire up young Muslims. That' s what 
young people are clinging on to in these organisations. 
Disillusionment with parents' cultural Islam was expressed by Ms D with 
reference to reactions to the wearing of the hijab: 252 
It's funny but when I got round to putting this on my parents were 
mad for days with me telling me that I wouldn't get a husband and 
stuff like that and that Islam doesn't say that you need to do this at 
all. For them it's all about how beautiful their daughter is and that 
will mean a good marriage. I told them that this is who I am. They
think it's just because all my friends are doing it and that I am part 
of some group. They don't understand that there is too much 
culture in their Islam and can't get to grips with the fact that what I 
practise is Islam. 
Another problem highlighted is a response to the big drive in recent years to get 
involved in Islamic activity in Luton beyond that located around the Mosque. 
Although the Mosque remains central to Islamic identity many younger Kashmiris 
explained that they were disillusioned by disputes like the one presented above 
and by older members of the community excluding them from the running of 
Islamic organisations. As Mr G said: "It's all very well them expecting us to be 
there all the time but they just won't let us get involved in any of the organisation 
or anything - they really want to keep it for themselves." 
Younger Kashmiris are particularly influenced by Islamic political parties. These 
are largely revivalist organisations which have their origin in the Middle East and 
which are generally becoming more significant in Britain. The attraction of these 
appears to be their denunciation of any form of sectarianism in the face of 
universal Islam and their commitment to political Islam. Ms R said: 
These oldies believe that the Mosque is everything but there is 
more to knowing about your religion and that's what we're all 
about. 
Some well-known examples that are significant in Luton are the Hizb-ut-Thariar 
and Al- Mahjaroon. 3 1 Both these organisations promote the ideas mentioned. 
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Both operate from members' homes and about three years ago went 
"underground" in Luton. 
We believe that all Muslims belong to the Ummah and that there 
are no important divisions amongst Muslims like the biraderis and 
stuff that our parents always come up with. 
Other less overtly political Islamic organisations catering for changing needs of 
the Luton Muslim community are an example of this. The British Muslim Welfare 
in Luton has a significant young membership as well as about thirty reverts to 
Islam. Mohammad Khalid established this organisation in 1995. The organisation 
is largely involved in teaching and interpretation of the Quran and Hadith within 
the framework of the Tablig-I-Jammat. The organisation is located on Kenilworth 
Road in the Bury Park area above Nasons supermarket. The Young Muslims also 
have a significant presence in Luton. The organisation in based in Madina Masjid 
and the activities centre on youth clubs, Islamic camps and activities. Dr Fiaz 
Hussain heads the organisation. Another recent organisation headed by Mobeen 
Qureshi is Khidmatt (service) whose premises are located on Leagrave Road. The 
Young Muslim Women's organisation and the Luton Islamic Society also carry 
out similar activities. In Luton these organisations appear to have been more 
successful than the welfare organisations which may suggest the importance of 
Islam for a sense of self. 
In addition the prevalence of posters advertising forthcoming religious rallies or 
lectures and the appearance of groups of stalls in the streets around Bury Park and 
Luton town centre to encourage passers by to engage in discussion on the merits 
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of Islam all indicate increased activity around religious identity.32 All this contributes to the increasing visibility of Muslims in Luton. Visibility has also come about from overt political mobilisation around Islam whether on international issues, such as the Gulf War or the Rushdie affair, or on more local issues such as the provision of halal meat in schools, appropriate dress for women students (particularly issues around the hijab) or the recognition of Islamic schools by central and local government. All highlight the political nature of Islam and the demand for a "Muslim Voice". The above issues and the organisations associated with them tend to transcend ethnic and linguistic differences. However, Kashmiri nationalism largely articulates itself through its Muslimness. Thus, unlike most nationalism in the Muslim world, Kashmiri nationalism is closely identified with Muslimness. Even the main "secularist" organisation the JKLF has to make many concessions to the intimate relationship between Kashmiri and Muslim identity. The effect of the way in which Kashmiriyat and Muslimness is articulated is that the increasing salience of Muslim subject position tends to go hand-in-hand with the assertion of Kashmiri identity. It is possible that the split between black and white which defined race relations in Britain up until about the 1980s may be giving way to a tripartite division of the black subject position, so that Britain' s  ethnicised minorities are increasingly categorised as black (people of the African diaspora), Asian (mainly people associated with India) and Muslim (including not only Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Bangladeshis but also Kurds and Arabs). All these categories are heavily contested. However, it is the case that such a development undermines the efficacy of the Pakistani identity option as a 255 
way of continuing to define people who migrated to Luton form the districts of 
Mirpur and Kotli in Azad Kashmir. Some of the difficulties these transformations 
pose can be seen by looking at Lewis's recent work.Lewis acknowledges the 
diversity of Muslims in Britain but then continues to do much the same as 
previous research and to talk of Pakistanis, implying that they represent the 
Muslim community in Britain. The writings on Pakistani Muslims, have given little 
recognition of Kashmiri Muslims who as discussed previously comprise the 
majority of those referred to as Pakistani. 
IV. THE POLITICAL VOICE OF "BURY PARK" 
The size and demography of the Kashmiri Muslim community in Luton and in 
Britain make their voice important in influencing votes. An acknowledgement of 
this can be seen during the General Election campaign in 1997 where political 
parties had an active policy of wooing the Muslim vote which was particularly 
significant in marginal constituencies. The various organisations described above 
are important in creating an authoritative political voice for the Kashmiri 
community in Luton. This is particularly significant in lobbying political parties 
and presenting community demands. As a consequence of the strength of the 
Kashmiri community in Luton, an otherwise hostile media covered "race" issues in 
the pre-Election season in a generally positive fashion. 33 
Within Luton, as in other areas of large Muslim settlement in Britain, a Muslim 
identity has emerged in response to majority-minority relations, i.e. between 
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secular and non-secular communities through bipolar ethnic competition. It is 
partly in the face of assimilationist and multiculturalist policies to eradicate 
difference and to contrive a "Britishness" based on majority identity, but also in an 
attempt to maintain distinctiveness from other South Asian communities in 
Britain.34 At a policy level it becomes clear that the majority community and 
minority communities do not share the same idea of national identity. 
Lord Tebbitt recently expressed these fears at a Conservative Party conference. 
The desire to hold on to a British identity were highlighted by his comments when 
he said: 
Multiculturalism is a divisive force. One cannot uphold two sets of 
ethics or be loyal to two nations, any more than a man can serve 
two masters. It perpetuates ethnic divisions because nationality is 
in the long term is more about culture than ethnics. Youngsters of 
all races born here should be taught that British history is their 
history, or they will be forever foreigners holding British passports 
and this kingdom will be Yugoslavia. 
In Britain's culture and hegemonic identity Muslims are seen as very alien and a 
direct threat to national identity. This is evidenced at all levels, most prominently 
in salient anti Islamic elements increasingly summarised as Islamaphobia35 . The 
next chapter shows how Kashmiris in Luton are expressing a national identity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The above sections have shown that far from losing their distinctiveness through 
migration and settlement Kashmiris have transferred their social and religious 
belief systems to the new environment, which has required gradual adjustments. 
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Islamist organisations appear at least for now to be fulfilling the needs of the 
Muslims born in Britain in their proclamation of a universal Islam. Overall cultural 
networks and Islam have become pivotal identifiers for community organisation. 
Culture and religion provide an ascriptive measure of social differentiation and 
offer a symbolic resource for belongingness.36 
Attempts by the majority communities to eradicate difference have failed. 
Contrary to Weberian analysis, recent years have witnessed the emergence and 
renewed assertion of ethnic identities. These have been a reaction to local, 
national as well as global developments which have in turn had an impact on the 
local, national and global scenes.37 With reference to increasing recognition of the 
rise of nationalism globally and with the resultant impact on international politics, 
there has been a growing interest and intensive debates on definitions and the 
relationships between nations, ethnic groups, their nationalism and the state.38 For 
Kashmiris national sentiments continue as focal points for movements for self­
definition. Rather than disappear in the face of assimilationist policies 
"Kashmiriyat" has emerged as currently one of the primary sources of community 
mobilisation in Britain. The next chapter looks at definitions of the nation and the 
emergence of "Kashmiriyat" and the particular form it is taking in Luton. 39 
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23 See Lewis, 1994. 
24 Schmitt, 1996, pp. 26-27. 25 This point is taken from the work of Peter Weinreich on identity redefinitions. 
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29 Clark as discussed Geaves, 1996, p. 54. 30 Ali, 1992. 31 The Al-Mahjaroon split from the Hizb-ut-Thariar due to an internal dispute. The Hizbul leader Omar Bakri left the organisation after being criticised by members for publicly inviting people to Islam in Trafalgar Square in 1995. He formed the Al-Mahjaroon soon after this event. 
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this size and depth it is not possible to present a detailed account of theories of nationalism. 
What is presented however is a broad overview of those aspects of the debate that are 
particularly relevant to the Kashmiris. 
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CHAPTER NINE: DEFINING "KASHMIRIYAT" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the nineteenth century ethnic identity was generally regarded as an objective 
fact although it was becoming difficult to define, it continued to be measured 
through the categories I have discussed previously in relation to Kashmiris, 
specifically culture and , religion. The idea was that these were central to 
distinguishing one group from another. The 1970s saw the emergence of two 
lines of thinking on identity. The first is usually attributed to Frederick Barth. For 
Barth ethnic identity is "an evanescent situational construct, not a solid enduring 
fact" .o1 He saw individuals as choosing identity to improve their situation, which 
was usually based on changed circumstances. His ideas led to the instrumentalist 
approach to ethnic identity. "According to this view, identities are not inborn and 
unchanging, but manipulable and chosen: the product of personal choice. In some 
contexts, they can also take the form of ideologies deliberately fostered by elites 
who want to create senses of solidarity in subject people bound to them". 2 The 
second is the primordialist approach in which ethnic identity is a seen as a given 
which can be passed on from generation to generation. The emphasis is on blood 
ties, common ancestry, language and culture, characteristics which are seen to 
define the group. Most importantly these cannot be manipulated. "Research has 
shown that many of the group's defining characteristics are picked up 
unconsciously in the earliest years of life. They can thus shape individual 
behaviour on a very profound level" . 3 These two approaches to ethnic identity 261 
contradict and conflict with each other. The emergence of Kashmiri nationalism 
however appears to fit both scenarios. In this chapter I show how both 
instrumentalist and primordialist notions of ethnicity can be found at work in 
Kashmiri discourse and how enculturation allows for the inclusion of both within 
notions of "Kashmiriyat". In this chapter, I will examine the various means by 
which Kashmiri identity is articulated. Specifically looking at the way in which 
the notions of "Kashmiriyat" have been disseminated throughout the Kashmiri 
population. I begin with a discussion of the idea of nationhood and how it applies 
to the Kashmiri case. 
II. DEFINING THE NATION 
Kellas defines nation as "a group of people who feel themselves to be a 
community bound together by ties of history, culture and common ancestry."4 A 
nation then, is social group which shares a sense of common history and a 
common way of life. Peterson defines the nation as: 
A people, a folk held together by some or all of such more or less 
immutable characteristics as common descent, territory, history, 
language, religion, way of life, or other attributes that members of 
the group have from birth onward. 5 
Oommen, presents another definition of the nation: 
A community of sentiment, which would adequately manifest 
itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which 
normally tends to produce a state of its own.6 
The abstract appears in all the definitions of nation presented above. Connor's 
definition talks of a "sense of belonging". Peterson talks of "a way of life" and 
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Oomman of "a community of sentiment". In all these definitions there is the 
assumption of a primordial psychological bond.7 The nation then is seen as 
ambiguous and essentially psychological. "What ultimately matters is not what it 
is but what people believe it is and a belief in the group's separate origin and 
evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology". 8 
Modernist approaches such as those of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner 
argue that notions of nation are constructed.9 In this instance: 
It is a political community - and imagined as both inherently
limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even 
the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in their minds lives the 
image of their communion. 10 
Gellner traces the development of nationalism to the need of modern societies for 
cultural homogeneity in order to function. This need, when satisfied, is sponsored 
by the modern nation state. 1 1  The state usually takes the form of a defined 
territory. For the Kashmiris the association between nation and territory is 
particularly important. Territoriality appears to be the central feature on which 
the defence of national-cultural identity is currently based. Oommen also 
references contemporary western sociology as seeing the state as: 
An entity endowed with political sovereignty over a clearly
defined territorial area having a monopoly on the use of legitimate 
force and constraining of citizens with terminal loyalty. A series 
of empirical situations is assumed to be in existence for such a 
definition to. be operative. For example if a people do not have 
their own territory in which to lead settled lives, they are defined 
as being "stateless". 12 
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These definitions are based on the associations between nation and territory that emerged after the French revolution (1789) on the one hand and the emergence of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 on the other. "The Westphalian order encouraged the idea that it was possible to make tidy correspondences between state, territory and people." 13 However this is not applicable to the Kashmiris whose nationalism is not confined to territory and in its current formation has emerged outside of the territory. Manifestations of "Kashmiriyat" transcend time and space. 14 Kashmiri nationalism has been constructed around nodal points of "peoplehood" : ethnicity, religion and citizenship of specific states, thus incorporating both instrumentalist and primordialist notions of identity. Collectively these have come to be known as "Kashmiriyat". Definitions of nation, state and nationalism have a tendency to simplify ideological movements. Kashmiri nationalism is complex. Nira Yuval-Davis's three categorisations of Volknation, Kultumation and Staatnation are particularly appropriate for describing and understanding Kashmiri nationalism. The first is constructed around the origin of people, the second around specific cultures or religion and the third around citizenship of specific states. These categorisations are more useful for understanding the complexities of nationalistic movements and ideologies than definitions of the nation based on the _Westphalian model. Kashmiri nationalism can be categorised as deriving from one of two stances, the Kulturnation or the Staatnation. 1 5  264 
Yuval-Davis goes on to argue that three key features are important in defining a 
nation - common sense of history, common destiny and an element of common 
solidarity. This is illustrated using a quote from Renan: 
A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of 
sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to 
make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the 
present by tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly
expressed, to continue the communal life. 16 
Kashmiri narratives presented below highlight these factors. 
ill. NARRATING "KASHMIRIYAT" 
Kashmiri narratives in Luton and Azad Kashmir highlighted the differing 
perceptions on notions of national identity. For Mr K and Mr M this is 
primordial. Mr K pointed out that "Kashmiris are a civilisation, a people who 
have a history that goes back generations. We are Kashmiris because it's in our 
blood". Similarly, Mr M suggested that, Kashmiris are a nation (Qaum) and 
Kashmir is our homeland. 
The narratives of Kashmiris interviewed in Luton and Azad Kashmir present 
strong evidence for people's belief in separate origin and evolution and their 
importance in the formation of "Kashmiriyat". Mr T said: "Kashmiris are a 
nation of people. We have a culture that is different from anyone else. Our 
history has been taken away from us [but] we still are Kashmiris". 265 
The naturalness of a nation having its own state to protect and maintain cultural 
identity as suggested by Oommen above was supported by Mr G when he said 
that: 
It's not a question of do we feel different. You see we are 
different. We have a different history and different culture and we 
had a place that was ours. How else can we belong to a place?
Look Pakistanis belong to Pakistan, the Indians have a state and 
just look at Israel. They needed a territory to have an identity and 
they didn' t  even really have one. We have a territory and we want 
it back. 
Certainly the Kashmiris see others as seeing them as "stateless". The importance 
of this for Mr G is highlighted when he asks: 
So where are we Kashmiris meant to belong? When someone asks 
us where are you from what can we say, our home is occupied by 
others. So they think that we are Pakistanis or Indians. How is it 
that we can have "Kashmiriyat" without a Kashmir? 
The majority of Kashmiri narratives in Luton suggest that Kashmiris fit into the 
definition of nation and categorisation of nationalism as defined by Yuval-Davis 
- Volknation, Kulturation and Staatnation. As has been seen with the comments 
from Mr G and others, there is a strong sense of solidarity, with individuals self­
identifying as Kashmiris and having a clear concept of the Kashmiri nation. The 
exact nature of geographical boundaries, however, is a cause of confusion. Ms F, 
a British born Kashmiri, comments: 
I still have to go to Kashmir but you know I sometimes have to 
make myself understand where it is and you know trying to tell 
someone else is always a nightmare. 
I know it's near Pakistan and that India's desperate to get their 
hands on it. Hey I know what the flag's like. It's ace that we have 
a flag. 
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There is a common sense of history and a common idea of destiny, which underpins not only a set of attitudes but also a set of "tangible deeds" : One day the killing is going to stop and our people are going to be together again. We will do anything to save our brethren - we will fight till the end to get a piece of our heaven back and all youpeople in Britain can bring attention to what's going on here. In Luton there is a commitment to a shared Kashmiri culture. Although important this does not appear to be central to the nationalist struggle. Many Kashmiris feel an alliance with Pakistan is the natural way forward, based on shared religion, but for the majority it does not appear to be the basis of national identity. The focus is on the idea of belonging to a nation. The foundation of this thinking is that before the partition of India and Pakistan in 1 947 it was an independent multi-ethnic state. Thus the emphasis is on Staatnation and not Kulturnation. This emphasis on belonging to a multi-ethnic state prior to the 1 947 partition refutes many of the arguments which describe the Kashmiri situation as ethno­nationalism. 17 The basis of these arguments has been that since Kashmiris do not share a common language, religion or physical appearance their nationalism is based on the polarisation of these differences between different groups within Kashmir (e.g difference between Hindu and Muslim Kashmiris). The Kashmiris believe that the "selling" of the Kashmir situation as a dispute based on religion is a distortion caused by the rivalry over the area by Pakistan and India. This definition also fits in with the Indo-Pakistan dimension of the Kashmir issue, i.e. the two-nation theory. This is that as most Kashmiris are Muslims so Kashmir 
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should become part of Pakistan, hence an ethno-religious Kashmir, or that 
Kashmir should become part oflndia because it is secular. 
There are four important features to consider in looking at Kashmiri ethnic 
groups: regional location, religion, culture and language. Religion has been 
highlighted by politiciaris for analysing the disputes in the territory and linking 
this to the basis for the 1947 partition. Given the apparent lack of ethnic conflict 
within Kashmir itself, the implication of labelling the Kashmir issue as an ethnic 
conflict is that there is conflict between one ethnic group, the Kashmiris or a 
subset of the Kashmiris, and another the Indians. The concept of Indians who 
represent the state as an ethnic group would potentially accord with those writers 
who have seen the events of 1947 as creating "ethnic" states, Muslim Pakistan 
and Hindu India. This categorisation accords religion the overriding 
characteristic of ethnicity in the subcontinent and lines it up with those conflicts 
where religion is the motivating factor. 1 8  
The focus in fact appears to be territorial identification with the united land of 
Kashmir. Mr I commented that "most of us are Muslims but in our history we 
have always lived peacefully with our neighbours and we like all people". 
Similarly another Luton Kashmiri said that "Too many people have turned this 
into a fight between.Muslims and Hindus [but] even the Hindus in Kashmir want 
to be free and separate from India". 268 
Throughout its history Kashmir has had a reputation for overall religious 
tolerance and ethnic harmony. This has to some extent continued through into the 
present civil uprisings which have been focused on the Indian State as 
represented by the police and the military forces. Most of the conflicts have taken 
place between Indian troops and Muslims in the Valley which has added to the 
confusion and discussion of the dispute as an ethnic and not political conflict. 
In much of the writing the focus has been on the Indian controlled territory of 
Jammu and the Valley with the implication that these areas together with Ladakh 
constitute Kashmir. The Pakistani controlled territories of Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir and the Northern Areas are virtually ignored. This then removes from 
the analysis any discussion of the "Kashmiri nation" or acknowledgement of the 
existence of a former legitimate state with, arguably, a current situation of 
colonisation by the Indian State. 
It can be argued that the presentation of the Kashmir situation as ethnic conflict, 
or religious nationalism, has a basis in a Western discourse whose own 
nationalisms are seen as secular. This then widens the categorisation of the 
"other" as religious fundamentalism. 
It appears that for _the majority of Kashmiris in Luton religion is currently an 
"irrelevant variable." 19 This does not mean that religion is not . central to 
Kashmiri ethnic identity or that there are not articulations of religious 
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nationalism amongst Kashmiris. Political organisations such as the Muslim 
Conference and the Jammat-I-Islami all articulate religious nationalism as one 
solution to the problem. Kashmiris also belong to pan-Islamist organisations such 
as the Hizb-ul-Tahrir which advocate an Islamic resolution to the Kashmir 
problem. However this does not form the majority consensus amongst the Luton 
Kashmiris.20 Oommen argues that although religious ties are clearly central to 
cultural and ethnic identity, their objective relevance to national struggles is more 
questionable. This has been the case for the Kashmiri struggle. In this sense 
many organisations "created" a "new religious symbolism". 21 
If notions of nation are psychological and imagined then the question is therefore 
how do these imaginings take hold and become ideological frameworks. As 
Ratcliffe argues: 
Awareness of a distinct national identity clearly in itself does not 
lead to the development of nationalist movements. One needs to 
ask another set of comparative questions about the ways in which 
community identity is mobilised and the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for this mobilisation to take place (at the same time 
avoiding the pitfalls of a crude historicism). 22 
Narratives of older generation Kashmiris now settled in Luton have highlighted 
the importance of memory. This appears to be particularly important for 
"Kashmiriyat ". The crystallisation of demands for a separate state is particularly 
fervent due to the memory of discrimination, exploitation and oppression. 
In Mercer's words "identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when 
something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the 
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experience of doubt and uncertainty" 23 and for the Kashmiris this identity has 
been displaced since 1947. Specifically since the 1930s the "bone of contention" 
has been social, economic and political marginalisation. This continues to be the 
focus of Kashmiri nationalism globally . For many of those settled in Britain who 
originate from Azad Kashmir there is a feeling of resentment towards Pakistan 
which is seen as controlling its "fifth province". 24 Yunas Samad has argued that 
for Pakistan, Kashmir is significant for the body politic and it has been a crucial 
component of Pakistan's Muslim nationalism. "In the core areas of nationalism, 
particularly Punjab, Kashmir was a sensitive issue and politicians were quick to 
recognise the influence it has; from Liaquat down to Nawaz Sharif all Pakistani 
leaders have been hawkish on Kashmir". As one Kashmiri commented: 
We might as well be Pakistanis so Azad is supposed to mean free? 
That's a laugh, they are making fun of us. We're not free, no way,
Pakistan controls us all the way [and] we are like occupied
Kashmir . India controls them and Pakistan controls us. 25 
Administratively and legislatively the functioning of Azad Kashmir is controlled 
by Pakistan in all aspects of decision making. Pakistan is significant in 
controlling Azad Kashmir's economy, defence and foreign policy and financial 
budget, all of which make the Azad Kashmiri administration and legislation less 
significant. This is a cause of much resentment amongst Kashmiris resident in the 
United Kingdom and Azad Kashmir alike. 
There are many ways in which Azad Kashmir is tied to the development of 
Pakistan. The educational policy promotes the idea of Kashmir being the "fifth 
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province" at the expense of Kashmiri identity. "Schools and Universities are not 
only the means by which society educates and trains its workforce but they also 
operate as a vehicle for developing national identity. The school curriculum in 
Azad Kashmir is that of Pakistan and is controlled from Pakistan". 26 There was a 
general feeling that the curriculum did not reflect Kashmiri geography, history 
and culture, and as results undermines the idea of a distinct Kashmiri identity. It 
was felt that the Pakistani objective was to subsume Kashmiri identity into a 
Pakistani nationalism. Ms R based in Muzzafarabad commented that : 
Sometimes it gets a bit much really but we know what goes on 
because the family is involved but what about those people who 
don't know as much as us. We have a duty to inform everyone. 
The remittance sub-economy has been important for building a poorly Pakistani­
supported Azad Kashmiri infrastructure. Ballard notes that as a result of 
migration, "Mirpur experienced a considerable economic boom during the 60s 
and 70s. Almost every family rebuilt their house in steel and concrete, and with 
the sudden inflow of funds, as well as a heavy demand for construction materials, 
the bazaars expanded rapidly".27 Narratives ofKashmiris settled in Luton suggest 
some reasons for this. Mr K commented: 
I've been here for the last fifty years and all those years I've been 
sending this money back - most of them still don't work over 
there. I have married off my brothers' daughters and now their 
children as well, my grandchildren. I want to set up some business 
for them to do because there is nothing for them to do over there. 
[Mr K talked at length of the lack of an employment structure] I'm 
not going to �e here for always but over there it' s  not like here so 
I end up doing everything over here. I've bought some property 
here. 
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Mr K's comments highlight an increasing problem for the Azad Kashmiri 
economy. Ballard noted the lack of investment in agriculture and the lack of 
government support in this sector of the economy. Whilst land and property by 
remittance money has helped the local infrastructure it has largely been for 
family prestige and thus superficial in terms of the general economic 
improvement of the area. 
The lack of development of the Azad Kashmiri economy has meant that the full 
potential of the remittances has not been felt. In fact in places like Mirpur they 
have increased local differentials leading to a distorted view of development. 
Most of the investment has taken place in housing or the buying of land plots 
primarily for family. Any investment that has taken place has been within the 
service sectors. Research suggests that overseas Azad Kashmiris are reluctant to 
invest in Azad Kashmir for three interrelated reasons: economic control by 
Pakistan, lack of investment infrastructure and the volatile political situation. 
Economic control by the Pakistani Government is felt in the controlling of the 
banking sector. Research suggests that because Pakistan controls the banking 
system this means that Pakistan gains the foreign exchange benefit from the 
remittances and the use within Pakistan of the investment opportunities from the 
now considerable savings accounts. 
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In addition to this there appears to be little evidence of a secure economic 
structure within Azad Kashmir for overseas investors. Interviews with 
Government officials and the political activists highlighted the lack of an 
effective investment infrastructure in Azad Kashmir.28 Sardar Qayum, the then 
Prime Minister highlighted the usefulness of overseas finance and argued that 
there were policies designed to attract investment into Azad Kashmir. These 
included the exemption from various types of taxes, and the provision of services 
at "reasonable rates". "Whilst there were examples of major foreign investment 
such as a European hydroelectricity project in the Neelam Valley and some 
World Bank money, there had been no investment from the British or the 
Japanese and this was attributed to the Kashmir situation". 29 
The political activists interviewed highlighted the potential of overseas 
remittances but felt that Pakistan's stranglehold and the Kashmir situation were a 
deterrent to investment. Abdul Rashid Turabi, the president of the Jamaat-I­
Islami in Azad Kashmir pointed out that: 
There is great potential. Community planners here have not 
exploited that potential in a sensible way [because] of the limited 
infrastructure and the political structure is corrupt. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by potential investors m Luton. Mr K 
summarises some general sentiments: 
There's no point in doing anything than build a place to reside 
really. I know Mirpur and Kotli are the same. Look people don't 
care what's outside their door. Nobody wants a nice road outside 
their beautiful house because they know that there is no one to 
maintain it. No Pakistani Government wants responsibility and everyone will be using it, at least people will be living in a house. Other examples of poor economi.c conditions facing the Azad Kashmiris were presented as poor employment opportunities and poor upkeep of public property and roads. "It was also pointed out that ironically the residents of Azad Kashmir find themselves suffering "load shedding" because of the growing energy consumption of Punjabi industry. However whilst poor economic conditions and impoverishment have added to the Kashmir crisis the roots of the problem lie in political marginalisation. It is documented that under an agreement between the Pakistani Government and the Azad Kashmir Government (Muslim Conference), defence and foreign affairs were the responsibility of the Pakistani Government. Although Azad Kashmir is recognised as a disputed territory, Pakistan controls it by exercising political control in a number of ways. The legislative Assembly was set up in 1970 and a constitution drawn up. However the legislative assembly can only concern itself with domestic policy matters. As it is not recognised internationally as an independent country, it is subject to the Pakistan government in terms of defence and foreign policy. This is particularly the case in matters concerning the northern areas (Gilgit and Baltistan). Further, it is dependent on the Pakistani government for a proportion of its revenue, which is received in the forip. of a grant. The ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Pakistan provides the Chief Secretary to the Government of Azad Kashmir. In addition the upper house of the Assembly is chaired by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, who 275 
also appoints some of its members. It has been suggested that the roots of the 
crisis may lie primarily in the Kashmiris' fears for their own distinct identity in 
the face Hindu nationalism. For Azad Kashmiris the crisis also lies in the notion 
of Pakistani nationalism. 
Kashmiri narratives, some of which have been highlighted above, suggest that 
psychologically primordial sentiments predominate amongst Azad Kashmiris 
because of the contested nature of their identity. As well as "emotional location" 
and feelings of marginalisation in Azad Kashmir, for the majority of Kashmiris 
another impetus appears to be the fact that "they are a community displaced from 
their homeland and stranded in an "archipelago of cities" in the "developed 
world", that they have been provided with specific opportunities to construct 
their identities as a response to globalisation through an engagement with civil 
society". 30 In the next section, I will focus on the development of Kashmiriyat 
specifically in Luton. 
A. "Kashmiriyat" in Luton 
There are four contextual changes arising out of the consequences of settlement 
in Britain that have contributed to the growth of "Kashmiriyat" in Luton. These 
are changes in the social structure of the community in Luton, the value placed 
on living in a "del'I1:ocratic" society, political upheavals in Europe, the crisis of 
British identity and events in the sub-continent since the 1970s. 
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1. Changes in the Structure of the Community Firstly, the Kashmiri community in Luton is now well established. It is socially, culturally and spatially distinct. Costs incurred during migration have been repaid and migration has been reduced to a trickle. After initial migration a sense of permanence has prevailed as owner occupation has become the trend. Businesses and institutions catering for the migrants' needs have become well established. There is a thriving sub-economy and community infrastructure. Concentrated settlement has reinforced the migrants' early desires for maintenance of the traditional culture, language, and religion. This institutional completeness has led to the migrants' desires for non-participation in the "morally lax, status conscious British society".31  Therefore the concerns of the early years of migration have become less important. That is not to say that issues such as housing problems and racism are no longer important but that the community is established enough to articulate itself in such matters and this has left space for them to express their collective identity. 
2. Living in a "Democratic" Society Whilst "emotional location" for the older generation is significant in maintaining links and identity through close contact with their homeland and continuing a biraderi based lifestyle despite geographical space, for the younger generation 
Kashmiriyat takes C?n importance particularly due to human rights violation in Occupied Kashmir. 32 Ms D pointed out: 
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Our parents were born over there but all I know is that Pakistan treats Azad Kashmir really badly and that's why we stay backward and that women are being raped and children killed in OccupiedKashmir. We fight for a dog's life here and well those are mypeople and their lives are worth loads more than animals. I didn't even realise what was happening to all these people until I went to a talk this year. I just can't believe in 1996 this stuff can go on. We are a free people and people need to know. I'm a lawyer right and I can tell you that there's no way that this can go on. It is clear that for these young Kashmiris being born and brought up in Britain has led to the greater questioning of the nature and principles of the situation in Kashmir. 
3. The Crisis of British Identity Kashmiris also feel that they need to maintain a sense of self within the changing definition of what it constitutes to be "British". In other words, as Britain sheds its perceived distinctiveness in the face of increasing cultural diversity, so internationally the term 'British' now gives off very different messages than it did a hundred years ago. For the Kashmiris as with many other ethnicised communities this increases the importance of working to maintain a sense of self identity. As Yinger comments: In the midst of collapsing states and empires, old dreams of their own nation-state become vivid for many long-suffering ethnic minorities. In less conflictual settings the continuing need for a more personal identity in a culturally complex and rapidlychanging world persists. 33 278 
Further it is interesting that the "presence of the migrant 'other' is used not only 
in the nationalist discourse of the established; this discourse, which marginalises 
and demonises the migrant, also breeds nationalism among those who are 
marginalised". 34 This has no doubt influenced the Kashmiri nationalism in 
Britain who not only feel marginalised because they are not seen as Kashmiris 
but also because they suffer marginalisation and exclusion along with other 
Muslim "settler communities" . 35 
At the "Kashmir Conference" held in Luton on 2 July 1995 the speakers (Zahid­
ar-Rashidi, Jamal Harwood, Rashid Karim and Omar Bakari Mohammad) all 
drew analogies between the Kashmiris' right for self determination and their 
human rights violations with those of the Muslims in Bosnia. A conversation 
with Ms R after the conference was significant in getting what she considered to 
be the general opinion across. She said: 
Kashmir is a real big issue for us Kashmiris. There's no way that 
people can't take notice of what's going on over there. I just feel 
that. OK so there's all this stuff going on in Bosnia and they're our 
brothers as well but the difference is that people seem to know 
what's going on there. No one knows about Kashmir but if we can 
fight for Bosnians we can fight for Kashmiris. 
4. Events in the Subcontinent since the 1970s 
It is within this wider framework of changing social structures, emphasis on 
democratic values, upheavals in Europe and crisis of "British Identity" that 
events in the subcontinent should be viewed. Since the 1970s a series of events in 
the sub-continent have led to a change of Kashmiri identity expressions among 
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Luton Kashmiris of both generations. This is not to say that subjective political 
identities did not necessarily exist before the 1970s but these sentiments however 
were dormant until that time. These feelings have been invoked by the various 
organisations that were established around this time as a reaction to events in the 
subcontinent adding an objective dimension to British Kashmiri identity. 
Interviews suggest that the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war fought over Kashmir was one 
such event. This war left the Kashmir issue unresolved. However interviews 
suggest that this event did help to politicise some Kashmiris in Britain. The 
emergence of Bangladesh in 1972 was also significant as it would appear that the 
Azad Kashmiris became increasingly disillusioned with Pakistan's role as a 
possible ally against India. It was increasingly felt that Pakistan was not strong 
enough to bring about their independence. This added fuel to the whole 
independence struggle. Since Bangladesh had successfully achieved 
independence Kashmiri independence for the Kashmiris became a possible 
reality. These sentiments were transmitted into the diaspora through links with 
Kashmiris already settled in the United Kingdom and also by the continuing 
migration. These factors appear to have contributed to the current expression of 
political identity. 
The offspring of the_ Kashmiris who have been born in Britain have also become 
heavily involved in liberation politics. The impetus for this appears to be the 
human rights violations in Occupied Kashmir. Reports of abuses against 
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Kashmiris are increasingly available in easily accessible media. An increasingly 
important source is the Muslim media. During the research period many have to 
varying degrees carried reports on the situation in Kashmir. 
Highlighting the primordial and socially constructed elements of identity in 
relation to contextual changes adds continuity to the concept of enculturation and 
allows an understanding of communities through the process that challenges 
common theoretical categorisations. The either/or options provided by 
primordialist approaches to national identity do not allow for the fluidity of 
identity, which is necessary for understanding redefinitions of identity. For the 
Kashmiris it appears that due to changes in historical, political, social and 
economic context the producers and reproducers of "Kashmiriyat" are tapping 
primordial sentiments. This is not to say that there is some absolute 
"Kashmiriness" They are only "real" in the Barthian sense in so far as 
nationalistic movements use these accounts of history to lend legitimacy to their 
actions. Linked to the discussion of the conditions for mobilisation therefore is 
the role played by the producers and reproducers of "Kashmiriyat". 
B. The (Re) Producers of "Kashmiriyat" 
There is an on-going debate within the social constructionist framework about 
how national identity is fabricated. As such it requires agents who have the role 
of (re) producing national identity. Some writers see these producers and 
reproducers to be part of the state-apparatus. Others emphasise the role of "free-
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floating" intellectuals. Organisations and the community also have a role in the 
perpetuation of a particular discourse. In what follows I will look at how 
"Kashmiriyat" is articulated and who are the responsible agents. 
1. The State Apparatus 
The institutions of the state have historically played a major role in articulating 
national identity. Nationalism tended to be state-led among the early nation-states 
(e.g. England, France, Sweden etc.). In others words there were states that 
became nations. 36 In contrast, in wake of the dissolution of the major empires, 
nations or proto-nations have tended to become states. The case of Azad Kashmir 
seems to hark to the earlier pattern of state-led nationalism, in that Azad Kashmir 
has been one of the main forces behind the articulation of a Kashmiri national 
identity. This, however, is not the complete story, since Azad Kashmir is not a 
totally autonomous state. As such its relationship to "Kashmiriyat" is as 
ambiguous as its own status. There are three main ways in which the Azad 
Kashmiri state contributes to development of the discourse of "Kashmiriyat", 
despite its paradoxical relationship to Kashmiri nationalism. 
Firstly, the existence of the Azad Kashmiri Government adds legitimacy to 
"Kashmiriyat" in the sense that the Government validates the idea of Kashmir as 
a nation state. Th�re is a Kashmiri flag, which is an identifier of this. 
"Kashmiriyat" is further justified with the establishment of Azad Kashmir 
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branches of political parties such as the People's Party in 1969 and the Jamaat-I­
Islami. 
At the same time, however, the Azad Kashmiri government's links to the 
Pakistani state deny ''Kashmiriyat " (for example, according to the 1974 
constitution, Azad Kashmir's political parties have to swear to accession to 
Pakistan in order to be recognised). As one disgruntled politician pointed out : 
There is a Kashmiri Flag that the government has as a backdrop to 
all meetings but the question we need to ask is what do they
actually do to advance the idea of a Kashmiri state? There is no 
point in having a flag to show the world we are a country when 
half of our country is being held by others (referring to Indian 
Occupied Kashmir) and the other half (referring to Azad Kashmir) 
has a government only by name. The Azad Kashmir Government 
[Muslim Conference] is the "puppet of Pakistan" : 
The Muslim Conference has had its hands tied by the Pakistanis. 
What's a government who has no charge over its defence? We can 
all herd sheep. They are puppets of Pakistan. We call them 
chamcha. 
Ellis and Khan point out that: 
The reality is that the Pakistanis are extremely influential and 
unofficially exercise a "chief whip" role on the Azad Kashmir 
government members and this is particularly the case where the 
party in power is the same as the party in power in Pakistan. A 
constitutional crisis occurred in May 1996, which underlined how 
closely Azad Kashmir governance is tied to that of Pakistan 
politics. The maximum term of office was about to finish for the 
Muslim Conference government of Sardar Qayum at the same 
time as the term of office for the President was also coming up for 
re-election. The Prime Minister of Pakistan indicated timing for 
the presidential election, which would potentially favour her party. 
In order to highlight the issue the president, who was of Muslim 
Conference affiliation, resigned ahead of time so that it would be 
the Muslim Conference government in power during the 
presidential election. He immediately offered himself for re-
283 
election and was successful. Three weeks later however the 
Legislative Assembly elections returned a People's Party 
government who immediately deposed the President through a no 
confidence vote on the legitimacy of the recent presidential 
election. It could be perceived that the Assembly is now 
exercising its democratic right to challenge situations through this 
vote of no confidence. 37 
There is a third relationship between the Azad Kashmiri Government and 
"Kashmiriyat" That is the simulanteous extension and denial of Kashmiri 
nationalism makes possible "Kashmiriyrat" in that this allows a particular 
discourse around notions of "Kashmiriyat" to exist. During the 1970s it is was 
this discourse around "Kashmiriyat", the discontentment with the Azad Kashmiri 
Government, and increasing resentment at Pakistan's involvement in Azad 
Kashmiri governance and political parties, which led to the emergence of 
liberation organisations. 
2. Intellectuals 
Smith and Gellner stress the importance of intellectuals in the creation and 
reproduction of nationalist ideologies, especially those of oppressed collectives. 38 
It is important to note that by intellectuals I do not simply mean academics, 
writers, artists and the like. Rather, following Gramsci, the category of 
intellectuals include individuals who carry out the task of organising civil 
society, thus intellectuals can include civil servants, political leaders, journalists 
or trade union activists. 39 These have the role of articulating pre-existing notions 
around Kashmir identity, and at the same time altering and suggesting new 
notions of Kashmir identity. In other words intellectuals both voice and at the 
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same time echo "Kashmiriyat". As we have already seen most Kashmiris already have an implicit primordial notion of what it is to be Kashmiri. What key intellectuals have done is to take the implicit, almost folksy collection of beliefs and assumptions about what it is to be Kashmiri and make it explicit, often harnessing it to Kashmiri nationalism. Some of the earliest intellectuals that can be identified with "Kashmiriyat" appeared during the oppressions of the 1930s in response to the autocratic rule of the Maharaja and poor social, economic and political rights.40 Their interventions led to uprisings in the Poonch area (the area that came to be know as Azad Kashmir). Amongst these, the best known was Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Abdullah later went on to head political parties, the National Conference in the Valley and the Muslim Conference in the Azad Kashmir Region. It is these political parties that are prominent in Azad Kashmir that also have branches in Britain and have been significant in the production and re-production of "Kashmiriyat". Key individuals such as Maqbool Butt, Amanullah Khan, Major Ananullah, Mir Abdul Qayyam and G.M Lone are seen as the forefathers of liberation politics in Kashmir. They began to organise themselves in the 50s. Their activities culminated in the formation of the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF) (which subsequently became the Plebiscite Front and which was 
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reorganised and renamed the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front-JKLF) in 
1965 . 
Research suggests that the marginality of political parties within Azad Kashmiri 
politics and the contextual factors outlined above have provided the space for the 
formation of branches of these political parties and liberation organisations to 
flourish in Britain. It is important to point out, however, that these parties would 
not have been established or survived without the social, economic and political 
links with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir. 
Individuals who had been involved with liberation politics in Azad Kashmir in 
the late 60s and early 70s moved to Britain. Since moving to Britain they carried 
out various initiatives to organise Kashmiri settlers in response to events in 
Kashmir. In the 1970s in Britain key Kashmiris such as Lala Abdul Rehaman, 
Sofi Azim, Habib Khan and others were trying to organise Kashmiri settlers. 
These initiatives were taking place in direct response to events in Azad and 
Occupied Kashmir. As Mr M pointed out : "we felt that being here we could still 
do something for our brethren over there but just didn't know how to go about it 
at all". 
In 1971  Abdul R�hman was central in the development of the Kashmir 
Independent Movement. This organisation was established in response to 
members of the Plebiscite Front and the Liberation Front being interrogated in 
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Pakistan in relation to the hijacking of the Ganga aeroplane belonging to India. 
Also at this time Choudry Abdul Majid and colleagues were forming the United 
Kashmir Liberation Front, the headquarters of which was in Birmingham. The 
key activities of these organisations was to raise the profile of the Kashmiri issue 
by meeting with various dignitaries including the Pakistani Ambassador and to 
demonstrate against the torture of the National Liberation Front and Plebiscite 
Front members in Pakistan. 
After the Ganga aeroplane incident two members of the United Liberation Front, 
Mirza Siddique and Arif Ansari formed the Plebiscite Front. This was 
reorganised in 1971  by Abdul Rehman. The Plebiscite Front in Britain was 
independent from the Plebiscite Front of Kashmir but through its constitution and 
activities was seen as a branch of the Plebiscite Front in Kashmir.41 It was not 
however, until 1975 with the arrival of Abdul Khaliq Ansari, Amanullah Khan 
and Mr G.M Mir, all members of the Plebiscite Front in Kashmir that Kashmiri 
Liberation politics in Britain began to take a more distinguishable shape. 
Amanullah Khan is generally assumed to have been the leading intellectual in 
bringing about some cohesion to Kashmiri liberation politics in Britain. At a 
convention held in Birmingham on 29 May 1977 he suggested that the name of 
the Plebiscite Fron� should be changed to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 
Front (JKLF). The grounds for change were that the aims and objectives of the 
Plebiscite Front no longer catered for changed circumstances in Kashmir and 
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since Kashmir belongs to Kashmiris then why would Kashmiris want a 
plebiscite? Its attraction to many of the members of the Plebiscite Front, the 
National Liberation Front and members of branches of the Muslim Conference in 
Britain was that it was systematic and organised. 
Whereas Amanullah Khan is seen as the leading intellectual in the Kashmiri 
struggle the most revered figure is Maqbool Ahmad Butt. Butt is generally 
recognised as the central figure of the armed side of the Kashmiri independence 
struggle and the epitome of what constitutes "Kashmiriyat". Not only is he a 
household name amongst Kashmiris world wide but also in many homes 
photographs of Maqbool Butt adorn walls, mantels and dressers. Kashmiri 
narratives suggest that this is a privilege accorded to only a few respected figures 
in Muslim households. The following comments are typical: 
Maqbool Butt is our hero. He fought for everything that we stand 
for. I keep a picture of him here to remind myself of who I am. A 
Kashmiri. 
He is like a reminder of what it is all about. He started this and we 
have to carry on with his dream of an independent Kashmir. 
The main message of these individuals is that Kashmir is a nation. The basis of 
this is common history, ancestry, and culture. There is also a strong idea of a 
shared territory, which covers the geographical areas of Jammu, the Valley of 
Kashmir, Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit and Aksai Chin. These intellectuals were also 
products of a wider vision, which many of them argue was put in place at the 
time of British colonial rule in the mid-nineteenth century when Kashmir, a 
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Princely State at the time, was sold to Gulab Singh. Many of these intellectuals believe that on the day ofilndependence Kashmir was legally and constitutionally independent as no accession document had been signed. The events surrounding the signing of the accession by the Maharaj a are considered dubious, leading to questioning of the legitimacy of the accession treaty. Based on these events many individuals believe in Kashmiri governmental sovereignty and self-determination for a unified Kashmir. These ideas constitute the essence of "Kashmiriyat". Intellectuals spread their messages through their writings m books and pamphlets, through rallies and tours, but to more effect within the context of particular institutional ensembles. The Azad Kashmiri government provides one of the main institutional arenas for the dissemination of "Kashmiriyat." 
3. Organisations Intellectuals need to consolidate and institutionalise their opinions and the best way of doing this is through organisations, which take on the role of advocates, promoting a self-conscious collective identity. They fulfil this aim through referring to shared beliefs to promote a sense in the individual of belonging to the collective and they mobilise this through demonstrations, lobbying MPs and fundraising. The discourse of "Kashmiriyat" has dispersed this because it is articulated by various organisations which means that "Kashmiriyat" does not have a sole 
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representative and thus its power centres are also scattered. This is not surprising 
since different people have produced it in different places and at different times, 
and all have been influenced by their context. In other words there is no single 
representative, a type of Qaid-1-Azam figure. The President and Prime Minister 
of Azad Kashmir, Political Parties in Azad Kashmir and Occupied Kashmir and 
Liberation organisations in Azad Kashmir, Occupied Kashmir and Britain all talk 
of "Kashmyriat" . The polycentric nature of "Kashmiriyrat" therefore makes it 
very diffuse and difficult to co-ordinate. 42 
There are significant differences amongst the nationalism expressed by these 
different organisations but interestingly none of them deny the existence of the 
Kashmir Problem and all are united in wanting a Kashmir free of Indian 
occupation. Their approaches vary with regard to the solution to the problem. 
There are a number of political parties that operate in Kashmir but only a few 
operate outside. 43 The pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference is one of these and has a 
considerable following in Britain and Luton.44 It was during the 1930s that 
religion became significant for different political parties as a way of gaining 
popular support against loss of Kashmiri sovereignty. The Muslim Conference 
continues to argue for a Kashmir that is a part of Pakistan on the basis of shared 
religion. ldentificat_ion based on the Ummah is also expressed by Islamic 
revivalist organisations such as the Hizb-ul-Tahrir. These organisations reject 
concepts of the nation state articulated by organisations like the JKLF in favour 
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of a transnational community based on Muslim identity. For them the solution 
has to be an Islamic one. The "creation" of this "new religious symbolism" has 
taken place in the context of wider political debates.45 
Research in Luton suggests that despite the existence of political parties such as 
the Muslim Conference and revivalist organisations like the Hizb-ul-Tharir it is 
the liberation organisations that have a stronghold. Mr E explained that this was 
because, " I suppose if we push the religion side of it then we become religious 
fanatics and the idea of Kashmiris being a nation goes out of the window. Islam 
doesn't allow for nations". 
The idea of Kashmir as a Nation-State is the sustenance of liberation 
organisations like the JKLF.46 The JKLF is the only liberation organisation that 
functions in all three parts of Kashmir-Indian Occupied Kashmir, Azad Kashmir 
and Gilgt-Baltistan and abroad under the same name, constitution, leadership, 
organisational structure, flag and policy.47 In the JKLF is regarded as "the face of 
liberation" and Luton is generally accepted as the place that the "movement was 
born". Discussions with Kashmiris suggested that there are three main reasons 
for this. Firstly because Luton was home to Kashmiris that were active in 
liberation politics, which made them sympathetic to the JKLF. Secondly because 
Amanullah Khan ah:eady had relatives and supporters in Luton and so used Luton 
as his base when he arrived in Britain in 1 975 and thirdly because the JKLF 
Zonal Office, Kashmir House, was established in Luton. Thus Luton and its 
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Kashmiri settlers were placed firmly on the "liberation map". The establishment of the JKLF signifies the emergence of political identity as a priority for Kashmiris. As Mr E commented: "There was no where else for us to go, no one was listening and our young brothers were being killed so the JKLF came at the right time for me". One of the problems of organisations like the JKLF that function globally is the contesting of authority within the organisation, which leads to factionalism. 48 This has been one of the problems for the JKLF. There have been several defections, the reasons behind which vary depending on who one is interviewing. The three most often recounted defections have been: firstly in 1 995 when Yasin Malik, the President of the JKLF in Indian Occupied Kashmir, was removed from office for ignoring Amanullah Khan's  authority. He then organised a splinter group. The second defection was by the JKLF "top brass" Raja Muzaffar, the ex Senior Vice Chairman and Dr Farooq Haider who allegedly wanted to move away from the armed side of the struggle and focus on a diplomatic agenda. Arguably the most serious split in the organisation occurred in 1992. Leading upto the 1992 elections there were increasing questions around the JKLF leadership and questions of organisation funding ( at this time the JKLF was linked to the Pakistani ISI - Inter Services Intelligence - so there were particular questions about wh�re weapons for the armed struggle were coming from). The elections provided an opportunity for change within the organisation. However there were accusations of unfair practices when 30% of the quota was allotted to 
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450 people while the full membership of the JKLF runs in excess of 
approximately 12,500. The majority of individuals elected were seen to be pro­
Amanullah Khan. This event was used to further question Mr Khan's authority at 
which time he dissolved the JKLF. Some individuals accepted this whilst other 
regarded it as unconstitutional. The current situation is that there are two 
organisations calling themselves the JKLF, one under the leadership of 
Amanullah Khan based in Azad Kashmir and the other under the leadership of 
Yunas Choudhry based in Accrington. To differentiate between the two one is 
commonly referred to as the Amanullah group and the other as the Yunus group. 
As well as liberation organisations there are also some NGOs operating in 
Britain. The UK based World Kashmir Freedom Movement headed by Ayub 
Thukar, The Jammu Kashmir Council for Human Rights headed by Syed Nazir 
Gilani, the Kashmir Welfare Association (Kashmir Relief Fund) which is 
patronised by Lord Avebury, who is the head of the Human Rights Group in the 
British Parliament, the Tehreek-e-Kashmir, the Kashmir Council for Human 
Rights and Kashmir Watch are all sympathetic to the violation of human rights in 
Kashmir.49 
Kashmiri welfare organisations have also played important roles. These have 
spread in Britain in response to the settlement of communities. Their function has 
been primarily welfare. They have, however spread "Kashmyriat" without being 
overtly political (in the sense that they are not directly linked to the idea of an 
Independent Kashmiri State) through assembling social identities. In Luton one 293 
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of the more "visible" organisations is the Pakistani/Kashmir Welfare Association. 
50 Recently, local residents have established organisations like Kidmat. Mr I pointed out that, "when we were first here everything was about how to find work, get somewhere to live, look after our children' s  problems at schools. Now we can tum to freeing our country". This suggests a priority in emerging political identity as organisations established in the early years of migration predominantly to serve a welfare type role become more politicised. 5 1  There has also been a proliferation of publicity organisations within Kashmir, which take on the role of making the Kashmir Issue visible through overtly political Eid cards and other material such as pamphlets. These organisations are not necessarily affiliated to liberation organisations, which have their own publicity corps but do at times work in association with them. The Kashmir International Friendship is one of these organisations. It is based in Mirpur and is responsible for the publication of the Eid cards shown overleaf in Plate 9.i1. Plate 9.2 shows the cover of a photo album purchased in Mirpur during a visit to a photography shop. These albums were also circulating in Kotli. The owner of the photograph booth in Kotli was the brother of a restaurant owner in Luton who mentioned that "this sort of thing was of contribution to the struggle" In frequent visits back and forth from Azad Kashmir and Britain this sort of national publicity also circulates. Eid cards are sent celebrating the end of 
Ramadan but with political messages such as "Freedom Now" and "The day of 
Independence will be the day of Eid for Kashmiris". Other organisations such as 
the Kashmir Record and Research Cell in Mirpur take on a more research 
orientated role. Many of the co-ordinators of the organisation are members of the 
JKLF. In this sense it is difficult to separate Kashmiris from the freedom 
stmggle. 
Plate 9. 1 - The Urdu writing says: "On this side ofKashmir is sadness and on the 
other side of Kashmir is barbarianism". 
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A picture of Maqbool Butt, similar to the one found in many Kashmiri homes. 
The Urdu writing says: "I swear to Allah you are free in Allah's court" On the 
left of the picture the Urdu writing says: "My work in Kashmir against evil 
forces, poverty and imperialism is seen by the world powers as treason". 
296 
The Urdu writing says: "With the blessing of Allah freedom is near". 
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The Urdu writing says: "When we stood out with the flag, we knew we would be 
martyrs. From that time to now the enemy is living in fear of execution". 
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Plate 2- The Cover of a photograph Album. The Urdu writing says: "My 
motherland one day I will be in your heaven". 
- OCCASION ___________ _ 
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Plate 3 - Kashmiri women at a political rally in Bedford calling for attention to the 
injustices in Indian Occupied Kashmir. 
The central roundabout in Kotli town, is also an everyday reminder of Indian 
occupation. It is built to symbolise a mountain and on it is pictured an armed 
soldier above whom the writing reads " Indians out". Another reminder is the 
extensive graffiti calling for liberation, the drawings of Maqbool Butt and the 
liberation organisation initials as well as slogans. 
Since the 1970s these political parties, liberation organisations and to a lesser 
extent welfare organisations have been tapping into people' s  emerging political 
awareness. Members of the community have been recruited through the tools of 
nation building. This can be best seen at the community level with a closer look 
at the discourses and symbols of nation building. 
4. Community 
"Kashmiriyat" has been constructed by intellectuals, the state apparatus and 
organisations through political action, which relies heavily on representation of 
what it is to be Kashmiri. Hall points out that, "We only know what it is to be 
English because of the way that Englishness has come to be represented as a set 
of meanings -a system of cultural representation". 52 In the same way Kashmiris 
only know what it is to be Kashmiri because of the way in which Kashmiriness 
has come to be represented by a set of meanings. 
For Kashmiris these meanings defend the discourse of Kashmiris as a national 
community and the symbolic power of the sense of identity and allegiance that 
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this generates is strong. 53 "Through this discourse they "rediscover" collective 
memories, transform popular oral traditions and languages into written ones, and 
portray a 'national golden age' in the far mythical or historical past whose 
reconstruction becomes the basis for nationalist aspirations". 54 
Community mobilisation around "Kashmiriyat" in Britain is closely linked to 
events in the subcontinent. Kashmiri community involvement takes several 
forms. The first activity is to maintain strong links with "home" through which 
"Kashmiriyat" is maintained. As discussed above the biraderi plays a significant 
role in this. "Political activity is particularly concentrated on the influencing of 
political processes in Kashmir primarily for the benefit of the biraderi in village 
of origin. There is evidence that this activity in the United Kingdom has a direct 
impact on the membership and conduct of Azad Kashmir Legislative assembly. 
Increasingly leading political figures from Azad Kashmir visit the United 
Kingdom to maintain their influence within the British based Kashmiri 
community. "55 
The first activity of maintaining their link to Kashmir is through the circulation 
of liberation material such as the Eid cards discussed above as well as phone calls 
and letters. All have the effect of keeping Kashmiri settlers informed. 
Secondly, the utilisation of community/welfare organisations maintains the 
social side of "Kashmiriyat", for example, the organisation of Eid festivals, or 
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celebrations of Muslim holy days such as the Birthday of the Prophet 
Mohammed (SAW). All have the effect of bringing Kashmiris together. 
Although not national occasions they provide the forum for the expression of 
"Kashmiriyrat" through articulation of a distinct collective identity which is 
made visible to members of the Kashmiri community and non-Kashmiris. These 
events bring Kashmiris together, which provides the opportunity for them to 
engage in discussion around issues of "Kashmiriness". 
The social side of "Kashmiriyat" is particularly important for women who 
generally do not attend political meetings. Women are central to the production 
and reproduction of nationalism, as they are the biological reproducers of the 
next generation. Also our early experiences of childhood influence our 
subjectivity and it is mothers who influence this stage of life, therefore women 
are vital teachers of social and political ideological structures and in this sense 
they are reproducing state ideology. In Luton women may gather for birthdays or 
weddings but they are promoters of Kashmiriness through various mediums. The 
following narrative points to the importance of cooking and clothes. Ms T said, 
"well I suppose you can tell we are Kashmiri from the way we conduct ourselves. 
I will make sure I cook things that are Kashmiri - cook with yoghurt and stuff 
like that, so that at least I can keep telling my kids this is Kashmiri. Sometimes 
the clothes I wear feel more Kashmiri than other times but you can tell the older 
ladies are definitely Kashmiri from the way they wear their dupatas". 
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This is not of course to say that women are not involved in "Kashmiriyat" outside 
of the home. Plate 9.3 shows a photograph from a political rally in April 1996 in 
Bedford where women were participants in voicing demands for peace in 
Kashmir. The political objectification of women and symbolism as daughters, 
mothers, wives has come to represent the honour of the Kashmiri nation but in 
Azad Kashmir and Britain they remain marginal in the struggle. Sabrina Sultana, 
the leader of the women's wing of the JKLF based in Mirpur, Azad Kashmir 
pointed out that the problem was that many families would not allow their 
daughters to take a public role in the struggle. She suggested that in many cases 
culture and Islam were used as an excuse for non-participation. Stories of 
violations by Indian armed forces against women's honour in Occupied Kashmir 
are currently one of the prominent nation-building tools and legitimisers of the 
Kashmiri freedom struggle amongst Kashmiris. 
Thirdly, through the support and membership of political parties and liberation 
organisations which arrange meetings and raise general community awareness 
around the liberation of Kashmir. Through these organisations, and particularly 
the JKLF in Luton, Kashmiri settlers have been involved in a number of 
activities, which have promoted "Kashmiriyat". Some these are discussed below. 
As mentioned aboye, the JKLF emerged in reaction to the interrogation of 
members of the National Liberation Front and the Plebiscite Front in relation to 
the Ganga Plane hijacking. It emerged most strongly, however, during the events 
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leading up to the execution of Maqbool Butt. For Kashmiris his execution is 
regarded unlawful and as one Kashmiri now living in Oldham pointed out 
"ignited a sense of who I should be". 
For Kashmiris in Britain Butt's execution was significant not only because of his 
position in the struggle but because of the reaction from Kashmiri settlers. In 
1966 Butt had been arrested and sentenced to death for killing an officer of the 
Indian Intelligence (who was actually killed by his colleague Aurangzeb who 
was himself killed later at the hands of the Indian Army). In December 1968 Butt 
escaped from prison to Azad Kashmir but on his return to Occupied Kashmir was 
arrested and taken to a top security prison in Tihar, New Delhi where his death 
sentence was renewed. Butt remained in prison until 1984. The injustice of his 
sentence enthralled some JKLF Kashmiri youth in Britain (some of whom were 
from Luton) whose response was to form the Kashmir Liberation Army (KLA). 
They kidnapped the Indian Deputy High Commissioner in Birmingham, the 
ransom being the release of Butt who was rumoured to have been executed. 56 
When Butt was not released the Indian Deputy High Commissioner was killed. In 
retaliation the Indians hanged Butt.57 Events surrounding his death led to 
demonstrations in areas of high Kashmiri settlement such as Bradford, 
Birmingham and Luton and raised the Kashmir issue onto the political agenda. 
One of the largest _protests took place outside India House in London on 10 
February 1984. It was in this highly charged atmosphere that Kashmiri 306 
intellectuals through their organisations were able to advance the idea of 
"Kashmiriyat". 
Liberation organisations like the JKLF were also instrumental in organising 
demonstrations at the time of the Hazratbal Siege and the burning of the Charare 
Sharif Shrine. The Hazratbal shrine was taken on 24 March 1996 by Indian 
troops as a combined meeting of the high command of the political and military 
wings of the JKLF was about to be held in the premises. The Indian troops 
opened fire and killed some of the JKLF commanders when the Shrine 
administration had been given assurances of safety. These events provoked 
public demonstrations at the Indian High Commission in London as well as 
marches and rallies in Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square. 
The JKLF have also organised events involving Kashmiris from Britain 
travelling to Azad Kashmir to take part in the 1992 border crossing. The JKLF 
leadership felt that the Kashmir issue was not getting enough attention. There 
was also a misconception by Kashmiris in Indian Occupied Kashmir that 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir were not doing enough to support their struggles. At 
a conference held in Islamabad in 1991 Amanullah Khan announced that JKLF 
members would cross the cease-fire line on 11 February 1992, the 8th anniversary 
of Maqbool Butt's martyrdom. 58 As the 30,000 Kashmiris, some of whom were 
from Britain, crossed the cease-fire line at Chakothi the Pakistani security forces 
opened fire and approximately fifty people were injured. In total seven lives were 
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lost. The significance of this event is not just that some of the protestors were from Britain but also that it was the Pakistani troops who opened fire killing Kashmiris. The attempted crossing had several important outcomes: it fulfilled its aim of making people in Occupied Kashmir aware that people in Azad Kashmir and indeed the Kashmiri community abroad were interested in their plight. It heightened the feeling that "the Pakistanis are just as bad as the Indians" throughout the Kashmiri community. The matter was taken up to the UN Security Council. It also helped to raise world wide publicity for liberation as a possible solution to the Kashmir problem. "It was after this event that Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan, in answer to a question from BBC correspondent Liz Ducet in an interview in Tehran on 18 February, 1992 conceded to Kashmiris the right to self-determination. 59 Two subsequent attempts to cross the cease-fire line were made on 30 March 1992 and on 2 and 4 October 1992.60 Organised Kashmiri activity also involves the lobbying of the British Parliament. On International Human Rights day on December 10 1991 they organised a mass lobby in London. Kashmiris in Britain have also reacted to the actions of British politicians. Ellis and Khan point out that: In 1994 Douglas Hurd, the then Foreign Secretary, said in a pressconference in Islamabad that the UN resolutions were no longeruseful in re�olving the Kashmir problem. There was uproar in Pakistan but in particular in the United Kingdom amongst the Pakistani/Kashmiri community. The Gulf war was invoked in questioning why UN resolutions should be the basis of actions over Kuwait but not over Kashmir. It raised the whole issue of 308 
'equality' of different UN resolutions. In August 1995, Robin Cook, found himself at the centre of a serious controversy over his speech to Brent Indian Councillors in which he stated 'the position of the Labour Party is that Kashmir is part of the Indian State' .  This provoked very strong reactions to the media in the United Kingdom by Pakistanis and Kashmiris as well as by the Pakistani media. One of the outcomes of the lobbying is that members of the British Parliament have an all party Kashmiri Parliamentary Group, which tries to influence British Foreign and European Parliament policy over the Kashmir issue.61  Kashmiri nationalism has emerged within the United Kingdom in the 1970s. Contextual changes have enabled the Kashmiris to construct a Kashmiri identity as "settler communities" away from their homeland. For the older generation Kashmiris, Britain has been an "emotional location" which is also an emotional dislocation given the situation of a divided Kashmir62 . Mrs K pointed out that, "My heart is still over there. I have been here for many years now but some of my family is over there and I worry. I am afraid for them"63 Mr F also commented that, "it's bad enough that we are seen as Pakistani but then no one understanding (sic) and taking notice of what goes on over there". For Kashmiris born and brought up in Britain the motivation appears to be the human rights violations. These activities have the effect of consolidating a Kashmiri identity and help alleviate some of the problems of negotiating Kashmiriness with other multiple identities such as a Muslim identity, Pakistani identity, Asian identity and a 309 
British identity. This means that "Kashmyriat" no longer exists just at an abstract level in the minds of the intellectuals and is validated ( despite the fact that the Kashmiri nation-state and a political entity does not exist) at the everyday level where Kashmiri is included in the fabric of the society. The visibility of "Kashmiriyat" through its inclusion in shop names, calls for renaming of streets and inclusion ofiKashmiri as an ethnic group on Equal Opportunity forms has the effect of creating a virtual nation state.64 
IV. CONCLUSION The spread of "Kashmiriyat" has been highly significant in developing among Kashmiri people their sense of "Kashmiriness". This notions of "Kashmiriyat" has relied on a number of factors to emerge and it has spread along a number for circuits which have been part of the Kashmiri migrations system. On the one hand it is the process by which the Kashmiri settlers have been given a strong sense of identity but at the same time "Kashmiriyat" has been dependant on the various ensemble of institutions and practices by which Kashmiris have lived there lives. This chapter has shown that traditional theories of nationalism with their focus on either primordialism or instrumentalist approaches fall short of explaining the complexities of K�shmiri nationalism in Britain. Individuals may display emotional dependence on their ethnic identity whilst simultaneously manipulating certain contexts in which they find themselves. 
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This manipulation may often take the form of primodialist claims or 
instrumentalist calculation. The fact that bot primodialist and instrumentalist 
options are available suggests the constructed nature of nationhood including that 
of the Kashmiris. Any claims that are made by individuals will of course depend 
on specific life experiences and the willingness of groups to recognise these 
claims. It is this recognition of the Kashmiri claim that it is a national community 
that is particularly significant. As discussed above, some local councils in 
Britain have recognised the Kashmiris as an ethnic group. The project of 
"Kashmiriyat", will no doubt continue until all groups at the local, national and 
international level recognise its existence and salience. During this process the 
components of "Kashmiriyat" highlighted above will change in response to 
community and individual experiences and the willingness of others to accept its 
existence. The concept of enculturation provides a useful anchor for 
"Kashmiriyat" allowing for both the primordialist and instrumentalist nature of 
"Kashmiriyat" to be understood. 
In the last three chapters I have looked at the "before" and "after" picture of 
Kashmiriness. In the next chapter I will corroborate these impressionistic 
accounts with statistical evidence gathered in Luton. The aim as outlined at the 
beginning of this study, to provide an inter-disciplinary approach, which matched 
qualitative and qua!).titative methodologies, will be realised in the following 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER TEN: BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES OF KASHMIRIS IN 
LUTON 
I. INTRODUCTION This chapter presents biographical data for the selected sample and analysis. Information was collected using the biographical questionnaire. The intention here is to give some indication of the sample characteristics to help develop an overall picture of the individuals selected for the study. This chapter focuses on four main features of the Kashmiri sample: its migration characteristics, its educational and employment profile, its household size and structure, and resideJlltial patterns, to highlight the degree to which the respondents were integrated into the Kashmiri community. I illustrate my discussion of these features by presenting the findings of the biographical questionnaire. The purpose of this chapter is to present an overall profile of the Kashmiris I interviewed in an attempt to bring them into the discussions outlined in the preceding chapters and as a background to the ISA results and discussion in chapters eleven and twelve. 
II. FREQUENCY ANALYSIS Analysis of the biographical data was undertaken by looking at the basic features of single variables of the sample. The variables had been coded from the outset to reduce time spent a� the data analysis stage. Data was entered using a number of SPSS data entry guides. 1 The intention was to identify the frequency distributions over a range of different values, which would allow the investigation of the 
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composition of the sample and to identify how many cases have any value for the variable in question. The SPSS frequency procedure displayed a series of tables, some of which have been regrouped here for consistency in presentation. The responses are presented descriptively below and the corresponding tables of results can be found in the appendices. 
A. Basic Sample Characteristics Seventy Kashmiri respondents completed the questionnaire, twenty-nine males, and forty-one females. The age of respondents ranged from sixteen to seventy with the highest number falling in the twenty-one to twenty-five and thirty-six to forty brackets. Twenty-three respondents were single, forty-six were married and one respondent was divorced. The majority (83%) of respondents currently have British citizenship and only 7% have dual nationality. The remaining individuals have elected to maintain a Pakistani nationality. 
B. Migration Characteristics 43% of respondents arrived between 1961 and 1980. Migration between 1961-1970 may have been influenced by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962. Responses to open questions suggest that Kashmiris arriving in Luton during these periods were also influenced by the Kashmiris settled in Luton as they arranged work permits for relatives and friends and sponsoring them to come to the United Kingdom - the kin relationship explained previously. This point is further supported by responses given to questions twenty-eight and twenty nine. 316 
The majority of individuals (53%) who migrated were sponsored. For the 
majority of migrants their sponsor was a relative or someone from the same 
village/town, which supports the earlier discussion of chain migration. Further 
support for the chain migration process can be ascertained from question twenty­
seven which asked about motivations and influences for migration to the United 
Kingdom. Male individuals referenced grandfathers, fathers and uncles as 
primary motivators whilst women mentioned parents and husbands. However 
only 15% of individuals stated that employment had been arranged for them on 
arrival. In accordance with the migration literature discussed earlier 44% of 
individuals were unmarried on arrival to the United Kingdom. 
From the data it appears that the second Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968 
may have contributed to Kashmiri immigration to Luton. Levels of migration 
between 1971-1981 were higher than the previous decade. Discussion suggested 
that this might have been due to a rush to beat the restrictions imposed by the 
Immigration Acts. Although the Act necessitated the need for a certificate before 
one could arrive here and often led to long periods of waiting, this factor does not 
appear to have reduced migration to Luton. One community leader commented: 
"I remember many of our men turning up on my door step with forms to fill 
because they thought this was the last time they would have to call over their 
wives." A romantic impression of the influx of women into Luton after the 
second Commonwealth Immigrants Act was given by Mr F who commented: "To 
me it felt like all of a sudden there was lots of colour." Question twenty-two 
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showed that 63% of individuals interviewed for the research identified 
themselves as being born in Azad Kashmir, 29% in the United Kingdom and 8% 
identified their country of birth as Pakistan. 
Questions twenty-four and twenty-five were further attempts to identify patterns 
of chain migration. Results illustrated in indicate that emigration to Luton 
occurred from specific areas. 67% of migrants were born in Azad Kashmir. 
Emigration was highest from Kotli ( 4 7%) and from villages around Kotli such as 
Roli ( 10%) and Narr (7%). The interesting point here is that results again 
highlight the significance of chain migration and illustrate its significance for the 
consequent town by town settlement patterns. 
The reasons for movmg to the United Kingdom were not always mutually 
exclusive, although joining the family figured highest among the reasons for 
moving. This reflects the high percentage of females in the sample. Migration for 
economic reasons was also emphasised. More particularly, subsequent discussion 
and comments highlighted the importance of economic factors. One individual 
stated, "I was coming here to Luton to be with my family. You see at the time I 
was too young to make decisions for myself, but you see I understood that I was 
coming to work so that my sisters back home could get decent husbands and good 
dowries." 
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For those individuals migrating to join family there also appears to have been an 
economic incentive. As Mrs K told me: 
When I came here I thought I was going to live a good . life. 
Everyone told me that England would be very good and that I was 
lucky to have a husband who was here. When I came there was a 
sewing machine ready for me. I couldn't sew but I had to learn fast 
because I was expected to help improve my husband's family
position back home. I've been doing it for the last twenty years. 
Therefore we can assume that for most migrants there was an economic incentive 
to migration. What does not appear in the are conversations with community 
elders who stated the partition of India and Pakistan was a cause of early 
migration and subsequently the unsettled conditions in Kashmir were an incentive 
to migrate. These individuals, however, were in the1 minority. Along these lines 
one community elder said: 
Look who would want to stay somewhere that had so many bad 
memories. First there was all the killing during the partition and 
then there was all the mess in Kashmir. I had so many members of 
my family dead that I just wanted to get out of that place. I know 
it's my home but at that time I had to come. 
As I have mentioned previously, early writings on the South Asian diaspora 
comment on the non-return of migrants to countries of origin once settlement has 
occurred, contrary to their early intentions.2 However there is little available 
literature on more recent patterns, perceptions and the structure of return 
migration. Questions thirty-two, thirty-three and thirty-four were asked in order 
to obtain some indication about these phenomena for Kashmiris in Luton. 7 1  % of 
the total sample have no intention of making a permanent move back to Azad 
Kashmir. This number was higher than initially anticipated and appears to be 
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consistent with the literature discussed. Based on open interviews, however, one 
can speculate that the percentage of the older generation wishing to return to 
Azad Kashmir would be higher than for their offspring. As Mr M commented: "I 
would go back today if I could but it's not the right time yet. I have to have more 
money to live a good life there." Mrs D said: "I will go back I dream every day of 
being with all my family again and in the open but you know I have to marry 
children first and then I will think it over. It will probably be too late by then." 
23% of individuals stated there were intentions of making a permanent move 
back to Azad Kashmir. Mr S summed up much of the sentiment when he pointed 
out that : "How can I go back when all my children are here? There are relatives 
over there and I have lots over there but my children are here and a man needs his 
children to be looked after in old age. No matter how close the relatives they 
never will do this." A younger respondent Ms G said: "I could never live there. I 
mean I love the place and all of that but you know it's so different and this is my 
home." 
From responses to questions thirty-three and thirty-four it was clear that there 
were two types of individuals moving back to Azad Kashmir. The first were older 
members of the family who were nearing retirement age. The second were young 
men and women w�o had married partners based in Azad Kashmir and who 
subsequent to marriage were unable to obtain a visa. The only option remaining 
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for the British based female was to join the husband in Azad Kashmir. Indications 
of both these situations are summarised below: 
Mr H stated that: "I just want an easy life now. I'm finished with working and I 
want to feel the sun on my face and smell home. I'm an old man now and I need 
to be with my brothers and sisters now that I have done all that I can for my 
children." Mrs M said: "You can never understand what that place means to me. I 
have never belonged here and now I'm going back. I have a daughter married 
there to my nephew and it's her tum to have a bit of me." Mr K commented: "I 
want to be buried on Muslim ground and in my home soil, this is my last prayer 
to Allah." Recently married, Mrs N told me: "I've been trying to get a visa for my 
husband for the last God knows how long and now I'm having a baby so I have 
no choice. I have to go back I suppose 'cause what else can I do. It's a mess cause 
I don't know if I can take that place." 
C. Education and Employment Patterns 
Questions on education and employment were asked to identify the socio­
economic status of the sample. Question seven asked the respondents to identify 
their qualifications. The qualifications of the sample ranged from the Pakistani 
matric through to the Pakistani degree. The English equivalent of O Levels and 
BTECs were menti�:med. There were some respondents with HNDs. 39% of 
individuals received basic FE education in Kashmir whilst 47% received this in 
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the United Kingdom. 11 % of individuals interviewed had not received any further 
education. 
It is important to note that comments in recorded interviews indicated differences 
in perceptions of education. Those individuals who indicated that they had no 
basic education pointed out that education in their village during their childhood 
was not as structured as is currently the case. They pointed out that they received 
religious, moral and basic matrical (GCSE) education from grandparents and 
parents. This type of instruction was irregular and took place in the home. They 
further pointed out that this was not because structured education did not exist, 
indeed it did, centring particularly around the village Imam and Mosque, but 
rather that they were needed at home. Individuals reporting this were 
characteristically the older female members of the family, who were required to 
look after younger siblings. Mrs S summarised this when she said: 
What education could my mother and father give me? I had to take 
care of my brothers and sisters and also my grandparents. When it 
was the time that my brothers and sisters were OK to help
themselves a little my father went away and my grandmother got 
ill. I can tell you my life itself has been education, what could they 
have taught me at school? 
13% of individuals received higher education in Kashmir and 27% in the United 
Kingdom. The majority (60%) had not received any higher education 
Question ten requested respondents to identify their employment status in their 
country of origin before coming to the United Kingdom. 20% of individuals 
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were employed, 1 2% were unemployed, 44% were not seeking employment, 8% 
were students and 4 declined a response. Question eleven asked individuals what 
their occupation was in their country of origin. Of the 20% employed 40% were 
self employed and worked on their own subsistence plots of land, 20% were local 
bus drivers, 10% were teachers, 1 0% religious instructors in the local village 
Mosque, 1 0% factory workers and 10% mechanics respectively. The percentage 
of respondents employed increased on first arriving in the United Kingdom. 30% 
of individuals were employed on first arriving. Consequently unemployment 
dropped to 6%. Individuals not seeking employment remained around the same 
level, 44% versus 46%. 16% of the sample were students and 8% declined a 
response. For those individuals who found work on arriving to the United 
Kingdom employment centred predominantly on factory work of different types. 
At the time of the interview 30% of respondents were employed, 1 7% 
unemployed, 31 % not seeking employment and 21 % students. This data is 
consistent with regional averages for economically active individuals - those 
employed or actively seeking employment. 3 The regional average for Pakistani 
males is 73%, for females 21% and the total is 52%. The issue of unemployment 
proved a little sensitive. Respondents looked upon the questions with suspicion 
and in many cases responses had to be coaxed. Often the aims of the project were 
re-emphasised to regain confidence. Where information was forthcoming the high 
rates of unemployment were mentioned. Discussion often centred on issues of 
discrimination, particularly for the younger generation. It is not being suggested 
that discrimination does not have a bearing on the statistics, certainly this is not 
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being excluded. However it is possible that discrimination itself may not be the 
underlying factor. The level of education of Kashmiris is one other reason, 
especially since the last ten to twenty years has seen a dramatic increase in the 
need for some sort of qualification or skill to be able to hold employment. This is 
particularly significant in the current economic climate, which has seen a 
wholesale decline in manual jobs. Mr F, a respected community leader, 
commented: "Look there's no need just saying that it's because we are the wrong 
colour for this country, we had jobs when there were jobs that we were good for. 
The thing is that our people just haven't got the skills that are needed now and 
don't want to get them." The opposite view was put forward by Ms H: "I'm a 
solicitor and I work with these people, and I can tell you with certainty that they 
don't want us to succeed. You see, I expect you know, that they see us as a real 
threat, after all ifwe get the jobs where will their young folk go?" 
The occupations of respondents who were employed varied considerably. To the 
nearest rounded figure, 40% were factory workers, 10% solicitors, 20% teachers 
and 10% dentists. It is important to note that it was the younger generation 
respondents who fell within the professional skilled category. 
D. Household Size and Structure 
As I discussed in ch�pter seven, there is a tendency for immigrant populations to 
settle in the central area and subsequently progress outwards to the suburbs. The 
intention of this group of questions was to assess the level of residential stability 
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of the Kashmiri community in the Bury Park area and to ascertain the extent to 
which the Kashmiri community settlement patterns are an indication of 
assimilation or lack of assimilation. Early literature on migration and settlement 
has addressed some of the issues of concern to the older generation. However, the 
literature does not sufficiently address the perceptions and choices of the younger 
generation who have been born and brought up in the United Kingdom. Earlier 
discussion and the results presented above suggest that the younger generation 
Kashmiris are the most upwardly mobile within their community. Investigation of 
settlement patterns and settlement choices can be used as an empirical measure 
and indication of levels of community involvement, maintenance of identity and 
assimilation into majority society. 
Question thirty-six asked respondents if their current home was their first in this 
country. For 46% of individuals their current home is their first in this country 
but 54% have moved at least once. This shows that residential mobility is taking 
place within the Kashmiri community in Luton. Research show that owner 
occupation is prevalent amongst the Kashmiri households (question thirty-five). 
Only 6% were tenants, indicating a sense of permanence. Housing tenure has also 
changed over time. Home ownership reflects a spectrum of housing tenure 
suggesting that some change in housing tenure has taken place within the 
Kashmiri sample int_erviewed. We can see that 23% of individuals are now sole 
owners of their property, compared with only 17% previously. Joint ownership 
(husband and wife) is also on the increase which is perhaps an indication of 
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greater "Westernisation" of ownership attitudes amongst the sample. What is 
interesting is the high percentage of individuals living with parents and in-laws, 
26% now compared with 16%. The latter figure was lower than initially expected 
which suggests that perhaps patterns of extended family are changing. This point 
was supported by interview data when Mr S pointed out that: 
I would love to have my son and his family live with me but the 
problem is that there just isn't any space in this house. If I was in 
Kashmir I would have bought a plot next to my house and built 
him a house or just extended my house so that we could live 
together. In this country it is impossible to go on living together. 
Mr M said: "There is no longer any space for all of us here so I thought the best 
thing was to look for a house close to us. "Mrs L commented: "Daughters-in-law 
don't want to live with us anymore. They argue and just living together in small 
spaces causes problems and fights so they just take off with our sons. At least 
they like to live close and that's something I suppose. In our time we just didn't 
have any choice." 
Question thirty-eight asked about the location of individuals' previous houses. 
Their responses showed that the majority of individuals who moved did so within 
the "Bury Park" area. Often individuals named roads only a few minutes away 
from their current residence. Question thirty:-nine asked respondents for the 
primary reasons for moving house. The results show that individuals moved 
because of insuffici�nt space to cater for their needs in their previous homes. 
These results are consistent with the behavioural models developed by Abu­
Lughod and Foley. 4 They suggested a series of moves within the same area would 
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result during the early stages of the life-cycle to satisfy additional space 
requirements following the extension of family. This pattern of residential 
mobility is supported by the work of Rees and Ram and is supported by 
comments from interview data mentioned above.5 Abu-Lugard and Foley have 
also pointed out that moves to suburban areas would take place once children had 
grown and income levels had been restored following both partners returning to 
work.6 Other motives for moving were redevelopment and in one case, eviction 
and bad neighbours. The priority however was insufficient space. Those few 
individuals who had moved from other towns had done so from towns 
characteristically settled by minority communities and from within community 
areas similar to that of "Bury Park". 
Question forty asked respondents who had moved from outside of Luton why 
they decided to move to Luton. It is worth noting here that due to questionnaire 
design there was an element of duplication with question twenty-six and many of 
the respondents were first time residents in Luton. Thus some of the responses 
given were similar to those given for question twenty-six. Respondents moved to 
Luton for work, to join family and to marry. Those individuals who moved to 
Luton from other towns and cites within the United Kingdom did so primarily for 
economic reasons and to be closer to family already settled in Luton. 
Respondents moved into their present area (question forty-one) overwhelmingly 
to be close to relatives and family, and bought houses using estate agents instead 
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of internal community links. It is interesting to note that approximately a quarter of individuals bought and sold houses between relatives, friends and someone known to the family. Individuals often commented that they bought their house from apna bunda (one of our own men). Contrary to extensive literature highlighting racism and prejudice within the housing market this was not evident in the experiences of the selected sample. 9 1  % of individuals did not experience any difficulties when purchasing a house. Any problems that were experienced (question forty-four) centred on not being able to afford deposits on housing. Financial problems were overcome by borrowing money from members of the 
biraderi without interest. Question forty-six asked respondents about future housing plans. 73% of individuals had no plans to move house. The remaining 27% planned to move house but remain within the Bury Park area (question forty-seven). They choose to remain close to local amenities, and all mentioned closeness to relatives and friends to be very important in their decisions (question forty-eight). Question forty-nine asked who individuals were planning to buy their houses from. The responses were similar to those found for question forty-two described above. Individuals were planning to buy houses from local estate agents and from friends or relatives. Often a family within the biraderi might outgrow their home and a smaller family kno�n to them might want the house, as one community leader explained: "We all know who is selling and who is in need so we can tell each other. It works out a lot cheaper and is safer like this." Ms K said: "OK so there 328 
are big risks because not everything is signed for and things but someone will 
know the person and if they made any bad deals then other people would never 
leave them alone in this place so it is safe I suppose." 
Only 10% of individuals had any plans to move out of Luton, to London, 
Bradford, Birmingham (question fifty-one). The reasons given for moving out of 
Luton ( question fifty-two) centred on better job prospects, being close to relatives 
and in one case for marriage. Of those planning to move whether in Luton or out 
of Luton 90% said that their new area would be near the city centre and only 10% 
said that they would live in a suburb (question fifty-three). All individuals 
planning to move were new and younger families. Households were splitting due 
to lack of space where older members of the family were staying in their house 
whilst the younger members were planning to move to a new house. It is 
interesting to note that although younger families were moving they were on the 
whole choosing to remain within the community area. This is further analysed 
below. Indeed results to question five and question fifty-five show that the 
average Kashmiri household comprised of 6.0 members with an average of 2. 9 
children. 30% of families lived as extended families. 
As previously mentioned housing in the Bury Park area typically comprises 
terraced houses with on average three bedrooms. Household size and limited 
space bring into focus traditional family organisation. In the subcontinent the 
extended family system is prevalent with two or more family units co-existing 
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within the one family enclosure. Question fifty-eight asked if individuals live as 
an extended family. Results showed that only 30% of individuals live as an 
extended family in Luton. This figure is unexpectedly low since so much 
emphasis is placed on the system of extended family within South Asian 
diasporic literature. However the interview data suggests that the form of the 
extended family is changing and thus a new definition of "extended family" 
needs to be ascertained. Since 94% of respondents had relatives living within the 
next few streets and regarded them as being part of their "extended family". 
Comments such as those made by Mr G where common. He pointed out that: 
Yes we live in an extended family but we're not all in the same 
house because it's not big enough . . . but my daughter lives next 
door and my son has just bought a house in the next street. 
Mrs B said: 
I see my daughter every day, she lives here all day, we all eat 
together and do things she only goes home to sleep. We wanted to 
buy the house next door but we didn't have the money then but 
we've got a house in the next street so she's close by. 
The extended family continues to remain strong but appears to be taking a 
different form. Some individuals commented that their extended family lived in 
other parts of Luton and stretched as far afield as other towns in England. 89% of 
respondents had relatives in other parts of Luton. 29% had relatives in the South 
East and 44% had relatives living in other parts of the United Kingdom. These 
figures are supported by comments made by one community leader who said: 
"Are you talking about the Biraderi or the extended family? Well I suppose they 
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are the same. Our extended family does not have to be living in our shoes it is 
still there to help however far it is. " 
Individuals living as an extended family suggested the benefits of this as 
financial, emotional, and economic support (question fifty-nine). From the 
results, expanding families, shortage of space and being close to relatives and 
facilities therefore appear to be significant factors for housing choices for the 
Luton Kashmiris for both generations. The Chi-square test was applied to 
questions forty-five and fifty-five to ascertain the statistical significance of the 
above factors and generational significance in Kashmiri housing choices. Results 
are presented below. 
The existing models of mobility indicate that movement of households would be 
expected to occur outwards from the central segregated area as greater inter­
group mixing takes place over time. The results of this study are not consistent 
with the established models and suggest that despite expanding generations, large 
proportions of intra-area movement has taken place. This pattern in Luton is 
similar to that found by Kearsley and Srivastava in their studies on the Asian 
community in Glasgow.7 They found that many shorter moves, most of which 
involve a short distance of no more than a few streets, seem to represent an 
adjustment within art area of adequate utility in order to optimise accommodation 
rather than location. It can therefore be concluded that there is some mobility of 
33 1 
households within Luton involving invasion, succession and filtering, produced 
by a combination of factors, but movement out of the area is not occurring. 
Research suggests that on the whole there appears to be a high level of 
satisfaction amongst households in terms of their house and neighbourhood as is 
evidenced by individuals' movement within the area rather than outwards, or in a 
few cases to other similar areas. This high level of satisfaction with the 
individual's existing environment was also found by Boales, McCluskey and Sim 
in their study of Glasgow's ethnic minority. 8 
High levels of satisfaction were also indicated by younger members of the 
Kashmiri community. This was evidenced in interviews when they expressed a 
desire to continue living within the community/biraderi although they will in the 
future no doubt have the financial ability to move out. These sentiments are 
expressed by Mr F who commented: "I'm training to be a solicitor . . .  but there's no 
point moving out of the area because Islam says you should use your education to 
help your own people and my people all live here not on New Bedford Road." Ms 
L said: "I could never move away from my parents and my parents would never 
move from here because they know everyone here. They have a better social life 
than me so I guess I'll have to stay here and anyway I like all the shops 'cause I 
don't have to go far !O get anything." 
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Not only were most people relatively satisfied but interview data interestingly 
highlights a high proportion of individuals who were living on the periphery of 
this area and in areas such as High Town who actually expressed a desire to move 
back into the "Bury Park" area. This desire for centripetal movement is 
unexpected and contrary to the established models of mobility discussed m 
chapter seven. These individuals referred to problems of moving out of the 
community area and highlighted feelings of non-acceptance from the people in 
the areas in which they are living and feeling cut off from relatives and the rest of 
the biraderi. Park talks of the "marginal man", that is, those immigrants who 
assimilate in the majority population, often losing contact with their "home" 
group without being fully accepted as members of the majority population.9 It 
was to avoid this fate that many of the respondents were reluctant to leave "Bury 
Park" and its environs. 
E. Maintenance of links with Community in Kashmir 
Patterns of settlement and the consequent formation of community and political 
organisation have contributed to the maintenance of social, cultural, political and 
economic ties within the locality but also with Azad Kashmir. The effect of this 
on the migrants here is that there is emotional pressure for the maintenance of 
culture and religion and non-conformation to the white majority culture. 
Community and po�itical organisations provide the facility for maintaining and 
strengthening community and political identity. Identity is also maintained and 
reinforced through the maintenance of links with Azad Kashmir. 
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This set of questions was asked to ascertain the extent of involvement of 
individuals within community and political organisations in Luton with 
individuals in Azad Kashmir. Research suggests that identity is maintained 
through membership of community and political organisations, extended visits 
for education or marriage, permanent visits, short visits, contact with extended 
family and investment in Azad Kashmir. 
36% of respondents said that they were members of a political group. A similar 
number said that they were members of community organisations. These results 
do not suggest high involvement in political or community organisations. 
However, during interviews there was considerable reluctance to answer this 
question. Reasons for not disclosing information are exemplified in comments 
made during and after the interview. One young man said: "You really don't think 
that I can tell you if I'm part of any political organisation do you? It's bad enough 
trying to get a job in this place. If people find out that I am part of this or that 
then that's it. You should know what it's like." Female respondents in particular 
mentioned that these were sensitive areas in the family. Ms B said: 
Well I can tell you that I am part of a community organisation but 
please don't write it down because there is no need for anyone to 
find out at all. I'm not really scared but it's just that my family 
think that other people will talk. You know they think like well 
Auntie will say this and that - that she's always out and about and 
that sort of thing. 
Ms B's sister said: "Look, it's not that they think we shouldn't be joining things or 
anything but it's just that it means that we are out and people will talk. It's OK if 
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they are women's things, that's always OK and if they know it's round someone's 
house or something like that." 
Questions seventeen and twenty asked respondents to name these organisations. 
In most cases respondents were reluctant to name them, particularly the political 
organisations. Organisations that were referenced were the JKLF, Hizb-ul-Tahrir, 
Tablig-1-Jamat and Young British Muslims. Community organisations referenced 
were the Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare Association. There were also several local 
women's organisations. 
Question eighteen and twenty-one asked respondents the purpose of these 
organisations. Responses varied according to the particular organisation. Local 
political and community organisations and their functions have already been 
discussed. Responses to question eighteen and twenty-one reflected these 
functions. Also that records of community and political organisations show high 
levels of membership and involvement. Further, despite low levels of 
involvement indicated by results from the biographical questionnaire, all 
respondents were passionate and enthusiastic about political/territorial questions 
as reflected by responses to the ISA instrument. 
Question sixty aske� respondents if they or anyone in their family had made 
extended visits to Azad Kashmir for education. Results show that only 4% of 
individuals have made extended visits back to Azad Kashmir for educational 
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purposes. This figure was unexpectedly low considering that in interviews many 
individuals referred to members of family or people that they knew were going 
back for extended educational visits. Mr K, a community leader, succinctly 
alluded to this process when he said: "Lots of people especially parents who have 
young daughters send them back to Azad Kashmir because there are better 
influences for their growing up there. If and when they come back they tend to 
have learnt how to respect their elders and tend to be better behaved. I think it is 
very good for the system." 
Individuals said that they sent children back to achieve a better standard of 
education. Here 'standard' was being seen as education in the values and morality 
of their culture which it was felt was lacking in this country. Mrs H pointed out 
that: 
You just have to compare the children here to the children there to 
understand which ones have better respect and care about the izzat 
of their families. Children here these days just don't care and well I 
will send all my daughters back so that they grow up having good 
influences in their lives and so that they don't start acting like 
these white girls going out with boys and doing sex and all that. 
The percentage of individuals returning for marriage was higher. 30% of 
individuals said that they or a member of the household had made extended visits 
back to Azad Kashmir for marriage. It is perhaps important to indicate that the 
question asked about extended visits for marriage rather than simply visits back 
for marriage. This may be one reason for the small percentage. Time constraints 
mean that on the whole individuals are unable to spend long periods of time back 
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in Azad Kashmir. Interviews suggested that shorter visits, often two or three over 
a number of years for marriage, were more common than extended visits. 
Reasons for returning to Azad Kashmir for a marriage partner were extensive and 
varied. Ms D said: "My parents want me to have a husband from back home 
'cause they think that he will be more respectful and look after me better but they 
only see those bad boys on the streets. I don't mind 'cause my husband is OK." 
One concerned parent pointed out that: "It's really important for their future 
children to have at least one parent who knows about our culture. The children 
here have a bit of everything in them and they don't know who they are so how 
will they tell their children about who they should be." Mrs G: said that: I prefer a 
daughter in law from my home because she will look after me better because she 
will be blood and not a gar (foreign)." 
89% of respondents had relatives back in Azad Kashmir and 94% own land in 
Azad Kashmir. Only 27% owned this land before moving to the United Kingdom 
which indicates that most of them have bought the land since moving to the 
United Kingdom. 83% of individuals hold investments in the United Kingdom. 
Discussions during interviews show that 77% of respondents make a trip back to 
Azad Kashmir once every five years usually to monitor investments, to keep in 
close touch with rel�tives or attend weddings and funerals. These results do not 
support the view that international commuting has been reduced as a consequence 
of changing economic climate in the United Kingdom. Interviews suggest that 337 
individuals do not intend to make a permanent move back to their country of 
origin but continue to own land and property there. 
The results suggest that cash remittances continue to be important. 90% of 
respondents indicated that they continue to send money back to relatives in Azad 
Kashmir and only 11 % of respondents expected returns on their "investment" It 
is interesting to note that these returns were not seen as material returns as Mr Y 
pointed out, "I've always sent money back home since I've been in this place. My 
mother is there you see. I don't want anything from her or any of the family but 
know that they respect me for looking after them and one day they will look after 
me inshahallah." Mr T said: "I must send something back to them. It is my farz 
(duty) to do this. The only thing they can give me back is good duwa (prayers)." 
ID. INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF DATA 
The results above have alluded to Kashmiri housing choices. It has been stated 
that limited outward movement is taking place for both the older and younger 
generation. It appears that for the majority of respondents the segregated 
community remains fundamentally important. Since respondents placed a high 
level of importance on being close to relatives, community, Mosques and 
community centres, they choose to remain concentrated within the central area. 
Therefore the research suggests that the desire to live in "Bury Park" area of 
Luton is related to the high value attached to community life and identity for 
older and younger individuals. 
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What is not clear from the results, however, is whether the similarity between 
choices amongst the older and younger generation is statistically significant. To 
identify if this association is statistically significant the inferential statistic of Chi­
Square was employed. This method of statistical analysis was used to look at the 
significance of the relationships between a number of variables for older and 
younger generation Kashmiri respondents in Luton The tables below summarise 
the data showing associations .and significance for questions forty-five and fifty­
five.10 
Table 10.1 Chi-square values for question forty-five 
Variable Calculated 
Chi-Square 
value 
Importance of closeness to own society 
0 .07 
Importance of closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children 3. 58 
Closeness to relatives 1. 96 
Closeness to Asian shops 0.39 
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres 0. 77 
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Table 10. 2 Chi-Square values for question fifty-five 
Variable Calculated 
chi-square 
value 
Importance of closeness to own society 0 .18 
Importance of closeness to schools with Kashmiri/Muslim children 1.31 
Closeness to relatives 1 .  54 
Closeness to Asian shops 0.30 
Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres 2.24 
The null hypothesis tested was that the above factors are important to older and 
younger generation. Table 10 .1 shows that that the chi-square value ( question 
forty-five) is lower than the critical value for Chi-Square at a significance level of 
0.05 which is 3 .84 (see Appendix 10.1 ). Therefore we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that being close to own society, importance of schools with 
Kashmiri/Muslim children being close to relatives, being close to Asian shops 
and being close to services such as Mosques and community centres are 
important to the Kashmiri respondents of both generations. 
The importance of amenities is the focal point of all discussions of models of 
residential mobility with increasing mobility away from the centre of the city 
linked to a proportional decline in the number of services available. As discussed 
earlier Luton Kashmiris are self-sufficient in terms of amenities. This factor 
340 
restricts movement away from the community centre into areas which do not 
offer such services and further forms a fundamental attracting force into the area 
i.e. institutional completeness which is an important factor in restricting 
assimilation. 1 1 
Question fifty-four asked the same questions as question fifty-five but to those 
individuals who were thinking of moving house. The intention was to ascertain if 
they placed a different emphasis on the above factors to those individuals settled 
and not planning to move. The null hypothesis tested was that there is no 
difference between individuals planning to move house and those settled with 
respect to the above mentioned factors. 
Table 10.2 above gives the Chi-Square values. These were lower than the critical 
values for Chi-Square, (which at a significance level of 0.05 is 3.84. See 
Appendix 10.2) for all the variables. Therefore we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is any difference between respondents wishing to move 
house and those settled in Bury Park area in terms of importance of being close to 
own society. 
Results appear to be consistent with the findings of Kearsely and Srivastava their 
study of the spatial �volution of Glasgow's Asian community. 12 They found that 
the most often quoted factor was the desirability of being in close physical 
proximity to member's of one's own society. In fact 30% quoted this as their main 
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reason for choosing their particular location, while a further I 0% indicated 
closeness to relatives as being important to them. Although their study involved 
the Asian community as a whole this trend of strong preference for a self­
segregated way of life appears to apply to the Kashmiris in Luton. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Results suggest that migration of Kashmiris to Luton reflects the general patterns 
of South Asian patterns of migration to Britain. It also appears that chain 
migration and sponsorship played an important part in the migratory process and 
the role of the biraderi was an important aspect of this. In the early days of 
migration this acted as a support network for the Kashmiris in Luton. The pattern 
of settlement has contributed to the maintenance of social, cultural, political and 
economic ties within the locality. Research suggests that in general Kashmiris 
choose to remain segregated within the "Bury Park" area because of the 
importance they place on being close to own society, appropriate facilities and 
closeness to relatives. Significantly this appears to be the case for the younger 
generation even though some have the potential to move out of the community 
area. Any mobility of households that is taking place occurs within the 
community area. The extended family no longer means living in the same house. 
Since houses are too small to accommodate the expanding generations, families 
are buying houses n�xt door or a few streets away. This has the effect of not only 
continuing the extended family as a form of community organisation but also 
further strengthens the community networks over an increasingly larger and 
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integral geographical area. This is furthered through membership of and 
affiliation with Kashmiri community and political organisations, which provide 
the space for the maintenance of identity. Social, cultural and political ties with 
the subcontinent have also preserved a strong sense of identity. 
Identity is also maintained and reinforced by frequent visits back to Azad 
Kashmir and the choosing of marriage partners from Azad Kashmir. These 
collectively provide the emotional pressure and incentive for the maintenance of 
culture and religion and non-conformation to the white majority culture. The next 
chapter presents a global comparison between Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon 
identity structures. 343 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: KASHMIRI AND ANGLO-SAXON IDENTITY 
COMPARED 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapters I have shown the way in which Kashmiri identity has 
emerged. I have relied on information gathered from interviews to give what can be 
called an impressionist account of how identification with Kashmir and Kashmiris 
manifests itself. I listened to the tales that Kashmiri respondents told about how they 
construct their own identity and how these have influenced the emergence of 
"Kashmiriyat". I have already mentioned the importance of the context in which 
identities have been formed and reformed, whether this has been the immigration 
policies of the British State, political developments within South Asia or social and 
economic structures within Luton itself 
Therefore, here I begin by examining the extent to which the context of the 
Kashmiris is specific to them. This requires two main lines of enquiry: a comparative 
analysis which I carried out with a sample from the Anglo-Saxon group and an 
examination of the core values and beliefs of the samples. The comparative analysis 
will of course be affected by which group is used to compare Kashmiris with. For 
example, the results would be different if I had chosen, for example, the Chinese or 
Indians as the control group. I am aware of the problems of using the Anglo-Saxon 
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group as a category. In doing this however I am keeping within the ISA tradition of 
using Anglo-Saxon as a descriptive category which refers to the white majority 
population. I would point out that the Anglo-Saxon like any other form of collective 
identity is internally divided along lines of religion, class gender etc. 
The reason why I decided on the Anglo-Saxon group is two fold. Firstly they are not 
subject to racism, so that comparing ethnicised minorities with ethnically unmarked 
communities like the Anglo-Saxons allows one to isolate the effects of racism on 
identity. 
Secondly as Anglo-Saxons constitute the majority of the population which is 
politically, economically, socially and culturally dominant many theories assume that 
it will be their values that will in the long term prevail over the members of the 
ethnicised minorities. In other words they will have a slower rate of identity 
transformation than ethnicised minorities because they are so embedded in the 
political, economic, social, and cultural context. Underlying these ideas is the view 
that Anglo-Saxons constitute the mathematical norm and Archimedian point by 
which we can compare other ethnically marked groups. For this reason then in the 
following section I will test my main propositions by using Anglo-Saxons as a 
control group. 
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By comparing structural pressures on constructs (for the Kashmiri instruments see 
Appendix 4.2 and for the Anglo-Saxon instrument see Appendix 4.3) for Kashmiri 
and Anglo-Saxon individuals this section addresses two questions. Firstly, to what 
extent do these evaluative dimensions of Kashmiri identity compare with ideologies 
as represented in Anglo-Saxon evaluative dimensions of identity? Secondly, how do 
different value systems meet in the minds of young Kashmiri people. In other words 
I am asking to what extent pioneer settlers transmit cultural values to their 
descendants. The format I will follow is that I will first present my findings, and then 
discuss some of the main points that arise from the findings. 
In this chapter I want to investigate whether the "impressionistic" accounts 
correspond with notions of identity produced by ISA. My aim is to use ISA to give 
depth to the open interviews I conducted and at the same time to use the interviews 
as ways of enriching the ISA findings. Specifically the objective of this chapter is 
twofold, firstly to present an overall picture for the different value and belief systems 
of the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon sample and secondly to present differences in the 
value and belief systems between younger and older Kashmiri men and women. To 
this end I use the ISA global indices of identity diffusion and self-esteem and the 
particular indices of empathetic identification, contra-identification and identification 
conflicts with specific people to obtain a comparative perspective on Kashmiri and 
Anglo-Saxon identity. 
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II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KASHMIRIS AND ANGLO-SAXONS In this section I use the ISA global indices of current and past identity diffusion and current and past self-evaluation to highlight overall comparisons between the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon samples. Selected target entities are used in conjunction with the ISA indices of empathetic identification and contra-identification to ascertain patterns of intra- and inter-ethnic identification conflicts. By investigating conflicts in identification, different identity states can be conceptualised. Weinreich has used the term identity diffusion to describe the identity state where the individual has conflicted identifications dispersed across several significant others. 1 In conjunction with the ISA indices of self-evaluation it is possible to evaluate the gross variations in identity states. Figure 11. 1  below illustrates that the scale for identity diffusion can range from individuals having high tolerance to low tolerance. Thus any identification conflicts will fall within the high range for individuals with high tolerance and within the low range for individuals with low tolerance. In other words this means that subjects with high levels of identity diffusion will have higher rates of identification conflicts. Weinreich has found that in ordinary cross-sections of most individuals the most usual identity variants are intermediate or confident.2 
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With self-evaluation we can see that individuals have high to negative se1f­
evaluation. On this scale if they have low levels of self-evaluation they perceive 
themselves as lacking the skills to act in accordance with their values and aspirations. 
In this case they are unlikely to be able to resolve all their identification conflicts and 
they also have difficulties in forming clear-cut commitments. People with a 
foreclosed identity state or low levels of tolerance are likely to be more dogmatic and 
make undifferentiated appraisals of their social worlds. They are also likely to 
experience difficulties in responding to complex relationships and changed 
circumstances.3 
A. Divided Selves 
As I have mentioned, there has been a tendency in the literature on ethnic studies to 
pathologise the experiences of ethnically marked people. For example they are seen 
as suffering from cultural schizophrenia and as "stuck between two cultures", the 
assumption being that members of these communities have a great deal of difficulty 
in narrating stories about themselves. In other words they would have high levels of 
conflicts over issues of identification. If this was the case then the Kashmiri sample 
would fall at the diffused identity state of the identity diffusion scale and this would 
be higher than that of the Anglo-Saxon sample. Identity diffusion falls within the 
moderate range for all groups. Analysis of variance found no significant difference 
according to ethnicity, generation or gender. There is no evidence therefore that 
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Kashmiris were more prone to identification conflicts than the control sample. 
Rather, my findings confirm Weinreich's point that individuals usually fall within 
the moderate range and therefore have some conflicts and are resolving others. They 
contradict the very popular notion that members of the ethnicised minorities are 
likely to experience more identification conflicts than the ethnically unmarked 
community. 4 
Figure 11.1 ISA Classification of Identity Variants 
IDENTITY DIFFUSION 
Diffusion variants Foreclosed 
indicating a tolerance variants indicating a 
of high levels of 
identification 
conflicts 
High Moderate Low 
(0.40 tol .00) (0.20 to 0.39) (0.20 to0.39) 
SELF-EVALUATION 
Positive Variant 
High Diffuse high 
self-regard 
Confident Defensive high 
self-regard 
Moderate Diffusion Intermediate Defensive 
Low Crisis Negative Defensive 
negative 
Negative variant 
Source: Weinreich (1992) 
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B. Ethnic Pride 
Identity diffusion is insufficient on its own for assessing individuals' adjustments. 
Using the ISA indices of self-evaluation can assist in a more holistic analytical 
impression. For instance when high self-evaluation is combined with high levels of 
identity diffusion the person concerned is said to be in a state of diffuse high self­
regard. High self-evaluation combined with low levels of identity diffusion is said to 
lead to a state of defensive high self-regard. Neither state is regarded as "well 
adjusted". Consequently, when assessing adjustment it is necessary to consider self­
evaluation along with identity diffusion. 
Current self-evaluation fell within the high range for all groups. Analysis of variance 
revealed no significant difference by ethnicity, generation or gender .  By looking at 
past evaluation we are able to identify changes over time. Past self-evaluation is 
higher for the Kashmiri sample than the older Anglo-Saxon men and women, falling 
within the high range for the older men and older women and within the moderate 
range for the younger men and women. Past self-evaluation fell within the moderate 
range for all Anglo-Saxon groups. Analysis of variance found an interaction effect 
for ethnicity by generation at a significance level of F=25 .4 728 ; df= 1 , 1 0 1 ;  p<O.0001 
and by ethnicity at a significance level of F=3 .658; df=l , lO lp<0.05. There were no 
interaction effect. A decrease in self-evaluation from the past to the present suggests 
that perhaps the older generation Kashmiris have experienced new and unfamiliar 
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encounters through migration. It further suggests that perhaps they are not gaining as 
much as they expected from migration. So far we have seen that in some areas there 
is a specific Kashmiri effect while in others the comparison between Kashmiris and 
Anglo-Saxons reveals no significant difference. 
C. Betwixt and Between Two Cultures 
Writers like Lewis, Anwar and Werbner tend to imply that identification conflicts 
among Britain' s  ethnicised minorities tend to be along inter-ethnic lines. In the case 
of Kashmiris, for example, it would mean that any conflicts that transpire would 
arise out of the Kashmiris trying to adjust to living in Britain, populated by a 
different ethnicity. Further there is a tendency to assume that offspring born and 
brought up in Britain will suffer greater degrees of identification conflicts. This is 
because their family circumstances and their social circumstances outside the family 
(for example, friends and school) may be based on significantly different values and 
customs. 
To investigate these claims it is necessary to turn to the ISA indices for empathetic 
identification, contra-identification and identification conflicts and carry out analysis 
with the selected entities (see below). It is the relationship between these indices 
which indicates the extent of identification conflicts. Identification conflicts occur 
when respondents perceive similarities with the other ( empathetically identifying), 
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whilst simultaneously wishing to dissociate from the other ( contra-identifying) . It 
follows then that if respondents do not empathetically identify with another, there 
can be no conflicts in identification. Similarly, if there is no contra-identification 
with another there can be no conflicts in identification. Three-way analysis of 
variance was carried out to elucidate the patterns of "other" and "own" group 
identification conflicts and to identify interaction effects. As suggested earlier the 
highest levels of identification conflicts are likely to be inter-ethnic. Further it was 
assumed that the younger generation of both samples would have lower levels of 
identification conflicts with the "other" ethnic group. This is because this cohort 
would be the most immersed in the multicultural background of Luton and as such 
this will be the space where most forms of cross ethnic identifications are likely to 
occur. 
Ideas of political separatism were represented by support for the JKLF and Scottish 
devolution. Consciousness of the political situation in Kashmir was investigated 
through identifications with Kashmiris in Kashmir for the Kashmiri sample and for 
the Anglo-Saxon group by awareness of the Kashmir situation. Identification with 
Islam was seen through mosques, identification with social networks through the 
comparable entities of biraderi and family networks for the Kashmiris and the 
Anglo-Saxon sample respectively. Finally representations of Asianess and 
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Englishness were seen through Asian men and women and English men and women Results of these grouping are presented below. 
D. Political Separatism ISA results for mean empathetic identification show that empathetic identification with idea of political separatism (political entities of JKLF and Scottish devolution for the Anglo-Saxon sample) is highest for the Kashmiri respondents. Contra­identification was lowest for the older generation Kashmiri men but higher for the Kashmiri older generation women and younger generation respondents suggesting that although they identify with the idea of separatism there are certain characteristics they wish to dissociate from. Anglo-Saxon respondents had low empathetic identification with ideas of separatism suggesting that in general they do not identify with ideas of separatism. Contra-identification was also low but since it exists suggests that they wish to dissociate from ideas of separatism. Consequently, identification conflicts fall within the very high range for the Kashmiri respondents and within the low range for the Anglo-Saxon respondents. Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference with the main effect of ethnicity for empathetic identification (F=66.2303; df=l ,82; p<0.0001 ), contra-identification (F=l 1 .0344; df=l ,82; p<0.01 )  and identification conflicts (F=39.669 1 ;  df=l ,82; p<0.000 1 ). No interaction effects were revealed. 354 
The JKLF stance for an independent Kashmiri nation state appeals to a large section 
of the Kashmiri community, which suggests that the JKLF' s political discourse has 
played a large part in developing and disseminating ideas of "Kashmiriyat". It was 
found that older male Kashmiris were the strongest supporters of Kashmiri 
nationalism. Women and younger Kashmiris were less strident in their support. This 
may illustrate perhaps the masculinist and patriarchal nature of nationalism in 
general and specifically the Kashmiri nationalism articulated by the JKLF. 5 For 
Anglo-Saxons the lack of support for separatism may suggest their South Eastern 
English location where issues of Scottish devolution seemed at the time of the 
research far removed from the current scenario. 
E. Political Consciousness 
Mean values for the Kashmiris in occupied Kashmir and the Kashmir situation for 
the Anglo-Saxon sample show high levels of empathetic identification and moderate 
levels of contra-identification leading to very high identification conflicts for the 
older generation. Lower levels of empathetic identification but higher values for 
contra-identification suggest a desire to dissociate from the Kashmir situation for the 
younger generation and lead to high identification conflicts. In comparison mean 
values for empathetic identification show low identification with the Kashmiri 
situation for older generation, low contra-identification and low identification 
conflicts for the men and moderate identification conflicts for the women. Younger 
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generation Anglo-Saxon respondents have low empathetic identification, low contra­
identification and low identification conflicts with the Kashmir situation. This 
suggests that for the older generation higher levels of empathetic identification with 
the Kashmiri situation are indicating a desire to dissociate from it more highly than 
the younger generation. Analysis of variance revealed a strong main effect of 
ethnicity for empathetic identification (F=S0. 1865 ; df=l ,99; p<0.0001), contra­
identification (F= lS .736; df=l ,  70 p<0.01) and identification conflicts (F=7. 9859; 
df=l ,  70; p<0.01). Analysis of variance also revealed a main effect of generation for 
empathetic identification at a significance level of F=l2.324; df=l ,99 p<0.01. No 
interaction effects were revealed. 
Given their support for the JKLF it seems strange to report that the older cohort of 
Kashmiris had high levels of contra-identification with the Kashmir situation. This 
however becomes explicable when it is realised that they also have very strong 
empathetic identification. The resulting identification conflicts appear to be of 
distressing proportions and suggest that the helplessness and sense of disappointment 
over the situation in Kashmir. Thus the strong contra-identification may be the 
consequence of frustration rather than any wavering of allegiance to Kashmir or its 
people. For the younger cohort the situation is less complex. Kashmir is far away and 
thus their identification and plight are predictably more muted. 
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It was interesting to note that despite Luton being the centre of Kashmiri activism the 
general public remained blissfully ignorant of the Kashmiri situation. This indicates 
that the discourse of "Kashmiriyat" may have been successful in articulating 
Kashmiri nationalism among Kashmiris but it has largely failed to make the issue of 
Kashmiri nationhood something that transcends Luton's ethnic enclaves. It is the 
case that a number of MPs (including Robin Cook in opposition) have voiced some 
concerns about the Kashmir situation but it is true to say, however, that Kashmiris 
have been unable to persuade the British Government to accept the idea in principle 
of a Kashmiri nation. As previous chapters have shown most political interventions 
on behalf of the Kashmiris tend to take the form of appeals for the ending of human 
rights violations rather than the ending of Kashmir' s occupation, and the satisfaction 
of its demand for self-determination. 
F. Identification with Islam 
Empathetic identification with mosques fell within the low range for all respondents. 
Contra-identification fell within the low range for the Kashmiris and was 
significantly higher for the younger generation. The picture was more complicated 
for the Anglo-Saxon respondents (F=lOS.1715; df=l ,177; p<0.0001) indicating a 
desire to dissociate from mosques. Identification conflicts with Madina Masjid was 
high for the Kashmiri respondents. The pattern for the Anglo-Saxon respondents was 
more complex. The younger generation respondents had higher identification 
conflicts with mosques than the older generation men but all fell within the high 
range. However identification conflicts fell within the very high range for the Anglo­
Saxon older generation women. Analysis of variance revealed a strong main effect of 
ethnicity for empathetic identification (F= 14 . 1686; df= 1, 77 p<0.0001 ), contra­
identification (F=108.1715 ;  df=l ,77; p<0.0001 and identification conflicts 
(F=28.9839; df=l ,77; p<0.0001). The main effect of gender was also found to be 
significant with contra-identification (F=8.9295 ; df=l ,77p<0.0l)  and identification 
conflicts (F=6.562; df=l ,  1,77; p<0.05). No interaction effects were revealed. 
One of the surprising conclusions from these findings is the way in which 
identification with mosques was comparatively low for both Kashmiri and Anglo­
Saxon respondents. Given the recent emphasis on the assertion of Islamic identity in 
Britain at first sight these results would appear to contradict the impressionistic 
accounts of the preceding chapters. The picture however is complicated. On one 
hand mosques represent aspects of Muslimness (which is closely linked to 
Kashmiriness) and on the other Mosques represent the site of political conflicts 
within the community. These political conflicts (for example fundraising, choice of 
Imams, elections of Mosque committees) tend to undermine the status of mosques as 
places of religiosity. This reading is born out by the way in which the older male 
cohort whilst strongly identifying still do not dismiss them since many of them 
would be involved directly or indirectly in Mosque politics. For the younger cohort 
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mosques were more exclusionary because of the political conflicts and since they felt 
that they could not participate in these conflicts. This ambiguous attitude replays a 
larger tension found in most Muslim societies between Islam in its universal form 
and its specific institutional incarnations. So that most Muslim communities have 
both high venerations for Islam and Islamic motifs combined with a folk-lore 
tradition which is often disparaging and sarcastic about Imams and other mainly 
junior Ulema. With the contemporary reassertion of Islamic identity this tension has 
expanded so that with a few notable exceptions Islamists tend to be hostile to most 
members of the Ulema. Some of these tendencies can be seen in response to this 
entity in Luton. The politicisation of Islam often means greater critical evaluation of 
mosques rather than increasing subordination to mosques. 
It was not surprising that Anglo-Saxons did not identify with mosques. After all they 
do not represent their religious institutions. Other reasons however may be at play. 
One explanation for this may be the popular references to Islam (see for example the 
recently published Islamaphobia report). Results found there was a gender effect 
amongst the older cohort with women strongly disassociating. This again would 
confirm the way in which in Luton members of the ethnically unmarked majority 
still continue to perceive Islam as misogynist. The younger generation also 
dissociates from mosques; that may be because they are more secularised. 
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G. Social Networks 
Biraderi has often been fetishized as an attribute peculiar to South Asian settlers. In 
these results I compare identifications with the biraderi for Kashmiris and with 
family networks for Anglo-Saxons to try and determine the role of these networks 
for these respondents. The results found that there was a generation divergence with 
identification with the biraderi with the older cohort falling within the high range. 
Empathetic identification with the biraderi was lower for the younger Kashmiris. 
Contra-identification for older Kashmiris was lower than for the younger cohort. For 
the Anglo-Saxon sample identification conflicts were high. Empathetic identification 
with family networks fell within the low range for the Anglo-Saxon respondents but 
was highest for older generation women. The Anglo-Saxon women perceived more 
similarities with the entity than the male respondents and contra-identification was 
low for all groups. Consequently identification conflicts fell within the moderate 
range. Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference with the main effect of 
ethnicity with empathetic identification (F=57.4881; df=l ,101 p<0.0001), contra­
identification (F=4.2144; df=l ,101; p<0.05) and identification conflicts (F=20.9649; 
df=l ,101; p<0.0001). Significant differences occurred with the main effect of 
generation for empathetic identification (F= l 7.4795, df=l ,101; p<0.001) and contra­
identification (F=6.4079; df=l ,101; p<0.05) and gender for empathetic identification 
(F=0.0315; df=l ,101; p<0.05). Interaction effects were revealed for empathetic 
identification for ethnicity by generation (F=12.3496; df=l ,101; p<0.001) and 
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ethnicity by gender (F=7.0067; df=l,101; p<0.01) and for contra-identification for 
ethnicity by generation (F=IS.1703; df=l ,101; p<0.001). 
These results suggest that the biraderi is more central to older Kashmiris than to the 
younger generation. Although the biraderi is important for younger Kashmiris they 
are more likely to see it as constraining than enabling. It may also point towards the 
fact that other networks such as neighbourhood links and the extended family are 
increasingly replacing biraderi relationships. Overall the results for the Anglo-Saxon 
group suggests that family networks do not feature very highly for Anglo-Saxon 
respondents and that they organise closely around the nuclear family principal. H. Asianness and Englishness 
As I have discussed previously the way in which ethnically marked communities 
have been categorised in Britain has changed radically in the last twenty years. Black 
as a catch all label gave way to Asian as a category. This bipolar scheme itself, some 
would argue, is in the process of breaking down with the introduction of a Muslim 
category. So when it comes to assessing ideas of the Kashmiri community' s 
identification with Asian men and women the results are fairly complex. It has to be 
pointed out from the start that in using the category Asian I had succumbed to the 
charms of this bipolar division of ethnicised minorities in Britain. Therefore I 
assumed that the identification between Kashmiris and Asian would at some point be 
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isomorphic. However my respondents showed me the error of my ways since they 
failed to include themselves unproblematically within the category of Asian. 
Analysis of variance found significant difference for identification with Asian men 
for the index of empathetic identification with ethnicity being at a significance level 
of F=l4. 1429; df=l , 10 1  p<0.00 1 .  Where as expected the Kashmiri men had highest 
identification with Asian men, Anglo-Saxon respondents contra-identification with 
Asian men was high and analysis of variance with the main effect of ethnicity at a 
significant level of F=l3.6821 ;  df=l , 10 1 ;  p<0.00 1 .  Interaction effects existed for 
contra-identification with ethnicity by generation at a significance level of 
F=l0.0572; df=l , 1 0 1 ;  p<0.01 and ethnicity by generation by gender at a small 
significance level of F=S.9321 ;  df= l ,  1 0 1 ;  p<0.05 . Identification with Asian women 
fell within the high range for all Kashmiri respondents. They were lower for the 
Anglo-Saxon sample. Contra-identification was low for the younger Kashmiri men 
and higher for young women and the older cohort and fell within the low range. They 
also fell within the low range for Anglo-Saxon respondents. Analysis of variance for 
identifications with Asian women found significant differences with empathetic 
identification for the main effect of ethnicity (F=B.7389; df=l , 1 0 1 ;  p<0.00 1)  with 
contra-identification (F=15 .60 1 8; df=l , 10 1 ;  p<0.00 1). A small interaction effect was 
revealed with contra-identification for ethnicity by generation (F=S .0270; df=l,  1 0 1 ;  
p<0.05). 
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Similar patterns of own group identifications were revealed for English men and 
women. As expected empathetic identification with English men and women were 
the highest for the Anglo-Saxon sample. This fell in the high range and contra­
identification was low. There were some variations in identification conflicts, which 
fell in the moderate range for men but were higher with women. The story for the 
Kashmiris was more complex. Perceived similarity with English men fell within the 
low range for the Kashmiri respondents but was higher for the younger cohort. 
Identification with women was low for all respondents. Contra-identification fell 
within the high range for English men and was very high for women. Identification 
conflicts with English men and women fell within the high range for older Kashmiris 
but were significantly lower for younger Kashmiris. They fell within the moderate 
range of English women. Contra-identification and low to moderate levels of 
identification suggests that although young Kashmiris do not perceive high levels of 
similarity with English men and women they do not wish to dissociate from them to 
the same extent as the older cohort. Analysis of variance for identifications with 
English men and women respectively revealed significant difference for empathetic 
identification with the main effect of ethnicity (F=94.4701; df=l ,99; p<0.0001), 
(F=13.7389; df= 1,99; p<0.001) and generation (F=13.4735 ; df=l , 99; p<0.001) 
(F=19.4982; df=l ,99; p<0.0001), for contra-identification with the main effect of 
ethnicity (F=58.1895; df= l,99; p<0.0001) (F=56.06971;df=l ,99; p<0.0001) and 
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identification conflicts (F=l2.345;df= 1,99; p<0.01) (F=S.4931; df=l,99; p<0.05). Analysis of variance revealed additional differences for generation at a significance level of F=22.2 140; df=I ,99; p<0.0001 and for ethnicity and gender at a significance level of F=4.3420; df=l ,99; p<0.05. The results can be seen in four main ways. Firstly there is a definite age cohort effect. The results suggest that older respondents have less difficulty in identifying with Asians. Identification with Asian men and women for the older age cohort may be higher because for these individuals the reality of a unified South Asia and a unified South Asian settler presence is strongest. (For example depending on the context these individuals are more likely to use the expression of Asian being apna, which is not used for the white community). Secondly, despite this Kashmiri identification with Asian it is possible to see the reluctant nature of this identity by the way, in which they dissociated themselves from aspects of Asianess. This contradiction produced high levels of identification conflicts. Part of this may be explained by the perception by Kashmiris of Asian constituting the "other" group, for example Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistani. This may also partly be because of the way in which Asianess is seen to be exclusionary of Muslims and also as a response to the way in which settler groups do not want to identify with the dominant notions of their community as being backward. 
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Thirdly, there was a strong ethnicity effect, which demonstrated the salience of the 
Asian category for both Kashmiri and the Anglo-Saxon respondents. Clearly the idea 
of an Asian community has some sociological weight in that Kashmiris continue to 
identify with Asian despite variations in identifications. Not surprisingly the 
Kashmiris had low levels of identification with English men and women. Even 
though there was among the younger cohort greater willingness to identify with 
Englishness it was still within very low parameters. This would suggest that the 
attempt to articulate Englishness in a multicultural environment has a long way to go. 
It would have been interesting if instead of Englishness the representation had been 
Britishness which might have generated more specific data to indicate the emergence 
of an enculturated identity under the label of Britishness. In other words would a 
British Kashmiri be less of an oxymoron than an English Kashmiri? 
The purpose of these global comparisons between Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxons 
was to examine the salience of the inter-ethnic frontier as a source of identification 
conflicts. What is clear from the above findings is that the division is for the 
purposes of understanding identification conflicts and that these do not necessarily 
arise from the situation in which you have ethnically marked minorities living in an 
enclave in a larger ethnically unmarked society. It is the case that most of these 
identification conflicts tend to be intra-ethnic. If this were truly the case then it 
would be difficult to imagine the existence of any unity that could be meaningfully 
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called a community. What the global comparisons thus far show is that each group 
had high levels of identification with the peoples and institutions that represent their 
"sense of community". Identification conflicts arise from a variety of contextual 
causes which are intra or inter-ethnic and which reflect specific political, economic, 
social and cultural concerns. As I have discussed previously within ISA 
identification conflicts are seen as the norm and all well-adjusted people have them 
in moderation. What is important is how they are distributed which is what this 
section has shown. In the next section my focus will be on the core dimensions of the 
respondents' identities. In other words I will be looking at the basic value systems 
around which respondents construct their identities. 
ID. FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS AND VALUES OF KASBMIRI AND 
ANGLO-SAXON IDENTITY 
This section presents data in relation to the core evaluative dimensions of identity for 
the Kashmiri sample and the Anglo-Saxon sample. The aim is to present an overall 
picture of the different value and belief systems of the two. The results are also 
presented with emphasis on comparison between generation and gender. It has 
already been suggested that central features ofKashmiri identity centred on principal 
values and beliefs embedded in cultural, religious and nationalistic aspects of 
Kashmiri life. By comparing structural pressures on constructs for Kashmiri and 
Anglo-Saxon individuals this section addresses two questions. Firstly, to what extent 
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do these evaluative dimensions of identity compare with ideologies as represented in 
Anglo-Saxon evaluative dimensions of identity? Secondly how do different value 
systems meet in the minds of young people. In other words I am asking to what 
extent pioneer settlers transmit cultural values to their descendants. 
A. The Place of Language 
Construct five (speaks traditional language because believes it is a valuable part of 
one's heritage/speaks traditional language only because of pressure from 
family/biraderi) highlighted the extent to which individuals saw language to be a 
valuable part of heritage or to what extent they considered it to be simply an attribute 
signifying local pressures and constraints. Results show the extent to which language 
played a role as a core evaluative dimension of identity. Most Kashmiris saw 
language as a valuable part of their heritage that is,(88% (Net SP=47.63) of older 
men, 95% (Net SP=52.01) of older women, 70% (Net SP=20.61) younger men and 
74% (Net SP=S0. 57) of younger women. It was a secondary dimension of identity 
for the older Anglo-Saxon cohort and a core evaluative dimension for the younger 
members of the Anglo-Saxon sample. (Structural pressures showed 50% (Net 
SP=37.86) older Anglo-Saxon men, 73% (Net SP=48.43) older Anglo-Saxon 
women, all Anglo-Saxon younger men (Net SP= 59.42) 80% (Net SP=60.37) Anglo­
Saxon younger women). 
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We can see from the results that for the Kashmiri community speaking traditional 
language was an important marker of collective identity. There was a generation 
effect with the structural pressures being lowest for younger Kashmiri men not 
seeing traditional language as a major dimension of ethnic identity. Again not 
surprisingly the Anglo-Saxon sample did not see language as a major core indicator 
of identity. This can be explained perhaps by the way in which English is not seen in 
Britain as an ethnically marked language. As such its ability to bound a specific 
ethnic community is muted. 
Pole one of construct four (speaks English only because it is necessary for 
employment and living in the UK/speaks English to become integrated into English 
society) was used to identify whether English is seen as either a resource for 
economic well being or as a means of assimilation and integration into British life. In 
the first position English is purely instrumental and opportunistic whilst the second 
position suggests that English is worth learning for reasons other than economic well 
being. Results for this construct support the results presented above. It would follow 
that if so many of the Kashmiris placed a high value on speaking traditional language 
then they would not see English as a substitute. In accordance with this a 
considerable majority of the Kashmiri respondents saw English as a resource (94% 
(Net SP =47. 10) older men, 95% (Net SP =52.01) older women, 70% (Net 
SP=20.61) younger men and 74% (Net SP=50.57) younger females), whilst the 
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Anglo-Saxon sample saw it as necessary to be part of English society. (87% (Net SP 
=62.84) Anglo-Saxon older men, 93% (Net SP=S0.95) Anglo-Saxon older women, 
86% (Net SP=52. 83) Anglo Saxon younger men, 90% (Net SP= 65.40) Anglo-Saxon 
younger women). 
B. Marriage 
A majority of Kashmiris believed that Kashmiris should be able to marry non­
Kashmiris 61% (Net SP= 19.00) of older men, 63% (Net 60% (Net SP=39.72) of 
younger males and 78% (Net SP=46.32) younger women). Structural pressures 
indicate stress for 63% Kashmiri older women (SP=-7.04). For the remainder of 
individuals this option was a secondary evaluative dimension of identity (75% (Net 
SP=24.61) Anglo-Saxon older men, 60% (Net SP=43.68) Anglo-Saxon older 
women, 71% (Net SP=52.30) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 90% (Net SP=45.97 
Anglo-Saxon younger women). 
One has to be careful here because exogamy was defined in terms of non-Kashmiris 
and did not mean non-Muslim. Thus it could be justified in purely Islamic terms, 
which encourages marriages in relation to other Muslims. Certainly for the Kashmiri 
sample marriage to Muslims was a core evaluative dimension of identity. The 
majority of Kashmiris felt that Muslims should only marry a Muslim rather than 
being able to marry non-Muslims (construct fourteen). (88% (Net SP=82.01) of older 
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men, all older women (Net SP=78. 1 5), 70% younger men (Net SP=55 .85) and 74% 
(Net SP=58.95) of younger women). 
For construct six (believes that traditional systems of arranged marriage are 
fundamental to being Asian/believes that in today's society it is better to have the 
freedom to choose one's own marriage partner) older generation Kashmiris saw pole 
one as a core evaluative dimension of identity (72% (Net SP=69.57) of the older men 
and 53% (Net SP=69.3 l )  of older women), whilst younger generation Kashmiris and 
Anglo-Saxon individuals place emphasis on pole two. It is important to note however 
that structural pressures show that for Kashmiri younger generation men, 
identification with pole two is only as a secondary evaluative dimension of identity 
(80% (Net SP=32.27) and for Kashmiri younger women it is a conflicted or 
inconsistently evaluative dimension of identity (69% (Net SP=l6.81). For the Anglo­
Saxon individuals pole two forms a core evaluative dimension of identity (87% (Net 
SP=51. 89) Anglo-Saxon older men, 73% (Net SP=63 .56), Anglo-Saxon older 
women, all (Net SP=74. 89) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 90% (Net SP=57.72), 
Anglo-Saxon younger women). 
Results suggest that the relationship between Kashmiri identity and arranged 
marriage is not seen as being fundamental for younger Kashmiris. They, agreed with 
the Anglo-Saxon sample that "love marriages" i.e. marriages in which individuals 
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choose their own partners without assistance or interference from their parents or 
other family members were preferable. The older age cohort amongst the Kashmiris 
clearly saw arranged marriages as being as one of the core pillars of Kashmiri 
identity. Structural pressures above highlight that this is a complicated relationship, 
which would suggest that marriages provide one area where the possibility of inter­
generational and intra-ethnic variations amongst the sample is high. 
C. Moral Choices 
Structural pressures for construct seven (believes that parents and elders should be 
treated with special deference/feels that parents/elders should be treated as equals 
and should have to earn special respect) shows that Kashmiris felt that parents and 
elders should be treated with special respect by virtue of their role and age. The 
highest structural pressure for majority consensus for Kashmiris (94% (Net 
SP==82.84) of older men, 95% (Net SP=83.24) of older women, 80% (Net SP=S0.00) 
of younger men and 61% (Net SP=75.19) of younger women). 
In contrast Anglo-Saxon respondents seem to feel that parents and elders had no 
intrinsic role and that they should be treated as peers. Structural pressures show that 
this forms a core evaluative dimension of identity for Anglo-Saxon older women 
(Net SP=68.68), and the younger Anglo-Saxon cohort (younger women 50% (Net 
SP=8 l .  3 8) younger men 86% Net SP=65 .13). The indifference towards this construct 
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is further highlighted by the fact that the older Anglo-Saxon men see this only as a 
secondary evaluative dimension of identity. (75% (Net SP=42.55). 
Structural pressures on construct nine (believes and respects izzat (honour)/thinks 
that doing the right thing according to one's own sense of morality is more important 
than izzat (honour) show differing value and belief systems. Kashmiri individuals see 
pole one as important (88% for older men (Net SP=87. l l), all older women (Net 
SP=86.30), 80% of younger men (Net SP=42.49) and 74% (Net SP=68.08) of 
younger women) although the structural pressures were lower for the younger 
generation. Pole two was important for Anglo-Saxon individuals. Structural 
pressures show that it forms a secondary evaluative dimension of identity for 75% 
(Net SP=42.o55) of older men but a core evaluative dimension of identity for 73% 
(Net SP==68.68) older women), 86% (Net SP=65 . 1 3  younger men and 50% (Net 
SP=81.38) younger women. 
D. Cultural Belonging 
Structural pressures for construct ten show that the Kashmiri older cohort felt deeply 
committed to the system of biraderi (67% (Net SP=73 .33) older men and 58% (Net 
SP=74.49) older women). Younger Kashmiris (70% (Net SP=24.74) 65% of young 
Kashmiri women (Net SP=l4.88) and Anglo-Saxon individuals believed in the 
freedom for individuals to follow their own independent life. 87%( (Net SP=41o.15) 
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Anglo-Saxon older men, 87% (Net SP=S0.88) Anglo-Saxon older women, 57% (Net 
SP=60.29) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 50% (Net SP=64.47) Anglo-Saxon 
younger women). Pole two was however a conflicted or inconsistent dimension of 
identity for Kashmiri younger generation whilst Anglo-Saxon older generation men 
see it as a secondary evaluative dimension of identity and other Anglo-Saxon 
individuals see it as a core evaluative dimension of identity. 
The findings for this construct demonstrate that there are some generational 
differences amongst all respondents regardless of ethnic belonging. This would seem 
to contradict the assumptions often made that members of Britain's South Asian 
communities are less individualistic and more collectivist than the members of the 
dominant ethnicity (I will discuss this assumption in greater detail in the last chapter 
of this thesis). 
The younger Kashmiris clearly thought that the ability of individuals to project their 
destiny into the future was a crucial aspect of their identity. They believed that 
individuals should be able to exercise their independence in the pursuit of life and 
happiness. Despite the emphasis on individual freedom the younger cohort among 
the Kashmiri sample expressed high levels of inconsistency in expressing this 
preference for individualism. This suggests that they are not necessarily removing 
themselves from the idea of biraderi in favour of individual freedom but that this is 
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an inconsistent dimension of their identity. When net structural pressures on 
constructs are low or negative the construct cannot be regarded as providing 
dependable criteria by which the individual may evaluate self and others. In other 
words this is an area of stress. 
Rather than projecting traditional ideas of inter-generational conflict this stress may 
be more to do with the relative lack of confidence that this cohort has about what is 
actually involved in being Kashmiri. They may see the dominant ethnically 
unmarked group perceiving these as their own and intrinsically linking them to their 
own history therefore internalising ownership. In other words the Kashmiris may see 
individualism as a trait specific to the dominant Anglo-Saxon society rather than 
something that is universal to all human beings. Therefore their support for this trait 
may be seen to be subversive of their community' s  identity. 
E. Notions of "Britishness" 
Older generation Kashmiris favoured pole two of construct seventeen stating that 
they would feel happier with Kashmiri nationality (78% older men (Net SP=48.39; 
84% older women (Net SP==44.56) whilst the younger generation Kashmiris and 
Anglo-Saxon individuals emphasised that they would feel happy with British 
nationality although this was a secondary evaluative dimension of identity. Results 
show that for 60% (Net SP=40.67) young Kashmiri men, 56% (Net SP=30.90) 
younger Kashmiri females, 50% (Net SP=41.47) Anglo-Saxon older men, 86% (Net 
SP=43. 89) Anglo-Saxon older women, 86% (Net SP=37.04) Anglo-Saxon younger 
men and 60% (Net SP=58.02) Anglo-Saxon younger women this pole forms a 
secondary evaluative dimension of identity. 
In the earlier section I discussed the possibility of Britishness providing a more 
inclusive label, better able to deal with the multicultural and multi-ethnic nature of 
contemporary society that the category of English. Support for this is provided by 
this construct, which clearly shows that the younger Kashmiris in common with the 
Anglo-Saxon sample were fairly happy to define themselves as British. It should be 
pointed out however that the fact that this was a secondary evaluative dimension of 
identity indicates that this aspect of identity is volatile and subject to changes. What 
is interesting is that this appears to be the case for younger Kashmiris and the Anglo­
Saxon sample indicating some overall unhappiness with what actually constitutes 
Britishness. The older Kashmiris consider themselves to be Kashmiris rather than 
British. 
This point is supported by looking at structural pressures for the Kashmiri samples 
on construct nineteen (feels more at home in Kashmir/feels more at home in Britain). 
67% (Net SP= 45.14) of older Kashmiri men and 58% (Net SP= 52. 12) older 
Kashmiri women emphasised pole one. The younger generation place emphasis on 
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pole two but feeling at home in Luton is only a secondary dimension of identity for 
69% (Net SP=37.50) of younger Kashmiri women and 70% (Net SP=45.96) younger 
Kashmiri men. 62% (Net SP=52.82) of older Anglo-Saxon men and 40% (Net SP= 
40.86) of younger Anglo-Saxon women felt at home in Britain. For 53% (Net SP=-
2.09), older Anglo-Saxon women and 86% (Net SP=- 1.30) younger Anglo-Saxon 
men this pole was an inconsistent evaluative dimension of identity. 
Pole one of construct twenty (wants the younger generation to think of Kashmir as 
their homeland/believes that the younger generation should think of Britain as their 
homeland) was a core evaluative dimension of identity for 88% (Net SP=SS.34) of 
older men, 89% (Net SP=56.80) of older women, 50% of younger men (Net 
SP=40.05) and 52% (Net SP== 50.03) of younger women. Results for the Anglo­
Saxon respondents show that 25 % (Net SP=S l .38) older men, 40% (SP=38 .38) 
older women, 57% (Net Sp=48.2 1)  younger women and 20% (SP=63 .28). It is 
interesting that although for about half of the older cohort Kashmiriness was far 
more salient than Britishness in furnishing the core of their identity when the 
younger generation project themselves into the future a Kashmiri homeland is also 
important. 6 
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F. An Independent Homeland 
The feeling that Kashmir should be united and independent of both Pakistan and 
India as opposed to a Kashmir which is part of Pakistan (construct eight) was valued 
by 67% (Net SP=62.32) older men 47% (Net SP=62.15) of older women, 70% (Net 
SP=29.86 of younger men and 61% (Net SP=39.34) of younger women. Results 
show that as with the Kashmiri individuals the Anglo-Saxon older men also placed 
emphasis on pole one. However structural pressures indicate that this is an 
inconsistent evaluative dimension of identity and is unreliable since it is likely to 
change (37% (Net SP=l9.30) Anglo-Saxon older men). Other Anglo-Saxon 
individuals favoured pole two but low structural pressures indicate further 
inconsistencies (33% (Net SP=16.12) Anglo-Saxon older women, 57% (Net 
SP=14.26) Anglo-Saxon younger men and 40% (Net SP=8.95, Anglo-Saxon younger 
women). 
These results are consistent with those presented in the preceding chapters where I 
have suggested the centrality of ideas of independence for Kashmiris. It is obvious 
that the Anglo-Saxon group interviewed in Luton do not identify with the political 
situation in Kashmir. This is not surprising since it is poorly publicised in the news 
and media, which would be their first point of contact with events in the 
subcontinent. 7 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have done two things: I have compared my Kashmiri sample with 
the Anglo-Saxon control group using selected entities and ISA indices, and I have 
tried to show structural pressures on target constructs to identify the value and belief 
systems of the Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon individuals interviewed. While my 
emphasis has been mainly on the Kashmiri experience it should be pointed out that 
there were a number of interesting findings regarding the Anglo-Saxon sample, for 
example the relationship between British and European identity. 8 To what extent has 
ISA helped to deepen the accounts that I gathered from my open-ended interviews? 
What was interesting to me is how many of the topics that came through almost 
informal discussions with respondents, using observer-participant techniques, are 
reflected in the more structured responses to the ISA instruments. What ISA helps to 
do in the first place is to demonstrate that my interviews were not just idiosyncratic. 
The opinions that my respondents expressed were somehow representative. This, 
however, is not the only or main contribution ISA made to my analysis. Far more 
important is the way in which ISA provided a theoretically rigorous and conceptually 
rich language for describing the "Kashmiri experience". The field of ethnic studies 
(especially studies looking at South Asian experience) has been framed within 
epistemology which carries with it traces of Orientalism. As such it is very difficult 
to find a conceptual language that is adequate to the experience of immigration and 
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settlement and not tainted by the Orientalist paradigm. ISA provided a schema which 
was not (as) beholden to Orientalism and which was also capable doing comparative 
research. 
The picture that emerges from the above ISA generated accounts of Kashmiris in 
Luton, are certainly far more complex than most conventional studies. This can be 
seen in the way which the Kashmiris are often contrasted with the host community in 
terms of the tradition/modem distinction. The argument is that since Kashmiris are 
from a traditional culture they are embedded within values and beliefs, which are in 
conflict with the modern world. Thus, the Kashmiris would be considered to be 
representatives of a world view that would emphasis collective endeavour over 
individualism, rural lifestyles over urban and so forth. My findings however do not 
support such a clear-cut division. What the ISA generated data demonstrates 
emphatically is that this "tradition Vs modern" framework is inadequate to the 
situation in Luton, and as such, it reflects the genre of writing of immigrant studies 
rather the complex realities found among the Kashmiris. 9 
My findings point more towards a process of enculturation taking place rather than 
de-traditionalisation of Kashmiri society. In other words many practices and rituals, 
values and beliefs that were considered to be primordial and uncontested, have 
become open to question and redefinition. This, however, does not necessarily imply 
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Anglicisation. My sample suggests that they want to be Kashmiris in a different 
context rather than abandoning "Kashmiriyat". Even the younger cohort wants to 
redefine its identity in terms of being modern Kashmiris rather than modern Britons. 
The continued importance of "Kashmiriyat" suggests that we may need a new 
vocabulary to describe dislocated ethnic community in the age of globalisation. As I 
noted earlier the Kashmiris have not been successful in establishing their nation state 
but as many of my ISA findings show there is a strong case to be made that they 
have been successful in forging a diaspora. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Weinreich, 1989 points out that this is the equivalent to Erickson's 1965 and 1968 clinically 
described identity state. He highlights that individuals who exhibit minimal levels of identification 
conflict do not in practice acknowledge ordinary differentiations between good and bad 
characteristics, nor recognise that they are often to be found in both oneself and in others. This state of 
defensive denial is regarded as the analytical equivalent of identity foreclosure as described by 
Erikson. In between these two extremes and for psychologically well adjusted people moderate and 
quite usual levels of identity conflicts are expected to exist. Since individuals may settle for a balance 
in identity conflicts rather than a total resolution of conflicts through resolving some identity conflicts 
with people and reassessing relationships with others. 2 See Weinreich, 1989, p. 54. 3 Ibid. 
4 Weinreich's Bristol Study demonstrated this point. See Weinreich, 1979. Weinreich points out that 
comparing current identity diffusion and past identity diffusion may give indications of resolutions in 
identification conflicts. For my sample past identity diffusion also fell within the moderate range for 
all groups and analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by ethnicity, generation or 
gender and consequently there were no interaction effects. 
5 See Anthais and Yuval Davis on patriarchy, 1992. 
6 Areas of stress did occur for a minority of Anglo-Saxon individuals and centred pole one of 
construct nine (believes and respects family honour above all else/thinks that doing the right thing 
according to one's own morality is more important than family honour) for 25% (Net SP==-13.27) of 
older men, 7% (Net SP= l5 .33) ofolder women and, 14% (Net SP==-3.70) of younger men. Pole two of 
construct thirteen (enjoys spending leisure time with women/prefers to mix with women only at work 
or at school/college or university) was problematic for 12% (Net SP=-33 .58) of older men and pole 
one of construct ten for 28% (Net SP= l 2.32) of younger men. Pole two of construct sixteen (is/are 
strongly British and would be happy anywhere in Britain/is/are British but feel a strong attachment to 
Luton) caused stress for 12% (Net SP=17.69) of older men and 20% (Net SP=-14.99) of younger 
women. Also pole two of construct seventeen (feels happy with British nationality/would feel happier 
with European nationality) proved to be a non evaluative dimension of identity for 37% (Net 
SP=28.t14) older men and 14% (Net SP=-21 .90) of younger men. From the results above there appears 
to be apparent separation of values and beliefs between the older generation Kashmiris and the Anglo­
Saxon individuals. In all cases inconsistent evaluative dimensions of identity occurred by values by 
respect of parents, respect of izzat (or honour), marriage to Muslims remains a core evaluative 
dimensions of younger generation Kashmiri identity suggesting that it is within these areas that 
enculturation may currently be strongest. 
7 Inconsistencies between evaluative connotations of cognitions and overall evaluations of self and 
others are represented by low or negative structural pressures on constructs. Cognitive-affective 
incompatibilities are seen as areas of conflict or stress. In these cases constructs cannot be used as 
dependable measures of an individuals evaluations. Results show that most areas of stress occurred 
for individuals who had a minority view. 28% (Net SP=-10. 14 ) older men and 47% ( Net SP==-18.47) 
older women placed emphasis on pole two of construct six. Net structural pressures show 
inconsistencies in evaluations and suggest that the idea that individuals should have the freedom to 
choose their own marriage partner is problematic for some older generation Kashmiris. Further 33% 
(Net SP=-13 .84) older men and 42% (Net SP=-7.37) older women have conflicted evaluative 
dimensions of identity with pole two of construct nineteen (feel/s more at home in Britain). For 10% 
(Net SP= -23 .72) of younger men pole two of construct nine is causing stress. It is important to note 
that two individuals did not respond to this construct which is an indication of possible conflict. Pole 
two of construct seventeen (would feel happier with Kashmiri nationality) is problematic for 38% 38 1 
8 
(Net SP=-19.76) of younger men. Results indicate that older generation women have the highest 
conflicted evaluative dimensions of identity. 37% (Net SP=-41 . 17) of older women have conflicted 
evaluations with pole two of construct ten (believes in the freedom for individuals to follow their own 
independent life). One individual did not respond to this construct. For 39% (Net SP= -5.68) of older 
women pole two of construct fifteen (would socialise with all Asians) is an arena of stress. Pole two 
of construct twenty (believes that the younger generation should think of Britain as their homeland) is 
an area of stress for 10% (Net SP=-22.54) of older women. 
Pole two of construct seventeen (feels happy with British nationality/would feel happier with 
European nationality) was problematic for the Anglo-Saxon respondents. The idea of European 
identity was an area of stress for a minority of Anglo-Saxon individuals and thus a non-evaluative 
dimension of Anglo-Saxon identity. For older men 3% (Net SP=28. 14) and 14% (Net SP=21 .90) for 
younger men. 
9 See Sayyid, 1997. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: KASHMIRIS, KASHMIR AND "KASHMYRIA T" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I focused on the comparison of Kashmiri and Anglo-Saxon 
identity structures as a means of providing a global context to the preceding 
chapters. In this chapter I will be focusing on the Kashmiri sample. In particular, I 
will be elaborating on a set of six postulates, which were developed in order to 
assess the degree of identity transformation undergone by the Kashmiris in Luton. 
The postulates refer to aspects of Kashmiri identity which are often ethnically 
marked in the literature on South Asian settlers. For example, the importance of 
kinship networks is considered to be something specific to South Asians but also 
something that reflects their past origins rather than their contemporary realities. In 
other words, all postulates tend to refer to sets of features, which are considered to 
mark out South Asians as a specific ethnicised minority. What these postulates then 
are trying to uncover is what makes Kashmiris Kashmiri, and whether being 
Kashmiri in Mirpur is the same as being Kashmiri in Luton. 
The format of this chapter is similar to the previous one. Under each section I 
present a brief description, followed by the results of ISA instruments, and conclude 
with a commentary. Once all the postulates have been discussed, I will reflect on the 
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way they have helped to answer the question of the Kashmiriness of Kashmiris and 
how they fit into my earlier discussions on enculturation. 
Il. POSTULATE ONE: CULTURAL NETWORKS ARE A CENTRAL 
COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN 
As I showed in earlier, "impressionistic" chapters, many respondents pointed to the 
significance of biraderi links in open interviews. Identifications with parents were 
also seen as important, as we know that in early life one's parents take on the role 
of giving primary socialisation to a child. In Kashmiri society parents exist within 
the biraderi and are in tum influenced by it. One of the major ways in which cultural 
influences were felt to have an effect on Kashmiri identity development was due to 
the way in which Kashmiris distinguished between children born in Azad Kashmir 
and those born in the United Kingdom. 
In the following sections I will consider the degree of involvement ( ego­
involvement ), the extent to which role models are mentioned (idealistic 
identification), the extent to which they contra-identify and the extent to which 
identification conflicts occur with these significant others, and finally how they are 
evaluated. Differences between older and younger Kashmiris of both genders will be 
discussed if and where they arise. 
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A. Identifications with the Biraderi 
The findings suggest that the institution of biraderi is a significant marker of 
Kashmiri identity. Mean values for the older generation current empathetic 
identification with the institution of Kashmiri biraderi falls within the high range 
whilst those for the younger generation with the Kashmiri biraderi falls just above 
the low range suggesting lower identification. 1 An analysis of variance revealed a 
generational difference at a significance level of F=48. 07; df= 1, 66; p<0.0001. There 
is some variation in empathetic identification when respondents are situated in the 
past self, which may reveal some ongoing psychological processes. When we turn to 
the mean values for past empathetic identification we can note that there is no 
change for the older generation whose past empathetic identification also falls 
within the high range. However for the younger generation empathetic identification 
with the Kashmiri biraderi is higher when they are situated in the past. Analysis of 
variance reveals a generational difference for past empathetic identification at a 
significance level of F=39.69; 1,66; p<0.001. Analysis of variance revealed no 
significant gender differences and no interaction effects were found. What these 
results show is that the younger Kashmiris are involved in an ongoing process of 
moving away from a close identification with the biraderi. 
What seems puzzling, given these generational differences, is the way in which 
results for ego-involvement, i. e. the indices of the intensity of involvement with the 
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biraderi, did not show a difference amongst generations or indeed any gender 
differences. Mean values for ego-involvement show very high levels of ego­
involvement with the Kashmiri biraderi for the older generation. One way of 
explaining this involvement for young Kashmiris may be to argue that they feel 
involved in an institute which they considered to be negative despite themselves 
(perhaps as a result of peer pressure). One way to find out whether the generations 
considered biraderi to be a good thing is to examine their idealistic identification 
with it. Mean values of idealistic identification for the older generation fall within 
the high range. The younger generation have significantly lower idealistic 
identification with the Kashmiri biraderi F=42.75; df=l,66; p< 0.0001, which 
suggests that the respondents see it as reflecting their own value systems? 
These results indicate that while the older cohort consider biraderi to be a positive 
aspect of the Kashmiri way of life, the younger cohort, while not necessarily 
disagreeing with this conclusion, do not rate it as highly. If a sense of empathetic 
identification, ego involvement and idealistic identification is associated with a wish 
to dissociate i .e. contra-identify from the characteristics that make up in this case 
the Kashmiri biraderi, then conflicts in identification will ensue. 
Contra-identification with the Kashmiri biraderi falls within the low range for the 
older generation. Analysis of variance highlighted higher levels of contra-
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identification with the Kashmiri biraderi for the younger generation at a significance 
level of F=25.67; df=l ,66; p<0.001. Analysis of variance revealed no gender 
significance and no interaction effects were found.2 As expected, high levels of 
empathetic identification and low levels of contra-identification with the Kashmiri 
biraderi for the older generation lead to only moderate levels of identification 
conflicts. These findings are therefore consistent with Weinreich's suggestion that 
for most people identification conflicts will fall within the moderate range. These 
results indicate that the younger Kashrniris wish to dissociate from certain features 
of biraderi to a greater extent than the older Kashrniris. Again results appear to 
contradict many popular accounts, which tend to see generational conflict between 
ethnically marked communities as endemic. The contrast between older and younger 
Kashrniris is one of "generational difference" rather than "generational conflict" It 
appears that the younger Kashrniris are showing signs of enculturation for they do 
not translate their distance from the biraderi into the rejection of the institution. 
As we have seen there is substantial evidence in support of Postulate One. 
However, variations in identification between older and younger generation suggest 
that the Kashmiri biraderi cannot be the only influence in the lives of the Kashrniri 
respondents. I have mentioned above that parents also play a central role in 
socialisation. I will discuss identifications with parents in the next section. 
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B. Identification with Parents 
The findings for identification with parents followed similar patterns as those for 
identifications with the biraderi outlined above, but there were some small gender 
differences. Current empathetic identification with parents is higher for the older 
generation Kashmiris and lower for the younger generation. Analysis of variance 
reveals a significant difference by generation F= 52.744; df-=1,64; p<0.001. All 
respondents are highly ego-involved with parents. 
These results indicate generational differences in empathetic identification with 
parents. In other words, the older Kashmiris were more likely to identify with their 
parents and elders than the younger Kashmiris who may show greater signs of being 
enculturated into the general British culture. This was further confirmed by looking 
at idealistic identification for which the older Kashmiris saw themselves as 
identifying with their parents whilst Kashmiri youngsters idealistically identified to a 
lesser extent. Analysis of variance revealed a significant difference by generation 
F=33.823; df-=1,64; p<0.0001. Analysis of variance also revealed a small gender 
significance. Male respondents have significantly higher idealistic identification with 
parents F=33. 823; df-=1,64; p<0.0001. Contra�identification with parents is low for 
the older generation respondents but higher for the younger generation. Analysis of 
variance revealed a generational significance F=19.952; df-=1,64; p<0.0001. 
Identification conflicts fell within the moderate range. This once again demonstrates 
388 
Weinreich's point that there is a general tendency towards achieving an optimal solution to attempts to resolve identification conflicts. Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by generation or gender. 
C. Imagining a Virtual Kashmir These results demonstrate the extent to which the idea of the Kashmiri diaspora is manifested in everyday identifications with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir. The results showed again a significant generational difference between older and younger Kashmiris. Even though both sets empathetically recognised their association with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir, this empathetic identification was greater for older Kashmiris who probably have direct relatives and memories of those associations. Analysis of variance revealed a significant generational difference of F=49.756 df=l ,64; p<0.000 1 (Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir) and F=64.374; df=l ,64; p<0.000 1 .  This result was further corroborated by the indices of ego-involvement and idealistic identification which both showed high values. While it is the case that this identification was lower for the younger Kashmiris it was still within the high range. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference of F=47.939; df=l ,64; p<0.0001 .  No gender significance was found and no interaction effects were revealed. The younger generation Kashmiri respondents have highest levels of contra-identification with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir while contra-identification was low for the older Kashmiris. Analysis of variance found this difference to be 389 
very significant F=27.214; df=l,64; p<0.0001.3 Overall evaluation of Kashmiris in 
Azad Kashmir fell within the high range for the older generation whilst overall 
evaluation by the younger generation within the low range. A generational 
difference occurred at a significance level ofF=36.977; df=l ,64; p<0.0001. 
The importance of these results is that it seems that direct familial links and 
knowledge between Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir and Kashmiris in Luton is very 
significant in giving rise to the idea of a Kashmiri diaspora. It would be wrong to 
read the generational difference as vital to the existence of the diaspora, in other 
words that the diaspora would disappear if the older generation were to die out and 
with them the links with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir. These findings confirm that 
the idea of a Kashmiri diaspora has now proliferated fairly firmly into Kashmiri 
society and is not the result of disgruntled intellectuals and politicians as found in 
the interviews. 
These results point towards two mam conclusions. Firstly, the importance of 
cultural networks for the maintenance of identity. Secondly, the results demonstrate 
that whilst there are significant generational effects these are contrary to popular 
and journalistic writings, and did not conform to the stereotype of inter-generational 
conflicts. I would argue that the generational effects point towards the process of 
enculturation rather than pathological inter-generational conflict. 
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ill. POSTULATE TWO: RELIGION IS A CENTRAL COLLECTIVE 
DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN 
This section presents data in relation to Postulate Two. As discussed earlier "public 
Islam" is easier to investigate. Mosques in Luton, specifically the Jammia Masjid 
(which reflects the Barelwi tradition with which the majority of the Kashmiris 
interviewed identified in the open interviews), the Madina Masjid and Masjid Noor 
were included in the ISA instruments as representations of "public Islam". Many of 
the younger Kashmiris mentioned the Luton Islamic Society, which was run within 
the University and appealed to young Muslims, so this was also included. The 
results for identification with these institutions are presented in terms of selected 
ISA indices. 
A. The Public Face of Islam 
Perceived similarity with the religious entities (Mosque Noor, Madina Mosque, 
Jammia Masjid, and the Luton Islamic Society) falls within the low range for all 
Kashmiri respondents. Analysis of variance found no significant difference by 
generation or gender. Ego-involvement with the religious entities falls within the 
low range for the older generation but is higher for the younger generation Kashmiri 
respondents. However analysis of variance did not find this difference to be 
significant. Women are more intensely involved with the religious entities. Analysis 
of variance found significant gender differences at a level of F=8.379; df=1;44; 
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p<0.05 (Jammia Masjid), F=9.718; df=l ,3 1 ;  p<0.0 1  (Mosque Noor), F= I0.4 19; 
df=1 '42; p<0.05 (Madina Mosque). No interaction effects were revealed. Idealistic 
identification with religious entities for all Kashmiri respondents fell within the low 
range. Analysis of variance revealed no significant differences by generation or 
gender. 
Contra.identification also fell within the low range for all Kashmiri respondents. 
However means show higher values for the younger generation. Analysis of 
variance found generational differences to be significant at a level of F=I0.889 
df=l,44; p<0.01  (Jammia Masjid), F=8.869; df=l,3 1 ;  p<0.0 l (Mosque Noor), 
F=7.4 1 ;  df.==1 ,42; p<0.0l(Madina Masjid) and F= 7.8 10; df=l ,62; p<0.01 (Luton 
Islamic Society). Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by gender 
and no interaction effects were found. Mean values for current identification 
conflicts fell within the low range for the older generation Kashmiri respondents but 
were higher for the younger generation falling within the moderate range. Analysis 
of variance revealed a generational difference with Mosque Noor (F=16.213 ;  
df=l,3 1 ;  p<0.001) and Jammia Masjid (F= l l . 776; df=l ,44; p<0.00 1). No 
significant difference was revealed by gender and no interaction effects were found. 
The older generation evaluate the religious entities very highly whilst overall 
evaluation of religious entities by the younger generation is lower but remains 
within the moderate range. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference at 
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a significance level of F=I0.291; df=l,44; p<0.01 (Jammia Masjid), F=7. 89; df= 
1,31; p<0.0l(Mosque Noor), F=6.458; df=l ,42; p<0.01 (Madina Mosque) and 
F==7.051; df=l,62p<0.0l (Luton Islamic Society). 
The most surprising conclusions from the results of identifications with these 
religious entities were the absence of gender differences. Some differences were 
found for ego-involvement with religious entities but it would seem that these 
results are at variance with accounts that see Mosques and Islam as mainly 
masculinist spaces. The general assumption is that older women, especially, do not 
go to the Mosques and as a result their involvement and attachment to Mosques 
would tend to be lower. This is not born out by the results. 
The second interesting finding was that while local opinion has it that the Jammia 
Masjid is the Kashmiri Mosque there was no significant difference in involvement 
with this Mosque when compared to the other Mosques in Luton. Again this seems 
to suggest a variance with many accounts which argue that Mosques are closely 
(almost exclusively) identified with particular national and sectarian communities.4 
It may be that the national and sectarian nature of identification may be the result of 
geography and demography rather than social exclusion. 
The third point to bring out is the identification with religious entities by older and younger Kashmiris. Referring back to my comparison between Kashmiris and the Anglo-Saxon sample using the global indices I pointed to the way in which youngsters did not identify as strongly with Mosques as the older Kashmiris. I read this not to be an indicator of greater secularism but a difference in their understanding of Islam. It is interesting in this light that the results for ego­involvement while within the range were actually higher for the younger cohort suggesting they have allegiance to mosques as indicators of Islam in Britain. It is important however not to fall into another stereotype with over-emphasis on the relationship between identifying with Islam and Kashmiri identity since all respondents for all indices ( despite the variations mentioned above) fell within the low range. Overall these results suggest that the place of religion as a marker of Kashmiri identity may be far more implicit than many analysts have considered. The idea that Islam is part of one's life may mean that for a community such as the Kashmiris in Luton, Islam is unmarked and an unremarkable part of their existence. Thus the lack of its contested nature may explain why it remains as a background to Kashmiri identity rather than the main banner under which Kashmiri identity is forged. This may also be the effect of the success of Kashmiri nationalistic discourse, which would reduce Islam to a secondary role within public life. 
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IV. POSTULATE THREE: NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IS A CENTRAL 
COLLECTIVE DIMENSION OF KASHMIRI IDENTITY IN BRITAIN 
This section presents data in relation to nationalistic identification with Kashmir as a 
central feature ofKashmiri identity in Britain. Previous chapters have already shown 
that open interviews stressed the importance of "Kashmiriyat" to Kashmiris in 
Luton. Most often this sense of being Kashmiri was referenced with respect to the 
disputed nature of their homeland as well as to key players and representatives of 
different viewpoints within the struggle. The JKLF, Muslim Conference, Benazir 
Bhutto and Narasimha Rao were all referenced and therefore included in the ISA 
instruments. In other words each of these figures indicated a particular stance 
regarding nationalistic identifications of the Kashmiri sample. 
A. Independent Kashmir 
It is clear from the findings that the JKLF exercises a hegemonic influence over the 
Kashmiris in Luton with regard to Kashmiri nationalism. There were only a few 
gender differences but analysis of variance did not find these to be significant. More 
marked were the generational effects. A review of the data shows that empathetic 
identification with the political entity of JKLF falls within the high range for both 
generations of Kashmiri respondents. However the older generation perceive higher 
similarity with the JKLF than the younger generation. An analysis of variance 
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revealed this generational difference to be very significant F=32.182; df-:::1 ,64; 
p<0 .0001. 
Identification with the JKLF fell within the high range for respondents of both 
generations. All Kashmiris are intensely involved with the JKLF. Analysis of 
variance showed no significant difference according to generation, but a gender 
difference was found. Men had higher ego-involvement with the JKLF at a 
significance level of F=4.375; df-:::1,64; p<0.05 . Idealistic identification with the 
JKLF is high for Kashmiri respondents of both generation but significantly higher 
for the older generation F=26.711; df-:::1,64; p<0 .0001. An interaction effect for 
idealistic identification with JKLF was revealed at a significance level of F=4.247; 
df-:::1 ,64; p<0 .05. 
Mean values for contra-identification with the JKLF fell within the low range for the 
older generation but were higher for the younger generation. Analysis of variance 
shows a generational difference at a significance ofF=12.697; df-:::1,64; p<0.001 and 
an interaction effect with contra-identification for generation by gender was 
revealed at a significance level of F=4.358; df-:::1,64; p<0.05 . For all individuals 
identification conflicts with the JKLF fell within the moderate range but are higher 
for the female Kashmiri respondents at a significance level of F=S .8 1  6; df-::: 1, 64; 
p<0. 01. Mean values for overall evaluation of the JKLF show highest evaluation by 
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older generation men. Older generation women's evaluation falls within the 
moderate range and the younger generation have low evaluation of the JKLF. No 
significant gender differences were revealed but an interaction effect occurred for 
evaluation with JKLF for generation by gender at a small significance of F=S.238; 
df=l,64; p<0.05. 
While the role of the JKLF was high for all respondents it was clear that this 
organisation was more favoured by the older Kashmiris. This again reflects the way 
in which the nationalist struggle has tended to recruit mainly from these Kashmiris 
who were politically conscious at the time of major struggles such as the Mangla 
Dam, the war in 1965 and President's rule in 1983 to name a few significant events. 
The extent of the JKLF' s influence was expressed not only by high empathetic 
identification, ego-involvement, idealistic identification, low contra-identification 
and moderate identification conflicts but also by correspondingly low associations 
with the political entities of Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao and Benazir 
Bhutto. 
Perceived similarity with the political entities of Muslim Conference, Narasimha 
Rao and Benazir Bhutto fell within the low range for respondents of both 
generations. Ego-involvement with the Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao and 
Benazir Bhutto was low and no generational significance was found. However, 
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analysis of variance did show a small gender significance. Women were more ego­involved with the Muslim Conference at a significance level of F=5.923; df=l ,40; <p 0.05. Narasimha Rao, Benazir Bhutto and the Muslim Conference were not seen as role models and idealistic identification fell within low range. There were no generational or gender interactions. Contra-identification with Narasimha Rao, and Benazir Bhutto was also low and no generational or gender significance was found. Contra-identification with the Muslim Conference was also low and a generational difference occurred at a significance level of F = 6. 8 19; df=l ,40; p< 0.05. Identification conflicts with The Muslim Conference, Narasimha Rao, and Benazir Bhutto fell within the high range. Analysis of variance revealed that the younger generation has higher identification conflicts with the Muslim Conference, at a significance level of F=7.448; df=l ,40; p<0.01  (identification conflicts based in current self) and F=6.486; df=l ,40; p< 0.05 (identification conflicts based in past self). Evaluation of Benazir Bhutto fell within the low range. Analysis of variance revealed no significant generation or gender difference and no interaction effects were found. Evaluation of the Muslim Conference and Narasimha Rao fell within the low range for women and fell within the moderate range for male respondents. 398 
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Analysis of variance revealed a small gender significance at a level of F=4.709 
p<0.05. No generational significance was found. 
What is interesting is the way in which the respondents did not distinguish between 
the Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers, which confirms that the JKLF' s position 
on the twin occupation of Kashmir seems to have made a great deal of headway 
amongst Kashmiris in Luton. 
V. POSTULATE FOUR: "CULTURE CONFLICT" BETWEEN KASHMIRI 
MIGRANTS AND THEIR OFFSPRING IS LEADING TO NEGATIVE 
SELF EVALUATION 
This section presents data m relation to "culture conflict" between Kashmiri 
migrants and their offspring and the extent to which this leads to negative self­
evaluation. It was assumed then that a common feature of Kashmiri adolescents 
would be their high incidence of identification conflicts with people of their own 
ethnicity. In an environment where alternative ethnic groups are salient, individuals 
have the opportunity of identifying with representatives of the other community. It 
was therefore assumed to be inevitable that some cross-ethnic identification would 
therefore take place. Previous ISA studies (see Weinreich and Kelly) have shown 
that high identification conflicts with own ethnic groups and partial identification 
with the dominant community would lead to overall negative self-evaluation. 5 This 
was combined with identity diffusion. 
When mixes of partial identifications occur individuals may experience a degree of 
identity diffusion. ISA conceptualises identity diffusion as the degree of difficulty in 
resynthesising childhood and later identifications, that is the difficulty in 
incorporating new identifications and resolving conflicts in existing identifications 
which are dispersed over a number of significant others. In some circumstances, 
high identity diffusion may be accompanied by very low self-evaluation and 
individuals concerned may be in a state of identity crisis. However in other 
circumstances individuals may exhibit identity diffusion as a result of having 
identification conflicts and yet have moderately favourable self-evaluation. 
Identification conflicts or the absence of identity conflicts with significant others on 
self-evaluation were investigated for older and younger generation Kashmiri 
respondents. Representations of own group culture, religion and political 
identification were chosen. Representations from the dominant community were 
also included. Identification conflicts were ascertained with the "own group" 
cultural entities of parents, Asian men and women and Kashmiri biraderi, with 
religious entity of the Jammia Masjid and with the political entity of JKLF. Also 
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there were identification conflicts with "other" ethnic groups by English men and 
women. 
A. "Culture Conflict" 
For all individuals conflicts in identification are high with their own group. This is to 
be expected and supports the idea that ethnic minority youngsters have high 
identification conflicts with their own group as mentioned above. A closer look at 
the results shows that identification conflicts with parents fell within the moderate 
range. Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference by generation or 
gender. Conflicts in identification with Kashmiri biraderi fall within the moderate 
range for older generation Kashmiris and within the high range for the younger 
generation Kashmiris. Identification conflicts with Asian men and women fell within 
the high range for the older generation and were significantly lower for the younger 
generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference in identification 
conflicts with Asian men at a significance of F=S.029; df=l ,66; p<0.01 and Asian 
women at a significance ofF=S.262; df=l ,66; p<0.01. 
Identification conflicts with the Jammia Masjid also fell within the moderate range 
for the younger generation Kashmiri individuals. Identification conflicts fell within 
the low range for the older generation and analysis of variance found a significant 
generational difference F=l 1.776 df=l ,44; p<0.001. Conflicts in identification with 
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the political entity of JKLF fell within the low range for the older generation but 
within the moderate range for the older generation women and the younger 
generation. Analysis of variance did not reveal a generational difference but a 
difference by gender was found. Women have higher identification conflicts with the 
JKLF at a significance level of F=S.816; df= 1, 44; p<0.01. Overall self-evaluation 
lies within the high range for all respondents and analysis of variance found no 
generational or gender differences. Combined with moderate levels of identity 
diffusion this indicates that identification conflicts are acting as a resource for 
redefinition of identity towards updated identifications. 6 
From the above some general patterns of younger generation identification conflicts 
with the older generation can be identified. The results suggest that the younger 
generation have high identification conflicts with representatives of their own 
culture. This difference reflects their dual socialisation, with early socialisation 
within their own ethnic group and increasing socialisation with white dominant 
society through school, university, work and the media. Moderate levels of current 
identity diffusion and high levels of current overall self-evaluation suggest that for 
the younger generation Kashmiris, identification conflicts with their own ethnic 
group may be the impetus for the redefinition and thereby maintenance in updated 
form of their ethnic identity.7 Results are in contradistinction to proposition four, 
which proposes the commonly held perceptions of generational culture conflict 
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within the Kashmiri community and the associated negative self-evaluation. 8 Results 
therefore suggest that whilst there is a difference in identification conflicts between 
the older and younger generation this difference is not about culture conflict, which 
is often translated as the younger generation being "caught between two cultures," 
but rather redefinition of identity. In other words the process of enculturation.9 
Whilst it is true that different age cohorts are operating under different influences, 
and that these influences are significantly different enough to make marked 
generational differences, these dissimilarities do not translate into inter-generational 
conflict along the lines of cultural conflict. Rather that inter-generational conflict 
may reflect "normal" differences between young and old and not necessarily 
differences about whether the young wish not to identify with the Kashmiri 
community. 
There was no sign in the interviews and the ISA results suggesting that the 
enculturation process of youth and the resistance to that enculturation by the older 
cohort caused inter-generational conflict. It is only possible to read this inter­
generational conflict as a conflict arising out of cultural schizophrenia, if the 
analysts assume the unproblematic relationship between certain traits and practices 
and British society (for example a belief in the individual as being intrinsically 
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British), and thus argue that expressing that op1mon 1s subject to a form of 
Anglicisation. 
VI. POSTULATE FIVE: CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTUAL 
REDEFINITION OF IDENTITY AMONGST SECOND GENERATION 
KASHMIRI BRITISH IS TAKING PLACE THROUGH A PROCESS OF 
ENCULTURATION AND RESULTS IN HIGH SELF EVALUATION 
This section presents data in relation to redefinition of second generation identity 
through a process of enculturation rather than acculturation and the extent to which 
this leads to high self-evaluation. As I mentioned previously I have used 
enculturation to explain a process of definition and redefinition of identity by which 
individuals pull together a series of overlapping networks of culture. The results 
outlined in this section suggest that people growing up in an environment where 
more than one culture is salient may identify with elements of the other cultural 
groups. Redefinitions of identity do not lead to either/or scenarios or well 
established negative notions of second generation offspring from ethnic minority 
backgrounds being "stuck between two cultures" as concepts of acculturation 
imply.t10 Enculturation allows for redefinitions of identity, which remove notions of 
victimisation and allow space for high self-evaluation. 
To investigate contemporary redefinitions of identity amongst young Kashmiris this 
section investigates the younger cohort's identifications with their own ethnic 
group. It also investigates the extent to which partial identifications with the 
dominant white ethnic group are occurring and the extent to which these lead to 
positive conceptions of one1s own ethnic group and the consequences these 
identifications have for overall self evaluation. 1 1  
I t  was assumed that young Kashmiris would maintain distinctiveness of their 
identity through high levels of empathetic identification with their own group 
including religious, cultural, and political representations. Redefinitions of ethnic 
identity are also occurring through enculturation of elements of the dominant 
culture, which form part of young Kashmiris' identity structures. The following 
central collective features of Kashmiri identity were selected for exploration, 
parents, Kashmiri biraderi, Jammia Masjid and the JKLF. Elements of dominant 
culture which have an impact on young Kashmiri socialisation through for example 
schooling, generally living in Luton were selected as English men and women, John 
Major, British Media, and Luton University. 
In order to highlight the partial cross-identifications with the Anglo-Saxon group 
and partial cross-identifications with the dominant community a sample of older 
generation Kashmiris is also highlighted. If the younger generation is indeed going 
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through a process of enculturation then it is expected that they will have higher 
empathetic identification with the Anglo-Saxon entities than would the older 
generation whilst simultaneously identifying with their own ethnic group, which 
would lead to positive evaluations, given that their own ethnic group is esteemed 
and held in high regard. 12 
A. Enculturation and the Maintenance of Distinctiveness 
Results suggest that the younger generation members of the Kashmiri community in 
Luton have partial identifications with institutions and emblems of the white 
dominant community. When compared with the older generation Kashmiris, results 
indicate low overall identification with white dominant community but this 
identification is nevertheless higher than that for the older generation. Younger 
generation Kashmiris are partially identifying with representations of the dominant 
culture. Partial identification is taking place with English men and women, political 
representations such as British political parties, British media and British 
educational institutions. 
For the younger generation some partial identifications with the Anglo-Saxon 
entities is taking place. When compared with the older generation Kashmiri 
individuals, mean values indicate higher identification with Anglo-Saxon entities for 
the younger generation. A closer look at the results highlights that empathetic 
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identification with English men and women fell within the low range for all 
individuals but was significantly higher for the younger generation. A generational 
difference in current empathetic identification occurred at a significance level of 
F=25.732;df=l ,65; p<0.0001 with English women and F=20. 867; df=l ,65 ; p<0.001 
with English men. Empathetic identification with John Major fell within the low 
range for all individuals but the younger generation had higher levels of 
identification. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference at a 
significance level ofF=12.226; df=l ,61; p<0.001. 
All Kashmiri individuals have low empathetic identification with British media and 
Luton University. As with empathetic identifications with English men and women, 
younger Kashmiris have higher identifications when compared to the older 
generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference in empathetic 
identification at a significance level of F=6. 194; 1,57; p<0.0 1  (British media) and 
F=7.020; df=l,32; p<0.05 (Luton University). 
Results suggest that the younger generation is identifying more with elements of the 
majority Anglo-Saxon culture than the older generation. As mentioned above this is 
to be expected since the young Kashmiris have experienced more years of their 
socialisation in Britairi. The results therefore support the idea that individuals will 
form partial identifications with dominant culture will exist where individuals are 
witnesses to other ethnic groups. 
If the concept of acculturation, however, were to hold fast then would be very 
limited identifications with elements of individuals' own ethnic expected. 13 Research 
shows that the younger generation Kashmiris simultaneously empathetically identify 
with individuals and elements ( cultural, religious and political) of their own group. 
Identifications with elements of own ethnic group are lower for the younger 
generation than the older generation. This is to be expected if, as the above section 
highlights, some partial cross-ethnic identifications are taking place with elements of 
the dominant culture. 
Results show that, for the older generation, mean values for empathetic 
identification with the cultural entity of parents falls within the high range. Younger 
generation empathetic identification with parents is lower. Analysis of variance 
revealed a generational difference at a significance level F=52.744; df=l ,64; 
p<0.0001 .  The institution of Kashmiri biraderi is very important to the older 
generation. Empathetic identification falls within the high range. Empathetic 
identification is significantly lower for the younger generation F=48.071; df=l ,  1 66; 
p<0.001. 
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The younger generation Kashmiris are maintaining religious activities and 
obligations. Identifications with the Jammia Masjid fell within the low range for 
older and younger generation Kashmiri individuals. However it is interesting to note 
that identification with the Jammia Masjid was higher for the younger generation 
than for the older generation. However analysis of variance did not find this 
difference to be significant. This generational pattern of identifications with 
Mosques and related activities may be due to the ongoing mosque disputes in 
Luton, which have involved many older members of the community and led to 
overall disillusionment with community establishment. The younger generation have 
been more removed from these local disputes which may be one explanation for 
higher identification with mosques. Identification with the JKLF falls within the high 
range for the older generation. Empathetic identification is lower for the younger 
generation. Analysis of variance revealed a generational difference in identification 
with the JKLF at a significance level ofF=32. 182; df=l,64; p<0.0001. 
It was anticipated that redefinitions of identity would lead to high levels of self­
esteem amongst the Kashmiri offspring.14 Levels of self-esteem fell within the high 
range for the older generation. Although levels of self-esteem were lower for the 
younger generation they still fell within the moderate range. Analysis of variance 
Mosque Noor, Madina Mosque, Jammia Masjid, and the Luton Islamic Society). 
found the difference to be significant at a level ofF=l 1. 836; df=l ,66; p<0.001. This 
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is to be expected since the older generation have more well established value 
systems that are subject to fewer outside influences than the younger generation 
who have been born and brought up in the United Kingdom. Scores for self-esteem 
do not differ significantly by gender. Current self-evaluation fell within the high 
range. Analysis of variance did not show any marked differences in overall self­
evaluation by generation or gender. 
The results above suggest that the younger generation continue to identify with 
aspects of their own culture. Since identification with own culture remains high 
regardless of partial identifications with the dominant we can assume that a process 
of enculturation is indeed taking place. Strong identifications with own ethnic 
group's cultural values and beliefs and partial identification with the white group are 
also leading to high overall self-evaluation. The young Kashmiris interviewed are far 
from being "stuck between two cultures". They are enculturating into aspects 
British values such as ideas of Western democracy, notions of justice and 
entertainment which reflect into various British institutions. They are redefining 
their identity into a contemporary Kashmiri British context. 
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VII. POSTULATE SIX: THE CENTRALITY OF GENDER ROLES IN 
REDEFINITIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY This section presents data in relation to the role of gender within the redefinition of ethnic identity. Results presented for postulate five above have highlighted that contemporary redefinitions in identity are taking place among the Kashmiri offspring. Gender identities are central to ethnic identity redefinitions since they are closely bound to the specific cultural milieu of ethnic groups. 15 Certainly the form and function ofiKashmiri society is bound by gender dynamics. Gender roles and the relationship between men and women are central features of Kashmiri society and are continuously reinforced by community, culture and religion. Whilst it is the case that I found very few significant gender effects for the discussions of the preceding postulates I felt that redefinitions of identity would be most strongly felt with respect to identifications with the opposite gender from own group and identifications with English and women. 
A. Changes in Gender Roles Results for gender identifications did reveal some interesting patterns. Kashmiri individuals and especially the younger generation are empathetically identify with English men and to some extent women (mean values fall within the low range for all respondents. Analysis of variance found a significant generational difference for English men F=20.867; 1,65; p<0.0001 and English women F=25.732; 1,65; 
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p<0.0001. Mean values for empathetic identification with Asian men and women 
were higher but fell within the low range for older Kashmiri female identification 
with Asian men. 
Details of mean values for identification conflicts with English men and women and 
Asian men and women show that identification conflicts fell within the moderate 
range for all respondents except for older men with Asian men and older females 
with Asian men and women. Identification for these individuals fell within the high 
range. Analysis of variance found the generation difference to be significant with 
Asian men F=0.034; df=l,66; p<0.01 and Asian women F=S.262; df=l,66; p<0.01. 
Results for evaluation of self and others show that Kashmiri respondents have low 
overall evaluation of English men and women. Mean values fell within the low range 
for older Kashmiri men and women's evaluation of Anglo-Saxon men and women. 
Whilst younger Kashmiris also had low evaluations of Anglo-Saxon men and 
women they were higher than the evaluations of the older generation. Analysis of 
variance found this generational difference to be significant for English men 
F=25 .575;df=l,65;  p<0.000, English women F=29.68 l ;df=l ,65; p<0.0001, Asian 
men F=7.669df=l ,66; p<0.01 and Asian women F=4.752; df=l ,66; p<0.05. 
412 
Mean values did show some gender differences. Highest evaluation is with own 
gender and falls within the moderate range. Younger generation Kashmiri women 
have low evaluation of Asian men and also have a poor view of own gender. 
Kashmiri men have a higher evaluation of English women than do Kashmiri women. 
Overall evaluation falls within the low range suggesting that both genders do not 
hold English men or English women with overall high regard. Analysis of variance 
did not however find this difference to be significant. 
We have already seen above that contrary to popular belief redefinitions in identity 
within young members of ethnically marked communities do not lead to low levels 
of self-evaluation. It is perhaps worth repeating here that levels of self-evaluation 
did not vary considerably between the genders. Gender dynamics appear to be 
playing some part in redefinitions of Kashmiri ethnic identity but these were not as 
extensive as I expected them to be. All Kashmiris had higher identifications with 
Asian men and women whilst identifications with English men and women were 
higher for the younger Kashmiris. vm. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING KASHMIRI IDENTITY 
In this study I have followed a dual approach to the analysis of my subject. On the 
one hand I have relied on interview data on what could be called an oral history 
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approach to uncover what Kashmiris thought and the metaphors they relied on to 
tell stories about themselves. The second approach was a commitment to ISA 
instruments, constructed using the results of the ethnographic fieldwork, as a way of 
giving a degree of rigour to the findings but also examining how by looking at the 
same subject in a slightly different light what contrasts might emerge. What the ISA 
chapters have shown in a theoretically and mathematically thorough language 
supports the more impressionistic conclusions derived from interviews. 
The absence of "cultural conflict" as a generalised phenomenon either along 
"generational" or gender lines is clearly evident in this assessment of the six research 
postulates. This finding strongly points to the way in which the process of 
enculturation is at work. Kashmiri identity is being transformed partly due to the 
consequences of immigration and settlement in Britain but also due to a number of 
developments in the rest of the world. Thus Kashmiri identity like other 
subjectivities is a process rather than an end state. 
It is clear from the ISA results that the younger cohort of Kashmiris is transforming 
the meaning of what it is to be Kashmiri. It is important to note that this is a 
transformation of "Kashmiriyat" rather than about abandonment or negation. For 
example when young Kashmiris are more willing to take on "love marriages" rather 
than arranged marriages they do not see moving from one to the other as 
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proceeding from Kashmiri to Western identity. They still define themselves as 
Kashmiri and would not readily admit they are Anglicised or diluting their identity. 
For young Kashmiris the idea of love marriages may no longer be a marker of 
Anglo-Saxon identity but it may be a more general form of the way marriage should 
be. In other words, that is the way that everyone marries in contemporary times. 
This can be seen by the way in which the Kashmiri idea of arranged marriage tends 
to differ from the Western conception of arranged marriage. That is, the way in 
which all respondents pointed to an absence of coercion and its pragmatic 
advantages, whereas in Western eyes it is usually seen as coercive and intrinsically 
misogynist. 
Like the notion of arranged marriages the idea of the extended family is also being 
transformed but this transformation cannot be read as a simple move towards the 
nuclear family despite the fact that in Luton there are many structural pressures that 
would favour the nuclear family over extended families. Take for example the size 
of dwellings and recognition of the importance of family members such as 
grandparents, aunts and uncles etc. It is true that the extended family in Luton is not 
the same as the extended family in Kotli. What is not the case however is that 
somehow the family in Kotli is more Kashmiri than the extended family in Luton. 
What my findings show is that the development of a Kashmiri identity has occurred 
in very different locations but there is no primary Kashmiri identity through which 
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one could argue that Kashmiris in Luton are less Kashmiri than their counterparts in Kotli. My ISA results clearly point to the way in which Kashmiri identity has expanded to include elements which conventionally would not be seen to be part ofiKashmiri life. Kashmiris are no longer primarily agricultural. They have largely become part of the remittance-based economy. All of these factors suggest that we need to take more seriously the notion of understanding Kashmiri identity in its fragmented and dispersed totality. We need to know how to connect Kashmiriness as it is articulated in British towns such as Luton to the way that Kashmiriness is articulated in Azad Kashmir and indeed around the world. A way of doing this would be to use the notion of diaspora. I will look at this in the final chapter. Results suggest that cultural networks, religion and nationalistic affiliation are currently central to the development of Kashmiri identity. Inter­generational differences amongst Kashmiris do not correspond to static notions of cultural differences but rather demonstrate the process of the redefinition of identity in the radically different context of settlement in Britain. Clearly the Kashmiri community is in a state of flux. To paraphrase Antonio Gramsci, the old is dying and the new has not yet been born. Traditional networks and structures of Kashmiri 
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life have had to be redefined in the context of settlement in Britain. So far this 
redefinition seems to be occurring without a dilution of a sense of "Kashmiriness". 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Recall that the recognition in another of characteristics one feels one has in common with another is termed empathetic identification. Individuals may want to emulate these characteristics or indeed dissociate from them, such that that though they possess them, they wish not to. 
2 I did not use the indices of past identification conflicts, as I was more interested in current identity structures. The results are however available in the Appendices. 
3 Identification conflicts with Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir fall within the high range for the older generation and within the moderate range for the younger generation but analysis of variance did not find this difference to be significant. 
4 Ahmed Andrews talks of this. See Andrews, 1993, PP. 68-95. 
5 See Weinreich, 1983 and Kelly, 1989. 
6 Earlier ISA studies have also found this to be true. See Weinreich, 1983, Kelly, 1989 and Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996. 
7 See Weinreich, 1983, Northover, 1988, Kelly, 1989 and Weinreich, Kelly and Maja, 1987 and 1988. 
8 This is a principal ISA postulate-that large identification conflicts provide the "engine" for the identification process. In this sense it is a resource. 
9 See Weinreich, 1979. 
10 I am aware that writers such as Weinreich, Ballard and others have challenged this notion of "stuck between two cultures" twenty years ago. My use of this notion again in this research highlights how these ideas remain in academic and popular accounts of ethnicised communities. This demonstrates how difficult it is to alter these views. On this point this research supports many earlier ISA studies such as Weinreich, 1979, which suggests that there is accumulating evidence with which to challenge these false descriptions. 
1 1  Weinreich, Luk and Bond, 1996 look at the self-evaluation of Hong Kong Chinese students in relation to identifications with other cultural groups. 
12 If they had poor evaluation of their own group, then close empathetic identification with them would be associated with low self evaluation. The point here is that, despite another groups low evaluation of one's own group (alter-ascribed social identity) one's own evaluation of one's own group is generally high. Weinreich makes this point in his Bristol study. See Weinreich, 1979. 
1 3  Berry's notion of acculturation and particularly his strategies of integration allow for partial identifications. 
14 Recall that self esteem or self-evaluation is seen as the extent to which individuals see themselves as implementing or failing to implement their identity aspirations. Self esteem is defined in terms of the individuals own value and belief system. 
1 5  See Weinreich, 1983 . 
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CONCLUSION: RE-THINKING ETHNIC IDENTITIES 
Over the last fifty years there has been a growing conviction among Kashmiris that 
they constitute a distinct people with their own way of life. The rise of Kashmiri 
consciousness has occurred despite the fact that the Kashmiris have been unable to 
form a sovereign nation state. In many ways Kashmiri identity harks back to a 
previous century when many people defined themselves as a nation even before they 
acquired statehood. 1 In contrast, most of the de-colonisation that has occurred in this 
century has tended to emphasise the role of states informing nations. The Kashmiri 
case differs from that of nineteenth century nationalism in the way in which it has 
been profoundly affected by the forces of globalisation. 
Kashmiris came to Britain in the 1950s and 1960s as part of the large 
Commonwealth migration. Even though they constituted one of the largest segments 
of post-war immigration and settlement they remained invisible and unrecognised. 
For the British authorities they were part of the South Asian immigrant population. 
For South Asians they were mainly Pakistanis and for Pakistanis they were Pakistani 
or Mirpuris. All of these designations were ascribed to the Kashmiris. 
The development of a Kashmiri consciousness was linked to four main factors. 
Firstly, Kashmiri settlement in Britain meant that the Kashmiris were relocated in a 
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society in which their ability to champion Kashmiri identity was unlikely to provoke the ire of state authorities ( contrast this with the situation of Kashmiris in Pakistani and Indian occupied Kashmir) Also, skills learnt through the process of immigration could be utilised for broader aims once settlement was complete. For example lobbying local authorities for welfare provision helped develop awareness amongst Kashmiris of how to operate within the British political context. This ability could then be used to articulate a distinct Kashmiri identity. Secondly, as with most South Asian post war immigration to Britain the Kashmiris continued to maintain core and frequent ties with friends and relatives in what was viewed as the Pakistani Occupied Kashmir. So that kinship ties, a remittance economy, the circulation of marriage partners, all of these in addition to other forms of communication such as telecommunications and letters, helped to maintain links between Luton, Mirpur and Kotli districts. These links however did not just help bind the Kashmiri settlers in Luton with those in Kashmir but also helped to articulate a notion of "Kashmiriyat" which is transnational . Thirdly, the crisis of British identity allowed many of Britain' s ethnicised minorities to abandon their ascribed identities in favour of projects in which they articulated their own subjectivites. The breakdown or at least the weakening of overarching categories such as Black allowed Kashmiris to articulate their own identity as distinct 
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from other ethnic communities. The unravelling of the "Rainbow Alliance" allowed 
many groups to claim that they were a separate ethnic formation. Among these were 
also Kashmiris. 
Fourthly, the above three developments provided the setting through which the 
consequences of events in South Asia could be played out. So that events such as the 
construction of the Mangla Dam, the formation of Bangladesh, the Indo-Pakistan 
wars and uprisings in Indian Occupied Kashmir all became episodes in the story of 
Kashmiri nationhood. "Kashmiriyat" then emerges as a diasporic formation. A 
community, now located transnationally, has dispersed from the villages of Mirpur 
and Kotli districts in Azad Kashmir to the streets of "Bury Park". Despite its 
dispersal it manages to gather a large number of people who subscribe to it. 
My research demonstrates that the failure of the Kashmiri nationalist movement to 
form a nation state has to be tempered by recognition of their success in forging a 
diaspora. Interviewee after interviewee was clearly beholden to the vocabulary, 
beliefs and values that emanate from the discourse on Kashmiriness. What many 
people may find surprising is, given its inauspicious situation, how durable the idea 
of Kashmir has become. So much so that even children of Kashmiris, who were born 
and schooled in this country, who could not recognise Kashmir on the map and who 
do not speak the language, still celebrate Eid by waving the Kashmiri flag. Both my 
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observer-participant data and my ISA results point to the continuing salience of 
Kashmiriness for those born and brought up in Britain. 
Culture and religion in the form of Islam were also important to Kashmiris and made 
up what they saw as Kashmiriness. The most prominent dimension of Kashmiriness 
currently appears to be national affiliation. The conventions of cultural-conflict and 
cultural schizophrenia do not present themselves in the situation of Kashmiris in 
Luton. That is not to say that there were no differences between Kashmiris born and 
brought up here and those who were settlers to Britain, but those differences were 
about redefinition and the re-articulation of Kashmiriness rather than its 
abandonment. For example, the institutions of arranged marriage and gender roles 
are being transformed but they are still distinct from marriage and male-female 
dynamics amongst the Anglo-Saxons. These transformations are not seen as a move 
away from Kashmiriness but simply a (re-) interpretation of what it means to be 
Kashmiri in Luton. 
Whether cultural, religious or political, ideas of "Kashmiriyat" were produced and 
disseminated by a number of agencies ranging from intellectuals such as Maqbool 
Butt and Amanullah Khan to local community leaders. The work of these men has 
not only been essential to give coherence to the idea of Kashmiri nationalism, but 
they have also contributed more generally to developing "Kashmiriyat". In many 
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homes in Luton you can find pictures of Maqbool Butt without necessarily implying 
a clear understanding of his project. In this sense Maqbool Butt operates as a symbol 
of "Kashmiriyat" and not just as an advocate ofKashmiri nationalism. 
Apart from the intellectuals, community centres and the organisation of community 
festivals are an important means of spreading the discourse of "Kashmiriyat". For 
example, anything ranging from birthday parties to religious festivals all gave space 
for discussion around what it was to be Kashmiri, whether this was the issue of being 
an independent state or the establishment of the latest Kashmiri accountants' firm in 
"Bury Park" . In other words all these became venues for the spread of ideas about 
"Kashmiriyat". In particular the formation of political organisations dedicated to 
advancing the cause of Kashmiri sovereignty have helped to further the idea that the 
Kashmiri people are not only distinct in South Asia but also that Kashmiris form a 
particular ethnicity in a multi-racial, multi-cultural Britain. The importance of this 
can be seen with the recently established Kashmiri National Identity Campaign 
(KNIC) in Bradford on 24 January. This national umbrella organisation aims to 
advance the general awareness of Kashmiris as a separate ethnic group, the idea 
being that this will avoid their frequent labelling as Pakistanis or Indians, promote 
Kashmiri identity including culture, religion and national interests and lead to the 
provision and delivery of more equitable services. One of the interesting paradoxes 
ofKashmiri politics is the way in which the existence of Azad Kashmir both hinders 
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and contributes to the development of Kashmiriness. These producers of 
"Kashmiriyat" are the main sources of Kashmiri identity. The question remains why 
was it that they were successful in recruiting so many people as Kashmiris? 
Given the above descriptions, what kind of community do the Kashmiris form? If 
this question was posed to members of the JKLF they would argue that the 
Kashmiris were a nation but on the other hand if the same question was asked of 
women in "Bury Park" they would reference being Kashmiri as a way of life. Both 
types of respondents agreed that there was something distinctly Kashmiri even 
though there was a huge debate about what that something was and what was 
included in its definition. It is the idea that there is a Kashmiri identity which 
circulates in Luton and other conurbations in Britain but which also circulates in 
South Asia and elsewhere. This circulation has material effects. For example the 
recent decision by Luton and Bradford Borough Councils to recognise Kashmiris as 
one of the main ethnic categories is not only a symbolic gesture but will help fine 
tune service provision for this community. 
The development of Kashmiri identity has been important not only for the Kashmiri 
people but also an example of how a disparate group can forge a collective 
consciousness in the age of globalisation. The Kashmiris are best understood as a 
diaspora, in that they are a community which is dislocated from its (imagined) 
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homeland but which nevertheless continues to see itself as a unit even though its 
location is fragmented. The identity of a diaspora comes about through its 
identification with the referent of am imaginary homeland. As such, diasporic 
formations are constituted by the way in which the imaginary homeland becomes 
constant whilst their contexts change through displacement. This is why it is not 
possible to say that the Kashmiris in Mirpur and Kotli districts are more authentically 
Kashmiri than young Kashmiris in Luton. Kashmiriness is something that is being 
defined and redefined in the various contexts in which Kashmiri settlers find 
themselves. Kashmiriness is an idea that floats along the circuit of the remittance 
economy and global telecommunications so that it may be true to say that Kashmiris 
in Luton are not what Kashmiris used to be. This however will also be the case for 
Kashmiris in the Mirpur and Kotli districts of Azad Kashmir. In effect what it means 
to be Kashmiri in these areas has been affected by Kashmiri immigration and 
settlement in the same way as immigration has affected those Kashmiris settled in 
Britain. 
I started this thesis by looking at the way m which ideas of assimilation and 
acculturation, steeped as many of them are in notions of traditionalist Western 
superiority, produced models which would have seen the gradual dissolution of 
Kashmiri identity as a consequence of its settlement in a tautologically adherent, 
highly urbanised society. As my research has shown this is far from being the case. 
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Kashmiris are not disappearing but actually appearing in more and more locations. 
The emergence of "Kashmiriyat", the assertion of a Kashmiri identity, points to a 
process not of nativist rebellion or some atavistic "return" to their roots but the 
creation of a new subjectivity. 
Kashmiri identity does not simply mean the uncovering of a primordial Kashmiriness 
shorn of its layers of repression. It means the articulation of a new subject position 
that takes the language of "Kashmiriness" but redefines it and makes it alive and 
relevant for the contemporary world. Enculturation is the name that is given to this 
process. Ultimately enculturation is about how we hold onto notions of our 
community while at the same time living with all the changes that time and 
circumstances throw at us. Enculturation is what stops the Kashmiris becoming 
another ethnographic exhibit in the museum of mankind. The Kashmiris have learnt 
how to be Kashmiris not just outside Kashmir but outside the historical notions of 
what it was to be Kashmiri. 
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1 ENDNOTES For an account of the process of early state formation see Tilly, 1990. 
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Appendix 4.1 Biographical questionnaire COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIR! COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE NASREEN ALI UNIVERSITY OF LUTON 
31-35 
36-40 41-45 51-55 PERSONAL DATA QI. Name Q6. What is your Nationality according to yourpassport? British Pakistani 2 Indian 3Q2. Gender Male 1 Female 2 Q3. Which of the foUowing age categories do you fit into? 16-20. l 21-25 2 26-30 3 Dual 4 (please specify) Other 5 (please specify) Q7. What qualifications do you have? 4 5 QS. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majorif 6 of your basic FE education? 7 In your country of origin 56-60 8 61-65 9 66-70 10 71-75 1 1  76-80 12 
80+ 13 
Q4. What is your marital status? 
Single 1 
Married 2 
Widow(er) 3 
Divorced 4 
Separated 5 
QS. How many children do you have? 
One 1 
Two 2 
Three 3 
Four 4 
Five 5 
More than five 6 
None 7 
In the United Kingdom 2 
Other 
(please specify) 3 
Q9. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majorit 
of your higher education? 
In your country of origin 1 
In the United Kingdom 2 
Other 
(please specify) 3 
QlO. What was your employment status in your 
country of origin before coming to the United 
Kingdom? (answer if applicable) 
Employed
(go onto Ql 1} 
Unemployed 2 
Not seeking employment 3 
Student 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
1 
Qll. If employed what was your
occupation in your country of origin before 
movmg to the United Kingdom? (answer i f  
appl icable) 
Q12. What is your employment status on first 
arriving in the United Kmgdom?(answer if 
applicable) 
Employed 1 
Unemployed 2 
Notseekingemployment 3 
Student 4 
Other 5 
(please specify) 
·································································•'-----
Q13. If employed what was your occupation on 
first arriving m the United Kingdom? (answer if 
applicable) 
-----·····································"••···· .. ··· 
Q14. What is your current employment 
status in the United Kingdom? 
Employed 1 
Unemployed 2 
Notseekingemployment 3 
Student 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q15. If employed what is your current 
occupation ? (answer if applicable) 
................................................................................................................................. 
Q16. Are r.ou a member of any 
community group/s? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Ql 9) 
Q17. Can you name these groups? 
u .............................................................................................. u .......................................... 
Q18. What are the purposes of these 
groups? 
Ql 9. Are you a member of any 
political group? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q22) 
Q20. Can you name these groups? 
Q21. What are the purposes of these 
groups? 
MIGRATION DATA 
Q22. Country of Birth? 
Q23. Date of arrival in the United 
Kingdom? (answer i f  appl icable) 
Q24. Area/region of birth? 
Q25. Town/village of birth? 
Q26. What were your reasons for moving 
to Britain? (answer i f  applicable) 
Work 1 
Education 2 
Marriage 3 
Joining family 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q27; Who motivated/influenced you to move to 
the United Kingdom? 
Q28. Were you sponsored e.g. given financial 
assistance ? 
Yes 1 
No 
(go onto Q31) 
2 
Q29. Was your sponsor a relative or someone 
from the same town/village as you already in the 
United Kingdom? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Other 3 
(please specify) 
.................................... ·---·----............................. . 
Q30. Was employment arranged for you on 
arrival to the United Kingdom? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Q31. Were you married before arriving in the 
United Kingdom? (answer if applicable) 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Q32. Do you or any member of your household 
have any plans to make a permanent move back 
to your country of origin? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q35) 
Q33. Who is going back? 
Q34. What are your/their main reasons for 
wanting to move back to your/parents country of 
origin? 
RESIDENTIAL DETAILS 
Q35. With respect to your house are you: 
Sole t1wner 
Spouse of sole owner 2 
Joint owner 3 
Tenant 4 
Living with parents 5 
Living with in laws 6 
Q36. Is this your first house in this country? 
Yes 
(go onto Q40) 
No 2 
Q37. With respect to your previous house wer 
you: 
Sole owner 1 
Spouse of sole owner 2 
Joint owner 3 
Tenant 4 
Living with parents 5 
Living with in laws 6 
Q38. Where was your previous house located? 
•••••••••••••••U•n•••••• ....... u••••••••••••••••• .... ••••••••••••••• .... •••••••••u••••••••••••• 
···••·•········ ···..·········..·······•·······..................................................... . 
Q39. What were your primary reasons fot 
moving house? 
....................................................................................................... 
........................................................ u . ................................................ . 
.................................................................................................. 
Q40. Why did you decide to move to Luton? 
......................... ................................................................... ....... 
.................................................................................................... 
Q41. Why did you move into your present are. 
••••••ooo•oo••••••••••••••••oo•••••••••••••••••••••"•••••••••••••••00•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
.................................................................................................... 
Q42. Who did you buy your property from? 
Q43. Did you have any problems when 
purchasing your house? 
Yes 
No 
Q44. What problems did you have? 
............................................................................................................................................................. 
. 
................................................................................................. -.......................................... " ..................................t. 
......................................................................................................................................................_.................... 
Q45. Which of the following are important in 
your decision to live in this .area? 
Closeness to own society 1 
Closeness to schools with 
Kashmiri/Muslim children 2 
Closeness to relatives 3 
Closeness to Asian shops 4 
Closeness to services such as 
Mosques and communitycentres 5 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q46. Do you have any plans to move house 
elsewhere in Luton in the near future? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto QSO) 
Q47. Where in Luton do you plan to move? 
Q48. Why do you plan to move into this 
area/street? 
........................................................................................................... 
Q49. Who are you buying your property from? 
...................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................ 
Q50. Do you have any plans to move out of Lut 
and into another city/town in the United 
Kingdom? 
Yes 
No 2 
(go onto Q55) 
Q51. Can you name the city/town where you 
plan to move? 
·---············-·------··------------............................ 
Q52. Why do you plan to move out of Luton? 
Q53. Will your new home be in any of the 
following areas? 
Near city centre 1 
Suburb 2 
Other 3 
(please specify) 
Q54. Which of the following are important in 
your decision to move to your new area? 
Closeness to own society l 
Closeness to schools with 
Kashmiri/Muslim children 2 
Closeness to relatives 3 
Closeness to Asian shops 4 
Closeness to services such as 
Mosques and community centres 5 
Other 6 
(please specify) 
Q55. How many members of your family 
are there presently living in your house? 
One 1 
Two 2 
Three 3 
Four 4 
Five 5 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q56. Do you have any relatives <outside of your house) living in the United Kingdom? Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q58) Q57. Where in the United Kingdom are theylocated? Living within the next few streets 1 Living in other areas of Luton 2 Living in the South East 3 Living in the United Kingdom. 4 Q58. Do you live as an extended family(Le living with immediate family and their spouses and children)? Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q60) Q59. Why do you live as an extended family? 
···································-----·········································--···· 
-----·---------· ---------MAINTENANCE OF LINKS DATA Q60. Have you or any children/young adult(s) in your houseliold made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for education? Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q62) Q61. Why did you go/send children/young adult(s) to your/parents country of origin for education? Q62. Have you or any children/ young adult(s) in your household made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for marriage? Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q64) Q63. Why did you go/send children/,youngadult�s) to your/parents country of origin for marnage? .............................................. ............................... ,u •••••••••••••••••••• ................................................................... ................................. Q64. Do you have relatives in your/parents country of origin? Yes No 2 Q65. Do you or members of your fami1y living with you in the same house own land in your/parents country of origin? Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q67) Q66. Did you /they own this land before or after moving to the United kingdom? Before my/ their move to the UK 1 After my/ their move to the lJK 2 Born in the UK 3 Q67. Do you or members of your family living with you in the same house own propert;r, in your/parents country of origin? (answer 1f applicable) Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q 69) Q68. Did you own this property before or afte1 moving to the United kingdom? (answer if  applicable) Before my/ their move to the UK 1 After my/their move to the UK 2 Born in  the UK 3 Q69.Do you or any member of your family livi with you in the same house have any investmt in the United Kingdom? Yes 1 No 2 (go onto Q71) 
Q70. Do any of tbe following describe these 
investments? 
House currently resident in 
Property 
Business 
1 
2 
3 
Shares 4 
Land 5 
Other 
(please specify) 
······························---·······················----
Q71. Do you regularly send back money to your 
family and relatives in your/parents country of 
origin? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q 73) 
Q72. Do you expect any returns on the money 
sent to your family and relatives in your/parents 
country of origin? 
Yes l 
No 2 
(go onto Q 7 4) 
Q73. What type- of returns do you expect? 
Q74. How often do you or members of your 
household return to your country of origin? 
More than once a year 1 
Once a year 2 
Once every five years 3 
Other 4 
(please specify) 
Q75. Why do you/they return this often? 
NOTES 
Appendix 4.1 Biographical questionnaire COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIR! COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONNAIRE NASREEN ALI UNIVERSITY OF LUTON-
---------·-- -----·----------------------------------
PERSON AL DATA----------------------------- ·-----
Ql. Name 
Q2. Gender 
Male 
Female 2 
Q3. Which of the foJlowing age categories 
do you fit into? 
16-20 1 
21-25 2 
26-30 3 
31-35 4 
36-40 5 
41-45 6 
51-55 7 
56-60 8 
61-65 9 
66-70 10 
71-75 1 1  
76-80 12 
80+ 13  
Q4. What is your marital status? 
Single 1 
Married 2 
Widow(er) 3 
Divorced 4 
Separated 5 
QS. How many children do you have? 
One 1 
Two 2 
Three 3 
Four 4 
Five 5 
More than five 6 
None 7 
Q6. What is your Nationality according to your
passport? 
Bri tish 
Pakistani 2 
Indian 3 
Dual 4 
(please specify) 
Other 5 
(please specify) 
Q7. What qualifications do you have? 
QS. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majorif 
of your basic FE education? 
In your country of origin l 
In the United Kingdom 2 
Other 
(please specify) 3 
Q9. Where did/have you receive(ed) the majorit 
of your higher education? 
In your country of origin 1 
lnthe United Kingdom 2 
Other 
(please specify) 3 
Q10. What was your employment status in your
country of origin before coming to the United 
Kingdom? (answer if applicable) 
Employed 
(go onto Ql 1) 
Unemployed 2 
Not seeking employment 3 
Student 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
······ ... .................. .............. ...... ....................... .... ............................. ........ . ... .. ...
Qll. If employed what was your
occupation in your country of origin before 
moving to the United Kingdom? (answer i f  
appl icable) 
Q12. What is your employment status on first 
arriving in the United Kmgdom?(answcr if 
applicable) 
Employed 1 
Unemployed 2 
Notseekingemployment 3 
Student 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q13. If employed what was your occupation on 
first arriving m the United Kingdom? (answer i f  
applicable) 
.................................................................. u••·••n••··••u••······· .................................. . 
Q14. What is your current employment 
status in the United Kingdom? 
Employed 1 
Unemployed 2 
Notseekingemployment 3 
Student 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
.................................................................................................................... ............ 
Q15. If employed what is your current 
occupation ? (answer if applicable) 
Q18. What are the purposes of these 
groups? 
Ql 9. Are you a member of any
p_olitical group? 
Yes 
No 2 
(go onto Q22) 
Q20. Can you name these groups? 
Q21. What are the purposes of these 
groups? 
----------------· --------MIGRATION DATA-------------------·-------------
Q22. Country of Birth? 
Q23. Date of arrival in the United 
Kingdom? (answer i f  appl icable) 
Q24. Area/region of birth? 
Q16. Are r.ou a member of any 
commumty group/s? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Ql 9) 
Q17. Can you name these groups? 
.................................................................................... ................................. .. 
······ ································ ··· ································ ······················· ·· ··· ····· 
Q25. Town/village of birth? 
Q26. What were your reasons for moving 
to Britain? (answer if applicable) 
Work 1 
Education 2 
Marriage 3 
Joining family 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q27. Who motivated/influenced you to move to 
the United Kingdom? 
Q28. Were you sponsored e.g. given financial 
assistance ? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q31 )  
Q29. Was your sponsor a relative or someone 
from the same town/village as you already in the 
United Kingdom? 
Yes 
No 2 
Other 3 
(please specify) 
Q30. Was employment arranged for you on 
arrival to the United Kingdom? 
Yes l 
No 2 
Q31. Were you married before arriving in the 
United Kingdom? (answer if applicable) 
Yes 1 
No 2 
Q32. Do you or any member of your household 
have any plans to make a permanent move back 
to your country of origin? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q35) 
Q33. Who is going back? 
Q34. What are your/their main reasons for 
wanting to move back to your/parents country of 
origin? 
--------·····-·--·-·----------RESIDENTIAL DETAILS 
Q35. With respect to your house are you: 
Sole l)wner 
Spouse of sole owner 2 
Joint owner 3 
Tenant 4 
Living with parents 5 
Living with in laws 6 
Q36. Is this your first house in this country? 
Yes 
(go onto Q40) 
No 2 
Q37. With respect to your previous house wer 
you: 
Sole owner 1 
Spouse of sole mvner 2 
Joint owner 3 
Tenant 4 
Living with parents 5 
Living with in laws 6 
Q38. Where was your previous house located? 
Q39. What were your primary reasons fo,;
moving house? 
Q40. Why did you decide to move to Luton? 
Q41. Why did you move into your present are. 
Q42. Who did you buy your property from? Q43. Did you have any problems when purchasing your house? 
Yes No Q44. What problems did you have? Q45. Which of the following are important in your decision to live in this .area? 
Closeness to own society 1 
Closeness to schools with 
Kashmiri/Muslim children 2 
Closeness to relatives 3 
Closeness to Asian shops 4 
Closeness to services such as 
Mosques and community centres 5 
Other 6 
(please specify) Q46. Do you have any plans to move house elsewhere in Luton in the near future? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto QSO) Q47. Where in Luton do you plan to move? Q48. Why do you plan to move into this area/street? Q49. Who are you buying your property from? 
••••••••••••••••••••••••---~-••-•m•••••• .......................... ._ ••• , ..... ,, •••••••,, 
.............................. 0 ......................................................................... .. 
QSO. Do you have any plans to move out of Lu! and into another city/town in the United Kingdom? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q55) QSl. Can you name the city/town where youplan to move? QS2. Why do you plan to move out of Luton? QS3. Will your new home be in any of the following areas? 
Near city centre 1 
Suburb 2 
Other 3 
(please specify) QS4. Which of the following are important in your decision to move to your new area? 
Closeness to own society 1 
Closeness to schools with 
Kashmiri/Muslim children 2 
Closeness to relatives 3 
Closeness to Asian shops 4 
Closeness to services such as 
Mosques and community centres 5 
Other 6 
(please specify) 
QSS. How many members of your family are there presently living in your house? 
One l 
Two 2 
Three 3 
Four 4 
Five 5 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q56. Do you have any relatives (outside of your house) living in the United Kingdom? 
Yes ., 
No 2 
(go onto Q58) Q57. Where in the United Kingdom are theylocated? 
Living within the next few streets l 
Living in other areas of Luton 2 
Living in the South East 3 
Living in the United Kingdom. 4 Q58. Do you live as an extended family (i.e living with immediate family and their spouses and children)? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q60) Q59. Why do you live as an extended family? 
MAINTENANCE OF LINKS DATA Q60. Have you or any children/young adult(s) in your houseliold made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for education? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q62) Q61. Why did you go/send children/y:oung adult(s) to your/parents country of origin for education? Q62. Have you or any children/ young adult(s) in your household made extended visits to your/parents country of origin for marriage? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q64) 
Q63. Why did you go/send children/youngadult!s) to your/parents country of origin for marriage? 
• •• • • •• • •••••••••••"''''"'"'"'"'''''0•••••• , . , , . , . , , .,, ,, , ,,oHou,.••••••••••••"•• • 
········································· · ·· ········ ··· ······ ····· ······ ························•····· Q64. Do you have relatives in your/parents country of origin? 
1 
No 2 Q�S. Do Y.Ou or members of your family living with you m the same house own land in your/parents country of origin? 
Yes l 
No 2 
(go onto Q67) Q66. Did you /they own this land before or after moving to the United kingdom? 
Before my/ their move to the UK 1 
Aftermy/ theirmove to the UK 2 
Born in the UK 3 Q67. Do you or members of your family living with you in the same house own property in your/parents country of origin? (answer if 
applicable) 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q 69) Q68. Did you own this property before or after moving to the Uni ted kingdom?
(answer if applicable) 
Before my/ their move to the UK 1 
After my/ their move to the U K  2 
Born in the UK 3 Q69.Do you or any member of your family livi with you in the same house have any investmE in the United Kingdom? 
Yes l 
No 2 
(go onto Q71) 
Q70. Do any of the following describe these NOTES 
investments? 
House currently resident in 1 
Property 2 
Business 3 
Shares 4 
Other 
(please specify) 
Q71. Do you regularly send back money to your 
family and relatives in your/parents country of 
origin? 
Yes 
No 2 
(go onto Q 73) 
Q72. Do you expect any returns on the money sent to your family and relatives in your/parents country of origin? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
(go onto Q 7 4) 
Q73. What type. of returns do you expect? 
Q74. How often do you or members of your household return to your country of origin? 
More than once a year 1 
Once a year 2 
Once every five years 3 
Other 4 
(please specify) 
Q75. Why do you/they return this often? 
Appendix 4.2 Kashmiri (older and younger generation) identity instruments COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIRI COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
�;;t;a-V:t,1J�t,)Jy1£(iYN_j{t.,2u,A IDENTITY STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT OLDER GENERATION 
,.,.,,,...C,Jy:efd..J:U:�_;,:., � 
(2fifl}.) NASREEN ALI UNIVERSITY OF LUTON 
••••• 
····· ····· ····· .....t..... ..... .... . 
Me as r am now 
Person in the coll'l.llluni ty r admire 
JKLF 
Me as I was when I was in 
Azad Kashmir 
Mosque Noor 
Kashmiri biraderi 
Young English women in Luton 
My children born and 
brought up in Azad Kashmir 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
My children born and 
brought up in the UK 
Luton Islamic Society 
Madina Mosque 
J amia Masjid 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare 
Association 
I have warm <1> 1 don't like at all feelings towards 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3  
..... ..... .....t.....t.......... ..... 
..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... ..... ..... 
0 
••on o u o o .o o o o o  • • • • •  • • • • •  • • • • •  • • • • •  
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0 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... ..... ..... 
0 
..... ..... .....t.... .t..... ..... ..... 
0 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... ..... ..... 
0 
····· ···-- ····· .....t..... ..... .... . 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... .... . ..... 
0 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 
Muslim Conference •••h•ou•••u••• ••••••••••••oo••• 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
N arasimha Rao 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
Luton University 
Kashmiri Music 
0 
..... ..... .....t.... .t.......... ..... 
0 
..... ..... .... .t.....t. . .. .......... 
0 
..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... . .... 
..... ..... .....t.....t. .... ..... ..... 
•••••••u•••••••• , 0 0 0 0 .0 00 0 • .••00• ••••• 
..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 
..... ..... .....t......t..... ..... ..... 
0 
. 
0 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
..... ....... .....t..... ····· ··•·· ····· .
..... ..... ... .. ···· ····· --··· ····· ·
..... ..... ..... ····· ..... ····· ..... 
..... ..... .....t..... ····• ····· ···· ·
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is/was strongly English <2> is/are very Asian in their way/s and 
in my/their ways keep/s away from English customs 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
Meoas I am now 
0 
Person in the 1...:::;m1m:�ity I admire 
0 
JKLF ..... ..... ..... ..... ····· ····· ····· 
0 
Me as I was when I was in 
Azad Kashmir 
0 
Mosque Noor 
0 
Kashmiri biraderi 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children born and 
brought up in Azad Kashmir 
0 
Young English men in Luton .... ..... ..... .....t..... ...... ...... 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
My children born and 
brought up in the UK 
0 
Luton Islamic Society ..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 
Madina Mosque 
0 
Jamia Masjid 
0 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare 
Association ••n••••••••••••• ••••• •••••••••••••u• 
Muslim Conference ..... ..... ..... ..... •·••· ····· ····· 
Young Asian men in Luton ..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 
John Major 
0 
0 
British media 
Narasimha Rao ........... u .... ...... .............. .. . 
0 
My Parents ..... ..... .....t..... ····· ····· ··--· 
0 
Benazir Bhutto ..... ..... .....t.....t..... ..... ..... 
0 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
Luton University ..... ..... ..... ..... ····· ····· ···--
Kashmiri Music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
j �t.v -'f .;,w L�.j 0( ( !.J'.d ✓ tJ.1 /11'1 ¾.t:; � /4 �/.J.r'-f fs:, -
�£ij , t �:; '1/ '{; '4, C[L.::tZJ iV� - w / c.f / 7 -
is/was/are strongly Pakistani in their <3> is/was /are strongly Kashmiri in their 
attitudes and customs and see Kashmiri everyday lives and regard Kashmiri attitudes 
and customs as different from Pakistanis 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... ····· ..... 
..... ..... .....t.....t.... ·. ·· ·· ····· 
..... ..... ..... 
..... ..... ..... ···· ····· · ···· ····· • 
..... ..... .....t.....t..... ····· ..... 
the same as Pakistani 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3  
Me as l am now •••••••H••••••••  •hoo """"•••••• ••••• 
0 
Personin the community l admire ..... ..... ..... ····· ····· ·····t··--· 
0 
JKLF 
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare 
Association 
0 
Muslim Conference ..... ..... ..... ····· ..... ..... .... . 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton ····· ..... ..... .... . 
0 
John Major ..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 
British media .. u . .....•.....• .....• ..... ••••• ••••• 
Narasimha Rao 
0 
My Parents ..... ..... .....t..... ····· ·····t····· 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
0 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir ... • • .• • • • •  • • • • •  ••••• • • • • •  • • • • •  o u o •  
Luton University ····· · ... . o .· 
Kashmiri Music 
0 
••o••••••• • • • • •  ••••• " """  • • • • •  ••••• Me as I would like to be 
Me as I was when I was in 
Azad Kashmir 
Mosque Noor 
Kashmiri biraderi 
Young English women in Luton 
My children born and 
brought up in Azad Kashmir 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
My children born and 
brought up in the UK 
Luton Islamic Society 
Madina Mosque 
Jamia Masjid 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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0 
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0 
0 
speak/s English only because it is <4 > speaks English to become fully 
necessary for employment and integrated into English society 
living in the UK 
Meoasoloamonow 
Person in the s;ommunity I .admire 
JKLF 
Me as I was when I was in 
Azad Kashmir 
Mosque Noor 
Kashmiri biraderi 
Young English women in Luton 
My children born and 
brought up in Azad Kashmir 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
My children born and 
brought up in the UK 
Luton Islamic Society 
Madina Mosque 
Jamia Masjid 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare 
Association 
Muslim Conference 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Narasimha Rao 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
Luton University 
Kashmiri Music 
Me as I would like to be 
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Appendix 10.1 Chi - Square calculations 
Factors important for living in current area 
(al Emi.!!ded contin1en£I table 
X 
Degrees of ereference 
N ;! l ! Total 
Closeness to own society Young 25 8 0 0 0 33 
Old 27 10 0 0 0 37 
52 18 0 0 0 70 
Closeness to schools with Young 25 8 0 0 0 
Kashmiri / Muslim children Old 20 17  0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 70 
Closeness to relatives Young 10 0 0 0 
Old 3 1  6 0 0 0 
54 16 0 0 0 70 
Closeness to Asian shops Young 22 1 1  0 0 0 33 
Old 22 15  0 0 0 
44 26 0 0 0 70 
Closeness to services such Young 27 6 0 0 0 
as mosques and community centres Old 33 4 0 0 0 37 
60 10 0 0 0 70 
(b) Exl!ected freguencies Degrees of ereference 
X N ;! l ! Total 
Closeness to own society Young 24.5 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 
Old 27.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 
52.0 18.0 o.o o.o 0.0 70.0 
Closeness to schools with Young 21 .2 1 1 .8 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 
Kashmiri / Muslim children Old 23.8 13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 
45.0 25.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 70.0 
Closeness to relatives Young 25.5 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 
Old 28.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 
54.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 
Closeness to Asian shops Young 20.7 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 
Old 23.3 13.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 
44.0 26.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 
Closeness to services such Young 28.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 
as mosques and community centres Old 31 .7 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 
60.0 10.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 70.0 
(cl Chi-sguared values Degrees of ereference 
X N ;! l ! Total 
Closeness to own society Young 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Old 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
Closeness to schools with Young 0.68 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.90 
Kashmiri / Muslim children Old 0.60 1 .08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.68 
1.28 2.30 0.00 0.00 o.oo 3.58 
Closeness to relatives Young 0.24 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 t.04 
Old 0.21 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.92 
1.51 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 1.96 
Closeness to Asian shops Young 0.08 0. 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 
Old 0.07 0. 1 1  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 
0.15 0,24 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.39 
Closeness to services such Young 0.06 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 
as mosques and community centres Old 0,05 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 
0.11 0,66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 
HYJ)othesis 
Ho = variables are independent 
Degrees of freedom = l  
Significance level = 0.05 
Chi-squared value = 3.84 
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0 
0 
0 
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····· ····· ····· 
0 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
0 
Luton University 
0 
0 
Bangra music 
Mc as r would l ike to be ····· ····· ····· .....t..... ..... .... . 
{) 
,. ... ..... ..... ... . ·····t···•· ·•··· 
····· ·•··· ····• ..... ····· ····· ····· 
feel/s that a Kashmiri should only <18> believe/s that Kashmiris should be able to 
many a Kashmiri marry non Kashmiris 
3 2 1 0 1 2 3  
Me as l am now 
0 
Person in the community l admire 
0 
JKLF 
0 
Me as l was wh<>!'l I left !;Choo! 
0 
Mosque Noor 
0 
Kashmiri biraderi 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children to be born in the future 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community l dislike 
0 
0
.
Apachi Indian .o .. ...... ..... ..... ..... ..... .... . 
Luton Islamic Society ...... ..... ........... 
0 
····· ····· ····· 
0 
Madina Mosque 
0 
Jamia Masjid 
0 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
0 
Pakistan/ Kashmir Welfare 
Association ..... ..... .....t..... ..... ..... ..... 
0 
Muslim Conference ··•·· ····· ··•·· ..... ..... ..... .... . 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media •···· ····· ····· ........... .... . .... . 
Narasimha Rao ..... ..... ...... ...... ····· ····· ····· .0 ..t ...tMy Parents ····· ····· --..· ..... .. .. ...t . .. . 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
0 
Luton University ..... ..... ...... ........... ...... ....... ..t 0 ...t.t ..Bangra music ..... ..... .t...t .... ..... ..t . ....t
0 
................... # ..... ...... ................... . Mc as I would like to be 
. . .  ··. .. .. .. . . ... .. . . . · ··· ··· · ·· ·· ·
0 _ .... .. . 
feel/s more at home in Kashmir <19> feel/s more at home in Britain. 
Mc as l oam now 
Person in the community I admire 
JKLF 
Me as I was when r left school 
Mosque Noor 
Kashmiri biraderi 
Young English women in Luton 
My children to be born in the future 
Young English men in Luton 
Luton Islamic Society 
Madina Mosque 
Jamia Masjid 
Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir 
YoungAsian women in Luton 
Pakistan/Kashmir Welfare 
Association 
Muslim Conference 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Narasimha Rao 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
Luton University 
Bangra music 
3 2 1 0 1 2 3  
..... ····· ·· ··• ..... ..... ..... .... . 
0 
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0 
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Apachi Indian 
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Mc as I would like to be 
· ····t··· · · ····· 
····· ····· ····· ..... ·····t····· ··· · · 
···· ..... ····· ····· · · ·· · ·· ·· ····· ··
want/s the younger generation to think of <20> believe/s that the younger generation should Kashmir as their homeland think of Britain as their homeland 
Me as I am now 
Person in the community I admire 
J KLF 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosque Noor 
Kashmiri biraderi 
Young English women in Luton 
My children to be born in the future 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Apachi Indian 
Luton Islamic Society 
J amia Masjid 
Kashrniris in Azad Kashmir 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Pakistan/ Kashmir Wel fare 
Association 
Muslim Conference 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Narasirnha Rao 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
..... . .... ..... ·· · ·  ··· ·· · ··· · ·"'' ·t
..... .....o.....o..... · ····t····· ····· 
Madina Mosque ..... .....o.....o... . . 
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0 
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Kashmiris in Indian 
occupied Kashmir 
Luton University ...... .....o.....o.... . ·····t
0 
() 
····· · ···· 
Bangra music 
Mc as ! would l ike to be 
····· ··:·· ····· .. ii' · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Appendix 4.3 Anglo-Saxon identity instrument COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY OF THE KASHMIR! COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IDENTITY STRUCTURE INSTRUMENT NASREEN ALI UNIVERSITY OF LUTON 
.......... ;. ... � ....... -..-
---- ------
I 
Meas l am now 
Pierson in thecommunity I admire 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
'4e as I was when l left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young Englishwomenin Luton 
My dlildren 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Anny 
Anglican Church 
Roman CatholicOlurch 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women inLuton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
I have wann <l> I don't liJ�e at all 
feelings towards 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
.....__.. ............. __
0 __..______ _ _ _ 
___ ...,__ ·-0 .....---
-----...,. -----
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__.,.. ___ _. ___ _
____ .... ____ _ 
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____ .,,. ___ _ 
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is/was strongly English <2> is/are very European in my/their ways and 
in my/their ways keep/s away from English customs 
Me as I am now 
Person in tile community I admire 
The idea ot �ottish Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Anny 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Church 
Kashnuris in Britain 
YoungAsian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
YoungAsian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Oelors 
My Parents 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
0 
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0 
0 ..... .... '" ··-· ........... ..... .... . 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
is/was/are strongly British in their <3> is/was/are strongly English in their 
attitudes and customs and see British everyday life and regard English attitudes 
as the same a English and customs to be different from British 
Me as l am now 
Person in t"'.� con-�unity I admire 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community l dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Church 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
is/was/are not at all integrated <4> is/was/are strongly integrated 
into British society into British society 
Me as loam now 
Person in,the community I admire 
The idea oi Scottish Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Oturch 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
····· ··•·• ····· ........... ..... .... . 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
..... OffH •••·• •• �. Offff ..... HOH 
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0 
0 
0 
0 ..... ..... ··-· ·-·· ···- ..,; ..... 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
considers the English language <5> believe/seit is not an important part of heritage 
valuable part of heritage 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
Meoas l am now 
0 
Person in the community I admire 
0 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Oturch ····· ····· -· .. ··o ····· ·-·· ····· 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media 
0 
Jacques Oelors 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
believe/s that traditional systems of arranged <6> believe/s that in today's society it is better to 
marriage are fundamental to being Asian have the &eedom to choose one's own maniage 
partner 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
Me as I am now 
0 
Person i(I the community I admire 
0 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques ···-····· ··-· . ·-..t.......... ....... .... . 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Church 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media 
0 
Jacques Delores 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
believe/s that parents/elders should be <1> feel/s that parents/elders should be treated 
treated with special deference as equals and have to earn special respect 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
Meoas I am now 
Person in the community I admire ..... ·-··--· .... 0 � ·-- ·-·· ··-· 
0 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Church 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media 
0 
Jacques Delors 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation ····· ·-·· ····· ...,.. ····· ·-··· ···· 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
feel/s that the Kashmir issue should <8> think/s that external international intervention 
be resolved internally is necessary 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
Meoas l oam now 
0 
Person in the community I admire 
0 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Anny 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
RomanCatholicCllurch 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British meqia 
0 
Jacques Oelors 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
believes and respects family honour <9>think/s that doing the right thing 
above all else according to one's own sense of 
morality is more important than family honour 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
Me as I am now 
0 
Person in th: com1r.:.mity I admire 
0 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton .......... ................. ..... ..... 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross.cultural music 
0 
Salvation Anny 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Church 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major . 
0 
British media 
0 
Jacques Delors 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
feel/s deeply committed to <10> believe/s in the freedom for individuals to follow family networks their own independent life 
Me asol am now 
Person in the community I admire 
The idea o.-scottbn Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
YoungEnglish men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman catholic Church 
I<ashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Oelors 
My Parents 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
believe/s that in Britain people <11> feel/s that people should conform to 
should be able to wear what ever they want wearing Western style dress 
Me as I am now 
Person in the community I admire 
The idea of Scottish Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Anny 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Oturch 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
prefer/s the company of men <12> would spend time with men only at work or at 
in leisure time school/college/university 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
Meoasol amnow 
0 
Person in the community I admire 
0 
The idea otScottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Cllurch 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media 
0 
Jacques Delors 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
enjoy/s spending leisure time <13> prefer/s to mix with women only 
with women 
Meoas l oam now 
Person in the community I admire 
The idea o� 5cotti"'� Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children to be born in the future 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic O\urch 
I<ashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
JacqucsDelores 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
Ravemusic 
Mc as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0 o
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0, 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
at work or at school/college/university 
1 2 3 
feel/s that Muslims should <14> feel/s that Muslims should be able 
only marry a Muslim tomarry non Muslims 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
Me as l amonow 
0 
Person ii;t the community I admire 
0 
The idea oi Scoinsh Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Oturch 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media 
0 
Jack Delores 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
prefers to socialise with own <15> would socialise with any religious group 
religious group 
Me as I am now 
Person in t�e community I admire 
The idea of :,cottisn Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic C,urch 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Mc as I would like to. be 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
is/are strongly British and <16> is/are British but feel/s 
would be happy being anywhere a strong attachment to Luton 
in Britain 
Me as I am now 
Person in the community I admire 
The idea ot Scottish Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Church 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Bcnazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0 o
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 2 3 
feel/s happy with British <17> would feel happier with European 
nationality nationality 
Meoas l am now 
Person in the community I admire 
The idea of �-Cotti$� Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Anny 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Church 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jacques Delors 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
...- ..... ....... .,. 0 ... ...... ..... _.. . 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
feel/s that people should only <18> believe/s that people should be able to 
many within their own culture marry across cultures 
Measolamonow 
Person in the community I admire 
The idea <'� Scotti,;h Devolution 
Me as I was when I left school 
Mosques 
Family networks 
Young English women in Luton 
My children 
Young English men in Luton 
Person in the community I dislike 
Cross-cultural music 
Salvation Army 
Anglican Church 
Roman Catholic Oturch 
Kashmiris in Britain 
Young Asian women in Luton 
Asian community organisations 
Conservative Party 
Young Asian men in Luton 
John Major 
British media 
Jack Delores 
My Parents 
Benazir Bhutto 
The Kashmir situation 
Luton University 
English music 
Me as I would like to be 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
0 ..... ..... ....... ........... ··•·· ..... 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
feel/s more at home living in Britain <19> feel/s at home living anywhere 
3 2 1 0  1 2 3 
Me as I am now 
0 
Person in the community I admire 
0 
The idea. of Scottish Devolution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton 
0 
Person in the conununity I dislike 
0 
Cross--cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman catholic Church 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men in Luton ·-- ·--·· ····· ....... ...... ..... .. -
0 
John Major 
0 
British m�ia 
0 
Jacques Oelors 
0 
My Parents 
0 
Benazir Bhutto 
0 
The Kashmir situation 
0 
Luton University 
0 
English music 
0 
Me as I would like to be 
0 
believe/s that the Kashmiri community4»feel/s that the Kashmiri community should want 
wants the younger generation to think the younger generation to think of Britain 
of Kashmir as their homeland as their homeland 
3 2 1 0 o1 2 3 
Me as I am now 
0 
Person in the communityI admire 
0 
The idea ofS�i,ttish �volution 
0 
Me as I was when I left school 
0 
Mosques 
0 
Family networks 
0 
Young English women in Luton 
0 
My children 
0 
Young English men in Luton ..... ..... .............. ..... ..... ..... 
0 
Person in the community I dislike 
0 
Cross-cultural music 
0 
Salvation Army 
0 
Anglican Church 
0 
Roman Catholic Church 
0 
Kashmiris in Britain 
0 
Young Asian women in Luton 
0 
Asian community organisations 
0 
Conservative Party 
0 
Young Asian men iri Luton 
0 
John Major 
0 
British media 
0 
Jacques Delors 
0
My Parents 
0
Benazir Bhutto 
0
The Kashmir situation 
0
Luton University 
0
English music 
0 
Me as l would like to be 
0 
ANY OTHER COMMENTS 
52 70 37 70 45 37 70 33 33 37 70 8.5 7.5 8.5 4.7 5.3 Appendix 10.1 Chio- Square calculations Factors important for living in current area (a} Extended contin:ena table Degrees of ereference Closeness to own society Young y25 N 8 ;!, 0 a. 0 ! 0 Total 33 Old 27 10 0 0 0 37 18 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 33Young 25Closeness to schools with Old 20 17 0 0 0Kashmiri / Muslim children 25 0 0 0 0 0 33Closeness to relatives Young 23 10 0 Old 3 1  6 0 0 0 54 16 0 0 0 Closeness to Asian shops Young 22 1 1  0 0 0 Old 22 15  0 0 0 37 44 26 0 0 0 70 Closeness to services such Young 27 6 0 0 0 as mosques and community centres Old 33 4 0 0 0 60 10 0 0 0 (!!) ExJ!e£!:ed freguencies Degrees of ereference y N ;!, l 24.5 ! I!!!!! Closeness to own society Young 0.0 0.0 33.00.0 Old 27.5 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 52.0 18.0 o.o o.o 0.0 70.0 Closeness to schools with Young 21 .2 1 1 .8 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 Kasluniri / Muslim children Old 23.8 13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 45.0 25.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 70.0 Closeness to relatives 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0Young 25.5 Old 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.028.5 54.0 16.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 70.0 Closeness to Asian shops Young 20.7 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.0 Old 23.3 13.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.0 44.0 26.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 70.0 Closeness to services such Young 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.028.3 as mosques and community centres Old 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.03 1.7 60.0 10.0 o.o o.o 0.0 70.0 (c} Chi-sguared values Closeness to own society Closeness to schools with Kasluniri I Muslim children Young Old Young Old y0.01 0.01 0.02 0.68 0.60 
1.28 
Degrees of ereference 
N ;!, l ! 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 o.oo o.oo 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 0.04 0.03 0.07 1.90 1.68 3.58 Closeness to relatives Young Old 0.24 0.21 0.80 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 0.92 Closeness to Asian shops Closeness to services such as mosques and community centres Old Young Old Young 0.45 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.11 1.51 0.13 0. 1 1  0.24 0.35 0.3 1 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.96 0.21 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.77 HV11othesis Ho = variables are independent Degrees of freedom = 1 Significance level = 0.05 Chi-squared value = 3.84 
70 
19 
45 
37 
19 
4.3 
Appendix 10.2 Chi - Square calculations 
Factors important for living in future area 
(a) E!!!l!!dtd contini:eno: table Degrees of 2reference 
y N J ! ! I!!!!! 
aoseness to own society Young 40 1 1  0 0 0 51 
Old 14 5 0 0 0 19 
54 16 0 0 0 70 
Closeness to schools wlth Young 30 21 0 0 0 51 
Kashmiri / Muslim children Old 14 5 0 0 0 19 
44 26 0 0 0 
35 16 0 0 0aoseness to relatives 51Young 
Old 1 0  9 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 70 
Closeness to Asian shops 14 0 0 0Young 51 
Old 15  4 0 0 0 
52 18 0 0 0 70 
aoseness to services such Young 41 10 0 0 0 51 
as mosques and community centres Old 12 7 0 0 0 19 
53 17 0 0 0 70 
(!!) Exeected freguencies Degrees of 2reference 
y N ;! ! ! Total 
aoseness to own society Young 39.3 1 1 .7 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.0 
Old 14.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 
54.0 16.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 
aoseness to schools wlth Young 32.1 18.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.0 
Kashmiri I Muslim children Old 1 1 .9 7 . 1  0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 
44.0 26.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 70.0 
aoseness to relatives Young 32.8 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.0 
Old 12.2 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 
45.0 25.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 70.0 
Closeness to Asian shops Young 37.9 13. 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.0 
Old 14.l 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 
52.0 18.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 70.0 
aoseness to services such Young 38.6 12.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.0 
as mosques and community centres Old 14.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 
53.0 17.0 o.o 0.0 o.o 70.0 
(c) Chi-sgl!!red values Degrees of 2reference 
Closeness to own society Young 
y
0.01 
N 
0.04 
J 
0.00 
! 
0.00 
l 
0.00 
I!!!!! 
0.05 
Old 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
0.04 0.14 o.oo 0.00 0.00 0.18 
Closeness to schools with Young 0.13 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 
Kashmiri / Muslim children Old 0.35 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 
0.48 0.82 0.00 o.oo 0.00 1.30 
Closeness to relatives Young 0. 1 5  0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 
Old 0.40 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 
0.55 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 
Closeness to Asian shops Young 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
Old 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 
0.08 0.22 o.oo 0.00 o.oo 0.30 
Closeness to services such Young 0.1 5  0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 
as mosques and community centres Old 0.40 1.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.63 
0.55 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.24 
Hveothe§Y! 
Ho = variables are independent 
Degrees of freedom = 1  
Significance level = 0.05 
Chi-squared value = 3.84 
--------------------·-�---------- ----------------------------------
--------------------------------- ----------------------------------
It is stressed that cut-off points are by their nature s01ewhat arbitrary. The 
subject to � as a result of over -inclusion, or oaission, of certain kinds of constructs or. 
entities, and to m.Qt as a result of rating-scale response failures. Caution should be exercised 1n 
Appendix 12.1 Scale ranges for ISA indices 
SCALE RANGES FOR ISA INDICES SUGGESTED CUT-OFF POINTS FOR 
DESIGNATING THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA 
INDEX RAlfGE CRITERION CUT-OFF POINT: 
APPROX. MAGNITUDE 
L EGO-INVOLVEMENT o.oo to 5.00 Very high: Above 4 .00 ' Low: Below 2 .00 
2 ,  EVALUATION -1 .00 to +1.00 Very high: Above 0.70 
( 1nor1alised1 ) Moderate: o . 30 to 0 .70 
& SELF ESTEEM Low: -0 .10 to 0.30 
Very low: Below -0,10 
••••••••-•••-•••••••••••••••••••• ••-••••••••••�••••••••••••r: •••u•• •• 
3 .  IDENTIFICATION & IDENTIFICATION CONFLICT INDICES 
IDENTITY o.oo to 1.00 High: Above 0.40 
DIFFUSIOH Moderate: 0.20 to 0.40 
r,ow: Below 0.20 
IDENTIFICATION o.oo to 1.00 Very high: Above 0.50 
CONFLICT High: 0 .35 to 0.50 
Moderat;,.: 0.20 to 0.35 
Low: Below 0.20 
IDEALISTIC· o.oo to 1.00 Bigh(+ve role) : Above 0.70 
IDENTIFICATION Low.: Below 0.50 
CONTRA• o.oo to 1.00 Higb(�ve role) :  Above 0.45 
IDENTIFICATION Low: Below 0.25 
EMPATHETIC o.oo to l.00 High: Above 0,70 
IDENTIFICJ.TIO!i Low: Below 0.50 
4 .  STRUCTURAL ·100 to +100 •corei evaluative)**** Above 80 
PRESSURE diaensions of )*** 70 to 79 
identity )** 60 to 69 
)* 50 to 59 
'Secondary• eval·)+++ 40 to 49 
uative dimensions)++ 30 to 39 
of identity )+ 20 to 29 
"Conflicted" , inconsist�tly, or non-, evaluative- · 
dimensions of identity: ·20 to +20 
Consisten�ly inco1patible evaluative dimensions: Large negative 
-------------1------------------- ------------------------------0�--
IMPORTANT NOTE: 
indices themselves should be regarded as esti1aj:es of the underlying para1eters, which may be 
their inter�!lli.QJl, 
ISA CLASSIFICATION OF IDENTITY VARIANTS 
IDENTITY DIFFUSION 
Diffusion Foreclosure 
Variants variants 
( indicating a ( indicating a 
tolerance of defensiveness 
high levels of against
identification identification 
conflicts ) conflicts ) 
High Moderate Low 
(0 . 40 to 1 . 00 )  (0 .20 to 0. 39) (0.00 to 0,19) 
SELF-EVALUATION 
-------------------
Positive High
variants (0.70 
to 1 .00) 
Diffuse 
high self-
regard 
Confident Defensive 
high self-
regard 
Moderate Diffusion Indeteninate Defensive 
(0 ,30 
to 0.69 )  
Negative Low 
variants ( ·l .00 
crisis Negative Defensive 
negative 
to 0.29) 
-----------------------------------------------·---------------------
NOTES (SEE IDEXPC USERGUIDE FOR ALTERNATIVE CUT-OFF POINTS)*  
1 .  This classification of identity variants is based solely upon the underlying para1eters of 
identity diffusion and self-eyalqation, and is therefore a global one that ignores individual 
characteristics indicated in detail by the full range of identity indices for the person. A 
person's identity variant classification will evidently vary over ti1e in accordance with 
biographical evolution. 
2 .  Because cut-off points are used with respect to underlying pargeters there is, of course, no 
hard and fast distinction between iuediately adjacent 1identity variants• in the 
classification. 
3. cut-off points are inevitably s01ewhat arbitrary, and the esti1ates of the underlying paraaeters 
are subject to error and bias, hence caution should be exercised in the interpretation of these 
identity variants. The cut-off points designated above should not be regarded as definitive,
but only indicative of gross qualitative differences between identity variants of polar 
contrasting kinds on the two para1eters in question. 
4. If two categories •confident• and "indeter1inate" are considered to represent well-adjusted 
identities, then the re1aining categories 1ay be designated vulnerable identities of various 
kinds. With the cut-off points indicated above, the degrees of identity vulnerabilities so 
designated will range fro1 the relatively 1ild ( likely to be experienced by everyone fro• time 
to time) to the more troubleso1e in accordance with the extremity of the underlying parameters •. 
* Revised cut-off points, based on statistical criteria for a sa1ple of 546 respondents, for self­
evaluation are 0.19 and 0 .81 ,  and for identity diffusion 0.25 and 0.41 , These 1ay be 
substituted for the default cut-off points indicated in the above Table (for self-evaluation 
0 .30 and 0 .70 ,  and identity diffusion 0.20 and 0,40 ) , 
GLOSSARY 
Alim, (pl. ulama) a learned scholar particularly in religious/Islamic thought. 
apna, ours 
baithak, front sitting room 
beti, daughter
betna-utna, the etiquette of socialising 
biraderi, literally brotherhood and/or kinship network 
chunda, alms collected from local community 
dupata, scarf_fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence 
Eid, religious festivals. 
Gar, foreign
Hadith, the sayings of the Prophet. 
ijtihad individual interpretation of lslamic fiqh 
izzat, honour 
jahil, ignorant (also the period before Islam) 
jihad, struggle in the name of God. 
jumma, Friday congregational prayers 
kafir, an unbeliever 
kacha, temporary (literally uncooked) 
khandani, lineage of extended family 
madrasa, schools for teaching religious education 
Pahari, Meaning literally mountain. The dialect of Punjabi spoken by many Kashmiris 
from Azad Kashmir 
pir, a leader of a Sufi order 
pukka, permanent (literally cooked) 
sawab, grace from God 
shalwar kameez, traditional South Asian trouser and top combination. 
Shia, the party of Ali, the second largest tradition within Islam. 
silsilah, the chain of spiritual descent reaching back to the Prophet 
Sunna, the customs and norms of the Prophet that Muslims should emulate. 
tangas, horse and cart 
tariqa, Sufi order 
Ummah, the global community of all Muslims. 
unpar, illiterate 
zaka.t, alms giving 
zimidars, landowner 
GLOSSERY OF ISA TERMS 
I. DEFINITIONS OF IDENTITY 
One's  identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one 
construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes 
oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the 
future. 
A. Ideal Self-image ( or ego-ideal) 
One's ideal self-image id defined as one' s  construal of "me as I would like to be" 
B. Positive values 
One's positive values are defined as those personal characteristics and guidelines for 
behaviour which one aspires to implement for oneself in accordance with one' s ideal 
self-image. 
C. Negative values (or contra-value) 
One's negative values are defined as the contrasts of one's positive values, that is, those 
characteristics and patterns of behaviour from which one would wish to dissociate 
D. Current Self-image 
One's current self-image is defined as one' s construal of "me as I am now" 
E. Past self-image 
One's past self-image id defined as one' s construal of "me as I used to be" 
II. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ROLE MODELS, AND POSITIVE AND 
NEGATIVE REFERENCE GROUPS 
A. Positive role model (and reference group) 
One's positive role model (reference group) is defined as some other person (group) 
constructed as having many of the attributes and values to which one aspires, that is, 
ones associated with one' s ideal self-image 
B. Negative role model (and reference group) 
One's negative role model (reference group) is defined as some other person (group) is 
defined as some other person (group) constructed as possessing many of the attributes 
and contra-values from which one wishes to dissociate, that is, one's aligned with one's 
contra-value system. 
m. IDENTIFICATION WITH ANOTHER OR WITH A GROUP 
A. Empathetic identification 
1. Current Identification (perceived similarity 
The extent of one's current identification with another is defined as the degree of 
similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other, whether "good" or "bad", and 
those of one's current self-image. 
2. Past identification (perceived similarity) 
The extent of one' s past identification with another is defined as the degree of similarity 
between the qualities one attributes to the other and those of one's past self-image. 
B. Role Model Identification 
1. Idealistic-identification (positive role model and reference group) 
The extent of one's idealistic identification with another is defined as the degree of 
similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those one would like to 
possess as part of one's ideal self-image. 
2.Contra-identification (negative role model and reference group) 
The extent of one's contra-identification with another is defined as the degree of 
similarity between the qualities one attributes to the other and those from which one 
would wish to dissociate. 
C. Identification conflicts and overall identity diffusion 
1. Identification conflicts with others 
In terms of one's current self-image the extent of one's identification conflict with 
another is defined as a multiplicative function of one's current and contra-identification 
with the other. 
A similar definition holds for identification conflicts in terms of one's past self-image. 
As one's current (past) and contra-identification with another simultaneously increase, 
so will one' s conflict in identification with that other become greater. 
2. Overall identity diffusion 
The degree of one's identity diffusion is defined as the overall dispersion of, and 
magnitude of, one' s identification conflicts with significant others. This may be assesses 
in relation both to one' s current to one's past self-images. 
IV. EVALUATION OF SELF AND OTHERS AND SELF ESTEEM 
A. Evaluation of another One's evaluation of another id defined as one's overall assessment of the other in terms of the positive and negative evaluative connotations of other in terms of the positive and negative evaluative connotations of the attributes one construes in that other, in accordance with one's value system. 
B. Evaluation of current (past) self One's evaluation of one's current (past) self is defined as one's overall self-assessment in terms of the positive and negative evaluative connotations of the attributes one construes as making up one's current (past) self-image, in accordance with one's  value system. 
C. self-esteem One's self-esteem is defined as one' s overall self-assessment in evaluative terms of the continuing relationship between one 's past and current self-images, in accordance with one' s value system. 
V. EGO-INVOLVEMENT WITH ENTITIES 
A. Ego-involvement with another One's  ego-involvement with another is defined as one' s overall responsiveness to the other in terms of the extensiveness both in quantity and in strength of the attributes one construes the other as possessing. 
B. Self •.involvement One's ego-involvement in oneself as one aspires to be (or as one is now, or as one was in the past) is defined as one's overall self-responsiveness in terms of the extensiveness both in quantity and in strength of the attributes of one's ideal self-image (or current self-image, or past self image). 
VI. STRUCTURAL PRESSURE ON CONSTRUCTS (CONSISTENCY OR 
STABILITY OF THEIR EVALUATIVE CONNOTATIONS) The structural pressure on one's construct is defined as the overall strength of the excess of compatibilities over incompatibilities between the evaluative connotations of attributes one makes to each entity by way of the one construct and one' s overall evaluation of each entity. 
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